ML19340D559
| ML19340D559 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/24/1980 |
| From: | Boger B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340D550 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012310244 | |
| Download: ML19340D559 (12) | |
Text
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i UNITED STATES OF A> ERICA NUCLEAR REGUIRIORY COfMISSIO1 BEFDRE ' DIE A'IOMIC SAFRI'Y AND LICENSING BOARD InW Futter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISO4 CO FR E,
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et. al.
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Ebcket No. 50-289
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(Three Mile Island Nuclear
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Generating Station Unit 1)
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NIC STAFF TESTIbDU OF BRUCE A. BOGER REGARDING LICEI: SED OPERA'IOR TPAINING t
CEA CON'lENTIGI NO.13 Q.
1.
Please state your name and position with the NRC.
A.
My name is Bruce A. Boger. I am a Reactor Engineering assigned to the Operator Licensing Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Q.
2.
Have you prepared a statement of professional qualifications?
i A.
Yes. A copy of this statenent is attached to this testimony.
Q.
3.
Please state the nature of the responsibilities that you have had with respect to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Stations.
A.
A list of my activities is attached to this testimony.
Q.
4.
W at is the purpose of your testimony?
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The purpose of my testiruny is to respond to GA Contention
- 13. GA Contention 13 states:
t "UA contends that there is a specific need for the establish-
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ment of training for operators that addresses the problen of a 'mindset' that denies information indicative of serious reactor problems.
In support of this contention, GA submits that such a mindset contributed to the gravity of f.he 3/28/79 I
accident, as reported in NUREG-0600, and that the routine occurrence 6
of abnormal transients will tend to condition operators to a mindset that underestimates the significance of (sequences of) abnormal transients. &A contends that specific training provisions designed to address this 'mindset' problen are necessary prior to the restart of IMI-1 in order to prevent the development or presence of such mindset anong IMI-1 operators from contributing to a serious accident at IMI-1."
l Q.
5.
Wat is "mindset"?
A.
According to the contention, it is a condition that leads operators I
to deay inforretion indicative of serious reactor problems, thereby causing them to underestimate the significance of abnormal transients.
The foreward of NUREG-0600 reports "Ihere is considerable evidence af a 'brindset", not only by 1MI operators but by operators at other plants as well, that overfilling the reactor coolant system (making 4
6 the systen solid) was to be avoided at alnost any cost. Undue attention by the TMI operators to avoiding a solid systen led l
them to ignore other procedural instructions and indications that the core was not being properly cooled. kithout this t
"mindset" they might well have acted to preclude or better mitigate the accident".
O.
6.
khat is the staff's position on preventing such a condition?
l A.
It is the staff's position that operating personnel and operating crews nust mintain an overall perspective of plant conditions.
This includes receptiveness to infora tion showing the plant is in trouble. In this m nner, operators are required to consider the available informtion and not underestimte the significance of abnormal conditions.
Q.
7.
khat are the staff requirenents to assure an overall perspective of plant conditions is mintained?
A.
To assure an overall perspective of plant conditions is mintained, the staff has required for restart of 1MI-1:
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1.
Training of the operating staff on how the M-2 accident occurred and the mistakes that were made.
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Changes to the caurgency procedures, i
3.
Training of the operating staff on the revised emergency procedures.
4.
Fnphasis on the Shift Supervisor's responsibilities.
5.
Assigns.: of a Shift Technical Advisor (STA) on each shift.
O.
8.
What training was conducted on the M -2 accident and the mistakes that were e de?
f, A.
As noted in NURH;-0680, "DfI-1 Restart," Training of Operating Staff
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(page C6-6), one of the major objectives of the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (OARP) was:
"c.
Assurance that the M -1 operators have an in-depth understanding of the M-2 accident and associated lessons learned."
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To achieve this objective, the licensee provided classroom instruction which covered the M -2 accident, alternate accident scenarios and recomendations made as a result of the accident. In addition, all licensed operators attended N?
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.!, sessions at the B&W sirulator. During these sessions, the 'DfI-2 accident, including operational errors, was denenstrated to each operator. H e event was then reinitiated and the operators were given " hands-on" experience in regaining control of the plant by i
several methods.
t Q.
9.
khat changes were required to the omrgency procedures?
i A.
In accordance with IE Bulletin 79-05A, item 4.d. the licensee I
was required to rodify the emergency procedures to provide operaters with additional information and instructions to examine various plant parameter indications when evaluating plant conditions. To this end, the emergency procedures I
were revised to include a step to reverify key plant parameters using alternate indications when available. 2 1s reverification is the first action to be taken following empletion of the inmediate operator responses to a transient situation.
Q. 10 How will this help to nnintain an overall perspective of plant conditions?
A.
%e operator will be required to nonitor plant conditions using a different set of indications. 2 1s will allow the operator to reassess the nature of a transient and will neximize the use of available infornetion, thereby helping to maintain an overall perspective of plant conditions.
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. Q.
11.
kha'. has the staff required in the area of training on the revised mergency procedures?
A.
As noted in NURFf-0680, "IMI-1 Restart," Training of Operating Staff (page C6-5), the licensee was required to augment the retraining of all Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators. Included in this training was a review of the revised emergency procedures which emphasized the use of alternate indications.to reverify plant parameters. In addition, the licensee conducted operator training at the B&W sinulator which covered analysis and response to the IMI-2 accident and other abnormal and emergency situations.
Q.
- 12. How will this help to maintain an overall perspective of plant conditions?
A.
Le operators have been trained to respond to abnormal and emergency situations by using the alternate indications of plant parameters. This will allow the operator to reassess the nature of a transient and will maximize the use of available information, thereby helping to unintain an overall perspective of plant conditions.
Q.
- 13. khat has the staff required with respect to Shift Supervisor responsibilities?
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L A.
The staff requirements are identified in NUPIG-0578, item 2.2.1.a, Shift Supervisor Responsibilities and further clarified in our letter of October 30,1979 (Reference 36 of NUREG-0680). In part, w have required licensees to define and e::phasize the duties, responsibilities, and authority of the Shift Supervisor. Training programs for Shift Supervisors have also been required to address r
the responsibility for safe operation and the mnagement function of the Shift Supervisor.
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Q.
- 14. Fow do these requirenents provide assurance that an overall perspective of plant conditions is mintained?
A.
These requirenents were intended to erphasize the comend function of the Shift Supervisor. The Shift Supervisor is directed not to became totally involved in any single operation in times of energency, dien unitiple operations are required in the control room. This will assure that the Shift Supervisor unintains an overall perspective of plant conditions.
Q.
- 15. Has the licensee complied with this item?
A.
Yes, the details ?re given in NUREG-0680, pages C8-50 and C8-51.
In part, the licensee has revised administrative procedures to place
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8-t enphasis on the cmrund function of the Shift Supervisor.
Additionally, all Shift Supervisors received decision analysis training that stressed their responsibilities for safe operation and unnagement of the facility.
Q.
- 16. Iku will the assignment of a STA on each shift provide assurance that an overall perspective of plant conditions is unintained?
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A.
"he STA will receive specific training in the response and I
analysis of the plant for transients and accidents. Accordingly, the STA will he able to identify and understand the significance of abnormal transients. Since the STA will not be assigned i
operational duties during trarcient situations, he will be responsible solely for nonitoring plant response and will therefore be capable of neintaining an overall perspective of plant conditions. The STA will also be available to provide an independent assessment of overall plant conditions to the Shift Supervisor.
Q.
- 17. Has the licensee conmitted to provide an on-shift STA?
A.
Yes, the details are given in NUREG-0680, item 2.2.1.b, pages C8-52 and C8-53. 'Ihe licensee has provided an on-shift technical advisor to the Shift Supervisor designated as the i
Shift Technical Engineer.
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- 18. Have any changes been required to address the possibility of a preoccupation with avoiding a solid systm?
A.
Yes, in addition to the training on the TMI-2 accident noted in the response to Question 8, training and pro-cedures have been nodified to address pressurizer level response during transient situations.
In particular, the possibility for a rising pressurizer level due to a pressurizer ste., space leak or a potential void in the i
l RCS have been stressed. This will assist the operators in the determination of diether the RCS is actually in a solid condition.
l Also, in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-05B, it s 2 (which modified IE Bulletin 79-05A, it s 4) and Order it s Id, the licensee has nodified the mergency procedures and conducted operator training to provide specific instructions on the override of automatic actions of engineered safety features. Continued operation of engineered safety fuldzes is required unless acceptable RCS cooling is attained or reactor vessel integrity is threatened. This will ensure that safety equipment is not pr aaturely deactivated.
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19 Has the licensee provided the training necessary to prevent the developrent or presence of a mindset among M-1 operators?
A.
Yes, as noted in this testirony, the licensee has provided training, revised procedures, emphasized the shift supervisor's responsibilities, and assigned a Shift Technical Engineer on r
each shift in an effort to prevent the development or presence of a mindset amng M-1 operators.
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PROFESSICM1 QUALIFICATIONS LIST BRUCE A. BOGER Education June 1971 Received BST. - University of Virginia l
June 1972 Received !E'E - University of Virginia Ii ibrk Experience e
June 1972 to Virginia Electric and Pcrer Cocpany June 1977 Surry tbelear Pcrer Station
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Assistant Fngineer - Perfomed startup testing on Unit i
No. 2.
Engineer - Assisted the Supervisor-Engineering Services;
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trained for and received a Senior Reactor Operator License.
Supervisor - Engineering Services - Directed the activities of the onsite engineering staff, t
June 1977 to Virginia Electric and Power Cocpa:rf September 1977 Richtend, Virginia Supervisor - Ibelear Engineering Services - Directed the activities of the offrite engineering staff in support of Surry Power Station.
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October 1977 to U. S. Ibclear Regulatory Comission j
'Present Bethesda, Maryland I
Reactor Engineer ir, the Operator Licensing Branch - Admin-i ister licensing examinations to nuclear power plant and research reactor personnel.
l Professional Affiliations Registered Professional Engineer - State of Virginia t
Me:ber - Acurican Ibclear Society
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Participation in M Activities Bruce A. Boger Nove-ber 1978, April 1980: Adninistered operator license examinations on Unit One.
Nove:ter 1978, Parch 1979, Parch 1980:
Adninistered operator license exa:ninations on Unit *No.
March - April 1979: Member of the M -2 emergency response ten, assisted in the preparation of emergency and contingency procedures.
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July 1979 - Present: Member of the M Technical Support Staff, conducted audit examinations on post-accident installed equiptrent on M -2.
Also partici-t pated in the review of training and procedures in conjunction with the M-1 restart programs. This included preparation of SER inputs and testimony.
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