ML19341C130
| ML19341C130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1980 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
| References | |
| LSO5-80-11-039, LSO5-80-11-39, NUDOCS 8103020089 | |
| Download: ML19341C130 (6) | |
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'p UNITED STATES
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7i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
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J{hQ Docx et No. 50-245 Plant Name: Millstone Unit No. 1 6
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TO ALL POWER REACTOR LICENSEES WITH PLANTS
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Gb LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,1979
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N s The Comission ::ublished on Novemoer 19,1980 (45 FR 76602), a revisec Section 10 CFR 50.28 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.28 and Aprendix R dill Decame effective February 17, 1981, wnich is 90 cays after puolication.
A ccpy of the Federal Recister Notice is enclosec (Encicsure 1).
Tne provisions of A:: endix R that are applicaole to the fire protection features of ycur f acility can be dividec into two categories. The f1rst categcry consists of tncse provisions of the Accendix that are recu1 red to be backfit in tneir entirety by ne new rale, regardless cf wnether or not alternatives to the specific requirements of these Sections have been previously accroved by the NRC staff. These recuirements are set forth in Sections III.G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability; III-J.
Emergency Lignting; and III-0, Oil r llection Systems for Reacter Ccolant o
Puro. The fire protection features Of your f acility must satisfy the soecific require-ents of these three Secticns by the dates established by Paragraon 50.tS(c), unless an exemption from the Appendix R requirements is acor0ved by the Comission. You shculd note the provisicns for tolling the time for comoleting tne mocifications required by these three Sections of Accendix R set fortn in Paragrapn 50.48(c)(6).
The second category of Accendix R provisions acclicable to the fire protection f eatures of your f acility consists of requirements concerning the *ocen" items of previcus NRC staff fire protection reviews of your facility. An open itt.m is defined as a fire protection feature tnat has not been previously approved by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Brancn Technical Position STP PCSB 9.5-1, as reflected in a staff fire protection safety evaluatien report. The fire protection features of ycur facility that are in this category must satisfy the specific recuirements of Apoendix R oy the cates established by Paragrapn 50.48(c), unless an exe t:-
tion from the Apcendix R requirements on those features is acoroved by tne Commi s sion. is a summary listing of the caen items concerning the fire protection features of your f acility based on a review of our recorcs. Also included is cur cos1-icn en the scecific recuirements that must ce satisfied in orcer to resolve these ::en items.
If you nave any cuestiens er :isagree-ments with this e1ciosure, : lease advise us within 30 days of your recei::: of this letter.
810302006 F
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Witn regarc to tne fire protection modifications nat nave Deen prev 1cusly approved by the '4RC staff, Paragraon 50.48(o) specifies a new senedule for j
- neir completien.
Tnis paragraph, wnen it cec:mes effective, will supersede the currently affective section of the regula:1cns nat temocrarily suspencs completion dates for previcusly approved fire protection modifications that j
are given in f acility license conditions (45 FR 71569, Octocer 29,19e0).
The Connission expects that all such modifications will be completea in accordance with this new schedule, unless an extension has been requested and granted by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
[see Paragraoh 50.48(d)], or an exemotion nas been requested and grantec by the Commission pursuant to Section 50.12 of the Commissicn's regulations.
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If you have previcusly requested extensions of dates for comple:1on of J
modifications that are required by license conditions for your facility
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which were not acoroved, and ycu have determined that these extensions are l
still necessary and justifiable, it will be necessary for you to reaccly for any such extensions in accordance witn :ne provisions of Paragrapn 50.48(d).
I All requests for Commission action resulting from this rule are subject to the schedule of fees specified in 10 CFR 170.21.
If you have any questions concerning the subject matters of this letter, please contact the NRC Project Manager for your f acility.
Sincerely, i
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F', Darrell G. Eisenhut Director
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Division of Licensing j
Office nf Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Notice. Fire Protecticn 1
i Rule 2.
Summary of Staf t Require-l ments to Resolve Open Items cc w/ enclosures:
l See next page t
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o Mr. W. G. Counsil November 24, 1980 cc w/ enclosures:
William H. Cuddy, Esquire Connecticut Energy Agency Day, Berry & Howard ATTN: Assistant Di'ector i
Counselors at Law Research arJ Policy One Constitution Plaza Development Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Department of Planning and Energy Policy Natural Resources Defense Council 20 Grand Street 91715th Street, N. W.
Hartferd Connecticut 06106 Washington, D. C.
20005 Director, Criteria and Standards Di vision Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Office of Radiation Progracs ATTN: Superintendent (ANR-460)
Millstone Plant U. S. Environmental Protection P. O. Box 128 Agency Waterf ord, Connecticut 06385 Washington, D. C.
20460 Mr. J ames R. Himmelwright U. S. Environmental Protection Northeast Utilities Service C;mpany Agency P. O. Box 270 Region 1 Office Hartford, Connecticut 06101 ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federai Building Resident Inspector Boston, Massachusetts 02203 c/o V. S. NRC P. O. Box Drawer KK Niantic, Connecticut 06357 l
Waterford Public Library Rope Ferry Road, Route 156 Waterford, Connecticut 06385 First Selectman of the Town of Waterford Hall of Records 200 Boston Post Road Waterford, Connec*.it at 06385 John F. Opeka Systens Superintendent Northeast Utilities Service Cocpany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 i
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
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November 25, 1980 TO ALL POWER REACTOR LICENSEES WITH PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,1979 The Federal Register Notice enclosed with my letter dated November 24, 1980 has a typographical error in the effective date. The effective date should be February 17, 1981. A correction wil's e Dublished in the Federal Register in the near future.
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Darrell G. Eisenhut Director g
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l ENCLOSURE 2 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO 1 l
SUMMARY
OF STAFF REQUIREMENTS TO l
RESOLVE OpEN ITEMS l
3.1.14 Auxiliary Soiler Blast Wall In the SER, it was our concern that an explosion in the auxiliary boiler room could affect the emergency diesel generator located in an adjacent room.
The auxiliary boiler roan and diesel generator room are separated by a 12-inch block wall.
By letter dated January 24, 1980, the licensee indicated that based on the manufacturer's experience, type of failure expected free a cylindrical type vessel'(end failure), orientaticn of the boilers, and the nature of the potential explosion, they conclude that the existing wall provides sufficient protection to the emergency diesel generater.
In our evaluation, dated May 9, 1980, we informed the licensee that there was insufficient technical justifica-tion to assure that the existing 12-inch block wall could withstand an explosien involving the auxiliary boiler.
By letter dated September 25, 1980, the licensee provided additional infomation regarding the wall between the auxiliary boiler room and diesel generator room (nerth wall of auxiliary boiler room). The auxiliary boiler room is a reinforced 12-inch block wall designed to withstand a tornado wind of 300 mph (185 psf). Additionally, the licensee indicated that the scuth and west walls are S-inch, ocn-reinforced block walls. The south wall has three fixed cpen vents to provide pressure relief venting. Therefore, in the event of an auxiliary boiler explcsion, the south and west walls would provide relief venting either through open venting er through failure of the 8-inch, ncn-reinforced block walls.
Based cn our review we conclude that the license 2 has not demonstrated that the blast wall has sufficient structural integrity such that it would not allow an explosien in the auxiliary boiler roan to affect the emergency gener-ator room.* To demonstrate this, the licensee should provide the following:
1.
The overpressure that can be expected to impinge en the blast wall in the event of a boiler explosion. This would probably be greater than the tornado wind design overpressure of 185 psf (1.28 psi).
2.
The overpressure the blast wall can withstand without collapse or causing blast generated missiles from the block wall or from boiler debris to enter the emergency diesel generator room. Account should be taken of material prcperties, edge supports, wall geometry and sizes, etc.
3.
A ccmparison of the two overpressures frem (1) & (2) above shculd be made to show that the blast wall has sufficient capability to protect the emergency diesel generator.
'Also see our letter dated Septemcer'29,1980
s If this cannot be demonstrated to meet the requirements of Section III.G of the proposed Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the licensee should construct the block wall as originally connitted.
3.1.19 Safe Shutdown Modifications In the Millstone Unit 1 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, it was our concern that in certain areas such as cable spreading room, redundant systems required for safe shutdown could be damaged by fires.
The licensee proposed to provide alternative shutdown capability inde-pendent of these areas by the following modifications:
(1) Redundant power and control cables connected to an independent essential power source will be provided for the operation of the isolation condenser valves located inside the primary containment.
(2) Transfer switches and local control switches will be installed to insure that at least one control rod drive pump remains in operation.
The control and power cables for one pump will be rerouted.
(3) Transfer switches and local control switches will be installed to insure that at least one shutdown cooling pump remains in operation.
(4) Redundant power and control cables. connected to an independent essential pcner source wi1Lbe.provided for the operation of the shutdown cooling isolation valve located in the primary containment.
(5) Transfer switches and local control switches will be installed to insure that at least one reactor building component cooling water cump remains in operation.
(6) Transfer switches and local control switches will be installed to insure that at least one service water pump remains in operation.
The.SER also stated that "the licensee requested during a telephone conversation on Septemaer 20, 1978, a delay in the implementation of the safe shutdown modifications until the impact, if any, from the Systematic Evaluation Program review can be assessed. We will consider this request and following discussions with the licensee, if any changes to these modifications or their scheduled completion.results, a license amendment will be required and a supporting safety evaluation providing justification for the changes will be issued."
The licensee's request for a license amendment and.information regarding these modifications or schedule has not been received. Therefore, all modifications should be completed before 1980 refueling outage.
Recently we issued a proposed change to 10 CFR Part 50 that would re-quire such modifications to be catpleted by a specific date.
-3 To meet our fire protection guidelines, alternative shutdown capability should be provided when safe shutdown cannot be ensured by fire barriers and detection and suppression systems because of the exposure of com-ponents in a single fire area to an exposure fire, fire suppression activities, rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.
To meet Section III Paragraph G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, the licensee should provide alternative shutdown capability for the following areas of the plant:
1.
Cable spreading area 2.
Other areas identified in the licensee's fire hazards analysis where redundant systems required for safe shutdown could be damaged by fire.
The proposed alternative shutdown system should meet the requirements of Section III Paragraph L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
6.0 Administrative Controls - Fire Brigade In the Millstone 1 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, it was our concern that the licensee's fire brigade was not sized, drilled, and trainad sufficiently to provide assurance that the manual fire suppres-sion capability would be adequate.
By letter dated September 27, 1979, the licensee provided a document entitled " Justification For Three-Man Fire Brigade." The licensee concludes that a three-man fire brigade can adequately extinguish or control any fire to assure safe plant operation, achieve safe shutdown, and minimize radioactive release of the environment.
Further, by letter dated July ll,1979, the licensee proposed.to provide annual classroom training and quarterly drills. However, the licensee concludes that ensuring all brigade members participate in one drill per quarter is not necessary to ensure an effective fire brigade response.
In our letter dated September 7,1979, we provided the licensee our report entitled " Evaluation of Minimum Fire Brigade Shift Size" (dated.
June 8,1978) in which we conclude all operating plant. sites should have an onsite fire brigade shift complement of at least five trained persons.
In addition, we provided our position regarding fire brigade training and drills which concluce that classroom training and drills should be held every 3 months fer all fire brigade memcers.
The fire brigade size and training program should meet the requirements of Section III, Paragraons H and I of the Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
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