ML19341B777

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Second Interim Deficiency Rept Re Inadequate Welds Joining Embedded Pipe Sleeves & End Plates,Initially Reported on 801024.Sleeves Will Be Reworked & Weld Insp Documentation Upgraded.Final Rept on 810515
ML19341B777
Person / Time
Site: Phipps Bend  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/20/1981
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-PBNP-160, NUDOCS 8102270486
Download: ML19341B777 (3)


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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A. TENNESSEE 374ot 400 Chestnut Street Tower II February 20, 1981 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Mar!7tta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - INADEQUATE WELDS ON EMBEDDED PIPE SLEEVES TO PLATES (NCR PBNP-160 AND AUDIT PB-0-80-14 DEFICIENCY NO. 2)

Initial notification of the subject deficiency was made to NRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector R. W. Wright 9n October 24, 1980. The first interim report was submitted on November 24, 1980. In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the second interim report on the subject deficiency. TVA anticipates transmitting the final report on or before May 15, 1981. If you have any questions regarding this subject, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY lN h C. M. Mills, Manager P%

l Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure) e j , ce Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 /[f , f g

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ENCLOSURE PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT INADECUATE WELDS ON EMBEDDED PIPE SLEEVES TO PLATES STRUCTURAL WELDING DEFICIENCIES 10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO. 2 (INTERIM)

NCR PBN-160 AND AUDIT PB-G-80-14 DEFICIENCY NO. 2 On October 24, 1980, TVA informed NRC-0IE Region II, Inspector R. W.

Wright, of a potentially reportable condition regarding welds joining embedded pipe sleeves and end plates (at penetration surface) at the Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant. He was also informed on December 2, 1980, of the addition of concerns about docur.entation of welds made en structural frames. This is tk.e second interim report on the subject rep'cetable condition under 10CFR50.55(e). The final report will be filed en or before May 15, 1981.

Description of Deficiency Investigations have disclosed deficiencies in the AWS structural welding program at Phipps Send Nuclear Plant. The structural welding deficiencies are grouped into two =ain concerns as follows: (I)

A major portion of pipe sleeves which had a complete penetration weld specified between the end plate and pipe and which were fabricated befare October 24, 1980, for the auxiliary, fuel, and reacter buildings were welded usir.t a partial penetration joint detail.

Sleeve types are 2, 3, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15,16, and 17; and (II) for embedded structural frames, lates, and sleeves fabricated before October 24, 1980, weld inspection documentation was ince=plete. This condition is applicable to a rajor portien of these items.

This breakdown of the structural welding program is attributed to the following causes:

1. Failure to adhere to the weld requirements as specified in the shop fabrication sketches and process documents.
2. Acceptance by CC-Welding inspectors of welds made under Cause 1.

3 In sc=e cases, a co=plete engineering review was not given to the process documents.

4 In some cases, partial penetration welding procedures were specified in error although the correct weld joint geometry was specified en the shop fabrication sketches.

5. Failure of CC Welding personnel to cceplete and review welding $

documentatien for those ite=s under concern (II).

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Correct 1"ve Action For concern (I), the subject sleeves have been or are being reworked to effect compliance with design requirements. Alternate joint geometries resulting in ecmplete penetration welds were submitted to and approved by the technical engineer. All rework is being controlled using the weld monitor program.

Fce concern (II), acceptable documentation is beie.g generated by (a) verification of previous inspections, and (b) physical reinspection.

Items which are not accessible for verification or complete reinspection will be handled en a case-by-case basis with the technical engineer.

Our actions to prevent recurrence are being developed and will be provided in the final report on this =atter which will be submitted on or by May 15, 1981.

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