ML19338F693
| ML19338F693 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1980 |
| From: | Snyder B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Howell J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19338F694 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010270067 | |
| Download: ML19338F693 (2) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
T/E K A s
OCT 10 E80 l
Mr. John A. Howell III 655 Verbenia Drive Satellite Beach, Florida 32937
Dear fir. Howell:
Your letter to President Carter about the accident at the Three !!ile Island nuclear station was referred to me for response.
I regret that this answer has been delayed. The accident and its consequences have created a substantial increase in the agency's workload, which has prevented me from responding to you as promptly as I would have liked.
The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile I.iland conducted an extensive investigation and concluded that the fundamental cause of the acci-dent was " operator error." They did not find that sabotage was involved.
Therefore, there is no need to involve the Justice Department as you suggest.
Enclosed for your information is a copy of the NRC Notice of Violation, which lists the items of noncompliance for which civil penalties were levied against i
Metropolitan Edison Company.
I With regard to the human errors that have been identified as contributing to the l
accident at Three Mile Island, steps have been taken to address procedure changes j
necessary to assist the operator on both a short-and long-term basis.
Immediate changes were required at all Babcock and Wilcox facilities prior to their restart after the Commission ordered them shut down. Also, the Lessons Learned and the
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Bulletins and Orders Task Forces have recommended design and operating require-i ments implemented in the near future on all facilities in operation or under con-I struction. Longer term modifications for all facilities are presently under con-i sideration by the Lessons Learned Task Force, f
The human errors experienced at Three Mile Island stemmed in part from the in-correct interpretation of reactor coolant system instrumentation. Operator training had not previously addressed the system and operator response to the set of conditions experienced during the March 28, 1979, transient. As a result, all licensed operators at Babcock and Wilcox facilities received special training i
and a written examination on the transient. Additionally, these operators at-i tended training sessions on the Babcock and Wilcox simulator to reinforce the j
operator response required during similar transient situations. All training l
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was completed before operators could resume their duties during power operations.
Long-tena commitments on operator training and licensing are being developed by fiRC's Operating Licensing Branch.
I appreciate your concerns and assure you that every effort is being made to ensure the continued protection of the health and safety of the public, not only at Threc !!ile Island, but also at all nuclear power plants.
Since: ely, Be nard J. Snyder, Progra:n Director Three flile Island Program Office Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
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