ML19340A614
| ML19340A614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/14/1964 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340A613 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008280686 | |
| Download: ML19340A614 (15) | |
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0 CONTROL ROD DRIVE INSPECTION REPORT. 1964
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A, wtMODUCTION The Technical Specifications to Dresden's License DPR-2, as amended by Change No. 7, dated April 9,1964, states that during major outages, "Not less than two control rod drive mechanisms shall be removed, disassembled, and thoroughly inspected at intervals not to exceed 16 months." In addition to license requirements, drives removed for inspection were selected on the basis of:
drive test results,and malfunctions experienced during operation.
Prior to shutdown for refueling, two drives, K-4 (#1225) and C-3 (#1307),
were selected for removal and inspection. During the refueling two additional drives were removed and inspected because of malfunctions encountered during the outage. The following table lists the drives removed for inspection.
Serial Number Drive Reasons for Removal 1225 K-4 Failed to withdraw during routine daily exercising on March 2, 1964 Further testing on March 3, 5, and 6,1964, resulted in full insartion of drive. Drive was disarmed on March 6 in fully inserted position.
1307 C-3 Exhibited higher than average friction pressure during tests.
Ih6 E-9 Drif ted out of core slowly (notch by notch) during fuel i
loading operations on May 6, 1964. Exercising, stepping, and scranuning apparently cleared the drif ting problem, but to determine original cause of drif ting, this drive was removed for inspection.
1309 C-4 Could not be withdrawn from core during refueling operations on May 7, 1964.
Increased pressure, and hydraulic and electrical systems checks failed to move the drive.
In compliance with license requirements, all drives, except K-4, were scram and friction tested on April 13 and 14, 1964 These tests fulfilled the quarterly requirement for January - March, and also served to determine if there were any additional defective drives prior to drive removal. The friction pressures averaged 11 psi lower than the data obtained during November, 1963, bue followed more closely the average friction pressure obtained in all tests made since drive modification in February, 1961. The scram test data obtained was satisfactory on all drives tested.
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II.
DRIVE REMOVAL AND INSPECTION A.
Removal Two drives, C-3 and E-9, were removed with the index tubes fully withdrawn af ter the fuel assemblies and poison blades had been rem 6ved from the two cells. This is the normal procedure. The two stuck drives, C-4 and K-4, could not be withdrawn from the core and had to be removed with extended index tubes, requiring the use of the long sealing tool. The outer filter and guide plug were removed on drives C-4 and K-4 in the reactor sub pile room in order to insert the index tube into the drive. This allowed more freedom of movement in the limited head space in the sub-pile room and permitted transpor-tation of the drive to the shop area for disassembly and inspection.
B.
Testing of Spare Drives Before Insertion in Core Four spare control red drives were prepared for use during the refueling outage by conducting the following tests:
1.
Control Rod Drive Leakaze Test Drive No.
Leakage Test Results 1264 Sa tis factory 1279 Satisfactory 1284 Satisfactory 1232 Satisfactory Control red drive leakage testing is conducted af ter rebuilding drives (which had been removed in previous reactor outages) to determine the effectiveness of the reassembly. Water at 200 pst is applied to tha "up" and "down" ports of the drive and leakage is measured at various points in order to establish that the leakage rate is within a specified minimum.
2.
Control Rod Drive Test Facility Drive No.
Normal Withdrawal and Insertion Scram Drive 1264 Satisfactory 1279 Satisfactory Satis factory 1284 Sa tis factory 1232 Satisfsetory A control rod drive test facility has been provided at the station in order to test reassembled drives before use in the reactor.
It is possible to insert, withdraw and scram a control rod drive in the test facility with normal operating pressures.
The four drives listed above were checket for latching and
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.c II.
DRIVE REMOVAL AND INSPECTION A.
Removat Two drives, C-3 and E-9, were removed with the index tubes fully withdrawn after the fuel assemblies and poison blades had been removed from the two cells. This is the normal procedure. The two stuck drives, C-4 and K-4, could not be withdrawn from the core and had to be removed with extended index tubes, requiring the use of the long sealing tool. The outer filter and guide plug were removed l
on drives C-4 and K-4 in the reactor sub-pile room in order to insert the index tube into the drive. This allowed more freedom of movement in the limited head space in the sub pile room and permitted transpor-tation of the drive to the shop area for disassembly and inspection.
B.
Testing of Soare Drives Before Insertion in Core Four spare control rod drives were prcpared for use during the refueling outage by conducting the following tests:
1.
Control Rod Drive Leakage Test Drive No.
Leakane Test Results 1264 Satisfactory 1279 Satisfactory 12 84 Satis factory 1232 Sa tis factory Control rod drive leakage testing is conducted af ter rebuilding drives (which had been removed in previous reactor outages) to determine the effectiveness of the reassembly. Water at 200 psi is applied to the "up" and "down" ports of the drive and leakage is measured at various points in order to establish that the j
leakage rate is within a specified minimum.
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2.
Control Rod Drive Test Facility Drive No.
Normal Withdrawal and Inse h Scram Drive 1264 Satisfactory 9
1279 Satis factory Satisfactory j
1284 Satisfactory 1232 Satisfactory
' A control rod drive test facility has been provided at the station in order to test reassembled drives before use in the reactor. It is possible to insert, withdraw and scram a control rod drive in the test facility with normal operating pressures.
The four drives listed above were checked for latching and
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unlatching through a complete insertion and withdrawal sequence.
One drive, No. 1279, was scrammed and a trace was made on the Sanborn recorder. This was done in order to test the scram valves which were installed af ter the 1962 refueling outage.
C.
JJ1sgection Procedure L.
Visual Inspection A drive repair shop was set up on the 565' elevation in the reactor 4
enclosure for disassembly, cleaning, inspection, reassembly, and testing of drive components.
Visual inspection was done by direct viewing whenever radiation exposure levels permitted the use of distance and/or the use of face shielding. Most parts could be inspected at close range.
Only the roller mount assembly required a lead cave ano quarts viewing window for more shielding during close observations.
All magnet housings were given a 212 F boiling test to check the integrity of the magnet housing seal.
2.
Fluorescent Dve Penetration Che ck A fluorescent dye penetrant (Zyglo) examination was made on components of the four drives. A penetrant (ZL-2), emulsifier (ZE-3), developer (ZP-5), and an ultraviolet light were used for this inspection.
The inspection procedure consisted of a thorough cleaning and drying of the parts to be inspected, applying the dye penetrant, followed with application of the emulsifier and finally application of the developer. The parts were then inspected for cracks using an ultraviolet light source.
The dye was allowed a penetration time of 15 minutes before applying the emulsifier or developer. On parts with a high-radiation level, the emulsifier was used to clean the parts.
This eliminated hand wiping of the parts and thus reduced unnecessary exposure of personnel. The low radiation icvel components were hand wiped with a clean cloth before applying the developer. The developer was dusted on in order to apply a light even coat to all surfaces.
If a surface defect is present, the dye penetrant is absorbed by the crack. Wiping the part removes the excess dye from the surface of the part but not from any cracks which may be present. The application of the developer draws out the dye penetrant and magnifies the defective area.
Viewing with ultraviolet light source pin points material defects.
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The following components of the four drives were subjected to the fluorescent dye penetrant examination:
Index tube (5850288)
Piston head assembly (192C554)
Shuttle piston (856B398)
Stop piston (115A8600)
Collet Assembly (693C827)
Roller mount assembly (932C149) a.
Weld b.
Spud c.
Anti-rotational roller d.
Guide roller e.
Roller housing Spring (111A3298)
Spring Washer (145AS454)
Guide Flug (856B397)
Drive Housing Welds (5850289)
D.
Results of Individual Drive Inspections 1.
Drive No. 1307 (Cell C-3) - High Friction The shuttle piston on this drive did not have the groove modification which was scheduled to be made to all drives during the February, 1961, drive' outage. This addition of four grooves on the shuttle piston will be made before reassembling the drive.
One segment of the three piece number one outer seal also failed on the main piston assembly of this drive. The two bushings and the No. 2. seal were also heavily scored by fragments of the broken seal.
Failure of a setnent on the nuniber one outer seal on the main piston assembly of this drive caused indicated high friction pressure during quarterly drive testing conducted on January 12, 1963. Subsequent friction tests on this drive were'niso high and pointed to the seal failure which was observed during inspection.
This failed seal would cause an increase in friction pressure because of additional leakage past the main piston seals. There was no evidence which would indicate seal material failure and the I
crack was more than likely caused by foreign material between the outer seal and inner tube surface.
A copy of the actual inspection summary is given in Figure 1.
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2.
Drive No. 1246 (Cell g-9) - Malfunction - Drifted Out of Core Slowly This control rod drive drifted out of the core stos v on May 6, 1964, during reactor fuel loading operations. The drive was exercised, stepped, and scrammed from position 0, but still drif ted out. The drive was then scrammed from position 12, but drifted out after exercising. Af ter a second scram from position 12, the drive did not drift and full loading was continued. On May 7, 1964, exercising and stepping did not result in further drif ting.
This drive had scratches on the inner surface of the shuttle piston and the outer mating surface of the collet assembly. The scratches were heaviest in two areas of the matching parts with minor marks adjacent to these areas.
The marks were located on the shuttling area of the mating pieces between the collet piston rings and the top end of the collet lock.
The scratches found on the inner surface of the shuttle piston and the piston ring area of the coller. Lock were caused by foreign material between these two moving surface 2.
This caused the shuttle piston to remain in the unlocked position and resulted in the control rod drifting out of the core. Two operational scrams frem position 12 apparently removed the interferring material and the drive was operative. The inspection revealed the damage to the shuttle piston and collet lock surfaces, but did not disclose the material which caused the shuttle piston interference.
The scratched area can be cleaned up by hsning and no other drive damage was observed.
A copy of the actual inspection sunmary is given in Figure 2.
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3.
Drive No. 1309 (Cell C-4) - Malfunction - Stuck Drive Disassembly of drive No.1309 revealed no unusual wear, distortion, or failure that would prevent drive withdrawal. Rod withdrawal requires that the collet fingers be held in the disengaged position.
The fingers can be damaged if they are disengsged while supporting the weight of the index tube and attached blade. Unlocking is accomplished, therefore, by giving the drive a brief " drive up" signal just before a " drive down" signal. The " drive up" signal raises the drive piston and index tube until the collet fingers are disengsged by the upward movement of the shallow cam located on the lower side of the locking groove on the index tube.
The period of up travel is adjustable by a time delay relay. The 4
"lcive down" signal of +200 psi reactor pressure drives the i
unlocking piston down against the collet fingers and holds them in the disengaged position. This same pressure is also applied to the drive piston for withdrawal.
i When the drive is fully inserted at position "0", the amount of over travet for unlocking is only 1" as compared to 8.83" between other notch positions. This means that a " drive up" signal at normal or higher than normal pressure can only move the drivo 1" above the "O" notch position. When the switching valve reverses the pressure and applies normal or higher than normal pressure to the unlocking piston and to the drive piston, the time-distance relationship must be such that disengagement of the colle; fingers is accerplished.
in the case of this control rod drive, a combination of leaky
" drive up" and collet seals plus friction resistance in the collet assembly would make the time-distance relationship even more critical and could have prevented drive withdrawal.
A copy of the actual inspection summary is given in Figure 3.
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Drive No. 1225 (Cell K-4) - Malfunction - Stuck Drive Malfunction of this drive was due to failure of the spirol pin which is used to fasten the shaf t and anti-rotational roller on the drive. This pin failure resulted in separation of the shaf t and anti-rotational roller from the roller mount assembly.
l This drive failed to withdraw during routine daily exercising 4
on March 2, 1964. Successive attempts to withdraw the drive under normal and higher than normal hydraulic pressure resulted in a i
notch by notch insertion from position 12 to position 9.
A complete investigation of the hydraulic system valves was conducted before attempting further withdrawal, and all valves appeared to be functioning properly. Further attempts to withdraw the drives resulted in complete insertion of the drive to position "0".
Additional testing of control rod drive K-4 was conducted under the directien of General Electric Company during the March, 1964, end-of-life nucicar testing outage. None of these tests resulted in rod movement, and on March 6, 1964, control rod drive K-4 was disa rmed.
1 This control rod drive was observed throughout removal from the reactor core on April 27 - 28, 1964, for any indications which may have contributed to the malfunction which occurred during routine daily exercising on I: arch 2, 1964. Observation of control cell E-4 af ter blade and guide tube removal revealed that the anti-rotational roller was not on the roller mount assembly.
While in the process of lowering the control rod drive from its drive thimb'e, the anti-rotational roller was obacrved to be j
wedged between the outer filter and the ir dex tube. The roller shaft was found in the bottem of the outer filter and the two outer ends of the spirol pin which holds the roller shaft in place were still in the roller mount assembly. The center section of the spirol pin was not found.
The drive was disassembled and visual examination disclosed the following:
a.
The mark found on the index tube and damage to the outer filter indicated that the roller had been driven down against the filter and the index' tube in such a manner that it functioned as a ratchet at each notch of the index tube during insertion.
The location of the roller against the index tube and outer filter could have prevented withdrawal of the blade but not insertion.
b.
The failure of the anti-rotational roller assembly was as follows:
(1) The 3/8" diameter hole in the roller mount assembly was elongated in a downward direction at about 100 from the vertical.
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(2) The spirol pin had separated in two places and the two outer ends were still in the roller mount assembly.
(3) The hole in the roller shaft was enlarged and the end toward the roller mount had suffered a 10% loss of metal.
c.
Visual inspection of all other moving parts did not disclose any failure, wear, or distortion that would cause high drive friction or preves.t drive withdrawal.
opy of the actual inspection summary is given in Figure 4.
.oca of failure was two-fold in the case of this control rod
.ve.
A heavy blow was experienced by the anti-rotational roller
,oint during handling or installation of this drive in the reactor vessel which partially sheared the spirol pin.
Elongation of the roller mount hole and the roller shaft was responsible for the subsequent wear to these parts. Complete failure of the joint resulted in separation of the roller, roller shaft, and center of the spirol pin from the roller mount assembly.
The spirol pin is actually a three layered rolled cylindrical member 3/16" in diameter and 1-3/4" long. Examination of the two remaining parts of the spirol pin under a 7.5X binocular microscope supported the mode of failure postulated above. The fractured cross-section of each spirol pin end which was adjacent to the roller shaf t was carefully examined.
The two ends were quite different in appearance, but had one similarity. Both ends had cylindrical concave surfaces which were presumably associated with the inter-section of the spirol pin and the shaf t.
One surface appeared to be a sheared surface and indicated that it had broken in a short time period. The surface of the other pin showed a number of interesting features.
Part of the spirol pin circumference showed a shear lip and sharp edge. The opposite edge appeared to be worn. There was also a thin sheet of metal which was folded over into the center of the pin which.was the remains of thin tube of metal produced by very gradual wear.
These observations indicate that the first break occurred at once (shear) and the second break started as a fast break on the portion of the circumference which stopped on the first layer of metal and then continued by slow wear t oward tne center of the pin.
The anti-rotation rollers of three spare drives were removed for inspection. The following table lists the inspection results.
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Location Drive Serial No.
Renarks
=
J Spare drive, removed No. 1284 Roller, roller shaft from H-6 during 9000 hr.
and spirol pin - OK.
Drive Inspection 12/18/62 l
Drive removed from No. 1307 Roller, roller shaft C-3 during April, 1964 and spirol pin - OK.
j Partial Refueling l
Drive removed from No. 1232 Roller, roller shaft C-7 during 9000 Hr.
and spirol pin - OK.
i Drive Inspection 12/18/62 3
I III.
SUMMARY
j The following table gives a summary of the drives removed and replaced during the 1964 refueling outage.
j Drive Removed Drive Replaced Cell No. in Se rial Serial l
Reactor Core Number Date Number Date Remarks C-3 1307 4/27/64 1264 4/27/64 Four grooves will be added to shuttic piaten before reassembling the drive.
K-4 1225 4/28/64 1279 4/23/64 Drive 1225 to be repaired and reassembled as a spare drivo.
E-9 1246 5/9/64 1284 5/9/64 Drf *e '?46 to be repaired 1
and reassembled as a spare drive.
C-4 1309 5/11/64 1232 5/1'/64 Drive'1309 to be repaired and reassembled as a j
spare drive.
In summarizing the results of inspection of the removed four drives, the following items are noted:
1.
Despite different types of malfunctioning, all three drives were capable of being inserted.
2.
No specific trend was noted in the several failures noted in component parts.
3.
No cracks or defects were found by visual inspection and dye penetrant tests.
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FIGURE 1
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DRESDEN CONTROL ROD DRIVE INSPECTION StHMARY Drive Serial No.
1307 Removed from Core Position Shop No.
15 C-3 Dye Penetrant Visual Part Name Insp. By Results Tnsp. By Results 1.
Index Tube (5850288)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 1
2.
Piston Head Assembly (192C554)
W. W. W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 2
3.
Shuttle Piston (856B398)
W. W. A.
OK R. E. R.
OK 4.
Stop Piston (115A8600)
W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 5.
Collet Assembly (693C827)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 6.
Roller Mount Asserrbly (932C149)
W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK a.
Weld W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK b.
Spud W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK c.
Anti-Rotational Roller W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK d.
Guide Roller W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK e.
Roller Housing W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 7.
Spring (Illa 3298)
W. W. W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 8.
Spring Washer (145AS454)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 9.
Guide Flug (856B397)
W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK3 10.
Drive Housing Welds (585D289)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK3
- 11. Magnet (llA2311)
Leak checked at 212 F - OK 1No. 1 ou.
t, one of three segments broken. Other seal (No. 2) and two bushings scm -
2
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Needs groove modificatiot..
3Threads galled during removal of guide plug.
W. W. Witt - C. E. Co., Testing Department R. E. Reder - C. E. Co., Dresden Nuclear Pouer Station.
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0, 13 FIGURE 2 LRESDEN CONTROL ROD DRIVE INSPECTION
SUMMARY
Drive Serial No.
1246 Removed fro:n Care Position Shop No.
78 E-9 Dve Penetrant Visual Part Name Insp. By Results Insp. By Results 1.
Index Tube (5850288)
W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 2.
Piston Head Assembly (192C554)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 3.
Shuttle Pistor. (856B398)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 4.
Stop Piston (ll5A8600)
W.W.W.
OK
,R.E.R.
OK I
5.
Collet Assembly (693C827)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 6.
Roller Mount Assembly (932C149)
W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK a.
Weld W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK b.
Spud W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OX c.
Anti-Rotational Roller W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK d.
Guide Roller W. W. W.
OK R.E.R.
OK e.
Roller Housing W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 7.
Spring (111A3298)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 8.
Spring Washer (145AS454)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 9.
Guide Plug (856B397)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 10.
Drive Housing Welds (585D289)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK
- 11. Magnet (llA2311)
Leak checked at 2120F - OK I Shallow marks on both parts frcn foreign material interference.
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FIGURE 3 DkESDEN C07. TROL ROD DRIVE INSP_ECTION
SUMMARY
Drive Serial No.
1309 Removed from Core Pesition Shop No.
21 C-4 Dye Penetrant Visual Part Mame Insp. By Results Insp. By Results 1.
Index Tube (5850288)
W. W. W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 2.
Piston Head Assembly (192C554)
' ?. W. W.
W R.E.F.
OK 3.
Shuttle Fiston (856B390)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 4.
Stop Piston (115A8600)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 5.
Collet Assembly W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 6.
Roller Mount Assembly (932C149)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK a.
Weld W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK b.
Spud W. W. W.
OK R.E.R.
OK c.
Anti-Rotational Roller W. W 'i.
OK R. E. R.
OK d.
Guide Roller W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK e.
Roller Housing W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 7.
Spring (ll1A3298)
W. W. W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 8.
Spring Washer (145A5454)
W.W.W.
OK B. E. R.
OK 9.
Guide Flug (856B397)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 10.
Drive Housing Welds (585D289)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK
- 11. Magnet (11/2311)
Leak checked at 212 F - OK W. W. Witt - C. E. Co., Testing Department R. E. Reder - C. E. Co., Dresden Nuclear Power Station
e FIGURE 4 y
DRESDEN CONTROL ROD DRIVE INSPECTION SUNMARY Drive Serial No.
1225 Removed from Core Position Shop No.
60 K-4 Dve Penetrant Visual Part Name Insp. By Results Insp. By Results 1.
Index Tube (5850288)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 2.
Piston Head Assembly (192C554)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 3.
Shuttle Piston (856B390)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 4.
Stop Piston (115A8600)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 5.
Collet Assembly W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 6.
Roller Mount Assembly (932C149)
See Note 1 a.
Weld OK b.
Spud Note 2 c.
Anti-Rotational Roller Note 3 d.
Guide Roller OK e.
Roller Housing OK 7.
Spring (lllA3298)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 8.
Spring Washer (145AS454)
W.W.W.
OK R.E.R.
OK 9.
Guide Plug (856B397)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK 10.
Drive Housing Welds (585D289)
W.W.W.
OK R. E. R.
OK i
11.
Magnet (11A2311)
Leak checked at 212 F IThese parts were sent to San Jose, California for inspection.
2Marks on two opposite corners of the spud indicated produced during blade removal.
3 Anti-rotation roller, roller shaft, and two of the three parts of the sheared spirol pin were found on this failed assembly.
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