ML19339B810
| ML19339B810 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109070 |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1980 |
| From: | NUCLEAR PACKAGING, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339B809 | List: |
| References | |
| 17663, NUDOCS 8011100139 | |
| Download: ML19339B810 (57) | |
Text
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCORPORATING REVISION 2 AMENDMEMTS TO MODEL N-55 APPLICATION, DATED JUNE 15, 1976 Insert new page 0-1 Remove old page 0-1 Add new page 0-la Insert new page 0-3 Remove old page 0-3 Add new page 0-4a Remove old page 0-4 Add new page 0-4b Insert new page 0-5 Remove old page 0-5 Insert new page 0-6 Remove old page 0-6 Insert new page 0-6a Remove old page 0-6a Insert new page 1-3 Remove old page 1-3 Insert new page 1-8b Remove old page 1-8b Insert new page 1-11 Remove old page 1-11 Insert new page 1-13 Remove old page 1-13 Insert new page 1-18 Remove old page 1-18 Insert new page 1-19 Remove old page 1-19 Insert new page 1-20 Remove old page 1-20 Insert new page 1-21 Remove old page 1-21 Insert new page 1-23a Remove old page 1-23 Insert new page 1-23b Insert new page 1-24a Remove old page 1-24 Insert new page 1-24b Insert new page 1-25 Remove old page 1-25 Insert new page 1-46a Remove old page 1-46a Add new page 1-46m Add new page 1-46n Add new page 1-46o Add new page 1-46p Add new page 1-46q Add new page 1-46r Add new page 1-46s Add new page 1-46t Add new page 1-46u Add new page 1-46v Add new page 1-47 Remove old page 1-47 Insert new page 1-50 Remove old page 1-50 Add Figures 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix 1.10.1 Insert new page 1-54 Add Appendix 1.10.4 Add new pages 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 Remove old page 5-1 180122oo /gy
Octobsr 3, 1980 Rnvision ~
APPLICATION FOR NRC CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANC".
AUTHORIZING SHIPMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN THEROPRIETARY NOTICE NUPAC MODEL N-55 PACddfhg ument c n a ns Pf prietan ina u r: anon of Nuclear Pacraging. Inc.
Ecx 1 Md. Tacona. Vash. 98401. It is tlancci ned to /ou in confidence and trust and is 'o ce returned upcn request. Its conean.; cay not be disclosed in whole or in part to others or used for other than the pur;cces for which transsitted without tne prior written pernisalon of Nuclear Packaging, Inc.
O.O GENERAL INFORMATION 0.1 Introduction The Model N-55 Packaging has been.. developed by Nuclear Packaging, Inc., as a safe means of transporting the following classifications of materials:
Classification I:
Type "B" and 2
Large Quantify levels of radioactive materials in all forms other than liquid.
Fissile radioactive material is limited to those quantities licensed under 10 CFR 71.9.
Classification II:
package containing a maximum of 200 grams of fissile material as plutonium 2
oxide or a mixture of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide, in the form of powder and/or sintered pellets.
Authorization is sought for shipment by cargo vessel, motor vehicle, and rail.
Radioactive material is contained in an inner 17H or equivalent j
55 gallon drum which acts as the containment vessel for classifi-c4. ion I payloads.
Two leak tight cylindrical vessels are 2
1 0-1
Octob3r 3, 1980 Ravicion -
supported by high density end buffers and surrounded by vermic-ulite within a 17H or equivalent 55 gallon drum are required for 2
Classification II payloads.
The Model N-55 overpack surrounds 4
and protects the drum from the normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions set forth in 10 CFR 71.
No shielding is provided by the overpack.
Instead, shielding can be added to the inner containment vessel as required by the user.
i 4
0-la 4
j
Octobor 3, 19E0 Rnvision i nto the cavity between the two shells and allowed to expand ccapletely filling the void.
Here it bonds to the shells creating a unitiznd construction for the packaging.
In addition to the foam, a key energy absorber, in the form of a high strength paper honeycomb, is provided.
This material is added to the top end of the overpack to provide additional protection to the drum rolling hoop area.
Mechanical proper-ties of these materials are further described in Section 1.0, below.
Once assembled, the overpack takes the shape of a vertical right angle cylinder with a central separation plane.
In use,
.he lower unit comprises the body or base of the container while the upper unit serves as the lid.
The stepped joint between the two halves is sealed with a neoprene gasket.
The upper and lower sections of the overpack, called the lid and body respectively, are pulled together and secured by four high capacity toggle clamps.
(See Appendix 1.10.2) 0.2.1.3 Containment vessel The overpack is not intended to be the containment vessel.
It's prime function is to reduce the severity of the hypothetical accident conditions and assure there will be no loss of contents to the 55 gallon drum.
0.2.1.3.1 Non-Fissile Material Containment The containment vessel is a gasketed 55 gallon drum, meeting the requirements of Specification 17H or equivalent as 2
stated in 49 CFR 178.118.
A testing program designed to qualify this container as meeting the normal conditions 0-3
Octcbar 3, 1980 f
Ravision 2 transport.
2.
Because the physical for. of the package contents excludes liquids, powders and slurries and because actual test conditions have shown only minimal deformation to the drum with no loss of contents, the leakage tests to verify containment under accident conditions are not required under cur:en: ANSI N 14.5 standards.
2.1.3.2 Fissile Material Containment j
For the shipment of fissile materials as described in Class-ification II, Section 0.0.1, a double containment assembly is provided in addition to the 55 gallon drum.
]
1.
Inner Containment Assembly 2
A double containmenc assembly is provided as shown in Appendix 1.10.1. It is ccanprised of two independent containment boundaries complying with the special requirements for plutonium shipment defined in Para. 71. 42 (b) of 10CFR71.
2.
Inner Container The inner container serves as the inner-most containment boundary for the inner containment assembly and is loaded with the package contents.
3.
Outer Container The outer container serves as the outer-most containment boundary for the inner container assembly and is loaded with the inner container, as defined above.
4.
Storace Drum The 55 gallon storage drum contains the inner containment assembly as shown in Appendix 1.10.1, and provides primary I
containment for package contents of solid form.
Inner 0-4a i
~_
October 3, 1980 Revision containment assambly and drum axis of symmetry coincide.
void spaces between these elements are filled with vermiculite and closed-cell polyurethane foam indexing buffers.
The 2
storage drum may be either a DOT 17C (16 guage body) or 17H (18 guage body) steel drum (55 gallon).
0.2.1.4 Neutron Absorbers There are no materials used as neutron absorbers or moderators in the Model N-55 packaging.
0.2.1.5 Package Weight Gross weight of the package is approximately 750 pounds.
0.2.1.6 Receptacles There are no internal or external structures supporting or protecting receptacles.
0.2.1.7 Sampling Port There are no sampling ports.
0.2.1.8 Tiedowns Tiedowns are a structural part of the package.
From the attached general arrangement drawing it can be seen that four reinforced tiedown locations are provided.
Refer to Section 1.4.4 for a detailed analysis of their structural integrity.
0-4b-w
Octobnr 3, 1930 c.evision 2 i
0.2.1.9 Lifting Devices Lifting devices are a structural part of the package.
From the general arrangement drawing it.can be seen that four reinforced lifting locations are provided.
Refer to Section 1.4.3 for a detailed analysis of their structural i
integrity.
0.2.1.10 Pressure Relief System There are no pressure relief valves.
0.2.1.11 Heat Dissipation 2
The package can safely transport up to 5 watts of internal heat.
See Section 1.7.3 below.
There are no special devices used for the transfer or dissipation of heat.
0.2.1.12 Coolants There are no coolants involved.
0.2.1.13 Protrusions There are no outer or inner protrusions in the Model N-55 packaging.
i 0-5 i
Octobor 3, 19.0 i
Revision 2 O.2.1.14 Shielding Shieldina is not a part of the N-55 packaging.
0.2.2 Operational Features Refer to the schematic diagram of the packaging.
There are no complex operational requirements connected with the N-55 packaging and none that have any trt:1 sport significance.
0.2.3 Contents of Packaging This application is for transporting the following radioactive materials:
I.
Classification I Contents:
a)
Type "A" quantities in normal or special form.
b)
Type "B" quantities, in normal or special form, as defined in 10 CFR 71.4 (q).
c)
"Large Quantity" of radioactive material, in normal or 2
special form, as defined in 10 CFR 71.4 (f).
d)
Fissile quantities are those limited to the amounts as generally licensed under 10 CFR 71.9.
e)
The chemical and physical form of the package contents will be in all forms other than liquids, powders or slurries.
II. Classification II Contents:
a)
Fissile material consisting of a weight not to exceed 200 g
~
of fissile plutonium oxide or a mixture of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide in the form of powder and/or pellets.
Materials are contained in plastic bags and within sealed metal cans.
0-6
Octobsr 3, 1980 Revision 2 0.2.3.1 Secondary Impact t
For less than full loads, sufficient dunnage, shoring and/or bracing shall be utilized to minimize secondary impact of the secondary packaging within the cavity under normal and accident conditions.
Protrusions from secondary packaging such a.s lifting eyes, etc., shall be positioned such that they will not contact the cavity walls or shoring shall be provided to prevent puncture of the cavity walls, by the protrusions under the nornsal and accident conditions.
l 0-6a
October 3, 1980 Ravision 2 Secondly, the superior absorption capability of rigid foam is utilized.
This material has a proven performance in Type "B" Packages as well as others referenced in MIL-HDDK-768 (sm)
Rigid Polyurethane Foam Packaging Design.
The third system is through the incorporation of a crushable honeycomb located 2
directly in the area of the drum lid.
The honeycomb is bonded i
to the fiberglass and forms an extremely strong panel able i
to react large bending moments.
It is through this combination of the reinforced undeflecting internal shell and the crush-able energy absorbing external shell and foam that the package design criteria is based on.
i For transporting fissile material enclosed in a double containment, 4
two closed cell polyurethane foam end buffers are used to keep the containment centered witnin the drum anc provice load cistributien over the ends of the drum.
2 The remaining space is filled with vermiculite to provide additional lateral support.
Full scale drop tests were run to verify the integrity of this package.
Reference:
Appendix 1.10.4.
i 1-3
~
october 3, 1980 Ravision 2 (46000)(.0276)(4)
P
=
5060 lbs (tension or shear)
P
=
t 1.4.4.2 Shackle Capability 2
1/4 shadde has an ultimate capacity of:
6000 lbs. per Crosby-Laughlin P
=
.7 P (heat treated steel)
P.,
=
u 2
4200 lbs.
e 1.4.4.3 Ring Capability Tie down loads are reacted at the lugs by the reinforced ring
~
and package section.
From the attached ring analysis, for a ring reacted at two points and loaded over the opposite section, the maximum bending moment can be determined.
The maximum moment occurs at the point of load and is defined as:
K, P M
=
n Where K,
.15050 (Se.e attached analysis)
=
P n
16 in.
r
=
(.15050)(2738)(16)
M
=
6593 in-lbs @ lug M =
The bending stress in the composite ring is given simply as:
Mc /I F
=
b 1-8b
October 3, 1980 Ravision 2 f2 in Timoshenko " Theory of Plates and Shells", page 62, as:
3+3 2
M Mr t
' 16 ga Where: 9=
Poisson's Ratio =.3 external pressure, (25 psig) q
=
radius of plate (16 in) a
=
i (25)(16)2 1320 in lbs Then:
M
=
r 1
Consider an element in the circular container end, subjected to 25 psi external pressure.
S?z "
1 i
The moment of inertia I for a sandwien structure,-using the
" transfer formula" is equal to:
2 I
=I
+ 2Ad gg xx with the nomenc.ature defined below:
T'le I term it. tegligible.
For a 5 " foam thickness, xx I
=2 (1) (2k) 2 =.485 in 4
gg 1
-Stress in the steel shells will be equal to:
=(
I
}
fb=
= 6110 psi i
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October 3, 1980 Ravicion 2 1.6 Normal Conditions of Transport The N-55 Packaging Sas been designed and constructed, and the contents are so limited (as described in Section 0.2.3 above) that the performance requirements specified in 10 CFR
- 71. 35 will be met when the package is subjected to the normal conditions of transport specified in Appendix A of 10 CFR 71.
The ability of the N-55 Packaging to satisfactorily withstand the normal conditions of transport has been assessed and de-scribed below:
1.6.1 Heat 1
A detailed thermal analysis can be found in Section 1.7.3 wherein the package was exposed to direct sunlight and 130 F still air.
The steady state analysis conservatively assumed a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> day maximum solar heat load.
The maximum drum temperature was found to be 163'F.
These 2
temperatures will have no detrimental effects on the package.
1.6.2 Cold The materials of construction for the packaging, including the overpack and the drum, are not significantly effected by an ambient temperature of -40 F.
The package contains no fluids which could freeze and expand such as water.
1-13
October 3, 1980 j
Ravision 2 1.7.1 Free Drop i
1.7.1.1 55 Gallon Drum Containment 2
j The performance and structural integrity of the N-55 Package was evaluated for the drop orientation that caused the most severe damage as described below.
The assessment of the package was made as a result of full scale testing and de-tails are provided below:
A full size N-55 overpack was fabricated for testing.
Its empty weight was found to be 180 pounds.
A 17H drum was filled with sand until its gross weight reached 570 pounds.
The lid was installed and pressure tested to 10 psi.
No leaks were noted.
i The d rum was placed in the lower half of the N-55.
The lid
[
1 was lowered into place and secured by means of the four toggle clamps.
It was then transported to the test pad.
A l
total of three 30 foot drops were conducted on this unit.
These tests wsre followed by a 40 inch pin drop.
I
- 1. 7.1.1.1 First 30 Foot Free Droo (Corner) 2 I
The N-55 was raised to a height of 30 feet above the test pad.
It was released with an orientation that would provide a corner impact directly over the drum's bolt ring.
(Refer i
Photo P-1, Appendix 1.10.3) t l-18
.. ~ -
Octobar 3, 1980 Ravision 2 9
On impact the overpack crushed to a depth of approximately i
8 inches (Refer Photo P 2).
All latches remained firmly intact with no indication of yielding.
1.7.1.1.2 Second 30 Foot Drop (Co rner)
]2 i
i Following the first test the overpack was reconnected to the quick release and positioned so as to impact on the diagonally opposite corner.
5 Upon impact the overpack crushed to a depth of approximately 4
inches (Refer Photos P 2 and P 3).
All latches remained firmly intact with no evidence of yielding.
i i
- 1. 7.1.1. 3 Thira in vnn*_ nemn reia.1 3
The overpack was again reconnected and raised to a height of 30 feet.
It was oriented so as to impact on its side directly over one of the latches.
Om impact, the overpack locally flattened in approximately 3/4 inch.
All latches, including the one receiving the direct impact, remained fully locked.
1 1-19
Octob2r 3, 1980 Ravision 2 i
1.7.1 1.4 Summary of Results l 2-
~
Since the closure ring end of the drum is more fragile than the formed end, it was protected with a greater foam thick-4 ness.
This provides increased stopping distance which is directly related to impact acceleration and loads.
The difference in crush depth then can be related to impact protection.
I
]
Following a 40 inch puncture test (Refer Section 1.7.2) the overpack was opened for inspection.
All four latches worked i
j smoothly.
The lid and drum were removed for inspection.
As can be seen from Photo P 5, P 6, P 8, and P 10, the drum I
experienced only minor lid deformation.
An examination of-the fiberglass liner showed little or no internal deformation.
(Refer Photo P 7).
A few small cracks in the wall were obser-i ved.
Thr un rusulted from the side drop. (Refer Photo P 9).
Since deformation to the drum was minimal, there was no loss of contents (sand).
A subsequent pressure test was conducted to 10 psig.
A small air leak was present in the area of the bolt ring.
1 The side drop produced a very slight flattening of the drum as evidenced in Photo P 10.
It appeared to have no effect on the 1-20
Octobsr 3, 1980 Revision 2 drum's integrity.
After reviewing the damage, it was concluded that the package performance could be improved through a small modification to the inside shell configuration.
The prototype interior ends were flat.
On impact the flanged heads of the drum were de-flected down until contact was made with the interior shell.
This represented the majority of the drum deflection.
There-fore, by preshaping the package interior to more closely match the drum lid exterior, localized deflection would be nearly eliminated. Leading would be mcre uniformly distributed and reacted in simple compression.
As a result the design has been modified to include localized support. (Refer attached sketch).
It can be concluded from the photos that the drum maintained its integrity following three 30 foot drops and experienced no loss of contents.
1.7.1.2 Doublo Containment + 55 Gallon Drum Tne performance anc structural integrity or the N-55 Package containing fissile materials in double containment and enc:osed in a 55 gallon 2
drum was evaluated for the drop orientation which caused the most severe camage.
The assessment of the package was made as a_ result of full scale testing and is described in full in Appendix 1.10.4.
1.7.2 Puncture A 40 inch drop onto a 6 inch diameter pin produced a local in-dentation of approximately one inch.
Examination of the drum showed no apparent effects from the drop.
It can be concluded that the drum experienced no detrimental effects from the punc-ture test.
1-21 m
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- ~.
October 3, 1980 Asvicion 2 i
1.7.3 Thermal Analysis 2
4 i
This section contains two separate thermal analyses.
Thermal analyses for general payloads are completely described in Section 1.7.3.1 (Classification I).
Equivalent thermal 1
.i analyses for the N-55 with a mixed oxide Inner Containment Assembly are described in Section 1.7.3.2.
(Classification II) l t
1-23a
(
=.
October 3, 1980 Ravision 2 1.7.3.1 Thermal Analvsim - canaral Pavicads (Classification I) 2 The thermal insulation capabilty of rigid polyurethane foam has been well established in such packages as DOT 6272 and DOT 6400.
Actual fire tests demonstrated a close correlation to analytic results.
When polyurethane foam is heated to temperatures above 600 F 4
it begins to decompose forming a char and gas.
Gases are vented frem the package through two low melting point plugs.
Since this decc= position takes place at the skin first, the vented gases carry much of the surface heat away with them.
The char is a porous material that blocks the radiant heat.
Therefore, the off-gasing and char serves to act as a high temperature insulator that protects the virgin foam.
The combination of these can be conservatively represented as an air gap.
For this analysis it was conservatively assumed that this decomposition would take place at 400 F.
By combining this action with the extremely high insulating capability of the virgin foam, a very eff_ective insulating system is achieved.
The following analysis, assumptions, and material properties i
are identical to those approved under numerous other applica-tions (DOT 6272, DOT 6400, DOT 6553, DOT 6679, DOT 6744, and Westinghouse Model MO-1 Packaging).
l 1-23b
October 3, 1980 Rsvision 2 12 1.7.3.1.1 Senmary Results The transient thermal response of the N-55 overpack due to hypothetical accident conditions (fire) prescribed by 10 CFR 71 has been determined by a lumped parameter thermal analysis.
4 Results indicate.both the payload (55 gallon drum) and the inner wall of the overpack exhibit peak temperatures less than 200 F.
Summary results, extracted from the computer analysis output listing, are shown on the following figure.
Specifically, the inner wall of the overpack approaches a peak temperature of 199.4 F approximately 33 minutes following termination of the fire exposure.
4 Similiarly, during the 3.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> period of the fire senario the payload temperature rises to a maximum temperature of 171.8 F.
I While the payload temperature does not maximize during the analysis, the surrounding inner wall, which serves as the heat source for the payload, has dropped to a temperature of 174.7 F.
Thus a peak payload temperature cannot exceed 174.7 F and more probably maximizes at approximately 172.2 F.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the thermal exposure will not cause pres-sure detrimental to the containment vessel.
i 1-24a
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October 3, 1980 Rmvision 2 1.7.3.1.2 Analysis 2
Analysis Assumptions The assumptions comply with those typically assumed for the 10 CFR 71 hipothetical fire accident.
Specifically:
Duration:
30 Minutes Source Temperature:
1475 F Surface Emissivity:
0.8 Post fire conditions assume cooling consisting of:
0
- Radiation to a 70 F sink (Ambient Air)
- Free convection over sides and top of overpack surface Initial conditions assume an overpack temperature of 161.97 F.
This temperature is consistent with the " Normal Transport" design conditions recommended by Shappert's Cask Designer's Guide, ORNL-NSIC-68.
Specifically, this design condition assumes a het summer day (130 F) and incident solar illumination at latitude 42 N.
Model Details Basically the model is subdivided into 13 nodes, as shown on
.the following sketch.
An individual node is assigned to each of the following components:
The source, the overpack outer wall, the inner wall, and the payload.
Three additional nodes are assigned to each of the three components of the overpack walls or sides, top, bottom.
Heat transfer mechanisms, for the undamaged overpack, are re-presented by 16 thermal resistors connecting the 13 nodes in an appropriate manner.
1-25
October 3, 1980 Revision 2 1.7.3.1.3 N-55 Internal Heat Fating f2 The maximum internal heat rating of materials transported within the N-55 overpack is directly related to external ambient air temperature, assuming a conservative solar heat load on the external surface of the overpack.
Assuming a summer day at latitude 42 N (per Shappert's Cask Designers Guide, ORNL-NSIC-68) the maximum internal heat rating of the N-55 is related to external ambient air temperature by the following linear relation:
46.2 -.2486T qI
=
Internal Heat Rating, watts.
Where:
qI
=
Ambient Air Temperature F.
T
=
Specifically, at 100 F this corresponds to an internal heat rating of 21.4 watts.
At 120 F the internal heat rating de-creases to 16.3 watts.
The analysis used to derive this rating assumed a maximum internal overpack temperature of 212 F and a steady state solar heat load corresponding to the p :ak (instantaneous) solar illumination on a totally unshaded N-55 overpack.
Notably, while the 212 F maximum internal ovarpack temperature assumption contains no conservatism, the use of peak solar heat loads as a steady state load does imply ample conservatism.
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- s.,.-
E..a r
i j
--- 5
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s
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= :::
i N
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9u
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= !!
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-l = {
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- 6. I 6 1-46m
-SA
October 3, 1980 Revision.2 1.7.3.2 Thernal Analysis - Mixed Oxide Payload (Classification II)
This thermal analysis is essentially identical to that contained in Section 1.7.3.1 except for the followinc chances:
The configuration and model has been augmented, as shown e
on the following sheets, to represent the inner contain-ment assembly surrounded by a vermiculite fill, all contained within the 17H drum.
e The internal decay heat load has bees revised from 3 watts to 5 watts.
2 e
Solar insolation loads and initial conditions for the hypothetical fire accident have been revised to agree with those defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 7.8.
(The analyses in Section 1.7.3.1 were performed prior to the publication of Reg. Guide 7.8.)
e The emissive power of the hypothetical fire accident has been adjusted to correspond to a source emissivity of 0.9, per Appendix B of 10 CFR 71.
(The analyses s
of Section 1.7.3.1 conservatively assumed an emissivity of unity.)
s 1-46n i
Revision 2 47224770dS ffE. $MMEC $ts<)MsWE2 b46Y Yebfd.,,
/.r - - a,< ~ -,
, /
A6&T 4A79'b.b. x &c "
(No/x/$)
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=
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i 4o
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[off Fod WCbs /D AU' sir-ecd <.
q,..e(,,,)
G,,4 = G&)(7M) = Kc wl.-
Pe oc st /b o (venecunirs an) r Ak,
.& (r./z) i(r-/;-) = 22/4179 Mia frK/
A
=K 16-9-
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=
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gp:(egoa4)/').,r(ge'),p = /6QG &)w fgr: (i/K) - (e6(e) ;V;
=
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WY= 'l&A$ hfu//w
/2 (vs.fDhbbMff/JE,p/-hh)
/A'aset to Mae Mbcet 6' ) %riR t' us,nsa 4y iseur = ju s-s p
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Yprer = /ffs'r--
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d gt =09Y a
THd ie Fr<M2avr.c A m.4/c7xby pr<.ueti sr--
5 =(c 5 *)+
\\
E = w,7l= V y 4
-+
& =pwx+Norf74 = asM *e= /M7/ **
1-4Go.
October 3, 1980 Revision 2 Table 1.7.3.2-1 summarizes predicted steady state temperatures for a 5 watt payload with solar insolation per Reg. Guide 7.8 and amhicnt air temperature of 100 F.
Key package temperatures I
are as follows:
1 Thermal Tenpgrature Location Node Nr.
( F)
Outer Shell 2
140.1 Mid Wall 6
150.3 Inner Shell 12 162.0 17H Drum 13 163.0 2
Inner Containment Assembly 14 206.6 The drum gasket represents the only temperature cr.tical i
element of the package.
An upper temperature limit of 300 F has been established for this component.
Since this analysis predicts a drum temperature of only 163 F, it may be concluded that normal thermal events will cause no detrimental effects upon the containment vessel.
1-46q
'N55-M0 EONIAINER, STEADT STATE, 100 F-AIR, 5 WAITS STEABY STATE FROBLEM TOTAL NUMBER OF NEUTDN ITERATIONS =
3 NUMBER OF TEMPERATURE DEFENDENT INTERPOLATIONS =
2 NO. OF MEUT0N ITERATIONS FOR FINAL UPDATE =
1 ELASS 2 - TEMPERATURE, 1 ID DEGREES F Il DEGREES F ID DEGREES F ID DEGREES F e
1 100.0000000 2
140.0716131 3
145.9279715 4
145.5427083 5
144.5735733 6
150.3402584 7
151.0138035 8
149.0755334 Q
9 155.9249842 10 156.4848987 11 153.5774936 12 161.9559939
{
13 163.0065199 14 206.6243414
~
L w
Y
~
s.g 5.l gn 8
tJ
~
October 3, 1980 Revision 2 The hypothetical fire accident was performed using the tenp-eratures of Table 1.7.3.2-1 as initial conditions.
All other facets of the corrsponding analysis presented in Section 1.7.3.1 were replicated, including insertion of " damage" resistors corresponding to predicted deformation of the N-55 overpack.
Plotted thermal transient results are shown in Figures 1.7.3.2-1 and -2.
Key package extreme temperatures during the fire transient are as follous:
Thermal Tempgrature Location Node Nr.
( F)
Outer Shell 2
1420.6 Mid Wall 6
696.1 Inner Shell 12 216.6 17H Drum 13 216.3 Inner Containment Assembly 14 216.9 Once again, the maximum temperature of the drum gasket is well below the upper temperature limit.
l 4
2-46s r -
October 3, 1980 Revision 2
FIGUDI 1.7.3.2-1 HYPOTHETI[nL F:RE ACCIDENT N55-M0 CONTRINER TRANSIENT, 100 F-RIR, 5 WRTTS o
9 STM VARIASLE DE8Cn!PT!oM MAXIMUM MINIMUM C15==
m -sounct/stNu 1424 7o O
e outra snELL 142o to a
M!o WALL 896 052 131 713
)ll d
+
INNEn SNCLL 218.58o 151 804 x
17nonuM zis.2so tar.sez g
.. m r.i.e.
u..........
5f li i
O i
i a
c e Yo Oll S-e!!
LL-
$8e z g-ll e
11J G o
3 h
a Lt.]
O
!g eo_
h 2
yso W G Ce LL.!O O_ R (Yh Ec to, O
8e !!L.
[B l
c_
3
= 33 9
%.00 2'.00 4'.00 6'.00 8'.00 l'O. 00 TIME (HOURS) i 1-A6t
October 3, 1980 Revision 2 FIGURE 1.7.3.2-2 HYPOTHETICAL FIRE ACCIDENT N55-M0 CONTAINER. TRANSIENT, 100 F-RIR, 5 WATTS oo SYN VAR!RSLE DESCRIPTION MAXIMUM MIN! MUM N_
INNER SHELL 218.540 181 004 A
M0 CONTRIMER 214.808 208.000 oo o
Z-
,k__.
M.-
=
5
^
^
1 1
r g;
IN ww To C.D o w-oh w
E o "D o
+.
cre_
x-w c_rWo
- 9o_
e o9
?-
oo "b. 00
. '8 0 1'.60 2'.40 3'.20 4'.00 TIME (HOURS)
~
1-46u
Octobsr 3, 1980 Ravision 2 The predicted pressure induced stresses in the inner contain-ment assembly are determined from the following:
1.
The contents are dry - no water present.
2.
The pressure rise due to air sealed in the cavity is simply:
P=
(14. 7) (216. 9 + 4 59. 6 9) = 18.78 psia
( 70
+ 459.69) 4.08 psig
=
3.
The 300 Series stainless steel containment assembly is a cylindrical vessel of 4.875" O.D.
x.095" wall.
Stresses are:
c
= Ro = (4.875/2
.095)(4.08)
Hoop t
.095
= 100.6 psi U
50.3 psi Long = JR
=
2t 2
The associated margin of safety versus yield is:
30000
-1 = + Large M.S.Y
=
(100.6+50.3)
Thus, it may be concluded, the hypothetical fire accident will cause no detrimental effects upon the package or containment assembly.
i 1-46v
October 3, 1980 Revision 2 1.7.4 Water Immersion.
Water immersion will have no effect on the overpack or drum.
1.7.5 Summary of Damage The prototype package for Classification I contents was subjected l2 to three 30 foot drops followed by a 40 inch puncture test.
Damage to the drum was limited to slight bulging of the head.
This will be eliminated on production units through a modification to the interior to provide a " form fit" interior.
Using the damaged configuration a computerized thermal analysis showed that maximum payload temperature would not exceed 200 F.
A prototype package for the double containment payload (Class-ification II contents) was also subjected to three 30 foot drops.
There was no measurable damage to either of the double containment 2
elements and both successfully passed post test helium leak check,
~7 3
ensuring a leak rate of less than 10 atn-cm /sec, at standard conditions defined in ANSI N14.5.
As a result of the above assessment, it is concluded that should the N-55 Package be subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions, no radioactive material would be released from the package.
1-47
I 1.10 Apoendix 2
Index To Appendix
+
i 1.10.1 Figure 1 General Arrangement Drawing, N-55 Package, Double Containment Figure 2 General Arrangement Drawing, Double Containment Assembly Figure 3 General Arrangement Drawing, Indexing Buffer t
1.10.2 Data Sheet - Toggle Clamps t
1 1.10.3 Photos 1
i j
I E
i-l-50
AFFt.N Dix 1.10 0 1 October 3, 1980 FIGURE 1
Revision 2 N -55 PACKAGE, DOUBLE CONTAINMENT (Mixed Oxide Fuel Configuration) a 25 DIA.
A N-5 5 'n~PE E l
OVERPAIK I
h I
I i
l 17C and/cr 17H I
i.
C-W-.-
55 GELON DEUM l
I e,
I
, f' g*
i
's INDEXING BUFFER Drawing DR-60-OlD i
kk WW-i 1
35-1/2 Ih-
'i i
h.
~'
-. y' i
43
.y sl N
l gy f'
J d
VEPF.ICLCITE l
1 e
'M i
e.n
.l DOUBLE CONTAINMENT I
. I A
ASSY INDEXING BUFFER
{
l[
l
]
=
24 DIA.
2
=
31-3/8 DIA.
~
D"*D
- D NY@
ob of XSL
(
-w<
Octobsr 3, 1980 sion 2 APPENDIX 1.10.1 FIGURE 2
DOUBLE CONTAINMENT ASSEMBLY HELIUM PURGE PORT TOP AND BOTTOM PLUG WELDED 0
N AFTER PURGING AND PRIOR f.c.,V
/
TO TESTING.
nx h
&T l
j d
l 1
l
]
i
.t l
OUTER CONTAINER
,1 300 SERIES SST TUEING
!, i 4.875 0.D. x.095 WALL (Min)
E k OR 4.5 0.D. x.120 WALL Nin) ll I
lN INNER CONTAINER STEEL TUBING (300 Series SST)
,[ f 4.50 0.D.X.
.065 WALL (Min)
OR 4.0 0.D. X.125 WALL (Min) 30 if
}
it l
1 PAYLOAD 16 1
~
l
'.i!
i t
l!
.j
?
4 i
i 3
!]
4 ll
.,1 l ;j TOP & BOTTOM PLATE
~
r ii STEEL X. 2 5 THK (300 SERIES SST)
! 11',-
Y x ' BOTTOM & TOP PLATE a
_ 13 TYP 300 SERIES SST X.50 THK m
NUCLEAR PA CKA GING, INC.
u if TA C O M A, WA S NINGTON 16" I 1 S4
=
8
s 2
1
[
/
2" REF
'////I
/
v
~4 7~ DIA 8
-0 2R 3 PER D MATERIAL:
CLOSED CELL POLYURETHANE F0AM 6 LB/FT H tD NUPA'C FOAM SPECIFICATION NPI.F7 INDBXING BUFFER SS EXXON N-55 MOD NOTES:
UNLESS OTilERWISE SPECIFIED.
DR-60-01D
Appendix 1.10.,
1-54
APPENDIX 1.10.4 QUALIFICATION DROP TEST REPORT HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (TYPE "B")
FOh NUPAC MODEL N-55 PACKAGE PROPSIETARY NOTICE This document contains proprietar7 134 j,
formation of Nucles: Packaging. Inc.
Box 12f.3. hecsa. Wash. 98401. It is
~
transsitted to you in confidence and trusi Its and, is to be returned upon request.
coatants say not be disclosed in whole og ta part to others or used for other th u t M purposes for which transmitted gtugt tM gior writtaa permission of.
Mau fac2 aging. Inc.
Prenared by:
oa Nuclear Packaging, Inc.
ooj j
815 South 28th Street Taconta. WA 9 840 9 Test Date:
September 18, 1980 Approval Signatures:
Project:
4 ll#v29 T
W j
i fd M/o Engineering:
a
/' Q M
9!/O!OO Quality Assarance:
r TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
Page 1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Test Summary and Results 1
2.0 Test Configuration, Definitions, and Descriptions 2
2.1 Containment Assembly 2
2.2 Inner Container 2
2.3 Outer Container 2
2.4 Storage Drum and Packing 3
2.5 NuPac N-55 Overpack 3
3.0 Qualification Tests 3
3.1 Drop Tests 3
3.1.1 Post Drop Test Damage Summary 3
3.2 Leak Test 6-4.0 Conclusion 6
f 4
e
,-, - - =
~
~<
c
-n,
l 1.0 Introduction This document summarizes the results of a thirty foot drop test conducted to verify the integrity of a double contain-ment package complying with the special requirements for plutonium shipment in Paragraph 71. 42 (b) of 10 CFR 71 when specially packaged in a standard NuPac Model N-55 package.
The purpose of this test was to demonstrate by actual test that the package was able to r.rvive the hypothetical accident conditions as specifisd in Appendix B of 10 CFR 71.
1.1 Test Summary and Results A test assembly was fabricated as described in Section 2.0 and subjected to three successive thirty foot drops in accordance with Test Plan DT-02, an end drop, an oblique drop and a side drop.
This series of tests was more severe than the regulations require in that the same package was subjected to the three thirty foot drops in succession.
Thus, the loading was cumulative in nature.
Several significant conclusions can be drawn from an assessment of the package following the series of tests.
N-55 Overpack - the integrity of the N-55 overpack was maintained with no tendency of upper section to separate from lower section and no metal tears.
This was despite landing on one of the latches during the final side drop test.
Although this latch was pushed flush with the skin at the compression plane, it remained latched and, in fact, could be unlatched and operated as designed.
55 Gallon Drum - The 17H drum sustained only slight damage during the test.
The bolting ring and seal remained intact.
During the end drop test, a slight bulging was observed where the containment cylinder and end buffer came into contact with the end of the drum.
After the side drop, an indentation of about 1/2" on the bolting ring and 1/4" on the barrel body was measured.
The lid remained sealed and, in fact, the drum was reusable.
End Buffers and Vermiculite - The end buffers were designed to center the payload (inner containment assembly) in the drum and provide some measure of load distribution over the end of the drum during end impact.
They performed this job well, as can be seen by the minimal damage to the drum. (Figure 3.1.4)
The end buffers were rigid enough to support the containment in the drum during installation, but not so rigid that they caused beam loading of the containment during side impact.
The vermienlite and end buffer combination provided uniform side cushioning to the containment.
i l
l 1
Doub7a Containment The Double Containment assembly showed no visual signs I
or. damage after the tests.
Close dimensional measure-ments taken before and after the test verified that both the inner and-outer cylinders were virtually unchanged.
A helium leak test was conducted on both the inner and i
outer containers and they exhibited no leakage.
(After each final leak test, the respective cylinders were punctured and tested to confirm the presence of helium.)
In summary, it has been conclusively demonstrated through actual test that a double containment afsembly specially packed in a standard NuPac N-55 package can withstand the thirty foot hypothetical accident condition as specified in Appendix B of 10 CFR 71.
2.0 Test Conficuration, Definitions, and Descriptions,
(
Reference:
Figure 2.1-1) 2.1 Containment Assembly Two containment assemblies are shown in Figure 2.1-2.
Each is comprised of two independent containment boundaries complying with the special requirements for plutonium shipments defined in Paragraph 71.42 (b) of 10 CFR 71.
The test assembly consisted of the thinner wall i
container configuration.
I 2.2 Inner Container The inner container serves as the inner-most containment boundary for.the double containment a sembly and is loaded with the package contents.
The package contents were simulated by metal paint or food cans loaded to the proper weight.
The test inner container was 4.50 0.D.
by.065 wall thickness, AISI 1010 steel.
The production inner container will be constructed of 300 series stain-less steel.
The use of AISI 1010 Steel for the prototype during test is conservative, since:
4 i
c
= 30,000 psi and c
= 47,000 psi for AISI 1010 l
- where as -
c
= 35,000 psi and a
= 85,000 psi for 300 Serie s y
u Stainless at the test temperature (%58 F)
The use of 300 Series stainlc s will ensure adgquate structural performance at low temperature (-40 F) operation.
2.3 Outer Container i
The outer container serves as the outer-most containment boundnry for the inner container. assembly and is loaded with - the inner container as defined above.
The test article configuration was constructed of 4.875 0.D. x 3
l 0.072 wall, 300' Series Stainless Steel.
This is conser-
.vative since the' containers to be transported will have a 0.095 (min.) wall. thickness, l
i 2
o 1
r i
1 2.4 Storage Drum and Packing The 55 gallon drum houses the containment assembly as shown in Figure 2.1.1 and provides packaging for contents i
of solid form.
The double containment assembly and I
drum axis of symetry coincide.
Void spaces between these elements are filled with vermiculite and closed-cell poly
)
urethane foam indexing buffers.
The storage drum may be either a DOT 17C (16 gauge body) or 17H (18 gauge body) steel drum (55 gallon).
The weaker of the two, the l
DOT 17H, was used for the drop test qualification of the package.
2.5 NuPac N-55 overpack A standard NuPac N-55 Overpack was used to package the double containment assembly secured in a 55 gallon drum
~
storage assembly.
The adequacy of the NuPac N-55 has been proven in past qualification tests for NRC certifi:ation.
Its performance was verified in this test.
3.0 Qualification Tests 3.1 Drop Tests All drop. tests were conducted at a height of 30'
,3",
measured from the fixed impact target surface to the lowest point of the suspended package by means of a pre-measured end weighted tag line.
All drops were conducted at the NuPac, Tacoma, Washington, drop test pad constructed for the qualification of the Paducah Tiger Package, certification of compliance 6553.
The test pad complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 71, Appendix B.
Drop release was accomplished by a quick release device.
Three package drops were made:
Flat Bottom Drop - The package was oriented vertically with the bottom down and centered above a fixed impact target.
Top Corner Drop - The package was oriented at an inclined angle with the top down and centered above the fixed impact t
target.
The package was suspended with the c.g. over the i
struck corner with its centerline oriented at an angle of 58 with respect to a horizontal plane.
i Side Drop - The package was oriented horizontally centered above the fixed impact target.
3.1.1 Post Drop Test Damage Summary Observations and measurements were made of the component pieces of the N-55 and double contain-ment assembly following each of the drop tests.
The component pieces were completely disassembled after each test to assess the damage.
A photographic i
record of these configurations is shown in Figures
' j
~,, - -
-w y
FIGURE 2.1-1 N-55 PACKAGE, MOD. II (Mixed Oxide Fuel Configuration)
-c 25 DIA.
,-- N-5 5 TYPE B l
OVERPACK l
]
i i
1 l
17C and/or 17H y
jf 55 GALLON DRUM f,ia
}.
'\\.
_ _ - _~
w INDEXING BUFFER 4
&(c.
3 8
C J
35-1/2 I
48
.yI N
LATCH
('
'.j TOGGLE VERMICULITE
',A j
1 e
l
-= r4; x
INNER CONTAINMENT h
I-A ASSY (See Fig. 2.1-2 l
INDEXING BUFFER V
l l
I
)
=
24 DIA.
r 4
31-3/8 DIA.
0{}
[
4
FIGURE 2.1-2 i
INNER CONTAINMENT ASSEMELY TEST ARTICLE ONLY HELIUM PURGE PORT TOP AND BOTTOM U,
PLUG WELDED U
AFTER PURGING AND PRIOR
,c,,v b TO TESTING.
13 s h
g, I
t q
t OUTER CONTAINER 300 SERIES SST TUBING I
4.875 O.D. x. 0 9 5 WALL (Min. )
f OR 4.5 0.D. x.120 WALL (Min. )
- i INNER CONTAINER STEEL TUBING-AISI 1010 4.50 0.D.X.
.065 WALL (? tin.)
OR 4.O O.D.
X 125 WALL (.' tin.)
30 (300 SERIES SST FOR PRODUCTION)
METAL FOOD OR PAINT CANS O
p 4
i ii TOP & BOTTOM PLATE O
i STEEL X. 0. 25" THK AISI 3 010 j
(300 SERIES SST FOR PRODUCTION)
L l
\\ >OTTOM. TOP vtATE
^
_ 13 m 300 SERIES SST X.50 THK 0
h e
l i
3.1.1 through 3.1.11.
The test damage summary is shown in Table 3.1.1.
3.2 Leak Test I
A helium leak test was performed on both the inner and outer containment vessels prior to the test and after the drop test.
In each case, both the inner and outer containers exhibited no detectable leakage.
Thus, it can be safely assured that the containment meets the requirgment of having a leak rate of less than 10-7 atm-cm /sec. after a 30 foot drop hypothetical accident.
(After each final leak test, the respectiva cylinders were punctured and tested-to confirm the presence of helium.)
4.0 Conclusion It has been conclusively shown through an actual 30 foot drop test that a proposed double containment assembly will survive the free drop hypothetical accident conditions as specified in Appendix B of 10 CFR 71 with no loss of integrity.
6
~
3.1.1 through 3.1.11.
The test damage summary is shown in Table 3.1.1.
3.2 Leak Test A helium leak test was performed on both inner and outer containment assemblies prior to the test and after the drop test.
In each case, both inner and outer contain-ments. exhibited no detectable leakage.
Thus, it can be safelyassumedthatthecontainmentcanmeeythereguire-ment of having a leak rate of less than 10 atm-cm /sec.
after a 30. foot drop hypothetical accident.
4.0 Conclusion It has been conclusively shown through an actual 30 foot drop test that a proposed double containment assembly will survive the free drop hypothetical accident conditions as specified in Appendix B of 10 CFR 71 with no loss of integrity.
6
DROP TEST - SEPTEMBER 18, 1.980 TABLE 4.1.1 1:
(BUFP2R)
ORIENTATION N-Fi BARREL INSERTS CONTAINMENT REMARKS.
DROP Bottom Down Pitched slightly Slight indentation Bottom: Insert No visible 1;
End Impact during drop. Max.
in bottom where deformed to a damage.
crush depth = 3" cannister hit -
depth of 1-3/8".
30' at outer edge, barely percept-This represents Crush plane at an
- able, crush of 7/8",
angle of 8 wrt side of opposite horizontal.
All counter bore had latches held and 1/8" protrusion.
integrity of over-Top: Small chip pack maintained removed.
No no damage to hver compressiors.
liner.
DROP CG over Crush depth to a No visible Top: Diagonal No visible Containment 2
struck depth of 5.1".
damage to translation of
- damage, was shifted corner.
All latches held barrel.
counterbore off center 9
30' Angle:57 59 and integrity shifted to b" in 55 gallon Top Down of overpack ain-of f center and drum.
tained.
No 1-h" deep.
Split 4
damage to inner into 2 segments liner.
with the impacted
~
side about 1/3 of segment._
DROP Side Drop Crushed uniformly Flattened Top:
Translated No visible Containment 3
along side to a locally to approx.
4".
Seg-damage.
was nearly depth of l\\".
a depth of ment slightly centered 30' All latches held
\\" on lid and bent.
in drum.
and operated
" on body.
despite impact on Seal held and one latch.
Inner lid securely plastic liner torn attached.
to a length of 34" Integrity of over-pack maintained.
Notes:
1.
Each container of double containment passed post drop helium leak test, insuring leak rate of less than 10-7 atm-3/sec.
2.
The same hardware was used for aST three drop tests.
Damage shown for tests 2 and 3 is cumulative.
PRE-TEST CONFIGURATION.
y_
~'
,5 END BUFFER 7,
f I2
~
1
- ~-
C1 A NMENT gI 5
T
]
bk
. _ -af END BUFFER 7
%;,. d
- l i
y w.-
~
- .v FIGURE 3.1.1 DOUBLE CONTAINMENT ASSY WITH END BUFFERS b"
END BUFFER
' - di
$I.
~
i.
,,.,:ay;..;c.Wx
.::.i VERMICULITE h
N S
.y.
i FIGURE 3.1.2 DOUBLE CONTAINMENT ASSY INSTALLED IN 55 GALLON DRUM o
wao
.m 8
DROP TEST 41 - END DROP r
I
~Iyj ll' FIGURE 3.1.3 ll 1
1
- .e. -
E-x -- e) 4M k.UM END DROP 40gt' t w
%~.- g 's. "p 2. x.<-,* -
(SHOWN AT REBOUND)
+W-x-
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Octob2r 3, 1980 Rsvision 2 5.0 CRITICALITY SAFETY 239 Model N-55 shipping containers, when loaded with 200 g Pu per container (classification II), have been evaluated to demonstrate the safety of Fissile Class II shipments under both normal and accident conditions of transport.
In accordance with the require-ments of 10 CFR 71.33 and 71.39, assuming that a maximum of ten (10) containers will be transported per shipment, it has been demonstrated that 1) a single package will remain subcritical, 2) five times the number of undamaged packages to be shipped (50) will remain sub-critical, and 3) twice the number of packages to be shipped (20) will remain subtritical when damaged to the maximum extent consistent with the hypothetical accident conditions.
5.1 Sinale packace Evaluation For water reflected spherical systems the minimum critical mass of 239 239Pu(I) based Pu-water mixtures has been derived to be 531 g on analyses using methods verified by comparison with Pu (NO )4 3
solution critical experiments. Hence, the limiting quantity of 239 239Pu contained in each package (200 g Pu) represents less than 40% of the quantity required for criticality under optimum conditions of moderation and reflection by water. Since the con-tained plutonium will have a significant (s 15%) 240Pu isotopic composition and, in some cases, will be blended with natural uran-ium oxide either and/or both such additions would result in an 239 increase in the minimum quantity of Pu required for criticality.
Hence, the above assessment remains conservatively valid for all proposed package contents and clearly demonstrates the safety cf individual packages.
(1)
C. R. Richey, " Theoretical Analysis of Homogeneous Plutonium Critical Experiments", Nucl. Science & Eng.. Vol. 31, pp. 32-39, January 1968.
5-1
- ~
October 3 1980 Ravision 5 l
5.2 Undamaged Package Arrays The requirements for Fissile Class II packages specify that for a shipment of ten (10) packages, an array of fif ty (50) packages must 239 remain subcritical. With each package limited to 200 g Pu the 239 average density of Pu within an array of packages is < 0.973 3
g/cm. This is computed as the average (smeared) density of pluton-fum within each specification 17H or 17C container and does not include consideration of the volume occupied by the N-55 overpack. Although much discussion has resulted from attempts to establish a precise 239 minimum critical concentration for aqueous Pu mixtures, the value given by RicheyI ) is 7.19 +.15 g 239 Pu/ t.. The actual aver-age density, therefore, is approximately 14'.' of the value required for criticality.
9 In addition to considering the average density of Pu assuming a homogeneous distribution of material, Clark (3) has shown that the 239 areal density of Pu required for criticality, independent of distri-239 2
bution, is > 0.25 g Pu/cm.
For the contents considered herein, assuming a two (2) high array of packages and ignoring the N-55 over-239 pack, the areal density of Pu is calculated to be < 0.163 g 239 2
Pu/cm.
Hence, the areal density is less than 65" of the minimum value required for criticality.
For verification of the degree of subcriticality expected for a at H/Pu ratios of 5 x 5 x 2 arrangement of packages containing Pu02 less than or equal to 5, calculations were performed with each inner containment vessel surrounded by a water region of varying thickness.
The maximum observed reactivity occurred with a water region thickness (2)
C. R. Richey, "Re-examination of the Value for the Mir.inum Critical Concentration of 239-Pu in Water", Nuclear Science and Engineering, 55, 244 (1974).
j (3)
H. K. Clark, "Effect of Distribution of Fissile Material on Critical Mass", Nuclear Science and Engineering, 24, 133 (1966).
5-2
~
October 3, 1980 Ravision 2
~
of 0.75 inch (1.5 inches between ~ adjacent containers) around each inner containment vessel containing Pu0 -H O mixtures with a H/Pu 2 2 atomic ratio of five (5).
1 The calculated reactivity however, was only 0.17 at the 95" statistical l
confidence level.
(Calculations were performed with the KENO IV Monte 1
Carlo code and multigroup cross sections,18 energy groups, averaged 4
by the GAMTEC-II code.) These calculations support the conservative demonstration of subcriticality provided by fissile material density
)
and distribution considerations and clearly demonstrate that five (5)
)
times the number of packages to be shipped will remain subcritical.
5.3 Damaged Package Arrays 4
Due to the assumptions in Section 5.2 which ignore the presence of the N-55 overpack and considering the minimal damage which results 9
from hypothetical accident conditions, it is evident that the eval-uation of the undamaged package array remains conservatively valid I
for an array of twice the number of packages to be shipped (20 total)
I when damaged to the maximum credible extent.. Specifically, the average density and distribution of the fissile material within an array of packages remains basically unchanged as a result of the hypothetical accident sequence. Consequently, it is conservatively demonstrated that twice the number of packages to be shipped will remain subcritical if each package is subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions and subsequently moderated and reflected by water in an optimum manner consistent with the condition of the damaged package.
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