ML19338D340
| ML19338D340 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1980 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-16, NUDOCS 8009220376 | |
| Download: ML19338D340 (5) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC' COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 SHIELDS L. DALTROFF stic =1c [n N ion July 30, 1980 Re: Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 IE Bulletin 80-16 Mr..B oy c e 11. Grier, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement Region I U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
This letter is in response to IE Bulletin 80-16, forwarded to us on June 27, 1980, concerning " Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitter with Either "A"
or "D" Output Codes".
Approximately 90 manhours were expended in conducting a review for Bulletin 80-16and in preparing this response.
The " Actions to be Taken by Licensees" and our responses are treated sequentially.
Actions to be Taken by Licensees 1.
Determine if your' facility has inst'alled or plans to install Rosemount Inc. Model 1151 or 1152 pressure transmitters with output-codes "A"
or "D"
in any safety-related application.
. Response The attached Table A lists the Rosemount Inc. Model 1151 or'1152 pressure transmitters with output codes "A"
or "D"' identified by our review that are utilized in safety-related applications.
'2.
_I f. Lit 'is. det ermined that your facility has the transmitters described in 1 above-in'any safety-related application, i
determine whether they can be exposed to input pressures that could' result in anomalous output signals during normal j
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' Page 2 operation,' anticipated. transients or design bases accidents.
'If!the affected transmitters can:be exposed to input pressures th'atLcould result in anomalous output signals, perform a'. worst case analysis to, determine.whether the anomalous-signals'could; result in violating any design basis
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assumption. 'The1 safety-related application shall include control,= protective or indication ~ functions..If any safety-t related' application does not conform'to the above i
-requirements address the basis for continued plant. operation until the ' problem' is - resolved and provide an analysis.of-all potential adverse system.ef f ects -which could occur as a result of a' postulated' pressure transmitter maloperation j
described iniEnclosure 1-of-this' bulletin.
In each instance, the. analysis should include the effects of j.
, postulated transmitter maloperation.as it relates to indication, control.and,protectiveJfunctions..The analysis
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shall address both: incorrect. automatic-system operation and incorrect operatorLactions caused by erroneous indications.
Address the conformance.to IEEE 279, Section 4.20 in your i'
analysis.
Include in your analysis the following table:
a.'
Complete model number.
b.
Transmitter range limits.
n c.
Transmitter range setting.
I d.
Range of process variable measured for (1) normal and
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(2) accident conditions.
e.
Values of process. variable which could produce i
anomalous indication based upon your evaluation.
I f.
Service / function.
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Response
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. hand-column in the attached Table A summarizes-the The.right results of our review and identifies the instruments that have t-
'the potential for generating anomalous output signals.
The following worst-case analysas were performed to determine whether k
the potential. anomalous signals could result ~ in violating any-design basis assumption for'the main-steam:line flow transmitters andJthefdrywell pressure transmitters listedlin Table A.
Analysis:for1 main ~ steam line flow transmitters:
ldPT12-116T,B,C,D; 'dPT 2-117 A,B,C,D; A
dPT 2-118 A,B,C,D;.dPT 2-119 A,B,C,D.
Thesma'inisteam line flow tr'ansmitters provide inputs to trip units that initiate isolation of the-main steam line.
whenever 'mainL s t'eam flow is equal to or. greater than.140 a
percent-of: normal flow.
'An anomalous. output of.-the main steam linerflow; transmitters ~could occur for line breaks-which'cause. choke flow-(200%" flow) in the main steam =line
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-flowDelement.- LFor1these breaks, the-transmitter. output wouldirise:throughithe trip' point and,.if the particular transmitters; measuring-the? flow weretsusceptibleito the~,
- errone'ousioperation^ described in the bulletin, the f tiransmitter bout'put 1would L drop below.the' t rip.~ unit setpoint y
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-before flow is reduced: by _ closure of the main steam line-isolation ~ valves.
Since,the logic has been. designed with a.
seal-in f eature',' isolation of the main steam lines willigo toJcompletion.: Therefore,uthere is no effect on automatic
. system operation.
H Th e~. s u b j e c t instruments.'do not directly transmit. signals to the cont rol ' room, however,- they do. initiate a control room
-annunciator.
'Although the annunciator could be reset if the transmitter output. dropped bel ~ow the trip ~ unit setpoint due 4
to an" anomalous output,- the an nu'ncia t o r. ~ r e s e t would occur in
- the normal sequence' of.. events after the valves closed.
Therefore..there are.no control room indications'that would lead!to incorrect; operator actions as a result of an anomalous transmitter output.
' Based on the aboveLanalysis~of automatic system operation and ap'erator action, it is concluded that an anomalous F
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. transmitter output would not result in the violation of sny p
design basis assumption.
17 Analysis.for drywell pressure transmitters:
PT 5-12 A,B,C,D.
p The drywell -pressure trap' Titters provide inputs to trip units that initiate a scrom and primary containment isolation?whenever drywell pressure is' greater than 2 psig.
Following initiation of these safety related functions, drywell pressure'during postulated. accident' conditions would remain aboveE21psig for a substantial time period.
If the particular transmitters measuring drywell pressure ~ were susceptible to the erroneous operation described in the bulletin,cthe transmitter output would drop below'the trip unit setpoint.. -However, since the logic has been designed with a s eal-in' f e'ature, scram and containment isolation
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L would go to completion.t-.Therefore, there is no effect on automatic-system operation.-
Although the subject transmitters do not directly transmit a signal to.the contro1~ room,fthey do initiate a control room i
annunciator-which alarms on high drywell. pressure.
The annunciator could.berreset if?the transmitter' output drops below theatrip unit setpoint'due-to an: anomalous output.
If the'operatorfdid,not observe actual drywell pressure U
indication, the reset annunciator could result in the
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' operator believing 1that'high drywell pressure;no longer existedeand could subsequently lead to the premature' L
resettin'g?of;the scramTand containmentLisolation logics.
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Duefto'thelpotential-for improper. operator action,
' additional' investigation was' performed.
. Vendor tests-have determined'thatitheipotentialferroneous transmitter operation}isJdependent;on-the~particular cell-and electronics inithatitransmitter and, isfrepeatableEfor each zg k
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.~Mr."Boyco H.'Crior.
Pogo 4 particular cell / electronics combination.
Each of.the
.su b ject. drywell'.p res sure transmitters has=been tested with inputs exceeding 140%'of the upper range limit at a point where'the center diaphragm of the pressure sensor bottomed out against.one of the fixed capacitor. plates.
In no case was an anomalous output generated or the operation of the electronic. circuitry affected.
This test verifies the operability of the' transmitters when subjected to an input signal which potentially could result in an anomalous output.
The drywell pressure transmitter calibration sheets will be revised to require'sinilar testing following.
replacement of the cell, electronics, or both.
Based on the above analysis of automatic sy' stem operation and operator action, and the results of the testing performed on the transmitters, it is-concluded that an anomalous transmitter output would not result in the violation of any design basis assumption.
3.
Submit a complete description of all corrective actions required as a result of your analysis and evaluations, together with the schedule for accomplishing,the corrective actions.
Response-P As a result of our review, it was determined the only corrective action. required is the revision of the calibration sheet for the subject drywell pressure transmitters.
It is anticipated that the calibration sheets will be revised by August 31, 1980.
Very truly yours,
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cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of-Inspection and Enforcement Division of Operations Inspection Washington, DC.
20555 H. T. Ayres Service Manager / Nuclear
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General Electric Company Tenn-Center Plaza
. Philadelphia, PA 19102
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F5 5ULLETIN 80-16 TABLE.A FOR PEACH BOTTOM, UNITS 2 AND 3 p
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~ 5 Value For Potentials Istot rument' Numbe r /
Range Limits /
Variable Range Anomalous.
Service /
Anomalous ~
M7d11 Number-
_Renge SettM S Normal / Accident Output Function
__0u t p t FT2-3-52A B.C.D (1)/ '0-3000'PSIC /-
1031 PSIC /'
4200 PSIC Reactor Pressure /.
No 1151CP9A2270003rs
- 26.70 1226 PSIC 26 to 1256 PSIC ECCS Permissive
'PT2-3-55A,B,C,D'/
0-3000-'PSIC /
1031 PSIC /
4200 PSIC Reactor Pressure /
No
.1151CP9A2270003MB 26 to 1226 FSIC 26 to 1256 PSIC RFS, PCIS Initiate LT2-3-72A,5,C,D / 750 in H2O /.
60 in H2O /-
+1050 in M20 ' Reactor Level./
.No 1151DPSA2270003FB
'41.31 to 191.9 in H2O
.0 to 227 in H2O ECCS Initiate
'.'LT2-3-73A,s /
.0-750 in H2O /
60 in H20./.
11050 in H2O Reactor Level'/ '
No 1151DP5A22T0003PB' 59.37 to 344.79 in H2O O to 227 in H20 Cont a in me n t Spray Form LT2-3-83A.BJ/
0-150 in'H20-47.in H2O
~+210 1.6 H20:
ResctorILevel /
No
'1151DF4A22T0003PB 20.87 to 62.90 in H2O O to 83 in H2O ADS Permissive LT2-3-99A,5,C,D /
0-750 in H2O /
60 in H2O /
~+1050 in R20 Reactor Level /
No 1151DP5A2270003F8 41'.31 to 191.90 in H2O O to 227 in H2O
.MSIV Isolate LT2-3-101A,B,C,D /
0-150 in H2O./
47 in H2O /
1210 in H2O Reactor Level /
No 1151DF4A22T0003PB 20.87 to 62.90 in H2O O to 83 in H2O RPS Initiate dPT2-116A,5,C,D /
0-300 PSID /.
55.5 PSID /
+420 PSID Main Steam Line Flow /
Yes 1151DP7A2270003PB 0 to 148.50 PSID 0-to 441 PSID MSIV Isolate dPT2-117A,B,C,D /
0-3OJ PSID /
55.5 PSID /
+420 PSID Main Steam Line Flow /
Yes.
1151DP7A2270003FB 0 to 148.50 PSID 0 to 441 PSID MSIV Isolate dPT2-118A,B,C.D /
0-300 PSID /
55.5 PSID /
+420 PSID Main Steam Line Flow /
Yes
'1151DP7A22T0003FB-O to 148.50 PSID 0 to'441 PSID MSIV Isolate dPT2-119A,5,C.D /
0-300 PSID /
55.5 PSID /
~+420 PSID Main Steen Line Flow /
Yes
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1151DP7A2270003FB 0 to,148.50 PSID-O to 441 PSID MS1V Isolate FT5-11A B.C.D /
0-750 in H2O /
-380 in H2O /
-+1050 in H2O Coodenser Vacuum /
No 1151CP5A22T0003HB
.-387.6 to 0 in H2O
-408 to +138 in M20 RFS Initiate 1FT5-12A.B.C,D (1) /
'0-150 in H2O /
0.25 PSIC /
-+210 in M20-Drywell Fressure /
Yes-
'1151CP4A2270003PB 0 to 138.7 in H2O
-0.5 to 56 FSIC (7.6 FSIC)
-RPS Initiate (1) UNIT 2 Only
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