ML19337A427
| ML19337A427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1980 |
| From: | Broughton T, Joyner L, Sadauskas G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332B231 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8009260411 | |
| Download: ML19337A427 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289
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(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No. 1)
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LICENSEE'S TESTIMONY OF T.
GARY BROUGHTON, GERALD J. SADAUSKAS AND LUTHER L. JOYNER IN RESPONSE TO SHOLLY CONTENTION NO. 6(a)
(INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM) g909%
OUTLINE The purposes and objectives of this testimony are to respond to Sholly Contention 6(a), which asserts that prior to continued operation of TMI-1, a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of the Integrated Control System (ICS) should be completed.
The testimony shows that an ICS FMEA has been performed.
The function snd operation of the ICS are also described and the results of the ICS FMEA and complementary evaluations of field data from B&W operating plants are addressed.
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INTRODUCTION This testimony, by Mr. T.
Gary Broughton, Control and Safety Analysis Manager, GPU; Mr. Gerlad J. Sadauskas, Group Leader, Instrumenticion Engineering, GPU; and Dr. Luther L.
Joyner, Principal Engineer, Power Systems and Controls Unit, Babcock & Wilcox Company, is addressed to the following contention:
SHCLLY CCNCENTION NO. 6(a)
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It is contended that the short-term actions identified in the Commission's Order and Notice of Hearing dated 9 August 1979 are insufficient to provide the requisite reasonable assurance of operation without endangering public health and safety because they do not include the following items:
Completion of a failure mode and a.
effects analysis (FMEA) of the Integrated Control System.
RESPONSE TO SHOLLY CONTENTION NO. 6(a)
BY WITNESS JOYNER:
)
Sholly Contention 6(a) states that a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of the Integrated Control System (ICS) should be completed prior to continued operation of TMI-1.
Sueb an analysis has been performed.
The B&W ICS provides a coordinated response from the reactor / steam generator / turbine system during power operation I
see Figure 1.
This results in a design which can readily respond to changes in demand for generated power and can accommodate various pertubations and maintain the unit in a stable power condition.
During load changes or system upsets during power operation, the ICS applies signals to the major control variables (feedwater flow, steam pressure, reactor power and reactcc coolant temperature) to achieve optimum overall plant response without challenge to the safety systems.
The system is designed to provide automatic control during power operation, and to accept step load changes up to 10% and ramp load changes up to 5% rated power per minute.
When load demand changes, the controls automaticall:7 adjust steam flow to the turbine and feedwater flow to the steam generators to maintain a constant steam pressure at the turbine throttle.
Simultaneously, the system positions groups of regulating control rod assemblies to adjust reactor power and maintain a constant average coolant temperature over a load range of 15 to 100 percent power.
While the ICS was not involved in initiating the TMI-2 accident and subsequently functioned as designed, a detailed FMEA has been performed for the ICS - see Reference 1.
The ICS FMEA determined the expected effects upon the B&W nuclear steam system from single failures of ICS inputs, outputs and internal modules.
The analysis was complemented, as shown in Reference 1, with an evaluation of field data from all B&W cperating plants, and a computer simulation to confirm the effects of various ICS failures on associated equipment.
The overall conclusion of the FMEA was the reactor core remains protected throughout any of the ICS failures studied.
For those postulated ICS failures that could cause reactor trip, the safety systems operate independently of the ICS malfunction.
The overall conclusion from the operating experience evaluation was that ICS hardware performance has not led to a significant number of reactor trips.
The ICS has prevented more reactor trips than it has caused and thus its net effect has been a reduction in the number of challenges to the Reactor Protection System.
BY WITNESSES BROUGHTON AND SADAUSKAS:
The B&W ICS FMEA was reviewed by GPU and found to be applicable to the TMI-l ICS.
The TMI-1 safety systems which would be actuated following ICS failures would operate indepen-dently of the ICS malfunction.
The FMEA did not identify any changes required at TMI-l to ensure the public health and safety.
Implementation of the FMEA recommendations, which will result in improved reliability, improvec control system performance and reduced consequences of malfunctions, is addressed in the TMI-l Restart Report (Supplement 1, Part 3, Question 12).
BY WITNESSES BROUGHTON, SADAUSKAS AND JOYNER:
In summary with regard to Sholly Contention 6(a), an ICS FMEA has been completed.
Reference 1.
Report BAW-1564, " Integrated Control System (ICS)
Reliability Analysis," August, 1979. -
FIGURE 1 INTEGRATED CONTRCL SYSTEM UNIT LOAD DEMAND CONTRCL i f INTEGRATED p _ _ _ _.
MASTER
- _ _ _ __ _ _. q CONTROL l
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I i f I f I F TURBINE STEAM REACTOR CONTROL GENERATCR CCNTRCL CONTRCL I
T. GARY BROUGHTON i
Business Address:
GPU Service Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Education:
B. A., Mathematics, Dartmouth College, 1966.
Experience:
Control and Safety Analysis Manager, GPU Service Corporation, 1978 to present.
Responsible for nuclear safety analysis and integrated thermal, hydraulic and control system analysis of nuclear and fossil plants.
Supervised on-site technical support groups at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 i
during the post-accident period.
Safety and Licensing Engineer; Safety and Licensing Manager, GPU Service Corporation, 1976 to 1978.
Performed and supervised nuclear licensing, environmental licensing and safety analysis for Oyster Creek, Three Mile l
Island and Forked River plants.
Served as Technical Secretary to Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island General Office Review Boards.
Officer,
U.S'. Navy,1966 to 1976.
Trained at Naval Nuclear Power School, Prototype and Submarine School.
Positions held include Nuclear Propulsion Plant Watch Supervisor, Instructor at DlG prototype plant and Engineering Officer aboard a fast-attack nuclear submarine.
Publications:
EPRI CCM-5, RETRAN - A Program for One-Dimensional Transient Thermal-Hy-draulic Analyses of Complex Fluid Flow Systems, volume 4: Applications, December, 1978, Section 6.1,
" Analysis of Rapid Cooldown Transient - Three Mile Island Unit 2", with N.G.
Trikouros and J.
F.
Harrison.
I
"The Use of RETRAN to Evaluate Alternate Accident Scenarios at TMI-2", with N. G. Trikouros.
Proceedings of the ANS/ ENS Topical Meeting on Thermal Reactor Safety, April 1980, CONF-800403.
"A Real-Time Method for Analyzing Nuclear Power Plant Transients", with i
P.S. Walsh.
ANS Transactions, Volume 34 TANSAD 34 1-899 (1980).
- I
l GERALD J. SADAUSKAS Business Address:
GPU Service Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Education:
A.A.S.,
Electrical Engineering, State University of New York at Farmingdale, 1963.
B.S.,
Electrical Engineering, C.W.
Post College of Long Island University, 1970.
Post-graduate courses, Mechanical i
Engineering, State University of New j
York at Stony Brook, 1975 to 1977.
Post-graduate courses, Electrical i
Engineering, Stevens Institute of I
Technology, 1979 to present.
i Experience:
Group Leader, Instrumentation Engineering, GPU Service Corporation, 1980 to present.
Responsible for establishment of instrument design criteria; preparation of conceptual designs, and verification of technical adequacy of designs; responsible for modifications of existing plant systems.
The instrumentation section i
is also responsible for the mea-surement of all system parameters, signal conditioning, display and processing of system parameter information.
Senior Supervising Instrumentation and Control Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc.,
1977 to 1980.
Responsibilities included implementation of TMI-2 lessons learned instrumentation requirements for the Oyster Creek and Rancho Seco nuclear power plants; was involved in the development of a
)
Disturbance Analysis System for Nuclear Power Plants under contract with EPRI; involved in the development of an oxygen-hydrogen flame arrestor for BWR plants; served as Supervising Engineer for TMI-2 recovery, instru-mentation and control systems; responsible for instrumentation and control engineering for the Forked River plant.
i Instrumentation and Control Engineer, Long Island Lighting Company, 1971 to 1977.
Duties included:
responsible for the installation and startup of instrument and control systems at the Shoreham nuclear plant and at the Northport Unit 3 oil-fired plant; and, served as Construction Engineer for the Glenwood Landing switchyard.
Electrical Engi".eer, Chemical Construction Corporation, 1970 to 1971.
Involved in installation of a CASO3 Venturi type flue gas scrubber at Boston Edison's Mystic Station.
Designed potential electrical power and control systems, including lighting power distribution and controls.
Instrument Engineer, M.W. Kellogg Company, 1965 to 1971.
Responsible for the design of instrumentation and control systems for petro-chemical plants.
Service Engineer, Bailey Meter Company, 1963 to 1965.
Serviced and installed electronic and pneumatic instrument systems on oil and coal-fired boilers, marine boilers and waste heat boilers.
Professional Affiliations:
Member, IEEE and IAS.
Licensed Professional Engineer, New York. -
LUTHER L. JOYNER i
Business Address:
Babcock & Wilcox Company Nuclear Power Generation Division P.O.
Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Education:
B.S.,
Electrical Engineering, Clemson College, 1964 M.S.,
Electrical Engineering, Clemson University, 1969.
Ph.D.,
Electrical Engineering, Virginia Polytechnical Institute and State University, 1973.
Experience:
Principal Engineer, Control Analysis Unit and Power Systems and Controls Unit, Babcock & Wilcox Co., 1977 to present.
Responsible for diverse problems involved with operation and control of the B&W NSS.
Participated in the failure modes and effects analysis and reliability study of the Integrated Control System, including co-authoring the resulting report, BAW-1564.
Supervisory Engineer, Instrumentation and Control Unit, Maritime Reactors, Babcock & Wilcox Co., 1976 to 1977.
Responsible for design and procurement of a digital control system for a maritime nuclear propulsion plant.
Program Manager, Product Development Section, Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
1972 to 1976; Responsible for the research and development program for NSS development.
Professional Affiliations:
Member, IEEE.
Registered Professional Engineer, Virginia.
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