ML19340D944
| ML19340D944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Koester G KANSAS GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101050614 | |
| Download: ML19340D944 (1) | |
Text
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'4, UR*lVED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N
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7 REGION IV a
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SulTE 1000 f,
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ARLINGTON. TEXAS 76011 j
j December 8, 1980 F3 N
In Reply Refer To:
Li ro RIV Q
Docket No.
STN 50-482/IE Information Notice No. 80-43 Kansas Gas & Electric Co.
Attn:
Mr. Glenn L. Koester Vice President-Nuclear Post Office Box 208 Wichita, Kansas 67201 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
Recipients of this notice should review the information for possible applicability tn their facility.
However, no specific response is requested at this time. After further NRC evaluations we expect a bulletin will be issued to recomend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate Ni Regional Office.
Sincerely,
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Q.('"lfL)W Karl V. Seyfrit' ; /
Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice l
No. 80-43 2.
List of Recently Issued l
IE Information Notices cc: w/ enclosures Messrs. Nicholas A. Petrick, SNUPPS D. T. McPhee, Kansas City Power and Light Company Gerald Charnoff, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge E. W. Creel, Kansas Gas and Electric Company 101 050 (gy
SSINS NO.:
6835 Accession No.
8008220279 N
UNITED STATES N
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
b-0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 r
IE Information Notice No. 80-43 December 5, 1980 Page 1 of 2 FAILURES OF THE CONTINUOUS WATER LEVEL MONITOR FOR THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME AT DRESDEN UNIT NO. 2 Descriotion of Circumstances:
l On December 2, 1980, following a reactor scram at Dresden Nuclear Power i
Station Unit 2, the licensee discovered that the recently installed scram discharge volume (SDV) continuous water level monitoring system had failed to respond as expected.
The continuous water level monitoring system was
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designed and supplied by Nortec Corporation, and utilizes a single transmit /
receive transducer for each of the four level monitoring channels.
Following installation of the continuous level monitoring system, the licensee verified its operability by tripping each alarm channel while its sensor was connected to a calibration standard consisting of a section of 4 inch pipe identical.to l
the SDV piping.
No in situ test of the equipment was accomplished.
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The expected high level annunciator alarms were not received in the control i
room following scram when the SDV filled with water.
An investigation to determine the cause was initiated and once per shift checks of the I
SDV level on both Units 2 and 3 were re-instituted.
The reactor scram i
system functioned normally and post scram manual ultrasonic tests on the SDV verified proper system drain.
Investigations by the licensee determined that the ultrasonic detectors 4
were inaaecuately coucied to the SDV piping.
The couoling was improved j
and testing performed to snow that the system could cetect water flow l
into the SDV during single control rod scram tests.
The unit was taken critical and was heating uo on December 1, 1980, at accroximately 100 osig anen a mactor scram occurrea.
The exoectec 50V hign level annunciator alarms vere not recaived in tne control room immediately 'ollowing tne scram, but were receivea aoout 10-15 minutes later wnen :ne SDV was drainina.
i Following an additional scram at approximately 20 psig with control roas
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inserted these alarms were received procerly.
Investigation identified level detection system operability proolems as eviaenced by a low-signal
.o noise ratio.
Arrangements are being made for reciacement comoonents (incluaing transoucers) to imorove the signal cnaracteristics ana reduce system noise.
Until the improvements are installea and demonstratec aceauat? by in situ testing, use of the ultrasonic cetection system is I
IE Information Notice No. 80-43 December 5, 1980 Page 2 of 2 being augmented with manual ultrasonic checks of level in tre SDV, using the previously required once per shift check.
A manual check will be performed after each reactor scram.
At Dresden Unit 2 the licensee will compic te the system improvements and required testing within 7 days in accordance with the Immediate Action Letter issued by Region III on December 4, 1980.
The above operating experience indicates the need for a demonstration of the operability of ultransonic systems recently installed to continuously monitor for water in the SDV.
Until demonstratea operable by in situ testing, these systems should not be solely relied on for detection of water in the SDV.
Use of new ultrasonic detection systems should be augmented by manual checks for water in the SDV each shift and after reactor scram until in situ testing is perforaed.
It is important that a high degree of reliability be establishec' ir operability of these continuous water level monitoring systems in order to support plant operations in the interim until final scram discharge system modifications are performed.
This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.
Recipients should review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific response is requested at this time.
Pending further NRC evaluations, we expect licensee actions will be requested or required.
No written response to this IE Information Notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
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IE Information Notice No. 80-43 December 5, 1980 LISTING OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued 80-38 Cracking in Charging 10/30/80 All Pressurized Water Pump Casing Cladding Reactor Facilities holding pcwer reactor Operating Licenses (OLs) and Construction Permits (cps) 80-39 Malfunctions Of Solenoid 10/31/80 All light
.ater reactor Valves Manufactured By facilities holding Valcor Engineering Corporation power reactor Operating Licenses (OLs) or Construc-tion Permits (cps) 80-40 Excessive Nitrogen 11/7/80 All power facilities Supply Pressure with an Operating License Actuates Safety-Relief (OL) or Construction Valve Operation to Permit (CP)
Cause Reactor Depressuriza-tion I
80-41 Failure of Swing Check 11/10/80 All power reactor Valve in the Decay Heat facilities with an Operating Removal System at Davis-License (OL) or Construction Besse Unit No. 1 Permit (CP) 80-42 Effect of Radiation 11/24/80 All power reactor on Hydraulic Snubber Fluid facilities with an Operating License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP) l Enclosure i
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