ML19338B811
| ML19338B811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1979 |
| From: | Sidell G, Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V), PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19338B810 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909060499 | |
| Download: ML19338B811 (73) | |
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UNITED STATES CF M! ERICA 2
PRESIDDIT'S CO.M21ISSICN CN THE ACCIDENT AT g
THREE MILE ISLAND 3
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DEPOSITION OF:
DANIEL M. STEPl! BERG S
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July 30, 1979 14 11:00 o' clock a.m.
15 16 APPEARMICES :
17 On Behalf of NRC:
IS MARIAN E. MOE, ESQUIRI 19 Office of General Counsel, NRC Washington, D.
C.
20 On Behalf'of the Commission:
21 GARY M. SIDELL, ESQUIRE 22 !
Associate Chief Counsel l
2100 M Street, N. W.
23j Washing:On, D. C.
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_I _N _D _E _X 2
MITNESSES:
DIRECT
-CROSS REDIRECT RECTGSS 3
Daniel M. Sternberg s
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_? _2 _O C _E.E.D I N G S 2
Uhereupon, x
3 DANIEL M. STERNBERG 4
having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein 5
and was examined and testified as follows:
6 3Y MR. SIDELL:
7 G
Would you please state your name for the record, S
!ir. Sternberg?
9 A
Daniel M. Sternberg.
10 g
Your current occupation?
11 A
Section Chief in the Reactor Operations and 12 Nuclear Support Branch, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
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13 Region V of fice, Walnut Creek, C.alifornia.
14 G
'In March, 1978, what was your position?
15 A
I was acting as the Section Chief for the pressuri=e'd water reactor section~ of the Reactor Cperations is 17 and Nuclear Support Branch in Region I of the NRC.
IS G
How long were you in that position?
19 1
Approximately five months.
20 G
To about November, 1973?
21 1
No; it was probably from February to July of 1973.
22 G
Are you accuainted with an individual by 'he name 23 of D. Haverkamp?
24 1
Yes.
Con Haverkamp was tha orojecr '_nspector for 25 the Three Mile Island site in the section that I was the Acme Reporting Company
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1 supervisor or.
2 G
At what particular time?
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3 1
During the whole period of time that I was acting 4
Section Chief.
5 0
Do you know if he was still in that section when 6
you stopped being acting Section Ch'.ef?
7 A
Yes, he was.
S G
Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
9 A
No.
Not in this context.
10 G
At all?
11 A
I have given testimony in public hearings for 12 licensing things.
13 G
Let me briefly explain what we are going to be 14 doing.
15 Your testimony is under oath, it is sworn, even 16 though we are sitting in a conference room at the NRC 17 Building in Bethesda.
Your testinony has the same effect as IS though it were given in a Court before a Judge or jury, so 19 that it is imperative that you be us precise and accurate in M
your responses to my questions as you can be.
21 If you don't understand a question, ask me for 22 clarification and I will try to explain what I am 1 coking for.
23 At the end of the deposition the reporter will transcribe l
24 your testimony and we will present a copy of it to you ior 25l correction and for you to sign.
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If you find places that you feel it necessary to 2
make corrections or changes and we consider those changes x
3 to be of a substantial nature, we are entitled to comment on 4
those changes and our comments may adversely affect your 5
credibility, so again the emphasis is to be as precise and 6
accurate as you can be now.
~
Since the reporter is taking the testimony down, 3
I would ask that you answer audibly all the questions, since 9
it is not possible to take down nods of the head or gestures.
to I also ask that you wait until I finish a questio'n before you 11 respond, even if you know where the question is going, and I 12 also will make every effort to try and refrain myself fron 13 asking the next question until you finish your response.
14 Do you have any questions?
15 A.
No.
16 G
The resume that you provided to me -- is this an 17 accurate description of your professional background?
18
.L Yes, it is.
19 G
This resume was made for the 7:rpose of this 00 depo sition, is that correct?
21 A
Yes, it was.
22 MR.,SIDELL:
Let's have this marked as Exhibit 1, U,
please.
i 24 l 05 l
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1 (The document referred to was 2
marked for identification as g
3 Exhibit 1.)
4 BY MR. SIDELL:
5 G
Mr. Sternberg, according to Exhibit 1 to this 6
deposition, your resume, there is a listing of 1978 to the 7
present which specifies your current position.
There is no 3
specification that deals with your position in Region I, is 9
there?
10 A
You mean relative to the acting Section Chief?
11 G
Yes.
12 A
Yes.
That is because there is no of ficial paperwork 13 written changing your job description when you are appointed 14 as an acting Section Chief so my position at all times 15 according to the official forms was that of a reactor 16 inspector.
17 However, I had been relieved of inspection 18 responsibility ar.d assigned to act as the Section Chief 19 because of the promotion of Bert Davis, who had been the 20 Section Chief.
21 0
So with that caveat, this resume fully states vour 22 prior employment to 1964?
r 23 A
Yes, it does.
l 24 Q.
But on the resume itself there is no indication l
3 that you were an acting Section Chief?
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1 A
That is correct.
There were other periods of time 2
where I may have acted in the same capacity.
x 3
For purposes of your ceposition we are primarily 4
concerned with your acting Section Chief.
5 A
Okay.
6 4
on March 29, 1979, did you happen to beccce aware 7
of an incident at Three Mile Island unit two?
8 A
Yes, I did.
9 4
How did that come about?
10 A
There was probably a telephone call from the 11 licensee or from Don Haverkamp if he were on the site, I 12 don't recall at this point, but we became aware that there 13 had been a reportable event involving a safety injection, 14 perturbation of reactor coolant system chemistry due to the 15 injection of sodium hydroxide, and we initiated an inspection 16 or an investigation of the event to deternine what had 17 ha;;ened, what were the causes and what the licensee was IS doing about it.
19 G
Nhat did you find out to be the causes of the 20 accident?
21 A
Mell, the main thing we were concerned with at that O!
point was reactor ecolant system chemistry and what I found
%I was that there had been an inadvertent or undesired safe:v
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24 injection and that had been produced by a depressuri:ation 25 of the reactor ecolant system.
Acme Reporting Company
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That in
- urn had been caused by an opening of the 2
PORV which had been produced by a loss of vital bus which hAd 3
been in. turn produced by the failure of an electrical 4
inverter.
5 4
In layman's terms is that essentially a situation 6
where the electrical system was set up incorrectly?
7 In other words, the PORY in order to remain closed 3
had to have a continuous source of energy?
9 A
Indirectly, that is true.
The bi-stable which to controlled the PORV was designed to de-energize on increasing 11 pressure.
The increasing pressure was the parameter that 12 would normally open the valve or require it to 'open.
13 That meant tnat anything which de-energi:es that 14 bi-stable, a loss of power or failure of the control relay 15 would give a signal to open the PORV, and that was the as 16 built design for that component, so to say whether it was 17 right or wrong, 1 don' t know at that point.
13 G
Well, did you subsequently come to a conclusion 19 as to whether or not that was a proper method to install a
'M PORV system?
21 1
Nell, I had two concerns about the PORV at that 22 poinc.
One was that it would fail open or a loss of power 23 to that bus and the ocher one was that it was unenunc:ated.
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24
-G Who do you mean by "unenunciated'?
3 A
That was not a form of indication on the centrol Acme Reporting Company
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I panel directly telling the operato'_- that that valve was being 2
co=manded open.
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the PORV?
5 A
Not only that, there wasn' t' any other kind of 6
indication saying th,at it was electrically being conranded 7
open.
8 G
So there was no indication at all?
9 -
A No direct indication.
10 4
Was there an indirect indication?
11 A
The parameters that woulc be disbursed by the valve 12 being opened, the pressurizef' level --
13 G
So there were no direct methods cf indication that 14 there was a problem with the PORV?
15 A
That it was open.
16 G
There were no indirect methods determining that the 17 PORV was open in terms of a light or a warning signal tied 13 directly to the PORV?
19 A
That is correct.
20 G
In other words there were no indirect metheds of 21 actuation where an energy signal was cent to the solenoid M
that would show up in a control room?
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23 i A
That is correct.
24 G
Uhat are the indirect parameters than the operator 25 would have had available to determine whether there was a j
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problem with the FORV?
2 A
Dec casing reactor ecolant system pressure, a chance 5
in pressurizer level, the --
4 4
Pressurizer level indication?
5 A
Yes.
6 0
Which direction would tnat go, up or down?
7 A
I would assume it would go down, because I would 8
he losing reactor coolant system inventory through the PORV.
9 0
Co you know of a case where it would go up?
10 A
Subsequent events have given sight as to which 11 way pressurizer level would behave.
12 4
Nhich subsequent events?
13 A
The failure of the actuator on March 29.
Also the
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14 Michelson Report.
15 4
Do you recall when you read the Michelson Report?
16 A
In April, 1979.
17 G
After the accident?
13 A
After the accident.
19 G
Have you also had an opportunity to read what is 20 referred to as the NOVAX or Israel nemorandum?
21l A
No, I have not.
22 g
To date you have not seen that?
23 A
No.
l 24 4
Please continue.
i 25i A
okay.
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The other parameters that would indicate an open 2
pilot operated relief valve would be the quench tank or g
3 drain tank temperature level and pressure.
4 G
Is that the temperature on the tail pipe?
5 A
The tail pipe temperature also, depending on wnat 6
the previous temperature was, it may or may not respond.
7 G
Do you know what at the time was considered to be 3
a normal operating temperature at the tail pipe for Three 9
Mile Island?
10 A
No, I do not.
11 G
Are you aware of it now?
12 A
I am aware from reading that the normal temperature 13 was belcw 130 degrees and that at times it read up to 190 14 degrees.
15 G
Would you consider a reading of 190 degrees to be 16 abnormal?
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17 A
It would indicative of a problem that ought to be 18 understood.
19 G
Uhat would the cut off point be in terms of M
temperature increase above 130 degrees to indicate that the 21 cperator should start checking some systems to see if -there S,
was a problem?
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A I don't think there is an absolute number.
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24 whenever you find a reading that isn' t what you expect it to 25 '
he ycu investigate the cause.
In this case you might assume Acme Reporting Company
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1 that it would be weeping PORV or a safety valve and then you f
2 might look at things like the level in the quench tank to sge 3
how f:equently it had to be pumped to get an indication of s
how much flow existed through the possible leaking valve.
4 5
Q.
Well, would 150 degrees be sufficient to arouse 6
an eperator's curiosity as to whether there was a problem 7
in the system?
8 A
I don't have any absolute numbers.
The reasor. that 9
you don' t know is each particular valve has a given ambient to condition that exists in each thermocouple and you would have 11 to know what was a normal condition and whether or not it was 12 deviating from the normal, so that absolute numbers I wouldn't 13 be familiar with.
14 G
If an operator was instructed that the normal 15 range of temperature was let's say 120 to 130 degrees and he is noticed a reading of 150 to 160, would that be sufficient to 17 cause him to inquire as to what the result of that 20 to 30 s
15 degree temperature rige was for?
19 A
Yes, but I have a feeling that what they would do 20 tnough is look at the other para =eters that would give an 21 indication as to what is the cause of that elevated temperature.
22l Once you master that, then you have to decife what i
23 i action to take.
i 24 !
4 Well, one of the other parameters you mentioned i
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correct?
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Yes.
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You said that you would expect the level indicatiqn l
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.to decrease if the POR7 failed open, correct?
4 1
If it were open, yes.
5 G
Well, in light of Three Mile Island in March of 6
1979, we know that the pressurizer level indication can also 7
go up as well as down with the PORV being open, correct?
8 A
That is correct.
9 G
So that if the operator noticed 150 to 160 degree 10 range in temperatures frcm the tail pipe and also noticed 11 the level indication of the pressurizer going up rather than 12 down, would that be sufficient to create some concern on the 13 part of the operator?
14 A
I am confused now whether you are talking about the 15 accident condition at Three Mile Island or a plant that is 16 operating with everything else apparently normal.
17 G
Everything apparently normal, but knowing as we do 18 that the pressurizer level indication can go in two i
19 directions.
20 i
Well, I think it is important that 150 degrees would 21 be indicative of a small weep or a small leak and you would t
t on 22 l
expect temperatures much higher than that pr' an actual opening 23 of the power operator relief valve.
1 24 G
How much higher?
3 1
I assume in excess of 212 degrees, because the tail l
Acme Reporting Company j
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. o-1 pipe is venting to atmospheric pressure and therefore I would 2
expect that you would get temperatures in excess of saturation 3
temperature for atmospheric conditions.
4 Namely, you know, in excess of 210 or 220 degrees.
5 4
So if an operator had readings of 220 or 230 6
cegrees, in your opinion would that be virtually conclusive 7
evidence he had a problem with the PORV or another small 8
break above the pressurizer?
9 A
It would indicate that the valve had probably 10 recently passed a steam flow.
The situation is, though, that 11 once that valve opens you would expect that tail pipe tempera-12 ture to hang up for some extended period of time depending on 13 what the ambient temperature.s and cooling was in the vicinity 14 of the valve.
15 G
If the temperatures were on the order of 210 or 220 16 degrees and it was merely one release of steam and the valve 17 did properly close, what length of time are we talking about IS before you would recognize that or notice that with the drop 19 in the temperatures?
20 1
A couple o f hours.
21 G
That long?
'5 1
From ny experience in boiling water reacecrs and 23 high tail pipe temperatures, yes.
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24 G
How is a boiling water reactor's tail pipe tempera-25 :
cure similar?
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Acme Reporting Company 1
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A They have power operator relief valves on boiling 2
. a ter reactors with tail pipe instrumentation.
I don't know 3
whether it is a strap on or a weld ther=occuple, but the 4
idea of looking at tail pipe temperatures, it is a good case 5
of the initiation of the event, but it doesn't tell you a lot 6
about the course of the events.
7 In addition to the tail pipe temperature and the e
8 pressurizef level indication I believe you also mentioned 9
pressure in the tail pipe system as falling if the PORV was to open?
11 A
Yes.
12 G
How would that manifest itself to the oper' tor?
13 A
There are low pressure alarms, pressurizer heaters 14 that would come on as pressure decreased.
If the pressure 15 continued to decrease there would be a safety injection
. 16 initiation.
17 4
Sixteen hundred pounds decreasing?
13 A
At this plant, yes.
19 0
I believe you also mentioned the level indication 20 on the quench tank would be indicative of a problem with the 21 PORV.
S j
Co you-know where the indication for the quench tank i
23 is in Three Mile Island in the centrol en of unit two?
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24 A
I have learned subsequent to the accident that it 3l is behind the front panel.
It is not a front panel parameter.
Acme R e p ar a,1g Company
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-1 G
Is tne location of the indicator for the quench 2
tank level in a conveniently located place so that in an i
3 emergency the operator could instantaneously determine what 4
was going on in the quench tank?
5 A
I don't really know the answer to that, convenient 6
o r no t.
Given the fact that there was the accident and --
7 G
Let's specifically deal with the indication level 3
first of all.
9 If you were an operator and you had the opt;ons 10 of checking the tail pipe temperatures, secondly the pressur-11 izer level indication, thirdly the pressure in the primary 12 system, and fourthly the indication level of the quench tank, 13 is there anything else you could check to determine if there 14 was a PORV problem?
15 L
Well, there is a pressure in the quench tank.
16 G
Where is that indication located?
17 A
As I understand it is also on the back panel near 18 the quench tank level and temperature indicators.
19 G
So all the quench tank indicators are on the back 3) of a panel, is that your understanding?
21 1
Yes.
22 G
At Three :lile Island unit two?
23 '
1 Unit twc, yes.
24 i G
Co you know the physical location of the other 25 indicators that we have jusu mentioned?
Acme Reporting Company
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1 No.
I have never been in Three Mile Island unit 2
two 's control room, so I am not familiar with the lay out g
3 there.
4 G
Would it be reasonable to presume that all the 5
other indicators are facing the operator?
6 A
For example, pressurizer level --
7 4
Pressurizer level, pressurizer heaters, primary S
system pressure.
9 A
Yes.
10 0
Tail pipe temperature?
11 A
I don't know about tail pipe temperarure.
12 4
That may be off in a different area?
13 A
It might well be, yes.
It may be on a back 14 panel.
15 G
How would you classify the temperature and pressure 16 and level indication on the quench tank in terms of their
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17 importance in providing relevant information to an operator 13 during an emergency?
19 A
I would not classify them as significant.
'N G
Nould they be less significant or more significant 21 than tail pipe temperature, for instance?
22 A
Probably more significant in that tail pipe tempera-23 ture you would not expect to be meaningful if you had an 24 expected operation of the PCR7.
For example, in the Three 25
- tile Island event the PORV did open.
It was kncwn since you i
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18 I
have a high pressure SCRAM that clearly the PORV had opened 2
at some point.
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3 Once it opened, as you can expect your tail pipe 4
temperature will be elevated and remain elevated for some 5
extended period of time at which-point if indeed your concern 6
was how to detect the failed open PCRV, the tail pipe 7
temperature would not be a particularly good indicator.
8 From my reading of the secuence of eve::ts to date, 9
I do not understand the temperature readings that tended to 10 indicate that the tail pipe temperature was coming down 11 during the time that the pORV was open.
12 I believe the first time the operator requested the 13 PORV tail pipe temperature he got a number around 285 degrees, 14 then 283 and sometime later, 223 -- an hour or so later it 15 was down to 223 and it was open.
16 G
223 is still above your general range of temperatures 17 providing concern for the operator, is it not?
18 1
Yes, but we are talking about the trend of the That 19 data.
X was trending down.
'M G
Trending dcwn, but nevertheless still in an area 21 or range that should have been sufficient to awaken the 5
operator's interest on why it was still at that high level?
U A
I think the fact that the operator requested the i
24 temperature printout indicated the operator was interested in 3
what was going on.
To me the significant thing, you would l
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dOO 19 1
I have to compare the rate of decrease of tail pipe temperatura 2
to some other given event in the past.
g 3
For example, when the PCRV had opened and did 4
anybody plot the rate of temperature cecrease so you could 5
get a nor=al rate of temperature decrecse, anc even that is t) tat 6
not too meaningful in ;2Jnr ycu don' t know how long it *.yas 7
open in the past compared to this event.
8 G
We have established that cuench tank indication 9
level or temperature or pressure are core significant than to tail pipe temperature.
11 Uhat about relative to pressurizer indication 12 level?
Nhich is more important in your opinion?
13 i
I would think pressurizer level.
14 G
Even having read the Michelson Report?
15 A
The interesting thing about the Michelson Report is 16 that that particular phenomena gould not have occurred in 17 the March, 1978 event at Three Mile Island in that it was a 19 relatively clear core, a little bit if any decay heat 19 inventory.
,The potential for flashing and Avoiding in a major 20 21 cooling system did not exist during this event, so that the t2 course of the event in 1973 '/ould be totally different than l
23 I the course of the event in 1979.
24; 4
Would this be due to the fact that the operating 25 license was issued four or five weeks before the accident at Acme Reporting Company l
dOO j
20 1
TMI-II?
2 A
Yes, and the fact that they were still undergoing g 3
low power seismic testing during that time.
4 G
Do you know the range of power operation they were 5
at?-
6 A
I believe it was less than one percent, essentially 7
=ero power.
3 4
Do you have any opinions as to a threshold level of 9
production where you would run into problems similar to 10 tnose mentioned by Mr. Michelson in his report -- in other 11 words, is nine percent above or below a problem level?
12 A
I think that the essential parameter is not 13 exactly the power level you are operating at but the power 14 history.
For example, if you would just come with a clear 15 core up to nine percent power, I don't think there is enough 16 decay heat to produce that kind of voiding.
17 The fact is you could have significant decay heat IS and only be at nine percent power and have the problem, 19 which is now understood was the root cause of the Three
'N Mile Island event.
21 G
It is not only a question of the current level of production of power, but also from which direction the plant 23 came?
24 A
What we refer to as decay heat history or inventcry.
I 25 4
So that a plant just starting up anc working ins Acme Reporting Company
<dOO 21
. ay toward nine percent would have a cuch less probability of 1
w 2
running into problems raised by Mr. Michelson than a plant x 3
coming down from nine percent -- coming down from something 4
abovc nine percent?
5 A
Well, more importantly, it is what the power history 6
for the facility was and what percent rate of power you might 7
refer to the decay heat at th'e time you would get a SCRAM and S
a low pressure condition.
9 G
What about quench tank indication levels and 10 temperature and pressure relative to reactor pressure?
11 Which would be more important in terms of indicating 12 a possible PORV problem there?
13 A
I think the quench tank.
14 4
So the four indicators, we have established that 15 pressurizer level indication is relatively more important 16 than quench tank indicators, correct?
17 1
Could you say that again, please.
IS G
We have established that pressurizer level indica-19 tion is nore important in terms of informing the operator of 00 a possible PORV problem than is the temperature or pressure 21 level indication on the quench tank?
22 A
I hesitate to generalize.
j 23 G
More useful if not more important.
24 A
I have a feeling that under scce conditions one l
3 would be much more useful than the cther, but I can't feel Acme Reporting Company l
y I
'dac 22 5
/
1
. comfortable in generalizing.
2 4
In any event, the temperature and pressure level x 3
indication on the quench tank is, in your opinion, a rather 4
significant or useful piece of information for the operator 5
to have during a potential problem with the reactor, is it 6
not?
7 A
It is one of the many pieces of information which 8
he can refer to, yes.
9 G
You have not become aware that this information is to on the back of a control room indication panel?
11 A
Yes.
12 G
In a less than convenient location relative to the 13 other instrument cisplays at TMI-II?
14 A
I hesitate to use the word " convenient".
There is 15 only so much panel space available.
16 G
Well, for' instance, in an emergency, based on what 17 you have indicated atout the quench tank readings and their 13 importance in assisting the operator in determining if there 19 is a problem and wnat the p,roblem might be, the operator would 20 have to turn around behind the back of the control panel to 21 cet the data for this particular indication, whereas for 22 reactor pressure, that is on the f ace o f the panel.
23 Tail cice temcerature is on the face of the panel.
1 l
l 24 Pressurizer level indication is on the face of the panel.
l
[
25 Would it net seem as though an operator trying to resolve a Acme Reporting Company
23 t cT s'
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l i
I proolem wher
.tme is a factor would find it less convenient 2
to check an indication on the back of a panel than one g
3 staring him in the face?
4 A.
He very well might.
There is another aspect of 5
that.
That gets involved with the number of operators in the 6
control room and the NRC's requirement that operators do not
?
go around to the back panels if they are the only operator S
in the control room.
9 G
There is a NRC requirement that prohibits --
10 A.
Going around to the back if they are the only 11 operator in the control rocm.
12 4
Do you know what that requirement is?
13 A.
No.
There is some guidance in the IE manual.
I
~
14 think it is 10 CFR50.34, but I am no t s ure.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 3
23 24 25 Acme Reporting Company
MSaathasp2:1 24 1
(Pause in proceedings.)
2 THE WITNESS:
An operator or senior operator 3
licensed pursuant to part 55 of this chapter shall be present i
)
~
at the controls at all times during the operation of the 4
5 facility.
6 SY MR. SIDELL:
4 What was the CFR designation of the.section?
10-CFR-50.54-K.
8 9
G Is there any NRC interpretation as to what 10 "present.at the controls of a reactor" means?
In other words, 11 does v. hat mean in front of the control panel rather.
than behind it?
12 A
Yes.
13
,One that I am sure of is IE chapter 71710 B, although I don't have it here.
There may have well been some 14 15 interpretation that under emergency. conditions does permit 16 the operator to leave, but under routine conditions nobody --
t-the panel cannot be without an operator in front of it.
13 So, the question about the back panel presentation 19
-- it is one aspect that the operator may if he doesn't feel
.;0 an emergency condition exists, if he were there by himself 21 mi.ght not go around to a back panel unless he felt there 22 was a compelling reason.
I l{
23 4
In view of the importance that you have established 24 that the quench tank indicators have in determining whether l
j I
25 or not an emergency exis u.
it would be to say the Ieas: rather j
l Acme Reporting Company I
I 1. _ -, _
= " ' ' " r " "
25.
i 15 :ama s 2P2
~
t difficult for the operator who is required to be in. front of 2
the control pane'. to look at important indicators behind 3
the panel to determine if there is an emergency, is that not correct.
4 A
Yes.
5 6
0 Catch 22, in other words?
A Well, if a. real emergency exists, I believe that-8 the guidance is rather clear.
9 G
Are you aware of whether or not the NRC has any room w
part in approving control ;regr r design?
11 A
I am not aware.
or 12 0
One'way the. other?
g 13 A
No.
14 G
Region-one didn't have any involvement in the 15 TMI-2 control room design, to the best of your knowledge?
16 A
Not at all.
Can we go off the record for a t-second?
18 (Discussion of f the record.)
)
19 MR. SIDELL:
On the record, i
20 BY MR. SIDELL-21 Mr. Sternberg, we just had a brief discussion of f
]
1 1
3 the record of some prior longstanding concerns you have had 23 with control rocm design.
Can you indicate "cr the reccrd what those concerns sere?
24 A
During the period when I was a reactor inspector 25 l
Acme Reporting Company
v
- 2'6 S:amapad2:3 1
I inspected primarily boiling water reactors.
As a result of inspecting certain incidents which had occurred at boilipg 2
3 water reactors, problems with control recm panel layouts, which I believe contributed to those incidents had arisen and 4
3 I had written a memo in probably 1976 or 1977 requesting 6
that the design adequacies and the human factors analysis 7
be initialed for control room panel layouts of boiling water a
reactors.
9 G
Can you recall whether that memo was sent to Region one or headquarters?
to 11 A
To headquarters from Region one.
12 O
From your recollection can you remember the time, 13 approximately?
~
14 A
No, I can't. I believe it followed an inadvertent 13 critical incident from Millstone I.
1 16 0
Do you recall to whogg'you sent the memo in head-1; quarters?
i 18 A
No.
19 4
Do you remember whether there was any follow up 20 ;
by headquarters to your concern?
i et '
A I don' t believe there was.
22 g
Would you have been aware of follow ups if they 23 existed?
l 24l A
If it was after the time when the action item l
t 23!
tracking sya.em was in effect, there would have been a follow l
l Acme Reporting Company
,MS:'ma 4: ped 2
- '27 a
t up memo.
I don't recall.
2 4
You previously indicatsd that you became aware in
\\
3 one form or another of the TMI-2.. incident in March of 1978.
What steps did you tas in determining the precise problem 4
5 and resolving that problem?
6 A
Well, again,'it was really the follcw up on what the licensee was doing..
Our primary concern was the 3
possibility of potential corrosion problems or radiological 9
problems from the injection of the sodium hydroxide.
We knew 10 that the licensee had gotten in contact with B and W.
11 4
How did you know that?
12 A
Through conversations on the telephone with licensee.
13 14 4
You spoke with someone at TMI-27 A
Yes.,
15 16 g
Do you recall who that was?
A I am not sure._I think it was Jim Seelinger.
17 gg
.O Who was he at the time, if you recall?
A I think he had the capacity of technical engineer gg I.
I i
20 or plant engineer.
21 4
And he indicated to you that the utility hac been,
1 i
in touch with 3 and W7 l
22 A
Right.
I believe there had been one or maybe two 23 l
23 previous injections of socium hydroxide similar in character 1
25 '
to this same thing through inadvertant safety injecticn, and i
Acme Reporting Company I
'~:: " " ~.
,MSiama 5:p2 28 ex ressed.
we had c ';p' cr:d our concerns at that ti=e with them and they I
were in the process of cleaning up the reactor cooling system.
~
2 a
We had also expressed our concerns over the design that would inject sodium hydroxide into the reactor coolant system which 4
5 was clearly not necessary.
6 G
, Was it not.becoming necessary to have sodium 7
hydroxide injected into the system and determination made a
during the emergency or the transient or looking back?
9 A.
It was never intended to go into the reactor to cooling system.
It was designed for reactor building 11 container spray.
It turns out that the way th'at that 12 chemical attitude gets into the proper pump, the potential 13 for injecting it into the reactor cooling system existed at 14 that time.
13 As I understand it was subsequently changed so that everytime there is a safety injection you will not' inject 16 17 sodium hydroxide into the reactor cooling system.
i 13 G
What corrective measures if any did the utility 19 take after the March 1978 incident?
20 A.
Well, again, the concerns which I relayed to v',em 21 had to do with the sodium hydroxide injections, the failu:.s open.. p4:4tcon.
22,
of the PORV in the c;;ccitirn, the lack of any iddication On 23 the FORV, and there :::ay have been something else related to 24 why the business was lost with a single inverter failure.
05 I don't recall at this point, but as a result the l
l Acme Reporting Company
29 MStama 6~:p2 licensee rearranged the electrical configuracion of the h'gh i
I electrical pressure bi-stable.
The added indication,,
2
\\
indication, a light on the control panel to :$how that the 3
~
valve was being cr-mmanded open.
4 4
Not an actual position of the valve?
5 A
Not an actual position of the valve.
6 4
Just to show that a signal was sent to close the T
valve?
8 A
More importantly that it was open.
In 'other words,
9 was energized on the PbRV an indicating whenever the solenoid 10 P light would illuminate on the control panel and relative to J
11 !
tha sodium hydroxide, the initiating signal th.2t would open 12 the sodium hydroxide additional valve was changed from a safe-13 ty injection to another paramater which more -- which 14 related more to the condition that would require the 15 c,Kg,
,e sodium hydroxide, either high c:n uiner pressure or something 16 1
along those lines, higher than which initiates safety inject i
17 injection.
18 4
The change in the initiating criteria for sodium 19 A
Hydroxide addition.
20 4
Do you know at the time whether they considered 21 changing the~centainment isolation factors?
22 A
I don't think.that ever.came-up, containment l
isolation..
I 23 24 4
Should that.have come up if they were considering !
25 the sodium hydroxide --
l l
Acme Reporting Company
i 30 MStamas7:ptd2 1
A Not really.
I don't think there is a direct 2
connection at all.
g 3
G Was it your opinion at the time of the March 1978 accident that the problem with the PORV at TMI-2 could be 4
5 considered a generic problem to B and W reactors?
A Which aspect of it?
g G
For instance, having no indication.
8 A
Yes.
I believe that the potential did exist that 9
it was probably part of the design supplied by B and W and to therefore it was potentially generic.
11 G
So as far as you know, all other B and W reactors i
12 are built in the same way as affects the PORV and the energy 13 source?
14 A
Well, no.
I don't know whether or not it was 15 similar.
16 G
At the time -- in March 19787 1-A Yes, I did not know.
tg G
Do you know now?
19 A
I suspect they are not the same.
I, subsequent 3) to your interview with me, made some calls around and found 21 out at least one plant that is energized to open.
3 G
Which is contrary to the original set up at TMI-2?
i e
A Yes.
24 G
Which plant is that?
l 25 A
Arkansas Nuclear 1.
j i
l Acme Reporting Company
$1 ISaama:pId2:3 1
4 Well, that leaves about six other reactors.
2 A
Yes.
g 3
4 Is it your feeling that tPey would have PORV's
~
4 energized on the basis of the way TFI-2 originally was or 3
the way Arkansas was?
6 A
I really don't know at this point.
4 It is entirely possible they could have the same 3
set up as'TMI-2?
9 A
It is probable, to 4
Did you follow up in any way in terms of your pro blem.
11 concerns about the generic applicability of the pr;b:iili..-
12 with PORV?
13 A
Yes.
14 G
How?
15 A
The event occurred on March 29, 1978.
We informed 16 the headquarters the next day by a preliminary notification, t-and at the same time I wrote that I wrote a memo to IE head-13 quarters requesting the design adequacy of a PORV failing in open, p 4 tion, 19 the Opp er ; ti;...
ctkee 20 We icoked at Three Mile Island and all apene 3 and W 21 plants.
I believe that was sent out the day after on March 22 31, 1978.
23 4
Let me show you a memorandum addressed to Seyfrit, I
24 Assistag Direcrer Technical Programs, II, cated March 31, 3
1978, by Daniel M. Sternberg, Acting Chief, Reactor project Acme Reporting Company
6
'iSaama 9: ped 2
~
'G 2 t
section number 1 and ask if you have seen this before?
2 A
Yes, I have.
\\
3 4
Is this the memo you just made reference to?
l f
A Yes, it is.
4 5
MR. SIDELL:
Let 's mark this Deposition Exhibit 2 6
to the deposition, please?
(Whereupon, the document reterred to a
was marked as Sternberg Deposition 9
Exhibit 2, for. identification.)
10 BY MR. SIDELL:
11 G
Mr. Sternberg, what is the second page Attached to what has now been marked as Exhibit 2 to th(h deposition?
12 13 A
"That is an action item control form, which is a 14 part of a system that I. & E uses to insure that correspond-15 ence which is sent into headquarters or from headquarters.'
16 requiring action actually gets its action acccmplished and it t-is a'. trac, king system.
tg G
So, this tells what the problem is and who sent it 19 and who received it and what was done, is that. correct?.
o A
Yes.
et G
Is there an indication on the action item control 22 form as to someone receiving your concerns?
23 A
Ye.s.
The action office has a person assigned.
24 4
And who is that person?
A Foger Wecdruff.
25 Acme Reporting Company
' *? 2L" * '* "
\\
~ *3 3 IStama:10: ped 2 1
4 That is indicated on the action item control.
form which is attached to exhibit 2 of this deposition.
It a
x 3
appears as though he completed or he sought to complete,
. 4 action by 5-8-78 and there is a separate section termed,'
3 action taken with an action date of 5-3-78 and can you see 6
the closecut action?
A Yes.
It was a memo to Brunner', who was.my boss, 3
my branch chief at the time while I was acting.
9 4
Let me show you a memo for E.J. Brunner, Chief 10 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, Region 'one 11 operations, dated May 3, 1978 from Karl V. Seyfrit, Assistant 12 Director for Technical, programs, Division"of Rha6 tors 13 operations Inspection. Have you seen that previously?
A
- Yes.
14 15 4
Is this the memo referred to as the action taken 16 by headquarters of Bethesda of the NRC?
A Yes, it is.
1-13 4
And in this memorandum what does it appear the re-19 sult of any I
& E headquarters analysis was?'
i A
That sney reviewed it and discovered that this 20 a the 3
type of failure had been studied FSAR for Three Mile Island-4 2.
22 23 4
Is there an occasion in the !My 3rd -- strike that.
3 MR. SIDELL:
Let's have this marked as Exhibit 3.
.;3 Acme Reporting Company
..-..a
s
~3 3 1
MS:ama: 11:p2 1
(Whereupon, the document referred to 2
was marked as Sternberg Deposition
\\
3 Exhibit 3, for identification.
BY MR. SIDELL:
4 G
on exhibit 3, to this deposition is there an
.a 6
indication that Mr. Seyfrit's office actually reviewed your concerns in your March 31, 1978 memo, Exhibit. 2 to this deposition?
g 9
I believe they did. There is a statement, their A
opes, posit.*os to request is based on failure of the valve in the oppeeniren, 11 which was certainly my concern.
12 G
What was stated in Exhibit 2, your memo to Mr.
13 Seyfrit?
A
~ Yes, in that I stated that the blowdcwn in the 14 had.
March 29, 1978 h been caused by the pressurizer relief 15 16 valve opening on a loss of electrical power.- -
G So, they could have written Exhibit 3, the May 3, 1
g 1978 memo, merely on the basis of the memo provided to th_m?
19 Well, somebody clearly researched it at a point A
00 where they discovered it was discussed at a point in the FSAR.
21 O
And they concluded that official review is not 1
l warranted, is that correct?
A Yes.
23 Which closed.out the concern you rasied in.vour G
.,i I
March 3.t, 1978 memorandum?
Is that correct?
25 l
Acme Reporting Company i
35 MStama:12:p2 t
A Yes.
-2 4
Did you feel that was a proper conclusion?
1 Yes. Now I will elaborato.
3 4
4 Please do.
1 5
A My view of the role of the inspector and the 6
regional management is to bring to IE and NRR management's 7
attention cond.". ions which are discovered in the field during 3
routine inspections during investigations of incidents 9
or accidents, and I feel that the role of IE headquarters is to basically to bring a bold perspective on these findings and 11 to take appropriate action when they deem necessary.
12 I was aware also that NRR knew about the failure
[
opes podt4e*
l 13 of the valve in the eppetiti n because I had discussed it 14 with the licensing project manager at the time of the event back in March 1978 15 16 0
Wh0- was that?
A I believe it was Harley Silver.
1-tg 4
Were these conversations over the phone or --
19 A
Yes, over the telephone.
20 g
Was there any written memoranda of these 21 conversations?
22 A
We were working rather closely during this period of time in that the plant had just been licensed and there 23 24 had been a safety injection system to this before the 25 licensing and we had looked at it in depth then and I was Acme Reporting Company
MStama 13:
36 i
staying very closely in centact with the licensing project 2
manager then just to make sure that he was aware of things 3
that were going on at the plant directly.
4 Although, there are other mechanisms for him 5
getting that information, the mest timely is a telephone 6
call.
7 Q,
So, the final. resolutions of the-problems was for 3
the licensee, at TMI-2 or Metropolitan Edison in this case 9
to " install a light which indicated that a signal was sent solembL to to the ::11r.cid for the PORV, but not an actual position in-11 dicator for the PORV, is that correct?
12 A.
That is correct.
13
~
14 15 16
~~
~
17
.ls
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19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Acme Reporting Company
'G 7 6
4Stamas p2d3:1 i
t G
And headquarters of I E in Bethesda found no 2
generic concerns with this problem?
A Yes.
I think, getting back to my statement that ---
3 4
I thought the response from headquarters was acceptable, I 3
think in part it was colored by the fact that.the licensing 6
at Three Mile Island II'had what I considered.torbe corrective actions which in my mind, improved safety and 8
tended to reduce the probability of an similar occurrence at 9
that facility.
10 g
Dealing with the PORV, are you referring to the 11 installation of the warning light for the fact that a signal 13 was sent to the solenoid?
A That and the reconfigura ion of the b -stable so 13 14 it -would energize to open the valve rather than deenergize 15 to open the valve.
16 g
Were these specifics of the solution known by I t-a iE headquarters when they reviewed your memorandum?
18 A
I don't know.
I am trying to remember whether tg or not that was discussed in inspection report." It may be 20 that it was discussed by the licensee in his follow up 21 licensee report of this event.
2 4
In other words, the licensee would have been under 23 a duty to inform the NRC of the precise problem as well as l
its solution?-
34 A
That is correct.
An official form called a 25 l
Acme - Reporting Company l
38 i
1 Stama 2:p3 t
licensee event report is submitted.
I don't have that in 2
front of me, but one was submitted for this event.
g 3
g would that have been because this would have been--
4 a violation of their technical specs?
5 A
It is interesting.
I do not recall what particular-6 aspect of this whole event in March of 1978 made the 7
occurrence reportable.
I think, interestingly, that..what 3
it was was the reactor ecolant system chloride exceeded the 9
technical spec limit.
I believe that may have been 10 the only aspect of the event which was reportable by t'.4 ti current technical specs.
12 G
Based on only one aspect of an event being report-i 13 able is the licensee required to report everything that goes t
14 on during"the event?'
15 A.
No.
16 4
So, it is entirely possible that if the' reportable.
t-part of the March 1978 event at TMI-II did not deal with the tg PORV problem, that never would has s come ' to light?
19 A.
Well, it might not have come to light --
20 4
In a LER?
21 A.
Yes, in a LER. C uring our records review and 22 log review, clearly some portion of it would have certainly 23 surfaced.
Additionally, the licensee dcas infcrm the 24 regional offices of significant events.
l 25 For example, I would think that prior to licensing A cm'e Reporting Company
- - - - - ~ ~
SS taina 3 pnd3 39' i
the safety injection which had occurrei:r it would not have been reportable in any way by the current reporting require-2 y
3 ments, but we were certainly aware of it and worked very 4
closely in reviewing the events then that proceeded this 5
March 28 or March 29, 1978 event.
6 O
Do you know whether at the time of the March 1978 7
problem at TMI-II the PORV was considered to be safety-re-3 lated or not?
9 A.
I reviewed it at the time, and I concluded from to the review I had done that it was not safety related and I 11 think I indicated that in the March 31 memo, that the. release 12 valve does not appear to be a safety related component.
13 Paragraph'two.
I 14 4
- And if you know, was that the reason why the PORV 15 would not have been the basis for a LER?
16 A.
Yes.
If it were not safety related -- in fact,
~
1-the PORV did not malfunction. in the March 29, 1978 event. It
~
is performed exactly as you would' expect it to perform.
When 19 it got a signal to open it opened, and when that signal 20 went away it closed.
The PORV performed normally.
21 As a matter of fact, that whole control system 22 perfermed as designed, namely when the bi-stable deenergized, 23 it opened the. valve, which is what you would expect.
24 4
But with the basic reblem that although the-25 mechanical parts operated as they should have, there was I
(
Acme Reporting Company
)
~: ~ v: -
M5:ama 4: pct 40 1
insufficient indication to allow the humap component, in 2
this case the operator, to know wnat to do when?
g 3
A Well, in the March 1978 avant -- as I recall, my impression at the time was that the operators were not 4
5 aware that the reactor coolant system was depressurizing and that 'there attentions were being called to other things that 6
were being produced by the loss of the inverter on that bus.
3 I think there attentions were towards getting the 9
bus reenergized, in G
Are you aware of what the first indication was that advised or indicated to the operators they had a problem 11 12 with the PORV?
13 A
As I recall, based on telephone discussions and I don't know whether it was with the licensee or our inspector 14 the first indication that they had anything involving the 15 coolant system was the initiation of.the safety injection at te g-1600 pounds decreasing.
ig G
So, the first time as far as you can recall the operator. knew there was a problem with the PORV failing.
19 open og at least open without any indication of that being - the.
.,0 that case, was y.brif the ICCS system came on at 1600 PSI?
A That is my recollection.
G And that is a relatively serious event, is it not?_.
A What aspect are you trying to emphasize the serious-
-~
ness of?
05 G
That is almost the last safety factor that comes Acme Reporting Company
41 MS:cma:5:p3 t
into play if there is a problem with the reactor?
A.
Well, --
\\
4 Alternatively you miss quite a few things up to.-...-
3 the point of the 1600 PSI.
4 5
That is what I am saying.
I do not recall what A
ther paramaters responded.
As I remember, there were other 6
instruments being supplied by the inverter _that. had failed, in cther words pressurizar level and pressurizer pressure, 3
which may have been two paramaters that would have given the 9
operator some indication.
10 They may not have-responded.or may.have responded' H
and thought it was part of the spurious problem. I think not all of the operators were aware what instrument they may lose to, or might give anomalons indications for the loss of that 4
inverter.
g 4
So, as a result of the problem with the-electrical set up and tne PORV, they also lost pressurizer level l
indication?
Did you also say they lost reactor pressure indication?
19
^
l
.i I think pressurizar pressure.
G Which is another mechanism an cperator can use to determine what is g61ng on in the core?
-l l
A Yes.
I 23 l-l 4
So they were essentially left with tail pipe temp-24 I f
erature and reactor pressure and quench tanx indications to Acme Reporting Company
42 4Stama:6:p3 1
. determine what was going on?
A And I don't know whether or not they were suppligd 7
by that same inverter.
I do not know what was supplied by--it;-
3 4
Can you recall whether or not the operator did in 4
fact have re b le quench tank indications readings?
5 A
6 It never came up. The valve as I recall was open less than five minutes until they got the. inverter reenergized g
and as soon as they did the reactor coolant. systed pressure presrure.
started to respond to the high injection pumps and everything g
g turned around from dere.
to g
So, it is conceivable that the most important in-4 dicator they had during this transient was the quench tank in terms of level and temperature and pressure indications?
A Well, yes, if you look at the problem as being the PORV being on.
But as I said before, our concern at the timo was not the PORV but the injection of sodium-hydroxide.
~
16 4
Let me show you an exceprt from a report, a
periodic report which deals with the March 9,19 78 problem at TMI and ask you if you have ever seen this before.
A Yes, I have.
20 4
What is this report from, if you know?
A It is from a publication that the NRC subscribes to called Nuclear Power Experiences, which is a private pub-11 cation. that indexes and cross references reports frem i
i licensees and other sources to discuss various problems which l
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have occurred in nuclear power facilities.
2 1
G Is this report available to anyone other than thh 3
-~-
NRC7 A
I do not kncw. I assume that.other people subscribe to it.
Idon'1iknowwhethersomebodyfrogthegeneralpublic 6
could get a copy of it.
~
G In terms of other operating reactors,. would 'it be s
likely they would subscribe to this publication?
9 A
Some may, but there are other mechanisms whereas to licenseer can exchange event reports.
I think the Edison 11 Intaitute has a system where each licensees reports are routed.
to other. licensees.
13 G
How does the description of the March 1978 TMI-II
~
14 problem in this publication refer to -- for instance, that 15 required by the NRC7 A
I don't have.the licensei~ report in front of me, but it appears to be consistent with my recollection of what R
,S was in the L%# from Three Mile Island - II.
19 G
Does it appear to be more information, less infor-
'O mation or about the same, if you can recall?
gell, it probably has more information thgh the 21 A
licensee event report, which is a - form apparently used for -
-23 ccmputer input. As I: rememmer, Three Mile Island II also i
24 would attach another letter to their LIR submittal which
5 was several pages long and would probably go into great Acme Reporting Company
44 1:ama:8:pcd3 i
detail or comparable detail to that which is here in front of me now.
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3 G
Sut this excerpt from the periodical you
~
mentioned provides sufficient detail to alert any other re-4 actors who might subscribe to this service, is that correct?
5 A
Yes.
6 MR. SIDELL: Let's have~this marked as Exhibit 4.
7 3
(Whereupon, the document referred to 9
was marked as Sternberg Deposition to Exhibit 4, for identification.)
BY MR. SIDELL:
11 4
Do you recall the date of this specific excerpt, 12 Mr. Sternberg?
13 14
- I think it is on the bottom of the page there, A
April '78.
15 4
I think it might 'be August, '78.
16 A
Yes, August '78.
g G
S that before the accident we are 'now IS I
investigating at TMI-II in March of 1979, several months 19 as
~
20 bef re, the public being defined ad' other operating reactors 31 had readily available information about the specific problem at TMI-II in March of 19787
,,l 23 Well, the public certainly did in that the licensee gi report and the correspondence. in our inspection reports fcIIcw 25 Sng the event are all publi~ ly recorded and. used in the.
c e
public document room.
I Acme Reporting Company
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G When I use the term public it is of a more limited 2
nature, defined in this context as being other opers 1
3 reactors who may subscribe to it.
4 A.
Or the LER exchange program.
I am not familiar 5
with the details of that -- I also know -that B&W was aware 6
of the event in that I knew they were at the least aware of tha sodium hydroxide injection initiation-and therefore I 8
felt that the NSSS was aware of this.
9 I don't know to what extent they may have investi-10 gated the electrical aspect of it.
~
11 O
Who are you referring to when you say NSSS?
12 A.
Well, the company that supplied the nuclear 13 reactor and the steam syttem -- Babcock and Wilcox.
14
-G
- Were they specifically aware, to you knowledge, 15 f the precise problem with the PORV?
16 A.
I have no idea. That is.what I_said. I know they t-we.re involved in reviewing the event and1I would. a'ssume, but 18 c I don't know.
The initiating event.
19 4
.It would be likely for them to be knowledgeable 20 about the problem of the PORV, since they were reviewing the 21 entire event?
l 22 A.
I would expect it to certainly be likely,_yes.
i 23 G
It would certainly be in their interest to find 24 out about all the problems, whether or not reportable to the 25
- NRC,
, would 2.t not?
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A Yes.
2 G
Are you aware of any analysis or follow up.by B&y 3
in this regard?
4 A
I know they performed an analysis of the enemical 5
aspect of the event.
0,,
6 4
So you did not see notice from B&W to other 3
2 opera
- reactors indicating suggestions to change the at 3-electronic system.above the PORV?-
9 A
No, I am not aware of it.
10 11 12 13 j
14
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15 16 17 IS -
19.
20 -
21
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23 24l 25 1 Acme Reporting Company I
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G If there was such a notice, would you have been he.tco a.
aware of it-in your position as acting 3 Chief in Region I?
2 g
3 A
I don't think so.
I don' t think NRC at that point--
4 in time would have been made aware of it necessarily.
That 5
was before 10 CFR Part 21 reporting requirements were required,
and it might have come out on something aimilar to what GE 6
7' has in the surface information letter.
S n
So it would have been possible for a vendor such 3
as B&W to remedy what may have been generic problems to all
~
10 of its plants for matters that were not deemed safety 11 related and therefore would not have shown up in LE2's, is 12 that correct?
13 A
Yes.
14
~ a
'They would not necessarily have notified the NEC 15 of any of these changes or corrections?
16 A
That is correct.
17 0
As far as you know, this was the accepted NRC 18 procedure at the time?
19 A
Yes.
M a
Do you know whether that NPC procedure has been 21 changed since the accident in March of 1979 at T.MI-II?
22 A
I think not, if you put.on_the caveat that. it is l
3 not safety related.
i i
24 a
Are you aware of any change in definition of what 25 is or is not safety related as a result of the accident in Acme Reporting Company n u n.a...
4:2 dca 48 1
T!!I-II of this year?
2 A
There is no change that I am aware of.
There a:4 3
studies going on, but there is no official change that I. _ _ _.
s 4
am aware of.-
5 4
You are referring to the Lessons Learned Study?
6 A
Among others.
7' 4
Does I&E have its own separate' study?
3-A Yes.
9 G
Your background is primarily, if not exclusively in 10 electrical engineering, is that correct, !!r. Sternberg?
11 A
My college degree is in electrical engineering.
12 However, my Navy training in nuclear power covered all areas 13 of nuclear thermal hydraulics, chemistry, core physics, 14 materials, acc' dant analysis.
15 4
When was it if you recall that you first saw the 16 Michelson Report?
-"~
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1-A In April of 1979.
18 G
Was that a typed version or handwritten?
19 A
Yes, typed.
20 a
Did you read the entire report?
21 A
Yes, I did.
22 4
How many times?
~-
23 A
Once.
24f G
Did you understand it?
l l
05 A
Certain portions I was comfortable with, other l
L Acme Aep arting Company
doc gg 4:3-I portions I was impressed with but didn't understand.
2 a
Nhich portions were you comfortable with, if you g s
3 can recall?
4
.A Nell, I was reading it in light of the Three Mile 5
Island accident and I gathered that the possibility for the 6
pressurizer lever to increase in steam space brakes in the 7
pressurizer was discussed there.
S a
In view of the fact that you read the report after 9
the accident at Three Mile Island and knoNing some of the 10 essential facts that occurred during the accident, would you 11 conclude that the Michelson Report or at least' those sections 12 you feel comfortable with was an accurate conclusion of what 13 went on at Three Mile Island in March of 1979?
'I don't really Ieel qualified.
It seemed like the
~~
14 A
15 Michelson Report predicted a potential and that similar events 16 occurred.
Whether or not the report explaini accurately what 17 went on I don't know.
IS There could be several explanations for what was
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19-observed.
That may not necessarily be a correct one, but it
'N certainly seemed to fit.
21 a
Well, would you say that the :lichelson Recort had 22 it been reviewed in light of its significance be: ore-ene 23 accident would have been successful in preventing the 24 accident?
25 Based on all the facts you new knew that occurred
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at Three Mile Island?
2 A
In my understanding of Three.' tile Island, based o.3 3
preliminary information is there were a large number of 4
factors.
It is my own eersonal belief about events at nuclear 5
power plants that typically there are many things which have 6
to line up before an event can occur with any consequences, 7
anyone of which if they didn't occur may very well have-8 stopped it.
er 9
The contribution of increasing pressuri:4ee level to to the decision of the operators to stop safety inje'ction I 11 think contributed to the significance, but I don't think it 12 was the sole' contributor to the significance of the accident.
13 4
Do you know what the operator based his decision 14 on when he terminated the system?
15 A
From reports I have read and interviews I have 16 heard it'was the information of taking the r'eactor ' coolant 17 system solid.
18 G
What was the reason, if you know, that the operator 10 had that information?
20 A
That that was part cf the standard training, is that 21
$bu don't want to take the reactor system solid.
Z1 4
How would he know the system. was going solid?
23 A
The best indication would be the pressuricer level.'
24 4
That based on the pressuri er level indication, 25 which was either increasing or off scale high, the operator j
i l
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then terminated the HPI system, is that correct?
2 A
Yes.
\\
3 G
Have you received any information on the March, ' - ~ ~
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4 1979 accident at Three Mile Island whether or not the operator 5
referred to raector temperature or pressure prior to termina-6 tion of the EPI system?
d 7
A I don't know.
I don' t recall see'ing anything on a
that.
9 G
Are you aware of what the general method of operation 10 was at TMI preceeding the accident of this yes: in terns of 11 operator reliance on pressurizer level indication?
12 A
Other than what I have heard that that was the 13 primary indicator.
I am not familiar in detail with anything.
14 G
Row have you heard that the operator primarily 15 relied on pressurizer level indication?
~
16 Were these conversatio:
degion I when you were 17 there?
18 A
No, definitely not.
It was all after the accident 19 in terms of the investigation, interviews with the operators.
20 4
Did you speak with the operators?
~~
21 A
No.
I heard transcripts of the interviews with r
the operators.
I was working in 'NRC'-s-i: cident response 3
center during the accident and one of the things I contributed.
24 to was getting transcripts made of the first interviews wich 25 -
the operators.
Acme Reporting Company
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G Uhat day was that?
2 A
I was in the response center fron Friday, March 3q 3
through Tuesday, April 11.
4 a
The conversations you were responsible for tran-5 scribing occurred when?
6 A
I believe they were interviews made by Region I 7
investigators with the operators on watch on April third and 8
fourth at the site.
9 G
No earlier than that?
10 A
No.
I believe they were the first interviews with 11 those operators, at least by, you know, people tasked 12 ultimately with the investigation of the accident rather 13 than coping with the event?
~
14
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'Are you aware of any operator training licensing 15 supervised by the NRC7 16 A
No, there is none supervised.
The' NRC reviews the 17 operator training and licensing.
18 G
Where does the operator develop or obtain official 19 training and licensing procedures?
20 A
You confuse me.
You used ti. i word licensing and 21 frocedures and training.
22 G
Licensing and procedures c _ training and procedures.
23 A
The licensee, Metropclitan Edison Company here 24 conducts its cwn training program, which is a program that is l
25 designed to get its operators licensed by the NRC.
They also Acme Reporting Company I
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.1 then subsequently participate in that training and requalifi-2 cation program, which is reviewed and approved by the NRC x
3 and then periodically inspected by the NRC inspectors.
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4 4
But in the first instance the utility obtains the 5
training procedures from the vendor, S&W in this case?
6 A
Well, they generate their own procedures.
They may 7
use B&W generic procedures or hire a company to come in and 8
write procedures for them.
All of those things have been 9
done.
I am sure they do work with other utilities that have 10 the same power plant.
11 G
What involvement does the NRC have in,for instance, 12 insuring that an operator of a reactor has been sucesssfully 13 trained or examined?
~
14
' A What assurances does the NRC have?
15 4
Does the NRC in any way get involved in determining
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16 that the operator is in fact qualified to run the plant?
17 A
NRC examiner 1 go to the site and ' conduct written 1
18 examinations, practical examinations, walk-through examinations,
19 oral discussions, and based on those examinations, if the 20 person is deemed to be qualified, a NRC license to that 21 individual to operate that specific power plant is issued.
l 22 4
Do you know whether there was any -- there-were any 23 operators at TMI-II in March of 1978 who had not creviously l
24 successfully passed their relicensing exams?
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25 A
well, I wouldn' t think at that point it would be l
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relicensing.
That was the first time, and I don't know.
i 2
g Do you have any information as to whether or not x 3
any operators at TMI-II have failed to pass their relicensIni-4 or licensing?
~
5 L
No.
I was trying to remember whether or not I knew 6
that.
Some utilities I know have never had anybody who have 7
gone up for a failed examination.
8 G
Has TMI --
9 A
I can't recall whether TMI has.
10 4
Are you aware of the testing procedure of the 11 11 and 12 valves at TMI-II?
12 A
No, I am no t.
13 When was the last date of your responsibilities in
~
Region I,'if you can recall?
14 15 A
In the acting capacity, as acting Section Chief or 16 when did I leave Region I?
17 A
Both, acting and when you left Region I.
18 A
I will answer the easy cuestion first.
I left 19 Region I around August 25, 1978.
Probably I stopped acting 20 in late July or August, and I don' t recall.
21 G
Shortly before you lef t?
22 A
Yes.
23 4
Co you know low long Mr. Haverkamp was responsible ~
24 for inspecting TMI-II?
25 L
Nell, he was already the inspector when'I took over
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the section, and as I understar.d it, he was still the 2
inspector at the time of the accident in March of 1979.
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3 4
So essentially he was the only inscector by the
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4 NRC?
5 1
For the operational things, yes.
Well, he was the 6
assigned principal inspector.
7 0'
Did he have inspectors who reporied to him? -~
~
8 1
Not in a line capacity, but in a' technical capacity, 9
yes.
The whole range of specialists -- I can renumerate to them, but they all inspected at that facility.
In other 11 words, the IE inspection program looks across all aspects 12 of plant operations and e principal inspector's role is 13 primarily oriented around the operations of the facility but 14 it is also concerned with the coordination that insures all 15 other aspects of a plant are looked at in a timely fashion.
16 How are you defining "timsly"?
17 A
In accordance with the schedule which has been 13 prescribed in the II Inspection Program Manual.
19 4
Well, would the precise length of time necessary 20 to be considered a timely review vary with the significance 21 of the component involved?
22 A
Nell, it is not specificall'y oriented around 23 components.
It is oriented around functional areas.
For 24 example, quality assurance, health physics, training, 25 calibration and the frequency that each of those-particular l
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functional areas is reviewed is prescribed in the IE manual, 2
and the frequency is generally related to the direct safety \\
3 significance of that functional area.
' " ~ "
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4 G
What about the primary system itself?
If there was 5
a problem with the primary system, what would be considered 6
a timely review of correcting the problem, or would it have 7
to be limited to a specific part of the primary system?-
8 A
Nell, the program which I have described to you.
9 doesn't relate to your question directly.
If you are talking to about a specific identified problem which may be reported 11 in the Licensee Event Report, we have inspection requirements 12 for looking at Licensee Event Reports and closing them out 13 to see that the correct action is taken.
14
~
Other general problems with reactor coolant systems 15 may be reviewed and things like an inspection where we 16 review when examinations the licensee-has pe'~ formed of r
17 nrimary system components, so there is not direct correlation I
t 18 p between our inspection program and how long it would take to 19 look at a given problem.
~
M G
For instance, if there was a problem concerninc 21 the accuracy of the pressuriner level indication, would 14 5
=enths for the resolution of the problem be considered timely?
23l A
If it was re artable it would be locked at sooner.
I 24 !
For example, the pressurizer level may have been required to i
31oT l
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Acnte Reporting Company
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30 inches and that is outside of acceptable tolerance, that 2
report may be looked at within a couple of ' months.
x 3
If it had resulted in an event of any kind of 4
significance, it may be that an inspector was sent to the,
5 site that day or ithin a few days or some intense conversation 6
on the telephone may have taken place to gather more informa-7 tion about it.
8 So the 14 months, I am not sure what you are getting 9
at there.
10 0
If you had an event and there was a problem 11 concerning the accuracy of the pressurizer level indication, 12 would 14 months have been a timely review and resolution of 13 the problem given its importunce in the primary system?
14 A
Well, I guess I am getting back to the work accuracy is here.
I am thinking perhaps in a narrower term than you were.
16 Accuracy says when a pressurizer level is. at a given point, 17 '
what does it indicate, and it has tech spec requirements 18 on that and I would look at that.
19 That would be looked at much more quickly than 14 20 mo nths.
It would require immediate correction by the licensee 21 4
So 14 months would be an uncimely review and-22 correction of the problem?
23l A
Relative to accuracy level against technical i
24 specifications, yes.
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3 4
That is the only ' function for the pressuriier level
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indication, is it not?
2 A.
Are you getting back to the Michelson Report?
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3 No, unless I should be.
4 A.
As I understand it, the Michelson then -- the level 5
in the pressurizer was fine.
It is just that the pressuri::er 6
level didn't reflect the coolant inventory.
7 4
No.
I have a different 14 months'.
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8 Are you familiar with someone by the name of James 9
Cresswell?
10 A
Yes.
11 G
How do you know him?
12 A
I met him at the response incident during the Three 13
!!ile Island accident.
He came in with the beginning of the 14 IE investigation team.
He and Bob Martin and Tim M.artin 15 started out their investigation at the Incident
Response
16 Center.
~-~~
17 4
Do you remember what day that was?
18 A.
Perhaps some time in the first week in April, l'9 Did Mr. Cresswell'during the time you were working 29 together in the Incident Response Center indicate to you Asty problems he may have ccme across that were sinilar to 21 22 TMI-II within his area of respon!. bili-ty?
03 A.
He had a general discussion with me abcut some transience of Davis-Besse with apparently an ancmalous ~
24 25 pressuri::er level and indication, yes.
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G Did he give you a,ny more specifics about what the 2
problem was, what the date of the occurencs was?
g 3
A No.
We discussed some of the details, but I am no t- -
4 familiar.
5 G
Nell, for instance, did he indicate after a few 6
days when people in the Incident Response Center had pretty much the relevant facts that were going on at TMI-II, I had 3
the same problem with Davis-Besse a year and a half ago?
9 A
I believe there was sone discussion along that line, 10 yes.
11 G
What did he relate to you about that?
12 A
I think we just had a general discussion that 13 indeed there was a problem with flashing' and / Voiding in
~
14 the' reactor coolant system, that he thinks that Davis-Besse 15 had had the same problem some period of time bef'. e that.
16 G
Did you come to learn why-there we'r'e not 'those 17 problems at Davis-Besse?
18 A
No.
I mean,perhaps,we had some discussions of power 19 levels in the decay heat inventory, but everything is blending
'7 sort of.
~
21 G
Let me ask you, if a reactor were going up to nine 22 percent power, had no prior history with decay heate.could l
Il that have explained the lack of a TMI-II type problem at 24 Davis-Besse as Mr. Cresswell explained it to you?
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l 25 A
I am not sure what T:12-II type problem you 'are n
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talking about, the increasing pressurizer level, an off scale 2
high -- I don' t remember if Davis-Besse had that problem, bqt 3
it would explain it, because that as I understand it the' ' - ~
4 mechanism, namely that the temperature and pressure relation-5 ships are such that you get. voiding in the core which is dis-6 placing water from the pressurizer and if you don't have that 7
temperature relationship you won't see that phenomena. -
8 G
Phenomena specifically referred to as off scale 9
high --
10 A
or' increasing level in a pressurizer with"a 11 decreasing average ecolant temperature, the divergent 12 temperature average.
13 G
The significance of the pressurizer level indication 14 going off scale high is that the operator referring or relying 15 on that information. terminates the HPI system, which in the 16 case of UtI-II and presumably Davis-Besse wa's' terminated 17 prematurely, is that correct?
18 A
Yes.
G I believe you pre'viously indicated, but let me 20 just make sure, that you had conversations with Harley Silver, Ehe project manager, concerning the March, 1973 TMI
.I 21
'5 problems?
U A
Yes.
24 n.
Did you specifically inform him of problems dealing 2
with the PCRV?
Acme Reporting Company
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.t I assume I did.
I reme=ber at the time being very 2
concerned with the fact t' tat the valve failed to open withogt 3
enunciation, concerned to the point that I wrote the memo ch
4 the same day basically as the event occurred, and I feel 5
confident that I would have discussed that with Earley at 6
the time.
7 G
Did he give you any indication whether that was a S
problem from Sethesda's view point or it wasn't a problen 9
or --
10 A
As I said, I don't recall specifically saying 11 anything to Harley, so I certainly don't recollect any u
response.
13 0
In view of the importance that you attach to the 14 PORV problem by writing a memo suggesting headquarters 15 review, either that day or the subsequent day, would you
~
16 consider it more likely than not that you would have mentioned 17 the PORV problems to Harley Silver?
IS A
Yes.
Let me discuss another aspect of the IE 19 modus operandi.
Several occasions in the past I had written 20 memos of the same general nature and included a request that l
l 21 this issue be transferred to licensing for review.
22 I had been informed and I do not recall by whom
%3 in this was preempting the prerogatives of headquarters to 24 do the review themselves and that such a request should not 25 he included in the future memos.
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4 Who informed you of that?
2 A
I don't recall.
g 3
4 Was it someone in Region I?
4 A
Well, if it were, it was at the direction of someone 5
in IE headquarters, but it was -- and I recognized what it 6
was that was being said, that in effect it was II headquarters 7
mission to make that decision, what should be transferred to 8
licensing, that it was not really a field prerogative to 9-decide, so I specifically included that request from this 10
- memo, 11 4
Well, in other words, if I understand you correctly, 12 if you find a problem in the field during an inspection or 13 investigation of a plant, and the inspector or the investi-14 gator feefs that this is a problem of significant size that 15 should be considered by licensing in an attempt to resolve 16 it across the board if it-is generic, before you can get 17 to the point of resolution you have to go through the entire 18 I&E structure?
19 A
Yes.
'M 4
Someone at the top of IGN in headquarters must make 21 f similar determination that, yes, in fact this is a serious 22 generic problem that should be corrected by licensing, is 23 ep.,e correct?
24 L
Or look at by licensing, yes.
25
?
Af ter that procedure is followed, does it then go Acme Reporting Company I
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directly from the top of I&E down to the bottom of licensing 2
where the problem is resolved or does it also have to go
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3 down the licensing chain of command?
4 A
As I recall, there are compatible levels with IE and 5
NRR and the agreement to transfer responsibility is effected 6
at that level and whatever internal mechanism NRR uses to get 7
it to a reviewer, I don' t know.
N 6
8 4
You are not familiar with the / tR mechanism?
9 A
No.
10 0
Based on your experience with the I&E mechanism, 11 what are the potentials for successfully raising a potential 12 generic safety concern at the field level and getting it 13 through all tre various stages of I&E 'up to the top where a 14 decision can be made to send it to NRR?
15 A
I think it depends on the significance of the particular item that is being address 4d and herhaps to some 16 17 extent on the way it is written.
18 The memo'as I 1cok at it now, you know, perhaps 19 didn't have enough red flags waving.
I emphasize in there 20 what I ccnsider to be the potential generic as=ects, the f act
[ hat it was safety grade and things like that.
21 I have a feeling -- my own personal feeli'ng was 23 that there was enough there if senehody was sensitive to my 24 concerns that there were enough flags there, but I have a I
Ahing A,-
feeling if I was truely concerned with getting that Acme Reporting Company
NGC 64 4:18 1
looked at I could have either gone back' with a follow up 2
memo or have written it different13
_o demand something.
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3 G
Nell, is it you opinion that based on your 4
experience with I&E as you attempt to bring a safety, a 5
generic matter up the ladder in I&E, a't each individual step 6
it is possible tnat the matter will be terminated without 7
resolution?
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s A
Yes, that is correct.
9 G
Is it more likely than not that substantial safety to concerns of regional people or in pectors or investigators 11 will not get to the top of the ladder because of the way in 12 which the procedure is established?
13 A
I don't think it is more likely than not.
If it is 14 truely substantial, I think it will and has clearly been in 15 the past transferred over.
I think -- you know, again' I will 16 get back to what I think headquarter's mission is, is to 17 bring a perspective and a judgment into play.
18 The fact is there are a lot of concerns which 19 surface from the field which may be valid concerns, but
'T which don't necessarily represent a significant threat to
$he health and safety of the public to warrant an allocation 21 22 of resources.
23 G
Well, you felt sufficiently concerned in your 24 March 31, 1978 memo to Mr. Seyfrit recuesting generic 25 expedited review by S&W of their ?OR7 problems that -- well, Acme Reporting Company i
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first of all to write a memo, and secondly to attempt to 2
climb the I&E ladder to get a resolution, which was net theg 3
resolution, evidently you eventually got.
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4 A.
As I said earlier, though, part of my acceptance 5
of the responsibility which I got was the fact that as far 6
ac I was concerned Metropolitan Edison had gone a long way 7
towards reducing the probability of the same event, which 8
I was concerned with in the March 29, 1978 event from 9
occurring.
- 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
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25 Acme Reporting Company
una:Upcc 5 MS t
(Recess.)
4 Mr. Sternberg, before we took a short break you 2
3 indicated that on most occasions you accepted I&E heade -
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4 quarter's perspective on matters that field representatives 5
may raise in terms of resolving possible generic or signifi-6 cant problems.
A Yes.
3 And that you specifically accepted their judge-9 ment on the March 29, 1978 TMI-II problem dealing with the 10 PORV and the fact that there was no indication light as to 11 whether the valve was open or closed.
A Yes.
12 G
D you know whether the same individuals who re-13 14 solved your concern in May of 1978 were also the same people who were in a position to resolve similar concerns in March of 15 19792
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16 g
Well, Karl Seyfrit wasn't.
Ife had been promoted A
gg as the Director of Region four in Dallas, Fort Worth.
tg G
What about Roger Woccruff, since he appears to be t
20 the individual most directly responsibile for reviewing your concerns?
21 A
I believe Roger is still in the same basic 3
23 capacity.
g; 4
So, based on the events that happened at TMI-II l
25 in March of 1979, had scmeone in I&E headquarters given a i
l Acme Reporting Company iL--
67 r
MStamas 2:pzd5 t
little more attention.to your concerns, there might not have been a TMI-II in March of 1979, is that correct?
2
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1 I don't think there is any direct connection.. - -.
3 4
Well, there was no adequate indication as to the 4
5 actual position of the PORV at TMI-II was there?
A No, but the thing which was responsive or would 6
have been responsive to my concerns relative to the valve position indication would at least -- at least what satisfied 3
me in that I understood that direct indication was not avali-9 g
able because of the construction of the valve, would have 11 been an electrical indication, which would'not have 12 necessarily functioned during the condition at Three Mile Island-II in March of 1979.
13 14 0
But we don't know whether had I&E headquarters 15 reviewed the problem more thoroughly than they apparently 3
16 did, they would have seen the neccessity for an actual 1-position indication on the PORV a year before the TMI-II 13 accident we are investigating.
In other words, they looked 19 at the minimum rather than the maximum of precautionary 3
measures necessary?
21.
A Yes.
i 22 G
To your knowledge, were individuals responsible 23 for review' by I&E headquarters aware of the 3&W change in i
24 the PORV by the installation of an indirect warning light?
l 25 A
A, I don't know whether it was B&W that made Acme Reporting Company
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6e MStamas 3:p5 t
the change.
I think it was Metropolitan Edison who made the 2
change.
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3 0
You think that was based on a recommendation by --
B&W7 4
5 A
I den.'t.know what role if any B&W played in
's that change.
They may or may not be aware of it through-the licensee report mechanism, which they did have access to, as 3
I indicated earlier.
9 0
So, it is entirely possible, based on the face 10 of Exhibit 3 to this deposition, the responses to you from 11 Karl Seyfrit terminating any further review of the PORV 12 problem, that they were unaware of the installation of an 13 indirect position actuation light?
" t4 A.
-
- I don't know.
It is possible.
I just don't 15 know.
16 G
And yet they still concluded that the matter was t-not sufficient to require further review?
33 A.
That is based on the discussion in the FSAR,-
19 which indicated the size of the PORV which you could then 20 compare to the analyzed range of pipe break accidents and 2
-they also indicated that in the event that the valve did I
[AO 22 j,atT open, there was a power operator block valve upstream 23 to isolate it.
l l
24 4
Are you -aware of whether or not I&E headquarters 25 has changed their precedures at all as the result of TMI-II i
i Acme Reporting Company
i s ama's 4 s pnd5 69 in March of 1979?
t A
2 There have been many changes.
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4 Their procedures for reviewing the types of conr.
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carns you expressed in your March 31, 1978 memo?
g No, I am not aware of any.
5 4
Are Y u aware f anY Pr Posed in the lessons 6
learned or I&E reports or investigations? _
A Let's go off the record for a second.
g (Discussion off the record.)
g MR. SIDELL:
Back on the record.
g BY MR. SIDELL:
G I believe the question was whether or not you are g
13 any c anges Gat are proposed to I&E in reviewing aware the types of cencerns you expressed in ycur March 1979 memo?
g A
Yes.
I am serving on a task force to review what 15 9"
16 proposed change.
g G
What does that change include?
g.
A Establishment of permanent groups composed of-NRR, g,
I&E, the NSSS, architect engineers to review events. Another g
system to dissemanate field events to all concerned people 3
through a mechanism similar to the I&E bulletin.
gg A simplified-what I call a reappeal of a response 23 to get it one level _above, although I suspect that that i
3 was always available to me.
25 mechanism Acme Reporting Company
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MStam2: 5ptd5 7C 1
4 Are you referring to the open door policy?
2 A
Yes.
The technical dissenting view or the g
3 minority opinion, or whatever -
something where without
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4 any prejudice, a simple thing saying let's look at it again 5
by another personnel would be available.
6 4
Is 'the essense of yo'ur prcposal to revamp the I&E 7
system to establish more direct communications with other a
branches within the NRC without having essentially to go all 9
the way up the I&E ladder to get all the way down.to the 10 bottom of the NRR ladder?
11 A
It is to assure that the information becomes avail-able to
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12 everybody who might be sensitive to the significance i3 of it and provide an earlier recognition of the potential 14 significance.
15 Also, to bring about a national perspective and 16 reliable mechanism for determining the generic aspects.
t; For example, a problem may occur in Region one and Region is four and they each individually may not recognize either the 19
similaricles of the event or the possibility for a -
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20
~ synergistic effect that you could bring. about at a national 21 2evel.
~s 22 g
So, essentially things-that are both compartment-m alized on an internal basis in headquarters as well as 24 compartmentalized between various Regions as you see them?
l l
25 A
Well, it is not so much that they are l
Acnue Reporting Company 1
7I MS:ame:6: ped 5 compartmentalized, but for exampia the information througn 1
the grey book and through morning reports is made available from one regicn to another.
However, if you had -- I am 3
proposing a standing group whose job is to review events, I 4
have a feeling ~that'they would perhaps~ dig more deeply into-5 the possibility that there may be an underlying cause for 6
some events or the possibility that two events independently 7
which have occurred, if they occurred simultaneously could provide a condition which hasn't been considered previously.
9 0
You previously mentioned that looking back you 10 may not have had enough red flags waiving in your March 31, 11
~
1978 memo to signal the, what you perceived as significant, 12 wsd generic problemskwth the PORV.
13 AfteryourreadingoftheMich/elsonreport, did 54 you find that there were enough red flags waiving in that report to signify significance?
16 G
I don't recall, but I was not lef t with an 17 overwhelming impression that it was the cry of a desperate 18 man.
No, I didn't sense that.
That it was a well written tachnical report which hypothesized certain conditions may
,o occur, and I don't even remember if there was any action 21 requested or suggested at that point.
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22 G
Co you know who that report was written for?
23 1
A.
No; I don't
)
24 l
G Nevertheless, you were aware in relatively clear terms of Mr. Michjlelson's concerns dealing with pressuricer I
Acme Reporting Company
72 MStama:7 pad 5 t
level indication problems and there inaccuracies?
A Yes.
Well, the potential for misleading them, 2
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3 yes.
4 As well as the fact that operators apparently 4
5 primarily rely on that method of indication to determine what is going on in the core?
g A
Yes.
MR. SIDELL:
Do you have anything? -
3 MS. MOE:
No, not at this time.
9 MR. SIDELL:
Mr. Sternberg, rather than adjourn 10 11 the deposition we will recess it so that in the event we have 12 further questions you will still be available.
We will make g
every effort to avoid that.
We will recess the deposition now, and when it is transcribed, it will be presented to you 14 f r review, correction if necessary, and signature. -Thank 15 16 you, very much.
(Whereupon, at 12:51 the deposition was recessed 1-33 to reconvene if necessary on a later date.)
19 I have read the foregoing pages, 1 through l
and they are a true and accurate record of my
._y
- stimony the in recorced.
%l
]Cl 27 3
DANIEL M. STERNBERG Q
22 i
. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23l this day of 1979 l
24!
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I Notary Public i
l 25 i My Commission Expires:
Acme Reporting Company
3 O 'Y
,3 1
2
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-REPORTEN'S CERTIF CATE 3
4 5
CCCEET NUMBER:
6 CASE TITLE:
DEPOSITION OF DANIEL M..STERNBERG 7
EEARING DATE: July 30, 1979 3
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LOCATICN:
Bethesda, Maryland
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9 to I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence 11 herein are contained fully and accurately in the notes 12 taken by =e at the hearing in the above case before the 13 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND and that this is a true and correct transcript of the 14 15 same.
16 17 IS 2
Date:
July 31, 1979
//
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d 4_ d./_s( d 21 Official Recc er Ac=e Repcrting C0=pany, Inc. ;
22 1411 E Street, ii. W.
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