ML19338C720
| ML19338C720 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1980 |
| From: | Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-17, NUDOCS 8008180576 | |
| Download: ML19338C720 (3) | |
Text
A GYDTER CREEK NU3 LEAR CENERATIN3 STATIEN 6
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- 08731 m u,% suem July 23,1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 I E Bulletin 80-14
Reference:
(a) I E Bulletin 80-17 " Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR" The subject bulletin required review of plant records and procedures to verify the integrity of the Scram Discharge Volume valves, instrumentation and piping during past/ future system operations.
The purpose of this letter is to forward the findings of this review.
It should be noted that certain information provided in this response was acquired during testing performed in accordance with reference (a).
A description of each action item and the associated response is listed below:
Item 1 Review plant records for instances of degradation of any SDV level switch which was or may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly.
Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance.
Response: Review of plant records and interviews with instrumentation personnel did not reveal any instances of degradation which may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly of the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) level switches.
Item 2 Review plant records for instances of degradation of SDV vent and drain valve operability.
Provide the closure times required and typically observed for these valves and the basis for the required closing times.
Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance of degradation.
S008180576
Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director July 23, 1980 Response: Review of plant records and interviews with cognizant personnel did not reveal any instances of degradation of SDV vent and drain valve operability.
Required closure times for the SDV vent and drain valves are not identified within the Operating License and Technical Specifications nor within the FDSAR for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
During testing of the SDV system as required by I E Bulletin 80-17 closure times for the discharge volume vent and drain valves were established.
The closure times listed below were taken during two reactor scrams, one manual and one automatic.
Valve Number Auto. Scram Manual Scram Time Closure Time NCll A (vent) 7.00 sec 7.00 sec NC11B (vent) 20.27 sec 22.00 sec NCl2 (drain) 15.62 sec 15.80 sec Valve operability and closure times under surveillance conditions will be incorporated into our Surveillance procedures and will be performed every thirty (30) days.
Base line data will be established, and used for comparative purposes to determine any degradation in the operability of these valves.
Procedure changes will be accomplished within 30 days after receipt of this correspondence.
Item 3 By procedures, require'that the SDV vent and drain valves be normally operable, open and periodically tested.
If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period during operation, the reason shall be legged and the NRC notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Prompt Notification).
Response: The SDV level switch surveillance procedure will be revised to incorporate operability testing and closure times of the SDV vent and drain valves.
By means of a memo all operation personnel will be made aware of the prompt notification required by the NRC should the SDV vent and/or drain valves be inoperable or closed for more than one (1) hour in any twenty-four (24) hour period. All action will be accomplished within 30 days of receipt of this correspondence.
Item 4 Review instances in which water hammer or damage which may have been caused by water hamer has occurred in SDV related piping.
Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance.
_ Response: Conversation with cognizant station personnel has revealed that there have been no instances of damage due to water hammer in SDV related pioing.
l
l Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director July 23, 1980 Item 5 Review surveillance procedures to ensure that degradation of any SDV level switch due to a damaged float or other cause would be detected and that inoperability from any cause would be reported to the NRC.
i Response: Present plant surveillance testing is performed every thirty (30) days on the SDV level switches.
Any degradation or inoperability of the level switches would be detected and reported to the NRC under the provision of paragraph 6.9.2 of the Operating License i
and Technical Specifications for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
Item 6 If no functional test or inspection which would detect degradation of each SDV level switch has been performed during the past 3 months, make provisions to perform an inspection and functional test of all SDV level switch assemblies at the next reactor shutdown of greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> duration.
Response: All SDV level switch assemblies are tested every thirty (30) days.
The last surveillance test was performed on July 10, 1980, with no discrepancies noted.
D W
D. A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generation DAR:dh cc: NPC Office of Inspection & Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
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