ML19338E661
| ML19338E661 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1980 |
| From: | Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8010030521 | |
| Download: ML19338E661 (1) | |
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Wisconsin Electnc m coumr 231 W. MICHIGAN, P O BOX 2046. MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 September 9, 1980 Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region III U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Dear Mr. Keppler:
DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 REPLY TO IE BULLETIN 80-06 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 It has come to our attention that our June 6, 1980, reply to IE Bulletin 80-06 was not submitted with the appropriate oath or affirmation as specified in the subject Bulletin.
Accordingly, we are resubmitting herewith our response to the Bulletin as euggested by the NRC Resident Inspector.
Very truly yours, (I { U. y C. W. Fay, D,ihector Nuclear Power Department Subscribed and sworn to before me This 9th day of September,1980.
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Notary Public, State of Wisconsin My Commission expires
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Copies to:
NRC Resident Inspector Point Beach Nuclear Plant Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ashington, D. C.
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231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. 60x 2045. MILWAUKEE. WI 53201 June 6, 1980 E-Mi. James G. Keppler, Regional Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region III U. S. IlUCLEAR REGULATORY C0 C11SSIO!!
799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Dear Mr. Keppler:
DOCKET t105. 50-266 A!!D 50-301
_ REPLY TO IE BULLEil:180-C5 P0lf1T BEACH f.UCLEAR PLA:.I Your letter of t' arch 13, 1980, forwarded IE Bulletin 80-06,
" Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls". A review of drawings at the schematic level was conducted to determine all actions (changes to valve position, breaker status, pumo status, etc.) which would result from an ESF actuation signal.
It was also determined wilether or not equipment returned to its non-emergency mode upon removal of the ESF actuation signal and reset of the ESF function. Two instances for which equipment did return to its non-emergency mode 'were identified.
1.
Two valves on each unit control the addition of additive to.the, containment spray system. Upon initiation of containment spray, these valves remain in their normal closed position, thus, not allowing additive into the containment spray system. Two minutes after containment
. spray initiation, the valves will open allowing additive injection into the containment spray system.
The opera-tor may prevent these valves from opening by switching the valve controls to manual prior to the expiration of the two-minute delay time. Upon removal of the contain-ment. spray actuation signal and reset of the containment spray system, these valves will return to their non-emergency or closed position, thus, cutting off additive to the containment spray system.
The operator does have manual control of valve position at all times.
2.
Upon initiation of containment isolation in either unit, a single solen'oid valve is de-energized, causing 1005 recirculation of control room air.
Upon removal of the dupe.
o -f' S o o'7 I 6 o'7 5 'l,
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Mr. James G. Keppler June 6, 1980 containment isolation actuation signal and reset of containment isolation, the solenoid valve 'is energized returning control room ventilation to its non-emergency mode. The operator does have manual control of valve position at all times.
A test to verify that the actual valve controls function as identified in the review of schematic d1agrams during ESF actuation and ESF reset was conducted on Unit 2 during its recent refueling outage. The results of this test showed actual equipment function to be consistent with the logic indicated on the schematic drawings.
We do no.t believe it is necessary to modify control of the containnient spray additive valves as described in (1.) above. This evaluation is based on the fact that containment spray would not be reset unless it was intended to stop the spray system shortly thereafter.
The present configuration would close the spray additive valves automati-cally as a result of containment spray reset and the spray pumps would be manually stopped.
Requiring that a separate operator action be required j
to close the spray additive valves before stopping the spray pumps would
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provide no change in the sequence of events and would introduce another t
manual action required by the operator.
Also, the operator has at all times the option of manually controlling the position of the spray additive valves. Manual control is needed to control the pH of the containment sump water during the post accident recirculation phase.
We do intend, however, to modify the control to the solenoid i
valve described in situation (2.) above, such that 1003 recirculation of control room air will continue after reset of containment isolation.
Return of the control room air supply to its non-emergency mode will re-q'uire separate operator action.
This' modification will be completed as soon as possible, as limited by equipment availability and continued safe operation of the Plant.
An Operations Group special order will be issued to all appro-priate operating personnel informing them that 1005 recirculation of control room air will be automatically discontinued as a result of containment isolation reset and that operator action is required to maintain 100" control room air recirculation.
If you have any questions regarding our corrective actions taken regarding this Bulletin, do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours,
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'h C. W. Fay, Director Nuclear Power Department Copy to:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0' MISSION Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, D. C.
20555 NRC Resident Inspector - Point Beach Nuclear Plant L