ML19340C549
| ML19340C549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1979 |
| From: | Basdekas D NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341B457 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8012110069 | |
| Download: ML19340C549 (2) | |
Text
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- UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtsslON g
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~E OCT 2 51979 MEMORANDUM FOR: Commissioner John F. Ahearne FROM:
Demetrios L. Basdekas Experimental Fast Reactor Safety Research Branch, RES
SUBJECT:
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS AND PLANT DYNAMICS t
01 September 4,1979 I sent you a memorandum on the subject matter, containing a number of recommendations including one to derate all l
operating nuclear power plants unless and until at least a prelimi-I nary review of their contrci systems is performed, including a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
On September 17, 1979 the Director, NRR, prompted by reports received from Public Service Electric and Gas Company, operators of the Salem Plant, sent a letter to all utilities operating LWRs giving them 20 days to show why their operating licenses should not be " modified, suspended or revoked" based on the " potential" for "an unreviewed safety matter" related to "the effects of the environment on contr61 systems resulting from high-energy line breaks inside or outside contain-ment and the results of these effects on the required safety systems".
The September 17, 1979 letter from the Director, NRR has addressed only a small portion of the problem. Even in the traditional " band-aid" approach the letter failed to address, for instance, the effects of control system failures due to an earthquake. These systems are not seismically qualified.
Isn't the staff concerned about that? Moreover, as far as I know, the staff has still to ask for an FMEA fcr each plant.
On October 22, 1979 the Director, NRR responded to my concerns and re-commendations on the subject matter. Although I do not propos e to go through his memorandum on a point by point basis at this time, I believe that it shows that business as usual of the " band-aid" approach is very much characteristic of the staff's direction.
I disagree with its approach, arguments, and (non-) conclusions and I stand by end reenforce my recomendations to you of September 4,1979.
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(e Comissioner John F. Ahearne OCT 2 51979 We cannot afford to limit our actions to just responding to " brush fi res". Our mission is to prevent accidents; not to help explain them after they happen. One wonders if the Staff Management is aware of this.
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Demetrios L. Basdekas Experimental fast Reactor Safety Research Branch
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c.c : Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Kennedy Comissioner Bradford L. V. Gossick, EDO M. W. Carbon, ACRS H. R. Denton, NRR S. Levine, RES R. Minogue, SD R. DeYoung OGC OPE SECY f
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