ML19338C732

Forwards NRC Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-7.c.3, PWR Loop 15 Isolation Valves Power & Control Sys Design. Loop Isolation Valve Power & Control Sys Design Complies W/ Current Licensing Criteria

ML19338C732
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	07/24/1980
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Kay J YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
References
TASK-06-07.C3, TASK-6-7.C3, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8008180650
Download: ML19338C732 (5)

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July 24, 1980 Docket No. 50-29 Mr. James A. Kay Senior Engineer-Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Conpany 25.tesearch ive Westborough.

,sachusetts 01581

Dear Mr. Kay:

RE: SEP TOPIC VI-7.C.3, PWR LOOP ISOLATION VALVES POWER AND CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN (Yankee-Rowe)

Enclosed is a copy of our current evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic VI-7.C.3, PWR Loop Isolation V&lves Power and Control System Design. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-29 with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. Please inform us if yeur as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. The topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to the topic are modified before the integrated assessment are completed.

Sin erely, jt; /

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- Dennis M. Crutchfield, C ef, Operating Reactors Branc '#5 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

Completed SEP Topic VI-7.C.3 cc w/ enclosure:

See next page 8008180650

I 2-July 24,1980 Mr. Janes A. Kay o

Cc Mr. J ames E. Tribble, P resident Yankee Atcaic. Electric Ccepany 25 Research Crive Westbercugh, Massachusetts 01581 Greenfield Community College 1 College Drive Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301 I

Chai r-a n Scart cf Selectmen Town cf Ecwe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Faci'ities Siting Council lath Flccr One Ashburten Place Scsten, Massachusetts 02108 Director, Technical Assessment Divisicn -

Office of Radiation Programs (AW 459)

U. S. Envircr. mental Protection Agency Crystal Mall #2 Arlingten, Virginia 20 50 U. S. Envirer.cental Protecticn Agency Region I Cffice ATTN:

E!S COCRDINATCR JFK Federal Buildirg Beston, Massachusetts 02203 f

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m SEPTECHNICALEVALUhTkON TOPIC VI-7.C.3 PWR LOOP ISOLATION VALVES POWER AND CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN YANKEE ROWE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

4 The objective of this review is to determine if the primary loop isolation valve power and control system is in compliance with Prent licensing criteria.- -

u The specific requirements for loop isolation valve power and control' system design derive from.4EE 279-1971, which statas that the unction will be removed automatically when-bypass of a protective 8

ever. permissive conditions are not met and which also assures that a single electrical failure or cperator error will not result in loss of capability of the protection sys tem to perform its safety function.1 The criteria are further defined in Branch Technical 2

Position ICSB 18,

2.0 CRITERIA Current licensing criteria from ICSB 18 are:

1.

Failures in both the " fail to function" sense and the " undesirable function" sense of components in electrical systems including valves and other fluid sys tem components should be considered in designing e

against a single failure, even though the valve or other fluid system component may not be called upon yr to function in a given safety operational sequence.

2.

Where it is determined that failure of an electri-cal system component can cause undesired mechanical motion of a valve or other fluid sys tem component and this motion results in loss of the system safety function, it is acceptable, in lieu of design chan-ges that also may be acceptable, to disconnect power to the electric sys tems of the valve or other f luid system component.

The plant Technical Speci-fications should include a list of all electrically-operated valves, and the required positions of 1

r thess valvas, :o which the re' quire =an: for ra= oval of electric power is applied in order to sa:isfy

he single failure cricezion'.

3.

Elec:rically-opera:ed valves tha: are classified as "ac:ive" valve 1.e., are' required :o open or close in.various safi:y syste= opera:icial sequen-ces, bu: are =anually antrolled. should be opera:ed fre: :he =ain control roo=.

Such valves =ay no: be included a=ong : hose valves fro = which power is re=oved in order :o =ce: the single fai.ure cri-terion unless (a) electrical power can be restored to the valves fro = :he =ain control roo=, (b) valve opera: ion is no: necessary for at lels: :en = nu:es following occurrence of the event requiring sucn opera: ion, and (c) it is demons:: aced tha: :here is reasonable assurance : hat all necessary opera:or actions will be perfor:ed wi:hin the :i=e shown :o

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be adequa:e by :he analysis.

The plan: Technical Specifications should includ's a lis: of :he required posi: ions o f =anually-con::alled, elec trically-opera:ed valves and should identify : hose ~ valves :o wnich the require =en: for re= oval of elec:ric power is applied in order :o satisfy :he single failure cri:erion.

4 When :he single failure cri:erion is sa:isfied by re= oval of elec: ical power fro: valves described in 2. and 3. above, these valves should have redun-dan: posi: ion indication in the main con::al roc =

and :he posi: ion indica: ion systa= should, i:self,

=ee: the single failure cri:erion.

5.

The phrase, "elec::ically-opera:ed valves," includes both valves opera:ed direc:17 by an elec:rical device (e.g., a =c tor-opera:ed' valve or a solenoid-opera:ed valve) and : hose valves opera:ed indiree:ly by an elec: ical device (e.g., an air-opera:ed

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valve whose air supply is controlled by an electri-

.al so lenoid valve).

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3.0 DISCUSSION AND E7ALUATION f

3.1 Dis cu ss ion.

Yankee Rove has four =ain coolant loops, each of which has :wo =o tor-opera:ed loop isola'.ica valves.

For power opre-a: ion, these valves are rea,uired to be opened and : heir power cables dis connec :ed fro = :he =o:c s:ar:ers; power cable status is verified by

=onthly surveillance.

Proper valve posi: ion =ay be verified by be:h va lve posi: ion indica: ion and redundan: =ain coolan flow indication.'

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' P 3.2 Evaluncion. Tha Ycnkas Rova loop isolation valve povar end con::el sys:e= design =eets the requiremen s of-ICS318, Parts 2 and 4

The re fore, :he design co= plies with curren: licensing e-i:eria.

4.0 SLT.ARY

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The Yankee Rove loop isolation valve power and control sys:e=

requires tha:, for power opera: ion, loop isolation valves be opened and power renoved fro = : hem, and provides redundant valve position indica-4 tica. Therefore, :he loop isola: ion valve power and control sys:e=

design co= plies with curren: Licensing cri:eria.

5.0 REFERENCES

1.

IEEE Standard 279, "Cri:eria for ? o:ee:ica Sys:e=s for.Nuclea:

Power Generating Sta: ions."

2.

3:anch Technical Posi:ic ICS3 13, "Applica: ion of the Single Failure Cri:erion :o Manually-Con::alled Elec::ically-Cpera:ed Valves."

3.

Yankee A:c=i: Elec: i: Co=pany Drawing 966-FM-6A, Revision 20, dated May 30, 1978.

4

" Yankee Nuclea Power Station, Technical Specifications," A=end-men: 52, paragraph 4.5.2.b.3.

5.

Loc. ei:., Table 3.3.1.

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