ML19340D920
| ML19340D920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1980 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Burstein S WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101050578 | |
| Download: ML19340D920 (2) | |
Text
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GLEN ELLYN,lLLINOIS 60137 December 5,1980 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-43 is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. Recipients of this notice should review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
However, no specific response is requested at this time. After further NRC evaluations we expect a bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, M.
ames G. Keppler Director
Enclosure:
IE Information l
Notice No. 80-43 8101050(7$
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Docket No. 50-266
- 3 Docket No. 50-301 Jy
.:2'If Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN:
Mr. Sol Burstein
. li Executive Vice Fresident
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Power Plants 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 cc w/ enc 1:
G. A. Reed, Plant Manager Cent ral Files AD/ Licensing AD/ Operating Reactors T. Colburn, ORB /NRR AEOD
'sident Inspector, RIII
'DR Local PDR NSIC TIC Sandra A. Bast, Lakeshore Citizens for Safe Energy John J. Duffy, Chief Boiler Inspector Peter Anderson, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade
SSINS NO.:
6835 Accession No.
8008220279 IN 80-43 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 December 5, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-43:
FAILURES OF THE CONTINU0US WATER LEVEL MONITOR FOR THE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME AT DRESDEN UNIT NO. 2 Description of Circumstances:
On December 2, 1980, following a reactor scram at Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, the licensee discovered that the recently installed scram discharge volume (SDV) continuous water level monitoring system had failed to respond as expected.
The continuous water level monitoring system was designed and supplied by Nortec Corporation, and utilizes a single transmit /
receive transducer for each of the four level monitoring channels.
Following installation of the continuous level monitoring system, the licensee verified its operability by tripping each alarm channel while its sensor was connected to a calibration standard consisting of a section of 4 inch ~pTpe identical to the SDV piping.
No in situ test of the equipment was accomplished.
The expected high level annunciator alarms were not received in the control room following scram when the SDV filled with water.
An investigation to determine the cause was initiated and once per shift checks of the SDV level on both Units 2 and 3 were re-instituted.
The reactor scram 3ystem functioned normally and post scram manual ultrasonic tests on the SDV verified proper system drain.
Investigations by the licensee determined that the ultrasonic detectors were inadequately coupled te the SDV piping.
The coupling was improved and testing performed to show that the system could detect water flow into the SDV during single control rod scram tests.
The unit was taken critical and was heating up on December 4, 1980, at approximately 400 psig when a reactor scram occurred.
The expected SDV high level annunciator alarms were not received in the control room immediately following the scram, but were received about 10-15 minutes later when the SDV was araining.
Following an additional scram at approximately 20 psig with control rods inserted these alarms-were received properly.
Investigation identified-i level detection system operability problems as evidenced by a low signal to noise ratio.
Arrangements are being made for replacement components (including transducers) to improve the signal characteristics and reduce system noise.
Until the improvements are installed and demonstrated adequate by in situ testing, use of the ultrasonic detection system is being augmented with manual ultrasonic checks of level in the SDV, using the previously required once per shift check.
A manual check will be performed after each reactor scram.
At Dresden Unit 2 the licensee will
9 IN 80-43 December 5, 1980 Page 2 of 2 complete the system improvements and required testing within 7 days in
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accordance with the Immediate Action Letter issued by Region III en December 4, 1980.
The above operating experience indicates the need for a demonstration of the operability of ultransonic systems recently installed to continuously monitor for water in the SDV.
Until demonstrated operable by in situ testing, these systems should not be solely relied on for detection of water in the SOV.
Use of new ultrasonic detection systems should be augmented by manual checks for water in the SDV each shift and after reactor scram until in situ testing is performed.
It is important that a high degree of reliability be established in operability of these continuous water level monitoring systems in order to support plant operations in the interim until final scram discharge system modifications are performed.
This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.
Recipients should review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific response is requested at this time.
Pending further NRC evaluations, we expect licensee actions will be requested or required.
No written response to this IE Information Notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IN 80-43 December 5, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No.
Subject Issue Issued to 80-42 Effect of Radiation on 11/24/80 All power reactor Hydraulic Snubber Fluid facilities with OL or CP 80-41 Failure of Swing Check 11/10/80 All power reactor Valve in the Decay Heat facilities with an OL Removal System at Davis-or CP Besse Unit No. 1 80-40 Excessive Nitrogen Supply 11/10/80 All nuclear power Pressure Actuates Safety-facilities with Relief Valve Operation to OL or CP Cause Reactor Depressur-ization 80-39 Malfunctions Of Solenoid 10/31/80 All light water reactor Valves Manufactured By facilities holding Valcor Engineering Corporation power reactor OLs or cps 80-38 Cracking In Charging Pump 10/30/80 All PWR facilities Casing Cladding with an OL or CP 80-37 Containment cooler leaks 10/24/80 All nuclear power and reactor cavity facilities holding flooding at Indian Point power reactor OLs Unit 2 or cps 80-36 Failure of Steam 10/10/80 All nuclear power Generator Support Bolting reactor facilities holding power reactor OLs or cps 80-35 Leaking and dislodged 10/10/80 All categories G and Iodine-124 implant seeds G1 medical licensees 80-34 Boron dilution of reactor 9/26/80 All pressurized water coolant during steam reactor facilities generator decontamination holding power reactor OLs 80-33 Determination of teletherapy 9/15/80 All teletherapy timer accuracy (G3) licensees
- Operating Licenses or Construction Permits