ML19340D993

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Forwards IE Info Notice 80-45, Potential Failure of BWR Backup Manual Scram Capability. No Response Required
ML19340D993
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/17/1980
From: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Pasternak R
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
References
NUDOCS 8101060116
Download: ML19340D993 (1)


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G LE N E LLYN. ILUNO15 600 7 ocrsi neo Those on Attached Address Listing:

Enclosed is IE Circular No. 80-23 which requires consideration by you with regard to your nuclear power facility.

Should you have any questions regarding this circular or the actions reconnended therein, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

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&' James G. Keppler Director

Enclosure:

IE Information Notice No. 80-23 cc w/ enc 1:

Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Reproduction L' nit NRC 20b 810106@lD

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RIII's CORPORATE ADDRESSES FOR OPERATING LICENSEES AND CONSTRUCTION PERMIT 110LDERS (BWR's and PWR's)

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Docket No. 50-440 Docket No. 50-441 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ac; Company f_8 ct' ATTN:

Mr. Dalwyn R. Davidson 7:e

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'OR Director, NRR/ DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission Mr. Daniel D. Wilt, Attorney Helen Evans, State of Ohio Docket No. 50-155 Docket No. 50-255 Consumers Power Company ATIN:

Mr. R. B. DeWitt Vice President Nuclear Operations 212 West.4ichigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 cc w/ encl:

Mr. D. P. Hoffman, Nuclear Resident Inspectors, RIII Licensing Administrator PDR Mr. C. J. Hartman, Local PDR Plant Superintendent NSIC Mr. R. W. Montross, Manager TIC Central Files Ronald Callen, Michigan Director, NRR/DPM Public Service Commission Director, NRR/ DOR Myron M. Cherry, Chicago AEOD

SSINS No.: 6830 Accession No.:

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IEC 80-23 UNITIED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 October 31, 1980 IE Circular No. 80-23:

P0TENTIAL DEFECTS IN BELOIT POWER SYSTEMS EMERGENCY GENERATORS BACKGROUND This circular addresses a potential deficiency involving the field leads of i

generators manufactured by Beloit Power Systems.

It is known that the suoject generators have been coupled with Fairbanks Morse diesel engines for use in nuclear power facilities; however, it is not known whether they have been coupled with other diesel engines for such use.

Accordingly, the intent of this circular is to notify all nuclear power facilities of the potential defect and to assure that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if needed.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was first informed of the potential defect by a phone call from Mr.

P.. H. Beadle of the Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Colt Industries to Mr. D. W. Hayes of Region III on September 19, 1980.

On September 20, 1980, a conference call was held between the NRC Duty Officer, personnel from Prairie Island Nuclear Power Station, Mr. Beadle of Fairbanks Morse and Mr. C. Evenson of Beloit Powe~r Systems, the principal spokesman.

The purpose of this call was to describe an inspection method which Prairie Island personnel could use to examine the field lead assemblies of their gen-erators for the potential defect.

(We have since been informed by the Resident Inspector that the field lead assemblies of the Prairie Island generators did not have the suspected defects.)

In order to disseminate this information on a timely basis, the NRC Duty i

Officer at Bethesda called those operating facilities which he knew were i

using the suspect generators on September 20 and 21, 1980.

The information conveyed included a description of the potential defect and a description of the aforementioned inspection method.

The operating facilities called were:

FACILITY N0. OF UNITS Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 3

Crystal River 3 2

Hatch I and 2 5

Duane Arn id 2

North Ar.aa 1 and 2 4

Millstone 1 and 2 3

Robinson 2 2

Prairie Island Vermont Yankee Peach Bottom 2 and 3 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 DUPLICATE [K)CUMENT Entire document previcusly entered into system under:

SODS 2.2.0 2 G ANO No. of pages:

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Docket No. 50-333 r,

Power Authority of the State of New York G

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ATTN:

Mr. R. J. Pasternak Resident Manager P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-45, "Potentici Failure of BWR Backup Manual Scram Capability," is forwarded to you for information.

No written response is required.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

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Di ctor

Enclosures:

1.

IE Information Notice No. 80-45 2.

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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CONTACT:

D. L. Caphton (215-337-5266) i l

CC w/enCls:

George T. Berry, President and Chief Operating Officer l

J. P. Bayne, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Generation l

A. Kladsmann, Director, Quality Assurance M. C. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer J. F. Davis, Chairman, Safety Review Committee C. M. Pratt, Assistant General Counsel G. M. Wilverding, Manager-Nuclear Licensing l

S101060l16

SSINS No.:

6835 Accession No.:

801216002 IN 80-45 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 December 17, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-45:

FOTENTIAL FAILURE OF BWR BACKUP MANUAL SCRAM CAPABILITY The primary purpose of this Notice is to advise BWR licensees that a mechanism exists which could defeat one of the backup manual scram (reactor trio) features normally available to the reactor operator.

In some GE-designed reactors, placing the Mode Selector Switch (MSS) in " Shutdown" should actuate a scram.

This feature is used at some facilities as part of a normal reactor shutdown, and for certain 71 ant situations the Technical Specifications require placing the MSS in the " Shutdown" position as a means of attaining immediate shutdown.

As described below, a situation may arise that blocks this scram.

The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station has reported that following the loss of power from a vital M-G set and manual transfer to the alternate power source, the annunciator " Shutdown Scram Reset Permissive" came on and stayed on.

Since such an annunciator may not be provided for all BWRs, some facilities may not be able to detect this condition.

Subsequent investigation revealed that when one RPS bus power supply is lost and the MSS is in the "Run" mode, relay K-17 is immediately deenergized and after two seconds one of two series bypass contacts in the MSS scram circuit is closed.

Upon restoration of RPS bus power, it is possible for relay K-16 to be energized before K-17 (i.e., a relay race).

If this occurs, the following conditions will result: (1) the normally open K-16 contact in the MSS scram bypass circuit is closed, thereby bypassir.g the MSS in e

" Shutdown" Scram; and (2) relay K-17 will be kept deenergized.

Even with this condition (i.e., the bypass circuit made up and the MSS in "Run")

a Scram should occur if the MSS is turned in a deliberate manner to " Shutdown" with a pause in either the "Startup" or "Re'uel" mode; however, if the MSS is turned to " Shutdown" quickly such that re'.sy K-17 is not energized, a Scram due to MSS manipulation may not occur.

We understand that General Electric has been informed of this potential for bypassing the MSS and that General Electric is preparing a Service Information Letter (SIL) containing recommendations for preventing such bypassing.

This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.

Recipients should review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.

No specific action or response is requested at this time; however, if NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested or required.

If you have any question regarding this matter, please contact the director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

4 IE Information Notice No. 80-45 December 17, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued to Notice No.

Issued 80-44 Actuation of ECCS in 12/14/80 All holders of a the Recirculation Mode PWR power reactor OL While in Hot Shutdown or CP 80-43 Failures of the 12/5/80 All holders of a Continuous Water Level BWR power reactor Monitor for the Scram OL or CP Discharge Volume at Dresden Unit No. 2 80-29 Broken Studs on Terry 11/26/80 All holders of a Supplement Turbine Steam Inlet power reactor No. 1 Flange OL or CP 80-42 Effects of Radiation on 11/24/80 All holders of a Hydraulic Snubber Fluid power reactor OL or CP 80-41 Failure of Swing Check 11/10/80 All holders of Valve in the Decay Heat a power reactor Removal System at OL or CP Davis-Besse Unit No. 1 80-40 Excessive Nitrogen 11/6/80 All holders of Supply Pressure a power reactor OL d

Activates Safety-Relief or CP h

Valve Operation to Cause Reactor i

Depressurization 80-39 Malfunctions of 10/31/80 All holders of a Solenoid Valves power reactor OL or CP Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation 80-38 Cracking in Charging 10/30/80 All holders of Pump Casing Cladding a PWR power reactor OL or CP 80-37 Containment Cooler 10/24/80 All holders of a l

Leaks and Reactor power reactor OL Cavity Flooding at or CP Indian Point Unit"2 l

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