ML19336A228
| ML19336A228 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1979 |
| From: | Yeager W METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010220101 | |
| Download: ML19336A228 (39) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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1.
In the Matter of:
I 2l' IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 31 of ry;mg_--ujm
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7l 8l Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant i
10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 June 20,1979 12j (Date of Interview) 13 July 26, 1979 (0 ate franscript Typed) 14l 315 15l (Tape tiumcer(s))
15 17j i
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t 20 21 NRC PERSONNEL:
Robert Marsh James S. Creswell 23 Anthony N. Fasano 24 25 l
8010220 / O /
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l lj MARSH:
The time is 7:45 PM.
The date is June 20, 1979.
My name is i
2i Bob Marsh.
And-I'm an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
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31 Commission assigned to the Region III Office, Chicago, Illinois.
This i
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evening we are conducting an interview, of a confidential nature.
The i
Sj interview is being conducted in Room 225 of the Red Roof Inn in Swartara, 6
At this time prior to commencing the interview, I'd 7
like the other NRC individuals in the room to identify themselves and 8
spell their last name if they would.
CRESWELL:
This is James S. Creswell.
I'm a Reactor Inspector assigned 10 to Region III.
a FASANO:
Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist, NRC, currently out i
of Region I.
1 41 15 MARSH:
I thank you.
For the expedient of conducting this interview 16:!
17;!
we will be referring to our subject of this evening by the name of l
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TM13.
And I will indicate for the record thatggg is present for the 18(
interview and is accompanied by his council.
At this time we would 191 normally go into some background and a brief resume of the individuals experience in the nuclear field, that will be bypassed tonight and I l
think.we'll go directly to the areas of questions.
Creswell do you 22i want to start?
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1 CRESWELL:
This is Jim Creswell speaking. Sm S I'd like to go back 2'
to the day of March 28, 1979.
31 41 MARSH:
Let me interrupt for just a second.
I just icticed one area I g{
omitted. f Map, before we started I gave you a two page memo wnich 6l before we begin questioning I would like to just '.1ake reference to.
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You've had a chance to look at that memo and I'm just briefly going i.o g
describe and indicate that it covers the purpose of NRC's investigation, gj some brief words about its scope and its authority to conduct it and 101 it provides you some words as to your rights as a interview subject.
On the second page are several questions which I would like to get a g
response to you before we begin.
First question aduresses your understanding
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of that two page memo.
Have you had a chance to raad it a.1d do you understand it?
15i
$g3:
Yes I have.
l 17!
MARSH:
Second question addresses, do we have your permission, we 181 ISi.
being NRC, to tape this interview?
20' fr4S :
Yes you do.
211 2$'
l MARSH:
And thirdly, the question indicates, would you li'Ke a copy of 23:
the tape or transcript?
24l 25i i
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3 lj TM8:
Yes, a copy for myself and probably for counsel.
i 2!
3 MARSH:
Fine.
That will be provided as I indicated earlier, firs't 4j thing tomorrow morning.
If you want to, I'll give you a phone number, 1
5 give me a buzz and I'll get you those two copies.
There is a fourth 6
question that is not called out at the rear of the page but it is i
7j covered in.the body and that indicates your rig?t to have a company g
representative or anyone you so chcose.
If it's my understanding, g
your noice would be strictly to have counsel here.
10l
- fad,:
Right.
t 11!
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MARSH:
Fine.
Okay, at that point then we 11 proceed.
131 141 CRESWELL:
Jim Creswell speaking again. $m3, again I'd like to go back to the day of March 28, 1979.
And could you tell us when you
~
came onsite and the conditions that you found whenever you arrived 17!
onsite?
l 18; l
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Sm3:
Okay.
I arrived onsite at approximately 6:10 AM.
I got to the 20 Unit 1 Instrument Shop at about 6:15.
At that time I took a cup of t
21l l
coffee and walked into the Unit 1 Control Rocm just to see what was 22
, going on, get an idea of what was going to happen that day.
As the 23 i
Shift Foreman who was in charge then, what was happening, he had told 24{
me that he was to busy right now, I can't talk with you.
I'll see you 25),
i e
4 l
1l later on So at that time I went back into the Shop, finished drinking i
2:
my coffe e and was waiting for the relieving crew to show up.
At 2;
approximately 6:40 A.M., Instrument Foreman walked in and we talked 4j for a few minutes and at approximately 6:50 A.M., Unit 2 had announced Sj there was a Site Emergency - Radiation dmergency, a Site Emergency.
i Gi Gave the, the alert siren went off I recall.
Also made the annourcement 7j for the unnecessary personnel to report to their assigned areas they i
g were supposed to go to.
9 10l MARSH:
Marsh speaking, SMS, let me interrupt for a second.
You say
- g 6
- 50, that sounds relatively specific, had you checked the watch or iy how vece you aware of this?
13l I M S Yes I did.
I looked at a watch, it was 6:50 A.M. on the button.
15i MARSH:
I thank you.
17l "J., H 6 Okay.
At that time right after the siren went off and they 18j i
announced the emergency, the Foreman had told us to report to the 20!
North Auditorium, which is the mustering area for Unit 1 personnel.
I then reminded the Foreman that the Eme*gency Repair Party was to 21!
22I report to the Health Physics muster point, wnich he had forgot about.
I So we went down there to the Unit 1 HP area.
When we arrived there, 23 it was a little bit of mass pandemonia going on.
People were running 24 around not knowing exactly what was happening.
We were mustering down 25i e
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lj there, trying to get an Emergency Repair Party crew together.
Some of 2
the crew was caught coming onsite, some of the crew was caught ca. sing i
3f offsite, so security had their hands full, everybody had their hands 4j iull.
About the only thing that I did see that struck me odd, that I
S there was something going on really bad was one HP technician going 6j bacA into the Unit 1 Aux Bui ding with a Scott Airpack on', it was 7
either a Scott Airpack or it was a Full Faced Particulata Shield, and a telector.
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1 CRESWELL:
Excuse me 1mg was that a teletector?
0 11!
- Teletector, right.
13!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
1si IMS Okay.
We stayed there for approximately oh I would say 30 1Gi minutes, it was between the timeframe of 7:20 and 7:30 we were told to i
report to Unit 2's STE Office, which is the Startup Test Engineers 18{
office adjacent to the Unit 2 Control Rocm.
Okay, we, there was about 19!
6 of us, I can't remember who all was in the party, but there was 20l l
mechanics, electricians, instrument, plus a foreman that was assigned.
21' We took the normal route to Un.". 2 which is through the outside area, 22'!
the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, through the security door and up the 23l l
steps. _And upon entering Unit 2's Control Room, it was just mass 24 confusion of people.
I never seen so many people in one Control Room.
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i We went directly to the STE's office and sat there and awaited further 2!
instructions-as to what was wrong and what was going on.
31 4
CRESWELL: @g going back to,the time that you assembled in the Unit 5
1 health physics area, was there any one person there in charge?
I 61 7f Img The Foreman who was with me at that time took charge and started 8
getting a muster sheet together because as I said before there was oncoming crews cming on, there was offgoing crews going off and at a
10l this time accountability was very difficult because of the people in jy and out of the plant.
So we started accounting for as many people as we could.
He was relieved of that duty when we were told to go to Unit 2.
I dc,.s:t know what happened to him or where he went after g
that, I believe he went back to the Unit l's muster area.
14!
15j CRESWELL: What was his name W g?
17(1 1Mg :
Gordie Lawrence, Gordie Lawrence.
19l CRESWELL:
Gordie Lawrence.
20 21l l
22I TMS:
Right.
He was the Unit 1 Instrument Foreman.
l 23 CRESWELL:
So he was in charge of the health physics area?
24; 25li l
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1mQ: Well, he was an Instrument Foreman, he did take charge of the 2j mustering area.
Health physics, as far as a foreman is concerned, I 3
don't know what foreman was on-duty at that time.
4j 5;
CRESWELL:
Was there a Mr. Kalenevitch there?
i Gi
%MS:
Yes.
He was there.
He had shown up there about 5 minutes 7
after we arrived at the HP area.
Advised us that he was appointed the g.
Emergency Repair Party Coordinator and ' Foreman and he would take over g;
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11:
CRESWELL:
Do you recall the name of the health physics technician 12t that you saw with a full faced protective apparatus, either a respirator or Scott Airpack?
14!
15i img:
No I don'+.
I can't recall.
17f I
CRESWELL: 'Okay.
So you arrived at the Startup Test Engineers Office, 181 l
who were the other 3 people that were with you?
191 20j ImS :
The offgoing instrument crew woulo of been Carl Vincent, and I 21(l believe his partner was Matt Joyce, a new guy that just came on.
22 23 CRESWELL: ~ D jou recall seeing a Mr. Bennett and a Mr. Gilbert?
24j 2Si l
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t 1l IM6 :
Not right then and there I didn't.
No, they didn't come in and 2f I didn't see those people until later on.
31 4;
CRESWELL:
Okay.
About what time would you estimate that you arrived Sj in the Startup Test Engineer's office in Unit 2?
Gi 7l TM8:
It would of been, oh, 7:35 plus or minus a few minutes.
i 81 CRESWELL:
Okay.
You've mentioned the impression that you got walking g
10j in the Control Room.
How many people would you estimate were at the control panels?
12!
SY^D :
At the control panels, uhm, it's hard to tell ea ctly hcw many 13 j
pecple were at the control panels itself.
I would estimata that there g
was a gcod 50 people inside the Control Rocn. at the time.
Aa far as 16i who was at the montrol panel, what was going on, and again it's another 17l!
stcr/ because there was turnovers taking place and everything else.
i There was just crews coming in.
It would be a wild guess for me to 18(
say how many people was at the panel itself.
20' CRESWELL:
Was it your assessment that things were being well controlled or that there was a non-controlled type of situation?
22' 23 1% @:
It seemed that though things were under control, 'cause I did Ntice the Shift Supervisors were going Over prints which normall" 25i i
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lj would tell me that they had an idea of what was going on, tryinn to 2
evaluate the situation.
There wasn't any paranoia, as to say nobody 3
was totally out of the scene, if you know what I mean.
So, everybody 4;
seemed to be keeping a little head, trying to observe what was going 5
on, seeing what was happening.
I 6i CRESWELL:
Okay.
After you reported to the Startup Test Engineers 7
g Office, what's the next thing that happens? Did you report to any one e
individual in that area?
g 101
}yy16 :
No.
We didn't report to any one individual at all.
We had our foreman that was with us and he stayed out into the Control Room and 12!
I he is the one that is supposed to coordinate the Emergency Repair 13l Party jobs.
I would say we were in there from maybe 20 to 25 :ninutes i
141 l
and the Uni: 2 Foreman, Doug Weaver, walked in and asked us, two of 15!
us, if we knew where the incere termination cabinet to the computer was.
There was a 'init 2 man that knew.
17' 181 I
CRESWELL:
Whowasthat,Td 19l 20!
I JN6:
Jim Wright.
Okay.
He knew where the termination cabinet was.
21f
'So they asked for_2 people to go down.
Jim and myself went down.
r 22f 23 CRESWELL: LynB,youwentduwnwithhiSi?
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IMI:
Right.
I went with who?
I 2
l 3j CRESWELL:
With Jim Wright.
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$ 6:
Right.
I went down with Jim Wright.
Our instructions were to r
6l g down with a Type K thermocouple reader to disconnect various inputs, 7j non-specifically given, to the computer on the incere detectors and to g
measure temperatures.
When we asked why, the reason was, the computer gl had over ranged on engineering units.
So, we went, got a thermocouple 10l reader and went down to the cabinet...
11!
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CRESWELL:
And this is you both go and get the thermocouple reader?
13 Tw S,:
Right, we both went together, rignt.
15!
CRESWELL:
16; Where did you get the reader?
)
17!
l 9 0:
Out of the Unit 2 instrument storage area.
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19!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
20l 21!
IWiS':
Okay. We went down to the relay room which was down through the control tower steps we went and went into the relay room, opened 23 up the cabinet for the thermocouple inputs to the computer.
And 24 visually looked at which ones would be the simplest to take off without.
25 t
w
11 1l getting involved in cutting wire straps and wrapping and everything 2{
else.
So we started pulling, oh, sets off at a time, just 1 thermocouple i
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at a time so as not to lose where they were on the terminal board l
4j measuring the temperatures.
Do you want to know what temperatures we 5
saw'or what?
6i 1
l 7j CRESWELL:
Please.
i 8j
?,D:
Okay.
Some of the temperatures we had seen were above normal g
10 RC temperature.
Two of the thermocouples, the first few we had gj measured, were around 700 to 800 degrees specific temperatures I can't quote you, I don't know. We had taken one off and we had measured
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2600 degrees in'and about that vicinity, it was very close to that.
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At that time neither one of us believed that this was a true reading l
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because after seeing two, three that were 700, 800 degrees 2600 was 151 hard to believe so w decided to take a few more off.
When we took, I 16!
don't recall exactly how many, I believe through the course of testing i
17 I
thermocouples we had at least 10 or 12 we had just connected the 18{
total.
We had seen temperatures ranging anywhere from I know there 191 was a bottom of about 690 some degrees tc uppers of 3700 to 4000
. i degrees.
21!
22 MARSH:
Marsh speaking, M S were there any written records made of this time of your readings.
24 25j
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1l pwGr Okay.
While we were down there Mr. Bennett came down.
i 2:
f 3j CRESWELL:
About what time {pg would he have come down or where were 4j you at the measuresments when he came down.
i Si Si ItwS :
We had just started.
We were probably finishing our second 7j reading because we had wanted to mark them down ourselves.
Neither g
one of us had a pencil or paper to mark it down with.
So Mr. Bennett g
had came down, also Mr. Gilbert.
This is when Mr. Gilbert and Mr.
10j Bennett showed on the scene and also an engineer from Unit 2 came
!nj down, the one that had originally requested that the readings be taken place.
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131 j
CRESWELL:
Who was that $MS?
15!
l 1pS:
Oh gees, I talked with him about the other day and I can't j
remen:ber his name.
17!
i 18f CRESWELL:
An Instrumentation Engineer.
19t 20?
I
$N9h :
No, I don't think he is an instrumentation engineer.
Oh my 21!
I this is embarrassing.
22' 23 l
CRE5WELL:
Well Mr. Porter is the Unit 2.
24i 2Sj
13 i
I 11 3mg:
There-You got it.
i 2'
1 3j CRESWELL:
Ivan Porter?
4I 5!
1mf3:
Ivan Porter, yea, I don't know whether he's an instrumentation i
6l engineer or not.
Okay, he came down on the scene then also.
I believa 7-Mr. Bennett was taking handwritte. notes as to what the temperatures were.
8 l
MARSH:
10i Excuse me, Marsh speaking,TMSwhy do you feel he was taking notes.
Did you see him with pad and pencil.
i 12!
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IM6 :
We actually asked him to take down what the temperatures were, what we had done is recorded the pull slip number of the thermocouple and cross referenced it, I believe, you know, later on to a core map 1s. :t because I did see a core map of the incores and trying to find out I
where they were with reference to the core, whether they were all 17l l
centrally located in one' area or whether it was staggered throughout 18{
the core.
19i 20i l
MARSH:
I Thank you.
fili 22i hS:
Okay.
As far as time frame when they arrived on the scene it would have been right after we had started making the measurements, 24i I
probably within a second thermocouple, you're talking maybe five 25i f
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a
14
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j lj minutes per measurement on it.
Okay.
After we had started getting 2{
some measurements there and we saw what was going on, not knowing 3j exactly where the thermocouples was located in the core we decided to l
4l make a few more measurements along with that and as I said befo e we Sj saw temperatures anywhere from 690 to close to 4000 degrees.
We did f
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see one I know for sure was 3700 around in that area and'at that time 7
both Jim and myself turned around and looked at all three of the g,
gentlemen that were with us and said this thing's melting down.
9 l
CRESWELL: Who was present at that time,.
10 nj
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...That the core is uncovered.
That's Mr, Bennett, Mr. G'lbert, Mr. Porter.
Okay Mr. Porter kind of doubted our word and didn't 13)
I believe the readings.
- 141 15l j
FASANO:
Fasanospeaking,1NS,howdoyouknowhedoubtedyourword.
16!
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To keep the tape clean, not to embarrass people I won't use the words, however he did turn around and look at us and says I don't 19t
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l believe your readings.
Are you sure you're taking your readings 20!
correctly or is the thermocouple connected to tne reacer properly.
So 21 i
after assuring that, he wanted a verification that the thermocouple 22' l
reader was working so the only verification we could really give not
-23 having type "K" material around to check it out was to get millivolt 24
(
reader and measure the actual volta g coming up from the incore.
So 251 i
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i 4
15 1
at this time I don't know who went up to get the meter, I believe it i
21 might have been Mr. Gilbert or Mr. Bennett went up to get a millivolt i
3l meter but.
l 41 5
CRESWELL: pg was there perhaps a digitial vold meter in that area?
I 6i i
7!
1pvi$:
I don't know whether there was digital volt meter there or not.
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We did not bring one down with us.
There might have been one there gj from the ICS technician, NNI technician that works there but normally i
10l when he leaves his equipment is all locked up so if there was one y
there it probably no doubt would have been under lock and key.
12!
CRESWELL:
Digressing a minute, I believe the statement that you made was that you felt the core was melted down or a statement of that 14 charactar was made.
Was it possibly, possible that you phrased it in g
terms tlat the Core was uncovered.
lytt$ :
Okay, the core was uncovered is what I said, the core is uncovered.
191 CRESWELL:
Which way did you say it?
Is that the way you phrased it.
20f 21f 1MS:
Right.
We're clarify that.
The core was uncovered is what I had said.
23 24 25 l
l
16 l
lj CRESWELL:
Not that the core was melted down.
I 2:
3 1MS:
No.
4l Sj CRESWELL:
Okay.
61 7j 1m@:
Anyhew getting back to the subject, we had obtained a digital 8
volt meter with a cross reference table for voltage to temperature gj wise for Type K Indicators and we had reverified I would say at least 75 10 f the thermoccupies we had originally taken readings on and g
especially the hot ones, the very hot ones, the 2600, 3000, 4000 degree one we had seen.
The two instruments both agreed with each y
other so at that time Mr. Porter had left the room.
i 14j CRESWELL: TMSabout what time would you estimate this is that you 1Si ITl m:
Roughly estimating I would say in the area of approximately 1,
maybe, oh boy, I gotta think now, 9:00, 9:15 around in that vicinity I 19 would say.
20{
21 CRESWELL: Werethereanymorecomments,1h6,abouttheconditionof the core.
23 24I 25 I
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17
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l ij p 6:
No'it was the general consensus amongst the instrument people 2
that were there that the core was definitely uncovered, we kind of 3
found it hard to believe that this many high temperatures that we had i
4 seen that all those incores would have been bad and the only way that Sj they could have went bad that radically would be an uncovering of the cc.'e, and a super everhaating.
The last thing we had done down there 7l in the relay room before leaving was that both Mr. Pacter and the 8
Instrument Foreman requested that we hook up this thermoccuple reader to various thermocouples so that the operations department could use g
i t.
10i So we did hook up I think it was maybe five or six.
Now there was no actual locations given, it was just pick five or six at random, hook them up, verify that they do indicate properly and then our job l
was finished then.
131 145 CRESWELL: TM O is there any doubt in your mind at the time all the 15l!
l 16; measurements are completed that Mr. Porter has been told by the people.
l i
i down there that they feel the temperature indications indicate the 17l i
core was uncovered.
l 18i 19l l
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Did he believe us?
l 20l i
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CRESWELL:
I say is there any doubt in your mind that he had not been l
'22 i
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' told or-that he had been told, sorry, that he had been told.
l 23 l
24 25:
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18
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1 Oh no, I personally told him that and he was physically there 2
to read the readings.
He saw the actual temperatures we had.
This is 3j wny the first time he didn't believe it.
4; FASANO:
Fasano speaking.
When the verification of the measurements 5
f 6i were made, using the millivolt meter was the information then given to 7j the same individuals and how, what was the response to the second set gj of readings that tended to verify, at least correlate to the original readings.
10i pS:
Okay.
Now the second set of readings did in fact correlate the l-original set of readings that was taken with the thermocouple reader.
12!
the general feeling at least amongst Jim and myself was that the 131 readings we had were true and accurate.
All five of us that were 34i 15; present there did in fact visually see the actual readings we had taken both off the thermocouple reader and millivolt reader.
All five of us did in fact verify that the millivolt reading through the conversion 17!
table was correct.
So I am sure we didn't read the wrong taole or the 18) wrong line or something of that nature.
At that time between Mr.
1$
Bennett ar.d myself, Mr. Wright, Mr. Gilbert, we had pretty well came 20' to the conclusion the core was uncovered.
I believe Ivan didn't 21.
really want to believe whai was really taking place.
I don't know 22 whether it was an attitude of hey your measurements are wrong, you 23 guys don't know what tha heck you're doing or whatnot.
I think the 24 general consensus throughout the whole first day was number one nobody 2Si I
i i
'I
l-l 19 l
l l
ij really knew what was actually happening, number two, some that had an 2
inkling of what was happening didn't really want to believe what was i
going on.
Once you start seeing a temperature of 3000 to 4000 degrees 3
i 4i in a e re zirconium alloy is what 3700 - 4000 degrees melting point r is it 5000, I can't remtanber the actual melting point of the zirconium.
5:
"9
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61 l
coming.
The core is uncovered.
That was basically the extent of our 7
8
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finished connecting up the thermocouple reader we reported back to the 91 t
ST office.
10i I
11 CRESWELL:
That would have been about what time.
12' 13 14l 1%$:
I would say probably between 9:25 and 9:35 around in that time l
frame till we got back upstairs.
15!
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l 16i l
l CRESWELL:
00 you have any knowledge of Mr. Wright's involvement in l
17!
i the hooking of the digital voltmeter on the T hot RTDs.
18!
19i pg :
No I don't.
l 20:
21 CRESWELL:
Did he leave you at any time that you were down in the l
22 l
cable room making these thermocouple measurements to perform any
~23 operation like that.
24 25 l
.l 20 l
1]
W g:
I don't' know of, I can't remember.
2!
i 3{
CRESWELL:
Did he. leave you, that's what I'm asking.
Was he with you i
4l all the time.
i T
sl wt3 :
I can't really say for sure if he did leave, I can't remember.
7l CRESWELL:
Okay what happened after you went back upstairs.
. g 9i WB:
O ty, we went back up to the STE's office and remained there 101 for a short period of time, I would say probably twenty minutes.
At 11!
that time Mr. Weaver came in and told the Unit 1 people that they 12 could go ahead and reassemble at the North Auditorium in Unit 1, that he had enough people on site at the time to handle anything that would come up.
So the people from Unit 1 started reporting to the North 15!
Auditorium.
This is where we back to.
We went over to the North 16i l
Auditorium.
In the meantime while everything was going on and we were 17!
taking readings and that the normal crew that would be coming on duty 18; l
finally got onto. the island, the off going crews finally got off the.
19!
l island, so we had our normal manpower in there for the daytime.
20 21;
. CRESWEL L:
Okay.
22 23 MARSH:
Before we begin another section here, I'm c;t g '.o break at 24 this time and turn the tape, time being 8:13 e % aro reading 463 on 25i i
the meter.
l l
f i
21 l
I 1
MARSH:
Again resuming at 463 meter and the time being 8:14 p.m.
I 2'
3 CRESWELL:len9, after you leave the auditorium'what happens to you.
41 5
fp6:
Okay.
We were told we were allowed to leave the North Auditorium -
and all personnel were to report to the 500 KV vold substation which 6
j is just south of the island on route 441.
As we were leaving the health physics people had set up a monitoring checkpoint with friskers 8,
g; to insure that if there was anyone contaminated that they would be taken care of.
I believe there were seven of us including myself that was contaminated that day.
We were told to report back to the Unit 1 I
health physics department to leave all our clothing there, anything 12!
that would be contaminated.
We were frisked before we went in to find 13 out exactly where the contamination was on us, which was.over, hair, arms, everywhere.
The only thing that was not contaminated was my legs and that because the contamination did not go through the clothing 16i or anything.
My arms of course were because I was wearing a short sleeve shirt, my face and my scalp was pretty well contaminated.
Actual disintegrations per minute or counts per minute I can't tell
- 19i, you.
We were checked there at the HP checkpoint.
We had stripped 201 l
down there, put all our clothes, personal belongings and effects in a 21i polybag and were told to go oack and shower which is standard HP procedure to remove the contamination.
Okay we had showered, came 23 back out, was refrisked, checked for any kind of radiation on us and 24 myself, I was clean.
I don't know about the rest of the people.
As
'25l l
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I i
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s s
a
l 22 li far as my personal belongings was concerned HP had frisked my personal 2
belongings, I was allowed to leave the island with my car keys, my 3i driver's license.
The rest of my clothing and everything stayed-4l behind.
HP insured me that they would wash my clothes, decon them and i
5l get them back to the substation.
Okay I went back out through the l
same 61 Ii gl MARSH:
Excuse me I N%, Marsh again, what type of dosimetry were you wearing at the time when you performed the duties.
g 10f w(5:
Self reader and also a TLD.
12!
MARSH:
Okay, have you ever been provided the results of that TLD.
14I
$wO :
No I haven't.
16i i
MARSH:
Okay, your self reeder, your talking dosimeter direct reading 17; I
dosimeter.
18i 19' Iwt):
Right.
20' 2 11 MARSH:
Do you recall what the accumulation was on that.
22 23
' gwS ':
No I don't.
24 25l 1
(
i i
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23 l
1 MARSF:
Okay.
j 2
3
$yn$ :
I do not recall what it was.
i 4!
Sj MARSH:
And you say you have not been provided a summary of what your TLD read for th.
6; 71 tynS:
I have not seen it yet, no.
g 9!
MARSH:
Fine.
Thank you.
10t.
11!
CRESWELL: imB did you look at your self reading dosimeter.
12!
13 g:
I hao looked at it when I was over in Unit 2 up in the STE's office and there was no indication on it.
It was the same indication.
15i Of course I didn't zero it, I can't remember exactly what it was i
16i setting at from the previous day.
But as far as any change was concerned i
- 171, I didn't see any change.
1s!
CRESWELL:
Where do you think you received the contamination.
20l t
2M
$M6:
I don't know because most of us were all in the same general 22 1
i area.
I believe where I received the contamination is that the Unit 1 23{
instrument shop was pretty well vacated.
Now I had went back in, the
- 24i, i
j Unit 2 instrument shop, excuse me, was vacated right after the accident
' 25 j i
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1
'i
24 t
lj cause everyor.e was in the STE's office.
Now I went back there to look
?
l 2j for test leads and things of this nature to make our thermocouple 3f readings with so it could very well have been back there.
Throughout 4
the rest of the morning Mr. Wright was with me and he, from what I 5
understand, wa; not contaminated, I don't know.
Somehow we believe l
the nly ther place we could have got it would have been over there Gi in the Unit 2 instrument shop.
i l
8 CRE5WELL: W B do you have any idea what might have caused this 9I event.
101 ni l
l WS :
Well frcm what I've heard as to what has caused the event, the u;
l l
initial cause of the plant trip was due to a malfunctioning vaive on l
131 the polishing system.
The nuclear portion of it again frem I've heard 14!
cause I can't verify that I've seen it, was caused frem, how shall I 15i l
put it, the negligence of leaving the emergency feedwater valves i
16i closed, again frcm what I understand, which was again a procedural I don't believe if it wasn't for the feedwater valves being l
error.
l 18 closed we wouldn't be in the mess we're 'in right now.
19l 20!
j CRESWELL:
Do you have any idea of what might have caused the valve l
21!
closure in the condensate polisher area.
22 23
$#6:
I think the valve closure was caused by the water in the instrument 24 air. 'From what I understand I don't know the operation of their 25l
\\
25
[
i 1
polishing system over there.
From what I understand the operator had 2
just got through, I believe changing vessels on the polishers, I don't 3{
think all the polishing vessels are used at any one time, I think 4
there is one in standby for regeneration and any other ones are in
/
I don't know how many polishing vessels they have, probably six i
use.
l I w uld assume.
I believe from what, again I've heard, the operator Gi had just got done changing vessels over.
My recollection of what was 7
told me was that a check valve or another type of valve was left open which caused water to get into the instrument air supply.
This had g
e used apparently an air signal for something to happen in the polishing 10 system to cause one of the polishers, I would assume just one polishing I
unit to trip off line, this is my assumption.
Judging from the problems 12!
that Unit 2 has had with primary system as far as flow and everyting 131 l
is concerned, there is spec limits as far as running that reactor were 141 a lot thinner.
No doubt the polishing unit tripping off line did 15 create one heck of a transient in the plant.
All right, this would 16i f
account probably for the turbine trip.
Okay the turbine tripping of 171 l
course is as in going to AC' count, possibly for the reactor trip.
1$
Very unusual that a nuclear generating station will have a turbine 19l trip without a reactor trip, at least in Unit 2 it was a rarity.
The events after that during the reactor trip of course the pressure is 21, l
going to build up once the turbine trips you lose feedwater, you 22' know, the reactor trips should pick up your emergency feedwater pumps 23 which of course did not pick up.
So we did not have emergency feedwater 24 for.any kind of cooling, I don't know how long the system was out.
25:
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1 Pressure apparently did build up from my recollection of what is 2
happening here, the reacc's
.arted building up in pressure, started j
3{
building up in temperatt ; and I believe the reactor would have tripped i
j d
on a high temper or a high pressure greater than 2255.
The actual 5
events of, you know, chronological order off the computer sheet I Si don't know, the pressure, the electromatic relief valve and the pressurizer i
7 was it RCRV2 I think it is went open, stayed open, from what I understand.
g If that would have stayed open that would have flashed a pressurizer gj dry.
Common sense would pretty well say that since you've got 2255 10; p unds worth of pressure in there, god knows what temperature it was at that time, I don't think our temperatures were measured at the i
i incare, had just started at that time, I think those temperatures l
12!
[
13l!
existed long before we got there.
Of course that is goint to flash i
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.the steam very rapidly.
l 14!
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l CRE5WELL: I M S do you have any evidence that anybody tampered with l
16;,
l the condensate system or with the emergency feedwater valves.
17i 18!
pS :
None that I know of, _ not tampered with.
There's been known 19 problems on the polishing system water getting into the instrument air 20.
line.
It's been a known fact that Unit 2 had that problem.
A lot of 21!
~
the maintenance people reported this to their foreman and instrument 22 air is an instrument shop responsibility.
It is my belief that the
'23 system should have been fixed, however, it is Met Ed's belief that the 2M j
. lant shouldn't be shut down to fix it.
p 25j p
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,l 27-l
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lj CRESWELL:
Do you have any evidence that any of the emergency feedwater 2
systems have been tampered with.
l 31 4
56:
As far as tampering with, no.
About the only tampering I could Sj say would have been along with them is when the operator had removed 6f the tags and didn't open the valves.
Of course the same~ situation I believe existed in Unit 1.
7 gj FASANO:
Fasano speaking.
Remove the tags, what tags, do you know of any ags.
10 11j j
1W6:
I had believed and it was my understanding that those valves I
were red tagged close for maintenance.
131 i
14!
FASANO:
Would that be then under a work request.
Would that entail l
16) operations to go and put a tag on before maintenance did any work on I
those valves.
17!
I 18!
TMS:
Yes it would.
I would hope so.
19i i
20i FASANO:
So this would be in the tag log.
21 22 IQ:
It should be in the tag-log, there should be a work request on I
it, yes.
24l i
25!
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t 28.
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1 FASANO:
You think there should be a work request, there would be a 2,
w rk request.
3!
4 Sk$:
Right.
There would either be, even during an inservice inspection, 5
ff it was not maintenance in an inservice inspection it would seem to 6
me 1 gically that the operations department should tag those valves 7i
- t' I
ai CRESWELL:
John, what evidence do you have that those valves should
'I have been tagged out.
1gl 11!.
1MD:
That they should have been.
12!
i 13l CRESWELL:
You mentioned red tagging.
14f 15i FASANO:
Tagout.
16i 17 1M:
Right. It's a tagout procedure.
If there is any kind of maintenance l
going to be done on any system or anything like that, to me as far as 191 again like I said this was something that I had heard, that the valves 20' were in fact tagged out.
No one has come up to me and said any different 21, i
yet,.of course.
22l 23 CRESWELL:
How did you hear that lyn %.
24
- 25l I
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.e
l 29-y
} tens:
Rumors and propaganda, more or less, from company employees I 2l w rk with.
3!
CRESWELL:
What was the statement, exact precisely what was the statement 4
that they made.
5 i
6i I
$WS : We had asked what was wrong with the emergency feed system.
.,l
/
I Why it did not go on, in fact, yoe know, what had happened.
The word 8,
was that I got, and this is the day of the accident, the emergency i
9J feed pumps did in fact start.
Operations did in fact see a discharge 101 pressure in the pumps, cause there is a discharge pressure indication ll!
there, however, there was no flow.
If there is a discharge pressure 12l and there was no flow it kind of tells you one thing, the valve's 13t closed.
Now we had asked, you know, why was the valve closad, it was 14:
tagged.
That was the word I got.
tagging mean red tag or blue tag, 15i one of the two.
1Si i
17!
l CRESWELL:
Was it possible somebody mentioned that some other equipment 18i j
was tagged, that - in the area -
19l 20' yyng :
Could very well be that some other equipment was tagged, but 21 the impression I got is-in fact the emergency feed valves were closed 22.
j and it took_them, what, approximately, from what one person told me, l
23 l
it took'him eight minutes to determine this factor, get down, get them
-24 open.
And I guess this would have appeared at what, between 4:10 and 25i j
4:15 during the initial turbine trip.
r l
l
30 l
ilj MARSH:
Marsh, let me ask one quick question of the same vein just to i
2j clarify and be sure that the question is asked the way I prefer it to be asked.
If I understand you right you have no knowledge whatsoever, 3
4j even heresay, of any attempted sabotage or intentional act by anyone 5l being the cause for this 6i 7{
WS >:
No.
No knowledge or anything of that nature.
i 8:
MARSH:
Second question in the same area.
Do you have any information g
10f heresay or direct of any type of a party possibly going on, I'm curious i
because March 28 being the anniversary date, of the date upon which 11 Unit 2 went critical...
13)
})4$ :
Well there was suppose to be a party that day, however, that 14:
was cancelled.
That was the instrument shop.
I think the instrument 15i shop was going to have a party, I know the whole unit as a whole was 16l going to have a party.
There was a lot of things scheduled since it 17!
was the anniversary date.
18t 191 MARSH:
Where would that party have been scheduled for, do you recall 20!
or know.
21 22
_pS:
I believe the instrument shop party was going to be right in the Unit 2 instrument shop.
The company party, I don't know where it 24 was going to be but I do know that there was, I believe it was an 25 offsite location.
I f
i
.f 31 l
MARSH:
Was that a formalized function.
Were there flyers put out on 1.
it and that...
2 i
3!
$m%:
Yea, there were postings put out on the doors, bulletin boards 4i 5
and this thing so there wa's Unit 2 commercial party.
6i MARSH:
7 Would you have any knowledge where any of those flyers or p stars are still located or pigeonholed.
8 9
DS:
I have no idea.
All I know there was one on our shop door, g
there was one down on the bulletin board, both bulletin boards in the Unit 1 building.
Unit 2 I can't tell you cause I very seldcm get over 12!
I the Unit 2 to do-anything.
131
' 14!
i CRESWELL:
The purpose of that party was what, the anniversary date?
15i i
16i gmS:
Right.
Unit 2 commercial date or power, you know, t.tey had an 17!
anniversary date when they went critical I guess.
And I was also 18{
suppose to be I guess a commercial party too or scmething like that 19i involved.
20l 21l VARSH:
Are you aware of any other groups in-house just picking 22 names, health rhysics or janitorial staff also slating internal parties unofficial.
24 25' l
A
+
I I
32 1
~
lj gmg:
I don't know, they might have, I have no idea, no recollection.
2!
3j MARSH:
Have you heard anything whatsoever on operational crews i
4j planning parties of that nature.
5 ImS:
No.
The only one I heard of was the company one and also the O!
I instrument shop one.
,1
/
8 t
MARSH:
91 Do you have any knowledge of past parties let's say by operational staff and by operational I mean control room staff at Christmas, 10!
l helidays or scmething like this.
Would this have been a normal thing 11:
to expect or is that...
12!
13!
1*f5 :
On the island itself?
1 41 15l MARSH:
On the isla.1d itself.
16i 17'!
TwS:
No we don't, as far as what we call party-wise no.
I worked 18 just last Cr.ristmas and about the only thing we had done then that was 19{
out of the ordinary was that the couple of the operators were female 20 on the shift had decided to cook dinner for everybody so they had 21; l
brought in spaghetti and meatballs and I was sick that night so I 22l couldn't eat any of it.
And my basic routine was to sleep on the work 23 bench most of the night until they needed me.
24 i
{
25j t
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I i
.. f 33 MARSH:
The obvious area I would be looking at deep concern would be 1.
2f the presence of alcohol beverages in or around the control room.
3l IMS:
I have never seen any alcoholic beverages in the control room.
Si MARSH:
No heresay of anything, 6
i 7l
}M6 ;
iTO. Everybody ' talks boy I wish I had a Budweiser but no it's g
never there.
I've never seen any.
g I
10 MARSH:
Okay.
Thank you.
12!
CRESWELL: 1W3atthispoint.
Tony did you have something.
r 14!
FASANO:
I just wanted to go back and maybe go throught just a couple 15:l 4
of steps, and then...
Do you recall who got the second instrument for 16!
the validation of the measurements when you were downstairs in the 17!
I cable room.
IS!
19f gwS :
No I don't.
I don't know who got it.
I believe Mr. Bennett 20l j
left the room.
I don't know whether he had brought back the actual 21 instrument itself, I do kndw that he did have with him the conversion 22 chart.
23 24i i
25' l
i-
-34
{
j i
i y
FASANO:
In making the measurements whost making the contacts.
Was-it i
1 2
a team effort or was one man doing the =,ntacts as well as the reading.
I 3I i
IW6:
I was doing the contacts, physically taking the contacts from i
l 4
Sf the back of the computer and putting them onto the meter movement, you y
know, the meter itself.
Mr. Wright would verify that it~ fact the 7I proper contact was on the proper post of the meter and we would both take a look at readings.
We were rather excited, its not every day g.
that you see a core temperature of 3700, 2700 degrees you know.
So of g
course we didn't believe it ourselves to begin with.
n; i
FASANO:
Since then have you gone and...apparently you are interested 12!
l t
in the melting point of various-materials.
13{
l r
l 14i TM6: We yes, sure am now.
15j 16 FASANO:
Well did you go back ano look to see what your melting point, 171 these are alumel thermocouples?
18(
19l T W Q 1:
No I had not taken a look at that but I guess pretty darn high from what I understand.
I don't know what it is.
Do you off hand 21 know?
22 23 FASANO:
No I d W t.
I just wondered if you knew.
24 i
25j
!l
t 35 l
.1 1!
lwS:
No I don't.
There's one guy there that does know pretty good
(
2 the melting points of different things.
l l
3i I
4l FASANO: We can look it up.
Si "J,W :
Yea.
6 7!
I FASANO:
Do you recall setting some, you mentioned that you set some 8
gj up permanent'y.
t 10' 1%$ :
Right.
I 12; FASANO:
Now prior to that did you measure any trends.
Were these temperatures fluctuating to any degree over the period of time you were?..
15i 16!
gwg:
They were fluctuating but the. amount of fluctuation as well as i
I was concerned was minimal.
Because when you start talking temperatures IS{
of like I said 2500, 3000 degrees plus or minus 10 degrees,.there 19i 20 might have a couple there that were fluctuating, the lower temperature l
ones may have been fluctuating a little bit more but there was no 2 11 i
actual what I ould say radical fluctuation frorr. siy you're sitting at 22 l
a 1000 now ans one minute later its at 2000 degrees.
23 24 25!
l i
l
.I
36
\\
lj FASANO:
Do you recall seeing any temperatures very low like 200 f
degrees.
2
\\
3i 4l IMO:
No I don't.
Si FASANO:
You-don't.
6 I
7 8l Img:
No.
9l FASANO:
I don't have any other questions.
10-11!
l CRESWELL:
John at this point I would like to ask you, do you have any 12!
I ccmments that you would like to make of any nature.
131 i
14i Im$:
As pertaining to what.
15; 16{
i CRESWELL:
Anything.
17!
18!
MARSH:
Marsh speaking, Its been our policy to turn the mike over to 198 l
the interviewee for any comment or point that he wants to make and 20!
I make a matter of record before we complete.
21!
22 14:
Well it sounds gross end maybe a little inhumane but I am kind 23-of glad the accident happened.
Because I think it is going to waken 24i j
some people up.
I'think we are going to learn a lot from it.
I 2Sj 1
~
37 o
-l y
believe it is going to make nuclear power safer.
And I am kind of 2
glad it happened in a new plant mainly due to the fact that the core 3
life being as shortlived as it was, it was only what only 97 days or 4j 90 days or something.
The actual radiation byproducts from a shortlived c re f that nature as far as plutonium-wise or cesium-wise or anything 5l 6l f that nature, the byproducts were ir.w and limited.
But I hope management learns a lot, I really do.
I think they ought to take the 7
view now of shutting the plant down and fixing what's right, rather than waitin; till the last moment.
9f 10 MARSH: Marsh speaking, I would like to say thank you for your time 11; and your recollection.
Before we do finish up, counsel is there any 12!
comment you want to put on record.
Okay, fine, there's a negative indication.
Iassureyc5t.hatisoneofthegoalsofthisinvestigation 1 41
- 15i, to wring out of what we've got as much corrective action and identify as much as we can as to what brought this about and what has to be 16i done to prevent it from happening again.
17 18f W6 :
It is my understanding that NRC is changing their ideas toward 19 control room operators, retraining program.
Have they given any 20 thought at all to relieving CR0 of a little bit of his responsibility 21 j
and putting two CR0s at that panel rather than one.
That's a hell of 22 a lot of responsibility to have up there.
I sure wouldn't want it and 23' the way Unit 2's control room is for one man to operate that contro) 24 rocm that is a nightmare.
The RPS cabinets are hid, you can't sce 25j i
i
~l i
e p,,
38 l
lj
- them, a lot of ; L e primary instruments that you need are in the back 2
of the panel, you can't see them.
Whoever engineered that job over i
3l there well he nas a lot to be desired.
1 4!
MARSH:
5 Marsh speaking, much of this is coming from the course of the interviews and our investigation.
Much of it will be addressed, not 6
y only as it pertains to this plant but to the industry as a whole.
No othercommentsbyanyonethenthetimethenbeing8:36andreading819 g;
gj on the meter I will terminate the tape and o e again say thar.k you.
10l t
11!
12I i
13)
' 14!
16i 17l 18f i
19l 20 1
21l 22 1
23' 24 25l l
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