ML19340E338

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Requests Info Re SEP Topic IV-2,reactivity Control Sys Design & Protection Against Single Failures.Info Should Be Provided within 90 Days of Receipt of Ltr
ML19340E338
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1980
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Linder F
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
References
TASK-04-02, TASK-4-2, TASK-RR LSO5-80-12-020, LSO5-80-12-20, NUDOCS 8101140077
Download: ML19340E338 (4)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20556 ner 1519 0 Docket No. 50-409 LS05-80-12-020 Mr. Frank Linder General Manager Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue South Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601

Dear Mr. Linder:

RE: LACROSSE - SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS DESIGN AND PROTECTION AGAINST SINGLE FAILURES The enclosed request for information has been prepared by the staff as a part of our review of SEP Topic IV-2.

Please provide the requested information within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield,[hief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Request for Information on SEP Topic IV-2 cc w/ enclosure:

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Mr. Frank Lindar LA CROFSE BOILING WATER REACTOR DOCLET NO. 50-409 i

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Fritz Schubert, Esquire Director, Technical Assessment Staff Attorney Division Dairyland Power Cooperative Office of Radiation Programs 2615 Ea',t Avenue South (AW-459)

La Cro',se, Wisconsin 54601 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency O. S. Heistand, J r., Esquire Crystal Mall #2 j

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Arlington, Virginia 20460 1800 M Street, N. W.

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Washington, D. C.

20036 U. S. Environmental Protection l

Agency Mr. R. E. Shimshak Federal Activities Branch

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La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Region V Offic's Dairyland Power Cooperative ATTN:

EIS C0' RDINATOR J

l P. O. Box 135 230 South Drarborn Street Genoa, Wisconsin 54'12 Chicago, Jilinois 60604 Coulee Region Energy Coalition Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman ATTN: George R. Nygaard Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P. O. Box 1583 C. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 washington, D. C.

20555 La Crosse Public Library Dr. George C. Anderson l

800 Main Street Department of Oceanography l

La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 University of Washington l

Seattle, Washington 98195 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Resident Inspectors Office Mr. Ralph S. Decker Rural Route #1, Box 225 Route 4, Box 1900 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Cambridge, Maryland 21613 l

Town Chairman Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Town of Genoa Kendal at Longwood, Apt. 51 Route 1 Kenneth Square, Pennsylvania 19348 l

Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Thomas ! Moore l

Chairman, Public Service Comission Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board of Wisconsin U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Hill Farms State Office Building Washington, D. C.

20555 i

l Madison, Wisconsin 53702 Ms. Anne K. Morse Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman Coulee Region Energy Coalition Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Post Office Box 1583 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601 Washington, D. C.

20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Mr. Frederick Milton Olsen, III Resident Inspectors Office 609 North lith Street Rural Route #1, Box 225 l

Lacrosse, Wisconsin Genoa, Wisconsin 54632

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ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION SEP TOPIC IV-2 General Design Criterion 25 requires that the reactor protection system be designed to assure that specified acceptable fuel damage limits are not exceeded in the event of any single failure of the reactivity control systems, such as accidential rod withdrawals.

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l 1.

Describe the single failures within systems used for reactivity control which can:

a) Cause an inadvertent reactivity insertion.

b) Cause a single or combination of rods to be positioned in other than the design sequence.

For PWRs this should include consideration of single rod withdrawal / insertions which can result from a single equipment component failure.

2.

Delineate those design features which limit reactivity insertion rates and rod malpositions resulting from a single failure.

Provide the appropriate circuit schematics showing these design features.

3.

Provide or reference appropriate analyses to demonstrate that specified acceptable fuel damage limits am not exceeded in the event of any of the single failures 16ntified in Item 1 above.

4.

Identify the operating procedures, alarms, interlocks, or protection system actions which must be used in limiting the consequences following a single failure within systems used for reactivity control. Where equipment actions are required, indicate whether the equipment meets the' criteria of IEEE-279.

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