ML19339C419
| ML19339C419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1980 |
| From: | Tramm T COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339C420 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011180335 | |
| Download: ML19339C419 (12) | |
Text
l f' ' 'x Commonwealth Edison 1
) One First Nationst Pina. Ch:cago. Ilkno,s kn ~ '?
Address Reply to: Post Of!>ce Box 767
\\s
/ CNcago, !!hnois 60690 v
a O
ll November 7, 1980 g
.-y
<o bi.y Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director a
Gd Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
[
SE$,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l;
c;
-)
Washington, DC 20555
'a j
Subject:
Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304 Reference (a):
July 31, 1980, letter from D.
G. Eisenhut to D. Louis Peoples
Dear Mr. Denton:
Reference (a) requested two reports documenting the results of our review of controls for the handling of heavy loads near spent fuel.
Attachment A to this letter contains the first of the requested reports.
The second report is not due for another three months.
Attachment A also indicates the manner in which the interim actions described in Enclosure 2 to Reference (a) have been implemented.
One original and thirty-nine (39) copies of this letter are included for your use.
Seven (7) copies of drawings referenced in Attachment A are also included.
Please address questions regarding this report to this office.
Very truly yours, TA,iW T.
R.
Tramm Nuclear Licensing Administrator Pressurized Water Reactors cc:
Zion Resident Inspector (w/att.)
S.
P.
Carfagno, Franklin Research Center (w/att.)
801 irs 0335 f
rocon
..J
2 l
NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 50-304 ATTACHMENT A Partial Response to Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads 2.1 General Recuirements for Overhead Handling Systems Request 1:
Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis).
4
.l Response 1:
The cranes and trolleys identified throughout the plant that handle loads in areas where equipment for shutdown or decay heat removal is located are listed below by building.
Containment Polar crane Underhung hand geared bridge crane (1 ton capacity)
Manipulator crane j
Fuel Handlino Building l
Fuel building crane Fuel handling bridge Auxiliary Building 2-ton trolley attached to rail at 666' 0" elevation at top of i
auxiliary building.
l Diesel Generator Room 2-ton trolley attached to two 10-ton monorails running the full length of each side of'each diesel generator.
Crib House 10-ton hoist attached to 16-ton monorail I-beam at 646' 11 3/4" elevation on roof of crib house.
l
. i Request 2:
Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impacs point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or core cecay heat removal.
Response 2:
The turbine building crane and MSR removal trolleys were excluded from item 1 aDove since no system or component required for plant shutdown or core decay heat removal is located in this building.
The radwaste crane and maintenance shop crane also are not listed since they are completely removed from the area of safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment by concrete walls.
The two 4-ton monorails between the fuel building and the
. auxiliary building (one on Unit 1 side, one on Unit 2 side) do not have hoists physically attached to them, are separated from d
safety-related equipment by concrete walls, an,1 physically far i
enough away from the spent fuel pool (approximately 40') to preclude consideration of dropping a load into the pool or damaging spent fuel.
i The two 25-ton monorails at the 592' 0" elevation of the auxiliary building in front of the elevator (running in the east-west direction) do not have hoists physically attached and aIe so low (approx 7' off the floor) that a physical inspection of the area confirms that no safe shutdown or decay heat removal component could be damaged by a load drop.
Request 3:
With respect to the design and cocration of heavy-load-nandling systems in the containment and the spent-fuel-pool area and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1-1, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUHEG-0612, Section 5.1.1.
The following specific information should be included in your reply:
Request 3a:
a..
Drawings or sketches suf ficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.
t
' Response 3a:
Attached are one print each of the following sketches:
MS-16 Holst load path - Crib House MS-681 Hoist load path - Plan Main Floor el. 642' 0" MS-682 Polar Crane load paths - Plan Melz. Floor el. 617' 0" MS-683 Diesel Gen. Room Holst load path - Plan ground Floor el. 592' 0".
These drawings have load paths clearly marked and the nearby equipment is also identified.
Heavy loads drop analysis and safe load path information concerning the fuel handling building have been previously submitted to the NRC in the 4-8-76 letter from R. L.
Golger to A.
Schwencer, 9-14-76 letter from R.
L. Bolger to A.
Schwencer, and the 8-9-77 letter from D. E. O'Brien to A.
Schwencer.
Request 3b:
A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.
Response 3b:
Loads moved in the areas defined in Section 5.1.1 (1) are listed in attached Table 3-1.
The procedures governing the assembly / disassembly and movements of these loads are also listed.
Loads number 1 through 9 are covered by maintenance department procedures.
These procedures allow the movement of the loads from only one point to another.
While the paths for these movements are not explicitly stated in tne procedures, the movements folloa the safest and shortest routes.
These rcutes are shown in 2
the attached sketches listed in the response to Request 3a above.
This practice is consistent with the company's general safety rules and practices.
These safety rules are an integral part of Zion Station's Maintenance Department Admir.istrative Instructions (MDAI's), under which all maintenance work is performed.
Also, this work is performed by maintenance nuclear mechanics and "A" men who are supervised by maintenance foremen.
These personn'el have achieved these positions by demonstrating their craf t knowledge and ability in performing the required work.
NN
-4 Since the safety rules are already established and being followed and the work is being performed oy experienced personnel, the intent of this request is now being met.
Request 3c:
A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lif ting device, and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (2).
Response 3c:
The attached Table 3-2 lists the cranes and the loads normally handled by each.
Table 3-1 indicates the written procedures that govern the handling of each load.
These procedures generally include sections such as Equipment Description, Purpose, Re ferences, Initial Plant and/or component Conditions, Precautions / Limitations in addition to the step by step instructions.
The procedures being used meet the intent of Section 5.1.1 (2) o f NUREC-0612.
Restrictions on loads in the vicinity of the spent fuel pit are also stated in the Composite Licenses for the Zion Units.
For applicable loads that will be moved in the future for which no procedure is now in effect (i.e.,
reactor vessel lower internals), a procedure will be developed prior to the movement of such a load.
Request 3d:
Verification that lif ting devices identified in 2.1.3-c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI 14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate.
For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (4) or 5.1.1 (5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.
Response 3d:
The RCP motor lif ting tripod and the RV head lifting device, and the 17-ton shield blocks slings used at the station comply completely with ANSI B30.9-1971.
This includes, use, maintenance, and r.torage.
Request 3e:
Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance.
Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.
Response 3e:
The crane inspection, maintenance, and operating procedures are all based upon ANSI B30.2-1976, Section 179.
Request 3f:
Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
Response 3f:
The cranes used at Zion Station were purchased to the Cranes which is based on the American Institute of SteelSarge Construction Specifications and the Electric Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. Specifications.
that it is in basic compliance with CMAA70 - 1975A review of this document shows following:
except for the i
1)
Impact Force:
The Electrical Overhead Crane Institute's (EC01) specification which was referenced in Form 2808 requires a design force equal to 15% of the rated capacity of the crane.
The CMAA #70-1975 specifies that the impact load be 1/2% load X Holst Speed in feet per minute and that the impact _should not be less than 15% or greater than 50%
of the rated capacity.
The re fo re, the Zion cranes have been procured to e, criteria which conforma to the requirements of CMAA specification for low hoist speed.
2)
Compressive Stress:
Although the allowable compressive stress specified for the Zion cranes is identical to those specified oy CMAA 70-1975, in Zion this allowable stress is B/C441, whereas CMAA 70-1975 provic.
a limitation of B/CI38, where B is the distance between web plates in incEes and C is the thickness of top cover plate in inches.
Therefore, only if the B/C value falls between 38 and 41, the Zion specification requirements may be slightly less conservative than CMAA 70-1975.
In summary, although the Zion procurement specification dif fers from CMAA 70-1975, in a few isolated areas as outlined above and on the attached Table 3-3, in general they were procured with structural design requirements that are identical or exceed those required by CMAA 70-1974 Reouest 3g:
Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.
Response 3g:
The crane operators for the Maintenance are all
'B' category union personnel.
The polar crane can only be operated by
'A' union personnel who have demonstrated their capability through on-the-job performance.
The fuel handling crane operators receive a refresher course.in crane operations prior to every refueling outage.
This is seminar type training administrated by the senior fuel handling foremen.
While ANSI B30.2-19 76 may be used as a guideline for crane operator training as formal program exists that uses this standard as a basis.
Procedures will be written to incorporate ANSI B30.2-1976 into the Zion operator training program.
..,e
r Table 3-1 m0 ADS PROCEDURE
- 1) Reactor Vessel Head
- 1) RC001-1 " Reactor Vessel and Lifting Rig Head Installation" RC001-4 " Reactor Vessel Head Removal"
- 2) Reactor Upper Internals
- 2) RC001-5 " Removal of Reactor and Lifting Rig Vessel Upper Internals" RC001-6 " Installation of Reactor Vessel Upper Internals"
- 3) Reactor Lower Internals
- 3) No procedure now. Will be and Lifting Rig developed when needed.
- 4) Reactor Coolant Pump Motor
- 4) P/RC110/410-6N
" Inspect / Adjust Reactor Coolant Pump Motor"
- 5) Reactor Coolant Pump
- 5) P/RC110/410-lN
" Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Inspection / Replacement"
- 6) Shield Blocxs
- 6) RC001-1 and RC001-4
- 7) Reactor Vessel Head Studs
- 7) RC001-1 and RC001-4 and Stud Hydraulic Tensors
- 8) Service Water Pump and Motor
- 8) SW001-1 "Disassemoly/ Assembly of Layne Bowler Service Water Pump"
- 9) Equipment Hatch and
- 9) P/PP000-2N Missile Shields
" Removal and Installation of Equipment HM.h"
- 10) Spent Fuel
- 10) FHI-23
- 11) New Fuel
- 11) FHI-02 FHI-14 FHI-33
- 12) Fuel Handling Equipment 12)
A) Spent Fuel Assemoly A) FHI '
Handling Tool B) Thimble Plug Assemoly B) FHI-20 Handling Tool C) Rod Control Cluster C) FHI-21 Change Fixture
- 0) Full Length Control Rod
- 0) FHI-26 Orive Shaft Unlatcning Tool
r: -
Ta ble 3 -1 (Cont'd)
~
LOADS PROCEDURE E) Irradiation Sample Handling E) FHI-30 Tool F) Burnacle Poison Rod Assemoly F) FHI-31 Handling Tool G) Guide Tude Cover Handling G) FHI-32 Tool H) New Fuel Assemoly Handling H) FHI-33 Tool
- 1) Rod Control Cluster Changing I) FHI-37 Tool J) Manipulator Crane J) FHI-13 K) Fuel Transfer System Operation K) FHI-12
- 13) Spent Fuel Handling and Shipment
- 13) FHI-23
- 14) Site Removal of New Assemolies
- 14) FHI-02 from Shipping Containers and Handling of Snipping Contairiers e
e
ZION STATION - UNITS 1&2 CHANES AND IIOISTS Crane / Hoist Load I
Lond Iden ti fication Location Loads Carried Teight Path Polar Crane RPV IIead 73.5T See 225T Stain Hook Each Containment. Rail Elevation 617'-0" RPV Upper MS-G82 35T Aux. Ilook Internals GOT RPV Lower Internals 170T RC Pump Motor 3GT RC Pump 51T Concrete Slabs 17T Underhung Hand Each Containment on permanent rails RX vessel head
.5T lSame as RPV Geared Bridge over the reactor cavity.
studs.
' head.
Crane - 1 ton (In place only during refueling).
2 work baskets.
.125T Along cavity walls when head I$ b* cavity ___
Thimblo nl mm 05T 1!ain tenance Each Containment over reactor Spent fuel
.8T Reactor cavity Bridge cavity.
assy's.
1 ton New fnel assy's.
.8T Reactor cavity Fuel handling
.2T Reactor cavity tools.
. Fuel Handling Fuel Handling Building. Rail Spent Fuel Cask 100T See Fig. 1
~ Building Crane Elevation 643'-0".
Col. Rows New Fuel Contain 3T in 7/14/76 125T Main Hook R-W/17-23 ers.
letter.
15T Aux. Hook Spent Fuel Spent fuel. building over spent Spent fuel
.8T In spent fuel i
Bridge fuel pool.
assy's.
pool.
1 ton New fuel
.8T assy's.
i Fuel tools
.2T In RX cavity.
l Table 3-2 '.
' Crane /Holst-fond Load Identification Location Loads Carried idei gh t Path 2T Trooley-Auxiliary Building in each Diesel Diesel Genera-2T See Generator Room.
Approx. Rail tor.
'MS-683 Elevation 615'-O".
Parts 2T Trolley Auxiliary Building. Approx. Rail Elevation 66G'-O". Col. Row N/18-20 Equipment 2T See Removal MS-681 10T Trolley Crib House. Rail Elevation 646'-11 3/4".
Renoval Slab 6T See Row CC-BB/101-113 SW Pump 5T MS-16 SW Pump Motor 7.5T 9
4
e.
Table 3-3 D
OvEttiirAo Ano ca:.TRy CanNc5 COMPARISON OF STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA ZION 1&2 (3)
Allcwable Stresses (ksi)
!!oi st ing
-:ca-Struct t,c tura l Structural (2)
Rope
- Load :carin
.'v at: i rc. mon ts Desinn Forces
-- Steci Tension Compresion Shear Bearing Rate.1 Cap
'(cracity Impact = I Lateral Material
- !fiesticns
.A snac s70 1.
t Lead X 2 % of ASTM-A3G 17.6 17.6 for b/c 13.2 26.4 20%
20%
Fultiratt Lo 38 frihht 1975 (Itoist Spccd (Live Load Breaking in Feet / Min)
+ Dridge)
Strength
~ss 51 (Standby eice) 2.
151(I(50%
of rated capacity.
20 20%
I=15% of the 5% of (Live ASTM-A36 17.6 17.6 for b/c 13.2 21.6,
Break}ing 41 AISC Fultirate
-- Crar.e (1)
Rated Capacity Load +
d Strength ll
$cifib$nt Bridge) ure-a tion eners 4
tes 461, Class A Service or Dased on 0.9 times the allowables of EOCI 0.3 vires the allowables of AISC pth 2dition) and use of A36 Steel.
.)
b = tistance between web plates (inches) 2)
c = Thickness of top cover plate (inches)
= Published average ultimate stress of material
- 1) Fult 10/14/80 n
"a