ML19338F104
| ML19338F104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1980 |
| From: | Pasternak R POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-578 JAFP-80-759, NUDOCS 8010070524 | |
| Download: ML19338F104 (9) | |
Text
e POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FIT 2 PATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT S
RAYMOND J. PASTERNAK P.o. BOX 41 ResWeat Manager Lycommg. New York 13093 315-342-3840 September 30, 1980 SERIAL:
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing
Subject:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Pre-Implementation Review of TMl-2 Action Plan item li.E.4.1
Reference:
Letter, D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to All Operating Plant Licensees dated September 5, 1980
Dear Sir:
Enclosed (Attachment A) for NRC pre-implementation review is the conceptual design for TMI action plan number ll.E.4.1 - Dedicated Penetrations.
Very truly yours, Raymond J. Pasternak Resident Manager RJP:WF:nvw Attachment cc:
D. G. Eisenhut, w/o attachment NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement Division of Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 George T. Berry, PASNY, NYO J. P. Bayne, PASNY, NY0 G. M. Wilverding, PASNY, NYO P. Polk, NRC, NRR o(
R. Burns, PASNY, JAF g
W. Fernandez, PASNY, JAF p
"J\\ \\
DCC 8 010 0705e2/
v-ATTACHMENT A Response to NUREG 0578 Item 2.1.5.a James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Power Authority of the State of New York
ITEM 2.1.5.a DEDICATED PENETRATIONS FOR EXTERNAL RECOMBINERS OR POST-ACCIDENT PURGE SYSTEMS NRC Position Plants using external recombiners or purge systems for post-accident combustible gas control of the containment atmosphere should provide containment isolation systems for cxternal recombiner or purge systems that are dedicated' to that service only, that meet the redundancy and single failure requirements of General Design Criteria 54 and 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, and that are sized to satisfy the flow requirements of the recombiner or purge system.
NRC Clarification (NRC Ltr. of September 5,1980) 1.
This requirement is only applicable to those plants whose licensing basis includes requirements for external recombiners or purge systems for post-accident combustible gas control of the containment atmos-phere.
2.
An acceptable alternative to the dedicated penetration is a combined design that is single-failure proof for containment isolation purposes and single-failure proof for operation of the recombiner or purge system.
3 The dedicated penetration or the combined single-failure proof alternative should oe sized such that the flow requirements for the use of the recombiner or purge system are satisfied.
4.
Components necessitated by this requirement should be safety grade.
5.
A description of required design changes should be provided by October 1, 1980.
Design enanges should be completed by June 30, 1981.
Response
The JAFi1PP design incorporates a Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) i System which provides for control of postulated combustible gases following a DBE. The CAD System is discussed in FSAR Section 5.2.3.8.
Additional information can be found in references 1, 2 and 3 of this attachment.
l l
The primary containment atmosphere is inerted dur ng reactor operation with volumetric oxygen concentration maintained below 4 percent. Approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter a postulated DBE, the CAD System is remote manually initiated to inject nitrogen into the containment to maintain the volumetric oxygen i
concentracion below 5 percent.
l
. Assuming no venting or containment leakage following a postulated DBE, CAD System operation will result in increasing containment pressure as shown in Figure 3A of reference 3.
About 52 days after the DBE, the containment reaches 37 psig (this is below the peak DBE pressure of 45 psig and the design pressure of 56 psig) and must be purged via the Standby Gas Treatment System to reduce pressure.
The CAD System is incorporated in a combined design with the Drywell and Suppression Chamber inerting and Purge System, and all purging is via the Standby Gas Treatment System. These systems are shown in Figure 2.1.Sa-1.
Sizing for Flow Requirements The Drywell and Suppression Chamber Inerting and Purge lines are used during normal plant operation for inerting and delnerting the contain-ment. The inarting and purge lines to the drywell and suppression chamber are 24" and 20" lines, respectively. These'large purge exhaust lines were originally combined into a 30" line leading to an exhaust fan and then directly to the stack. The system was subsequently modified by closing off the 30" line with a blind flange and routing all purging through a 6" line 'to the Standby Gas Treatment System, where the flow passes through HEPA and charcoal filters before going to the stack. The CAD nitrogen supply and purge lines are 1-1/2" and 2" lines, respectively. The CAD System purge lines are sized to limit the maximum CAD purge flow rate and to limit the pressure to the requirements of the Standby Gas Treatment System.
Consideraticn of Single Failure for Containment isolation The redundancy and single failure requirements for containment isolation are discussed in FSAR Sections 5.2 and 7.3, and conformance to General Design Criteria 54 and 56 are discussed in Appendix H, Section H.2.5 The containment isolation systems were found to be acceptable by the AEC in SER Section 5.2.3, and the plant design was found to meet the intent of the General Design Criteria in SER Section 14.0.
Consideration of Single Failure for CAD Dilution Af ter a postulated DBE, normal and CAD purge and supply lines are automatically isolated by the containment isolation system. CAD nitrogen dilution is initiated remote-manually, approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter the DBE, from the CAD panel located in the Relay Room. This is accomplished by first opening a key-locked " emergency manual override" switch mounted on the CAD panel, and then opening the nitrogen makeup valves (27A0V-131A/B and 27A0V-132A/B). No single failure can prevent the initiation of CAD nitrogen dilution, or result in the venting of the containment to the environment during containment dilution.
Consideration of Single Failure for CAD Purging Assuming no containment leakage, CAD purging would be initiated remote-manually approximately 52 days af ter the DBE from the Purge Control Panel, also located in the Relay Room. With the current plant design, when acceptable venting conditions exist, purging is initiated by first opening a key-locked " emergency manual override" switch mounted on the Purge Control Panel, and then opening the CAD purge valves (27MOV-113 and 27A0V-114 from the drywell and 20MOV-117 and 27A0V-118 from the suppression chamber).
As originally designed, CAD purging was not required to meet single failure criteria. There is suf ficient time (approximately 52 days af ter the DBE to rrach 37 psig, and over 100 days after the DBE before the containment design pressu e of 56 psig is approached) for operator action to correct any failure which could prevent purge initiation. However, the proposed modifi-cation will make the design single-failure proof, and eliminate any require-ment for operator entry into the Reactor Building to initiate purging.
With the current plant design, after purging has been established, an inadvertent or spurious opening of 27A0V-113 or 27A0V-117 could result in a higher venting rate to the environment via the Standby Gas Treatment System. This flow rate would be limited by cr*tical flow in the 6" line and would not exceed the design limits of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Remote-manual isolation would be accomplished using 27MOV-120, or either 27A0V-114 or 27A0V-118 depending on which stream the failure occurred. The proposed modification eliminates this potential problem.
Proposed Modification for CAD Purging To insure the capability for purge initiation without requiring operator entry into the reactor building following a postulated DBE, and to eliminate the concern about a single failure while purging, the following modifications are proposed:
The piping and valve modification shown on Figure OP 37-1 will be made.
This involves:
a)
Moving the 2" CAD purge line connections from upstream of 27A0V-114 and 27A0V-118 to downstream of these valves, b)
Changing the power supply of 27MOV-113 to the 125V DC blue emergency bus.
A new MOV (27MOV-122) is to be added to the same line powered by the 600V AC red emergency bus, c)
Leaving 27MOV-117 as is, 600V AC blue, and adding a new MOV (27MOV-123) to the same 1ine powered by the 125V DC (red) emergency bus.
P.e ferences 1.
Responses to AEC questions of May 3, 1972, FSAR Volume IX under "AEC Questions Answered by Letter" 4
2.
Responses to AEC questions of November 30, 1972, FSAR Volume IX l
under "AEC Questions Answered by Letter" 3
Responses to AEC Staff Verbal Requests by the Authority's letter of January 22, 1973, F3AR Volume IX under "AEC questions Answered by Letter" 4.
Letter from the NRC to all licensees of operating plants dated September 5,1980 regarding the TMI Action Plan Requirements i
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