ML19332F300

Forwards D Kwiatkowski 891006 Memo Forwarding FEMA Joint Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise Conducted on 880622, Demonstrating Ability of States of Mn & Wi & Local Govt to Implement Radiological Emergency Plans

ML19332F300
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	11/30/1989
From:	Greger L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Larson C NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8912140241
Download: ML19332F300 (2)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:cp ~ 1 < e [ b F N0Y S 0 899 4 Docket No.~ 50-282 ' Docket No.-50-306 Northern States Power Company u ~ . ATTN:- Mr. C. E. Larson p -Vice President, Nuclear Generation 414 Nicollet Mail-Minneapolis, MN-55401-Genthr.an:- i ~ We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) I letter dated October 6,1989, and associated final exercise evaluations of-i .the Prairie Island joint offsite emergency preparedness exercise conducted lon June 22, 1988.- This'was a drill to demonstrate the ability of the States 'of Minnesota ard Wisconsin, and local governments to implement their Radiological Emergency Plans. The final FEMA exercise evaluation lists areas

i which required' corrective actions regarding the offsite emergency response I

plans for the area around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, i . Based 'on the performance of the offsite agencies during the exercise, FEMA identified deficiencies regarding Emergency Broadcast Service. messages which 1' !could'potentially affect the public health and safety in the event of an

accident at the Prairie Island site. However, each state subsequently.

submitted a schedule-of corrective actions and conducted remedial exercises. The activities demonstrated during the remedial exercises corrected the 1 . deficiencies. As a result, the approval of offsite emergency preparedness 1 under FEMA Rule 44-CFR 350 will remain in effect. l iz -1 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commissior,'s regulations, a copy of j this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. i Sincerely, ~ . 8912140241B?jh02 I iPDR-ADOCK 0 PW L. Ro'e t eger, Chief ~ Reactor Programs Branch

Enclosure:

As stated i See Attached Distribution n i RIII RIII RjU RI \\ jf jf s. t jh Snell e r ess ir

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gi' t' ' p Northern States Power Company 2 NOV 3 01989 1 Distribution-cc w/ enclosure: . E. L. Watzl,. Plant Manager I - DCD/DCB-(RIDS)' , Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident-Inspector,'RIII Prairie Island-i Resident Inspector, RIII-Monticello l - John W..Ferman, Ph.D.. !i g Nuclear Engineer, MPCA 1 ' State Liaison Officer, State' 1 of Minnesota R..Erickson, NRR, EPB i .a -I l 1 L j l p

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Washington, D.C. 20472 1' OCT 6 1989 4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel Director 1 Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S.fNuclear Regula y Co,mmission FROM: din is kwi tikobs 'i ,, b'AssistantvAssociate Director L [T Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report for the June 22, 1988, Exercine of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (NGP) Attached is a copy of the exercise report for the June 22, 1988, joint exercise _of the offsite REP plans for the Prairie Island NGP.. Participants included the State of Minnesota, Goodhue L County and the City of Red Wing, the State of-Wisconsin and Pierce County, and Northern States Power Company. The report, l dated September 22, 1989, was prepared by Region V of the Federal l Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On December 15, 1988, FEMA Region V provided the Minnesota Division of Emergency Management and the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government with a draft copy of the exercise-report, which identified deficiencies, areas requiring corrective action and areas recommended for improvement. Each State subsequently submitted a schedule of corrective actions which are incorporated in the final exercise report. l 1 Two deficiencies are identified in the exercise report, one for l the State of Minnesota and one for Pierce County, Wisconsin. A remedial exercise was conducted for Pierce County, Wisconsin, on i April 12, 1989, and for the State of Minnesota on April 28, 1989. i The activities demonstrated during the remedial exercises corrected the deficiencies. A copy of each remedial exercise report is attached. q; D y q ty >I wY94, k )1 O 114 A A M ./ U

5* t Based on the results of the June 22, 1988,-exercise and remedial exercises conducted on April 12 and April 28, 1989, FEMA considers!offsite emergency preparedness adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public living in: the vicinity of'the site in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the approvals under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 on May 16, 1985, for Wisconsin and September 24,- 1985, for Minnesota will remain in effect. If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871. Attachments As Stated-l 4 l l l L I

9: e S' r.- Y;. ~;, E. ^ 4-4- f .c. EXERCISE REPORT PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT t NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE i v. Location of the Plant: Located in the State of Minnesota, Goodhue County, near the City of Red-A- Wing, Minnesota L Exercise Date: June 22, 1988 Date of Draft Report: -December 14, 1988 Date of Final Report: June 30, 1989 Date of Revised Final Report: September 22, 1989 f ParticiDants Included:- The State of Minnesota:(' full), Goodhue County / City of Red Wing (full), Dakota-County-(full)', the State of Wisconsin (full), Pierce County 4(full) and Northern States PoQer Company -l l PREPARED BY THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS BRANCH 175 WEST JACKSON BLVD., 4TH FLOOR CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604 n ) Odi Jg o ) ; q ff l Q f. L-W ) J r b iC

l ', l C '.'r_ T TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS page-1 ' EXECUTIVE SUP&mRY .page 3 State of Minnesota page 3 Goodhue' County / City of Red Wing page-9 . Dakota County page 11 State of-Wisconsin. page 13 . Pierce County page 14 ~ Joint Publ'ic Information Center (JPIC) - page.16 -EXERCISE REPORT . Introduction 1.. . Exercise Background page-18 ~ ~ 2. Participating and Non-Participating State and Local + Governments-page 18' ~ 3. List of Evaluators page 18 4. Evaluation Criteria page 19 5.. Exercise Objectives page 19 -6. Summary of the Scenario page 20 7. Description of State and Local Resourded page 20 8. Findings Noted in Past Exercises page 21 9. Exercises Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved page 22 Narrative 1. State of Minnesota page 26 2. Goodhue County / City of Red Wing page 40 3. Dakota County page 46 4. . State of Wisconsin page 52 5. . Pierce County page'58 6. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) page 61

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS page 67 State of Minnesota 1. Deficiencies page 68 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 69 3. Areas Reccmmended for Improvement page 73 1 .u__ -_u-_________.__m._.m____ ,_x_ _,. _ _,, _ _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. ___ ___ ___ _ _, __

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS.(cont.) Goodhue,. county / City.of Red Wing; 1.--Deficiencies page'75 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 76' 3 '. Areas Recommended for' Improvement' page 78 Dakota County' 1. Deficiencies ~ page 79 2. - Areas T<equiring Corrective Action page 80 '3.. Areas Recommended for Improvement page 81 state of Wisconsin 1. Deficiencies page 82 Areas Requiring Corrective. Action page 83 -- 2.. 3. . Areas Recommended for.Tmprovement page 851 Pierce County -1. Deficiencies page-86 5 2' ' Areas' Requiring. Corrective Action page 87 3. Areas Recommended for-Improvement page 88 l - i 4 . e l t l 4 X: 2 s <w w

facsimile operator (s).seemed unaware of this exercise and - the simulated priority that should be given to EBS messages. The resolution of this issue must be reexamined by both parties before the next exercise. The Minnesota State EOC in the basement of the Capital building is a facility that has been in existence for several years. It has received FEMA funds and approval. It has sufficient space, furniture, lighting, map displays, etc. to support emergency operations. It is recommended that color overlays depicting subarea evacuation or sheltering be developed for the EPZ map. This EOC has proven to be adequate during several previous exercises and actual disacter operations. Back-up power, although available was not demonstrated. The physical space used by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) staff to perform dose assessment activities during an exercise or emergency consists of a single room off of the main EOC. The work-area layout is poor, with work areas segmented, insufficient desk top space, and emergency telephones located separately from the general staff work areas. Noise levels in the room were extreme at times due to the presence of the_otner non-nuclear' power plant emergency equipment in the room and the presence of mah EOC staf f discussing issues with the MDH staff. At one point fifteen EOC staff were present in the room discussing the emergency. Corrective actions are required to be taken by the State to reorganize the physical layout of the room, to ensure that critical communication links are located immediately adjacent to work areas, and to eliminate or minimize those factors involved in the extreme noise levels in the room. It is recommended that a system be developed to ensure important information is posted in the dose assessment area in a timely manner. ', f The MDH field teams partially demonstrated their ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. The field teams carried TLD dosimeters and two ranges of self-reading pocket dosimeters. They filled in an exposure control log when they were deployed to the field, and checked their self-reading dosimeters periodically in the field. However, because the team members were unclear of their exposure limit, and because they were not carrying mid-range self-reading dosimeters, this objective was l partially met. It is required that the field teams are trained and briefed before deployment on their exposure limits in the field, and that a reference of the exposure limits be included in the written instructions that they carry in the field. It is also required that the field teams carry medium range self-reading dosimeters (0-20R) since this range is crucial for determining their exposure limits accurately. The MDH field teams correctly used Eberline Geiger-Mueller counters and ionization chambers to obtain ambient field measurements. However, it is required that radioactive check sources be placed 4

4. -in the kits to enable them to check the operation of these instruments in the field. It is also required that the State . Highway Patrol participate with the field teams during full-participation exercises, to enable the teams to practice their required duties. fully and accurately. The field teams demonstrated the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10E-7 microcurie per cc in the presence of noble gases. The field teams used a calibrated RADECO air pump for air measurements. They ran the pumps with-silver zeolite cartridges for at least 15 minutes, recorded the measurement times and flow rates to accurately measure low concentrations of airborne radiciodine in the presence of noble gases. They have the capability and instrumentation to obtain these concentrations in the field as a quick check and then to transport them to the State Laboratory. The State of Minnesota also demonstrated the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses. The Radiochemistry Laboratory adequately demonstrated appropriate operations and procedures for measurement and analysis of radioactivity on air particulate filters and air iodine cartridges. Of fsite exposure levels and potential integrated population doses, for the expected duration of the emergency, were calculated by the MDH Dose Assessment staff for the plume exposure pathway. Calculations were made throughout the exercise using both computer programs and manual calculation methods. Calculations results were compared to field readings received from Minnesota, Wisconsin and utility field teams and with calculations inade by the utility and Wisconsin. Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were made by the MDH Dose Assessment staf f at each stage of the emergency. Initial PARS were based upon plant conditions and the potential for degradation in the plant's status. PARS made at the start of the General Emergency classification were based upon scenario releases and projected offsite doses. An excellent level of coordination was displayed by MDH, Wisconsin and the utility staffs during the formulation of uniform PARS for the general public. PARS made by the MDH staff were not routinely approved by the Governor, or his representat.ive, as required by the Minnesota Emergency Plan. MDH recommended PARS were distributed outside the State EOC by EOC staff-without Governor approval of the recommendations. Corrective actions should be taken by the State to ensure that the Governor's approval of PARS is received prior to the distribution of the PARS to the EOC or others This information should be provided to the MDH Dose Assessment staff to ensure continued coordination of PARS 5

y 4 with the State of Wisconsin and the utility. The State of -Minnesota partially demonstrated the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin to disseminate an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State Officials. The State faxes all EBS messages to NOAA for broadcasting over EBS. Delays were observed in faxing these EBS messages to NOAA. In addition, there were also delays of several minutes between the sounding of the siren system and the activation.of the EBS system. Future exercises will be required to better demonstrate the procedure for obtaining the Governor's approval of protective action recommendations and the sounding of the sirens and activation of the EBS system. The ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely manner after the initial alert and notification occurred was not demonstrated. This was primarily due to EBS message #3 (General Emergency). The emergency public instructions were drafted,

however, part of the EBS message described the shelter and evacuation area as the same area.

Absence of information also existed, e.g. locations where transie.nts can go for help, location of reception / congregate care f acilitiles and guidance on sheltering methods. The message was also confusing and difficult to ' understand. The State did not take action to provide corrected information to the public. No one approved the quality and content of EBS messages prior to f axing to NOAA. No confirmation of receipt ex3sts at the NOAA facsimile station. Space for Press briefings is established in room G-15 of the State Capital-Building. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) workspace for JPIC staff is located in thy'EOC. Activities in the JPIC, though, are controlled by the, Governor's PIO who is located in the EOC. The Governor's PIO is responsible for coordinating information prior to the briefings given to the media l at the JPIC. This is done by the Governor's PIO holding a l pre-briefing with the various JPIC spokespersons (Utility, State, Local). These pre-briefings were conducted in the office of the

Director, Minnesota Division of Emergency Government.

Each department represented in the EOC also had a PIO who was responsible for development of news releases and bulletins. l The EOC staffing pattern includes a person who is responsible for controlling ru. Tors in a timely < fashion. This person, when a rumor l-was received, coordinated the rumor with the appropriate EOC staff person for an answer. The answer would then be called back to the originator, and significant rumors would be given to the l appropriate JPIC spokesperson to be included in the next media briefing or included in a written news release / bulletin. Federal evaluators question the ability of this system to handle a large volume of incoming calls. 6 s

Y: .g: The need for distribution of potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers was discussed by the MDH staff at numerous times during l the exercise. The decision to distribute KI to emergency workers was made at 1155. The recommendation was immediately communicated to the main EOC staff and the MDH field staff. This recommendation was not coordinated with either the utility or - the State of Wisconsin. Although this decision effects only emergency workers in the State of Minnesota, it is recommended that it be coordinated with the other emergency organizations involved in the response to the emergency. The sensitivity of emergency workers to KI has not been evaluated by the MDH since the most recent Prairie Island exercise. This was an item recommended for improvement during that exercise. However, during this exercise, an individual team member identified herself as being allergic to iodines after the recommendation on KI was made. This individual was " rotated" out of the evacuated and sheltered areas after an evaluation by the MDH Dose Assessment staff. This spontaneous event was handled effectively by the MDH staff. The previous recommendation for improvement, to evaluate the sensitivity of emergency workers to KI, is being roissued as a result of this exercise. l The State of Minnesota EOC staff demonstrated their ability to determine the Shelter / evacuation areas and the EOC planning to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to the shelter / evacuation area. The EOC staff monitored the action taken by Dakota and Goodhue Counties and provided State evacuation assistance requested by the Counties. Two contacts were made (simulated) by the Minnesota Department of j Health (MDH) Dose Assessment staff with'the U.S. Department of Energy, Chicago Operations Office's Radiological Assistance Program during the exercise. A request for assistance was made. The l: request for assistance was based upon the increasing potential for offsite consequences due to the emergency at the Prairie Island facility. The Minnesota Department of Health field teams used correct equipment and procedures for collection of vegetation, water, and soil samples. These samples were representative of the area and were properly labelled, bagged, and transported to the hot line. The Minnesota Department of Health Radiochemistry Laboratory adequately demonstrated appropriate operations and procedures for measurement and analysis of radioactivity in a variety of environmental samples. Sample

intake, scanning, log in and

~ identification, bagging, preparation and analysis were adequately demonstrated or discussed for air iodine cartridge, milk, soil, vegetation, water and animal feed samples. Equipment and quality assurance measures are suf ficient, however, a problem could develop if the digital equipment computer which controls the gamma analysis fails. It is recommended that staff be trained in manual operation 7

of multichannel analyzers as a back-up. Staf fing of the lab is adeq'2 ate with a staf f of one director and two assistants and a backup staff of six additional assistants. However, there is only one individual who can function as the director and so around-the-clock operation is doubtful. It is recommended, as a corrective action, that a back-up director be i trained and available. Several' weaknesses were observed in the sample intake process and the sample storage process. The sample exchange pad was located i near an operating air conditioner exhaust stream and there are no plans or necessary materials available to rope off and post the sample storage area. Required corrective actions include revision 1 of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for exchange pad location i and storage area posting; training of staff in these procedures; the developmont of an inventory list of accessory materials; the addition of a variety of plastic bags of various sizes (so large and small samples can ce compactly bagged); a spill absorption-and decontamination kit; and rope and " radioactive material" signs for posting the storage aree. Finally, the sample preparation and 6ounting procedurer which were l demonstrated for soil, milk, and other environmental samples, although appropriate to the situation, are different from the SOPS j for routine sample analysis and are not written down. Additional required corrective actions include the development of SOPS for sample preparation and counting in support of State response to a radiological emergency, and the updating of the list of laboratory equipment in the State Plan. The total population dose received by th'e l general public, as a result of the emergency, was estimated by the MDH during the exercise. Results of field measurements, previous computer calculations of exposure levels, and a manual calculation sheet l were used to perform the calculations. Reentry and recovery PARS were made by the MDH Dose Assessment staff. PARS were based upon field team measurements and results of laboratory analysis of environmental samples. All PARS, previously issued during the course of the exercise, were not relaxed at the end of the exercise due to the levels of radioactivity present in the analyzed samples. Long term PARS were coordinated with the State (of Wisconsin, and the utility. Reclassification of the emergency by the ' utility to " Recovery Phase" was required by both States prior to the issuing of final i PARS. Limited recovery and reentry procedures were effectively demonstrated during this exercise. This was done through a table top discussion in the EOC. Protective action recommendations were not relaxed until monitored field data showed safe radiation levels 3

for reentry. .A public health information bulletin with instructions to the evacuees was issued in conjunction with advisories from the Minnesota Department of Agriculture. The-instructions included restrictions on crop harvesting and the censumption of garden vegetables and raw milk. Goodhue countv/ city of Red Winc The City of. Red Wing /Goodhue County activated the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) at the County Public Safety Building. The call initiating activation of the EOC facilities and mobilization of staff were received in the dispatch center of the County Sheriff '.s Department. However, the County EOC was never fully staffed as reflected in the County plan, nor did the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County fully demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change of all positions represented in the County EOC.

Further, evaluators observed that first shift staff in several positions represented in the EOC, remained in the EOC and continued. to control or prompt their second shift counterparts on their responsibilities and involvement in the exercise.

i l The EOC management staff did not fully demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. EOC briefings, I staff involvement in decision-making and direction and control deteriorated during the advent of the second shift. The Chief of Staff reflected dependency on his first shift counterpart (who had remained in the operations area after the shift change) regarding his responsibilities and what to do next. i The required maps were posted in the EOC and the staff effectively l used the map displays to enhance the EOC operations. Although there is a status board in the EOC, the staff chose to use a flip chart to - record the sequence of events and other important-l information. The status board contained only marginal information, much of which was incomplete. The flip chart was difficult to read without walking up to the chart. The EOC was noisy, due to extraneous conversations being carried on during briefings, the ' State Police radio and staff movement into and out of the area. To assist in reducing the noise level, it is recommended that the State Police radio be relocated outside the operations area or be operated with a headphone, and management controls be instituted to reduce private conversations during briefings. The EOC and Red Wing Fire Department staff demonstrated primary and backup means of communications by use of commercial telephone and radio to the State EOC, Dakota and Pierce Counties, State and County field teams, and the JPIC. Present in the COC and the Red I. Wing Fire Department were amateur radio operators from the Hiawatha Valley Amateur Radio Club and the Civil Air Patrol. The CAP and Hiawatha Valley Amateur Radio Club, which are fully equipped, 9

4-serves as additional backup means of communications to the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County. The EOC is also equipped with a data fax-capability to the State EOC and the JPIC. The EOC staff' responded to initiate the activation of the siren systems (2 separate systems) for the City of Red Wing and Goodhue County - during the Site' Area Emergency Classification _when the protective action recommendation (PAR) notification came from the State EOC. The State had informed the County, via telephone, when the EBS would be activated and the time to sound the sirens in the County. To insure that siren systems .were activated simultaneously, the-Sheriff's dispatchers coordinated the information with the Red Wing Fire Department and Dakota and' Pierce Counties. The initial sounding of the sirens was at 1101 and at 15-minute intervals thereafter. The initial siren activation was implemented in accordance with the emergency plan operations procedures. The EOC staff of the County Sheriff's Department and Red Wing Police and Fire Departments coordinated to demonstrate the capability to control evacuation traffic flow and access to evacuated and sheltered a7eas; to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure; and the ability to implement apprcpriate protective actions for special needs population, handicapped and institutionalized persons. Beginning at the Site Area Emergency notification, the County Sheriff and Red Wing Police Departments simulated in the EOC the staffing of traffic and access control points and actually i dispatched patrols for route alerting in the 0-2 mile radius of L the plant. Subsequent route' alerting and staffing of traffic and l-access control points were implemented uponl receipt of protective actions by the City / County after the General Emergency notification. A traffic and access control point was manned at U.S. 61 and County Route 7 and the intersection in the Village of Welch i by personnel of the Goodhue County Sheriff's Department. Federal i ' evaluators determined that the patrolman at U.S. 61 and County Route 7 had been issued dosimetry, potassium iodide and the l necessary - record keeping and instruction cards. While on l assignment, the patrolman received radio instructions to ingest the KI which had been issued to him prior to his departure for the traffic and access control assignment. The patrolman was aware of the evacuation routes, the location of the Reception and Congregate Care and Decontamination Centers. He had radio capabilities with his counterparts at other traffic and access control points, and l the County EOC. The patrolmen were polled by radio on the need to l lead and report their respective dosimeter readings to the Sheriff's dispatch center. l l The County has a room designated for media briefings in the EOC. I However, the area was not set up for that purpose and there are no l maps nor displays in the room to enhance briefings. Upon inquiry l l 4

by evaluators near the end of the exercise the Mayor and Chief of Staff stated they were prepared to brief media representatives, however no media came to the EOC. The County did not demonstrate 7 the ability to brief the media and to establish and operate' rumor 1 control. -The County's failure to brief the media is a repeated weakness identified in Goodhue County from the last exercise June 17, 1986. The objective must be demonstrated during the next exercise. The EOC staff also did not entertain the reentry and recovery objective, although they were provided the information by the State EOC and posted it on the flip chart in the EOC. Upon notification that the exercise was terminated the Chief of Staff announced the termination and dismissed the EOC staff. I Dakota County Dakota County clearly demonstrated the ability to utilize the appropriate emergency classification levels and fully activated the ' Dakota County EOC in the Dakota County Government Center, l following receipt of the Alert notification. l The County Administrator, supported by the Operations Chief, effectively managed the emergency response activities within Dakota County and coordinated these activities with the State of Minnesota and Goodhue County. However, on several occasions County requests to the State for supplementary emergency information did not receive a prompt response, q s The demonstration of decision-making and einergency activities was met. The Dakota County EOC utilized the dedicated telephone line as its primary communication system, and employed commercial telephones, telefax and radios as "back-up" systems. These systems operated adequately. Despite this, hard copy message delays did occur when the telefax system at other locations malfunctioned. The - EOC operations area was situated in a temporary basement location in the Dakota County Government Center. This location and the associated maps and graphics were sufficient to support emergency operations. The ability to continuously monitor emergency worker exposure was to be demonstrated by the Dakota County EOC and Dakota County traffic control point personnel. Greater familiarity with radiological monitoring instruments and concepts would have enhanced the exposure control function. Emergency workers staf fing traffic control points wore only low-range dosimeters (0-200 mR). High-range dosimeters (0-200 R) were available to those staffing 11

p 9 the TCPs, but'were not actually worn. There was insufficient i knowledge displayed as to when or by whom the high-range dosimeters were to be used. There was also a failure to issue- (or to simulate issuance. of) TLDs to emergency workers. The workers themselves were unaware that TLDs existed.' Confusion regarding the location. of, and procedures for reporting to decontamination facilities was also in evidence among the TCP staff. This is a repeat weakness from the previous exercise. EOC radiological staff were not aware of stay times for emergency workers in evacuated areas (e.g., security patrols). This objective wns not fully met. The ability of the Dakota County EOC to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and to begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of state decisions regarding PARS was demonstrated. In the case of the two emergency PARS, siren activation was achieved within S-8 minutes of PAR notification from the State EOC. Objectives involving the coordination of public information, briefing the media in a timely manner and the coordinated operation of rumor control required damonstrations performed by a Dakota County representative to the JPIC. During this exercise, the representation of Dakota County at the JPIC was simulated because the appointed representative was unavailable for duty. This l simulation was not sufficient to meet these objectives, nor can it correct two ARCAs identified during a previous exercise, given that no alternate County representative to the JPIC had been designated to compensate for the missing staff member. l The-Dakota County EOC demonstrated that it possessed the ability L and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions l-for the impacted permanent and transient pluine EPZ population. The ability and resources were specifically demonstrated by the Dakota County Sheriff's Department (handling route alerting and traffic l control) and the Hastings Fire Department (handling the evacuation of special needs populations, rescue operations and emergency medical transportation). l The Dakota County EOC demonstrated that it possessed the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. The lead in this process was taken by the Dakota County Sheriff's Department, which established two of its Traffic Control Points in Sectors P and Q on the very perimeter of the 10-mile EPZ. The Radiological Officer handled all requests for access to restricted areas based on State-issued PARS and forwarded this information via the Sheriff's dispatcher to the traffic control points. A tabletop discussion held by the staff of the Dakota County EOC demonstrated the ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and

recovery, based on total population 12

d Q exposure, available PARS and other relevant factors. The table-top discussion included considerations of population distribution and size within areas - still on restricted status during recovery, environmental radiation assessments provided to the EOC by the MDH and MDH pars regarding food and water consumption.- On this basis a strategy for handling the reentry of the evacuated popu2ttion to restricted areas was developed. With the exception of a shif t change performed by the Hastings Fire Department EOC staff member, the objective involving 24-hour staffing was partially demonstrated through the presentation of a roster and by double staffing of positions at the EOC itself. State of Wisconsin The State Division <of Emergency Government (DEG) demonstrated their ability to use emergency classification levels and for each level. This was accomplished in a timely and efficient manner. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was fully activated and 1 staffed-for a full-participation exercise. Several State government agencies were represented and carried out emergency response activities. Personnel call-up procedures were initiated by the Operations Officer in accordance to the plan. The Department of Health and Social Services, Section of Radiation Protection staff handled the radiological control / dose assessment function in the State EOO and carried out field sampling and = monitoring activities in the vicinity of the plant. l l The Wisconsin DEG participated in coordination with the field activities in Wisconsin and Minnesota. utiliz'ed to accomplish the Several communications methods were i dissemination of information to field offices and field personnel. Used were commercial telephone, NAWAS, DATAFAX, RACES, TIME and State radio bands. The State DEG demonstrated the capability of facilities to support h the emergency response operations. Maps, displays and message status boards were utilized. The message status boards were not kept up-to-date nor were they accurate, timely or graphically displayed. Many key emergency response messages did not get posted or were excessively late in being posted. The message distribution system needs specific attention to improve the message flow. Improvement can be achieved by designating and training an individual to post key emergency response information. l'- Field team monitors reported their exposure at every sampling point. This included pocket dosimeters. i The field proceduras and equipment were demonstrated for taking direct air measurements, particulate and Iodine 131 samples and 1 l 13 l l 7 l

sc,il and vegetation samples. Gamma spectroscopy is available in the field to make the measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations following the collection of samples. These procedures were demonstrated in accordance with the SOPS. -The dose assessment group using the projected dosage assessment in the plume made protective action recommendations and disseminated the information to the field through the State officer in Charge. The State DEG supported Pierce County in their decision-making and notification as to the appropriate protective actions when notified by the utility. The recommendation to use potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers in the EPZ was made at 1206 and then disseminated to the field. The decision for this was predicated on the evaluation of theiexposure expected in the plume. The Wisconsin.DEG demonstrated the requesting of Federal assistance in two forms; 1) that FEMA by the central point of contact for the Federal response and, 2) that additional assistance was requested for livestock feed. The radiation assessment group utilizing their equipment and expertise demonstrated the estimated total population exposure _in the evacuated areas using both plant and field data. i The SRC and staff discussed the reentry and recovery procedures with the State Department of Agriculture in the EOC and made l_ recommendations to be implemented by the State. The L recommendations pertained to food, dairy animaleproducts and water in the evacuated area.

• l' j

Nearly all Departments demonstrated the a'bility to perform a 24 l hour continuous operation by a shift change with the exception of the State PIOS in the State EOC. They _ presented a roster ' of l personnel. The Wisconsin Department of Transportation did not make provisions for a shift change. L Pierce County pierce County effectively demonstrated its capabilities for taking, in a timely _ manner, appropriate emergency response actions te y l-protect the public upon receipt of the ECLs; including alerting and l mobilizing personnel, activating and staffing of the EOC, as well as managing, coordinating, and controlling emergency operations. l-Leadership and supporting personnel were assigned to the EOC including two full shifts. All participants appeared very l knowledgeable of their responsibilities and demonstrated their competence by taking appropriate actions as required throughout the simulated emergency. The Pierce County EOC f acility, together with its communications, displays, and amenities proved to be fully 14

adequate to enable the carrying out of necessary emergency actions by the staff. The initial protective action recommendation of sheltering people and livestock in a two-mile radius was received in the Pierce County.EOC during the Site Area Emergency. The simulated siren sounding and issuing cf an EBS message was accomplished in 11 minutes.- After the simulated accident escalated to the General Emergency, the protective action recommendations were increased to evacuation of the two-mile radius and 2 to 5 miles in the downwind sectors with sheltering in the remainder of-the EPZ. The second simulated siren sounding and issuing of an EBS message was accomplished in 10 minutes. Although the instructions to the public were timely, the conversion from-the sector designation to geopolitical boundary descriptions for the second set of emergency instructions for the public was not accurate. The prescripted sub-area designations were-not used. l The 10-mile radius for sheltering was not defined by geopolitical descriptions familiar to the public. The City of Prescott not in the EPZ was included. Clarification of procedures and additional training will be required to insure that the accurate description of the affected area will be contained in the EBS messages. Since Pierce County also provides information direct to the local media (in addition to the State JPICs), this function was demonstrated by the preparation and conduct of three media briefings during the exercise. The State PIO assigned to the Pierce County EOC conducted the briefings following preparation of l l the materials in coordination with the Pierce County PIO and the i State EOC at Madison. The briefings were sketchy and the presentor was unaware of fundamental information.* 1 Improvements to this function are needed to essentially enhance the County capability L to handle-an expanded local media. This w'ould involve providing appropriate displays and providing facilities to support the media staff. Specific rumor control activities were not observed to have occurred at the Pierce County EOC. However, constant coordination between the EOC and the JPIC was maintained primarily by using the FAX equipment thereby providing the capability for rumor control coordination should it be needed. To fully demonstrate rumor control in future exercises, specific rumors should be inserted into the exercise play. The EOC staff demonstrated the implementation of the protective action recommendations (PARS) of sheltering and evacuation by effectively simulating their responses. The County Highway Department and the Sheriff's office coordinated the location and maintenance of the traffic access control points. A thorough procedural discussion of assisting the evacuation of the mobility impaired was given by the Social Service representatives. 15

L Activation and staffing of the Plum City congregate care facility was simulated. The Social Service, American Red Cross and Health Services rescesentatives discussed each of their roles in supporting congregate care. Even though school was not in session, the arrangements for notifying and coordinating evacuation of schools was reviewed with the evaluator. An exc311ent demonstration of emergency worker exposure control was given by the County Radiological Officer. When the Site Area Emergency classification was received, he distributed dosimeters and TLDs to all emergency workers in the EPZ together with written instructions and registration cards. Periodically, throughout the

exercise, the radiological officer acked the Department representatives to obtain dosimeter readings from their personnel in the field.

When KI was recommended for emergency workers in the EPZ, instructions were given for the distribution of the initial dose. Sufficient quantities and types of dosimeters, TLDs, MI, and monitoring equipment are stockpiled in a room adjacent to the EOC. Arrangements for identifying evacuated farmers as emergency workers e and establishing a pass system to allow their reentry into the evacuated area for feeding livestock have been developed. When the sheltering and evacuation protective actions were lifted, residents of the area that had been evacuated were advised not to eat garden produce until samples could be tested. This precaution was communicated to the public in a news release. An orderly reentry process was discussed which included closing of the l congregate care center, transportation coordination, and traffic l control. Both shifts of the Pierce County EOC staff demonstrated a positive cooperative attitude and accomplished their tasks in a professional manner. An open dialogue between the agency representatives was maintained throughout the exercise. point Public Inforration Center (JPICl l The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was established and activated in two locations in the State Capitol Building.

One, the primary working JPIC was collocated with the State EOC, and two, the press briefing area was in the Senate Hearing Room.

The center was activated and staffed in accordance with the plan with all representatives present in the JPIC within 1 hour of alert, with the exception of a Dakota County representative. The JPIC staff included representatives from Northern States Power l (NSP), States of Minnesota and Wisconsin and from Goodhue County. Dakota County did not send a representative to the JPIC. The Press Briefing room was equipped and staffed to assist the media during l periods between briefings. The JPIC immediately began operations following activation, 16 1 i

P collecting information on the situation and scheduling briotings for the media to make them aware of the situation. Throughout the exercise, timely briefings were held and information was distributed to the media to keep the public informed as to actions taken to protect lives and property. Conditions at the plant were described in detail by NSP representatives and measures taken to protect the public were discussed and described by stato and local officials. Press briefings were videotaped to provide a permanent record of the proceedings and to be availabic for review for media who woro not at the briefings. The purpose of the JPIC is to provide a central point for the media to receive information about a Nuclear Power Plant accident or in this case, an exerciso. Although the JPIC met the required objectives for the exercise, there are a number of problems relating to the location, operations and staff training that should be addressed to improve the overall functioning of the JPIC. The Dakota County representativo did not attend the exorcise. His attendance at this exercise was the solution to an Area Requiring Corrective Action raised in a past exercise. The JPIC is physically located in EOC space and among the EOC staff. Because of this physical location, the DEM Director assumes a measure of control over JPIC activitics even though he is not a member of the JPIC. Finally, the location of the JPIC causos operational and organizational problems that would not occur if the JPIC were in a separato location from the EOC. Arrangements for the media should be improved to provide better f acilities for their coverage of future events. These improvetonts should include sufficient telephones, adequate work space for interviews and taping sessions, ao well as better lighting and a minimum number of desks and/or tablas and chairs. The present rumor control operations of both Wisconsin and Minnesota cannot begin to handle the types or number of calls that can reasonably be expected in a real emergency. One man for the Minnesota JPIC and an answering machina for Wisconsin in the JPIC would be overwhelmed by the calls that can be expected. Additional training and facilities will have to be made availablo for future events in order to provido a credible resource. 17

F 1 I i i FXERCISE REPORT Introduction 1. Exercise Background This was the sixth exercise resulting from a simulated accident at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, operated by Northern States Power Company. The first exercise was October 14, 1880. The second exercise was December 8, 1981, with full participation by the State of Minnesota, Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, Dakota 1 County and Pierce County. The State of Wisconsin chose partial participation in the second exercise because they had demonstrated full activity in an earlier exercise involving a different power plant. The third exercise was conducted October 14, 1982, with partial participation for the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin and full participation for Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, Dakota County and Pierce County. The fourth exercise was conducted March 13, 1984, with the two States again partially participating and the three local jurisdictions fully participating. The fiith exercise was conducted June 17, 1986, with partial participation for the state of Wisconsin and full participation for the State of Minnesota, Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, Dakota County and Pierce County. Exercises have been conducted during each of the four seasons. 2. Participating and Non-participating State and Loca3 Governments The 10-mile Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating 71arit i' impacts on Goodhue County / City of Red uing and Dakota County in the State of Minnesota and Pierce County in the State of Wisconsin. The June 22, 1980, exercise was a full-?articipation exercise for the States of Minnesota and Wiscons;.n and the Counties of Goodhue/ Red Wing, Dakota and Pierce. 3. List of Evaluators For this exercise, there was a total of nineteen evaluators observing offsite exercise activities. Onsite activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Of the offsite evaluators, six, including the offsite Exercise Director, were Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V staff. RAC member agencies were represented by one evaluator from the Department of Energy (DOE) two from the Environmental Protection Agency (FPA), one from the Federal Highway Administration and one from the Department of Health and Human Services (FDA). The balance of the team was composed of three contract evaluators from the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and five contract evaluators from the Center for Planning and Research 18 s

l O 4 conducted and federally evaluated on July 19, 1988. 6. Summary of the Scenario The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Radiological emergency preparedness exercise objectives and scenario for the June 22, 1988, joint exercise were developed by exercise planners from the Northern States Power Company, the State of Minnesota Division of Emergency Management and the State of Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government. TEMA Region V reviewed and approved the objectives selected by each governmental jurisdiction prior to seen.u io development. The utility scenario primarily addressed activities within the plant. A separate scenario developed by the Minnesota DEM, included as ATTACHMENT 3, and a scenario timeline developed by Wisconsin DEG, included as ATTACHMENT 4, complimented l the basic scenario to encompass offsite activities. Submission of the scenario was according to deadlines outlined in NRC and FEMA guidelines. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company Incorporated reviewed the scenario for FEMA and found it to be adequate to exercise the objectives selected by the two States and three Counties. It was recognized that exercise radiation l intensities offsite would be low a'nd that downwind evacuation i actions would have to be driven by conservative interpretations of field data or upon plant status. Synopsis of Exercise Events During the June 22, 1988, Prafrie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Exercise the following emergency classification levels (ECLs) were declared by the plant: Alert at 0901, Site Area at 0944 and General Emergency at 1106. At 1331, a 24-hour ti'me step was implemented l that gave the current status of the plant,as in a Site Area ECL with releases terminated and plant stable. ' The plant lif ted their emergency classification and entered the recovery phase at 1405. he exercise was terminated at 1530. 3 )

7. Description of State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In The Exercise During the exercise the State of Minnesota planned to activate and staff their EOC in the State Capitol Building in St. Paul; the Joint Public Information Center, which is also in the State Capitol Building, the analytical laboratory in the Department of Health Building and; prepositioned field monitoring teams in Hastings, i

l Minnesota. The reception center at the State Fair Grounds was to be simulated as open. In Dakota County, the EOC was to be activated and one traffic and access control point actually staffed. Sirens were to be simulated being sounded. l l 20 l l l \\

In Goodhue County / City of Red Wing, the joint roc was to be activated and one traffic and access control point actually staffed. Sirens within the County were to be simulated but actually sounded within the City of Red Wing. Route alerting was to be partially demonstrated. The State of Wisconsin planned to fully activate and staff their Eoc in the DEG's offices, spokespersons were to participato at the JPIC. The State radiological function was to be exercised through the Department of Health and Social Services, Section of Radiation Protection accident assessment in the State EoC, the mobile laboratory located in Ellsworth, Wisconsin and the prepositioned field teams. Pierce County was to activate and staff their Eoc for participation in the exercise. Sirens were to be simulated being sounded. 8. Findings Noted In Past Exercises There were two deficiencies identified in the area of public alerting during the June 17, 1986, exercise. One of these was for As corrective action for these defici',the other for Pierce County. Goodhue County / City of Red Wing and encies, the two States and the three EPZ Counties (including the City of Red Wing) met and established coordinated alerting procedures to preclude the disjointed public alerting which occurred during the 1986 exercise. On February 10, 1987, a joint meeting to review the procedures and to conduct a remedial table top session was held which corrected the deficiencies. The State of Minnesota received eleven (11) areas requiring corrective action during the June 17, l'986, exercise, six (6) i addressing ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry

planning, l

procedures and training. These were corrected the following year during the September 29, 1987, Monticello full scale ingestion exercise. I The Goodhue County / City of Red Wing two areas requiring corrective action indentified in the June 17,

1986, exercise involved coordination of EBS messages and representation at the JPIC. These were corrected during this exercise.

l ll The Dakota County area requiring corrective action of providing a representative to the JPIC was not demonstrated during this exercise and remains. Emergency worker decontamination was not on objective for this exercise. Demonstration of this remains as an area requiring corrective action. The State of Wisconsin two areas requiring corrective action included demonstration of rumor control and consistent protective l actions. These were successfully corrected during the June 26, 1987, Zion exercise. 21 l l l

The Pierce County previous area requiring correction of logging and disseminating the PIO messages was corrected this exercise. Although a school evacuation demonstration was not an objective there was a procedural discussion during the exercise. This corrects the past area requiring corrective action. 9. Exercise Objectives Still to be Effectively Achieved ^ Six Year Exercise Cycle The FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1: POLICY Oli 11UREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1 AND 44 CFR 350 PERIODIC REQUIREMEliTS dated October 1, 1985 established a six-year biennial exercise cycle and revised and/or clarified exercise requirements. Applying PP-1, the June 22, 1988, Prairie Island Exercise was the first exercise of the second six (6) year exercise cycle for all affected political jurisdictions. This is also the first exercise using the revised objectives as issued,in FEMA GM EX-3, dated February 26, 1988. The following Table A depicts the objectives demonstrated this exercise by the State of Minnesota, Goodhue County / City of Red Wing and Dakota County. Table B depicts the objectives demonstreted this exercise by the State of Wisconsin and Pierce County. With the exception of the previously identified remaining areas to be corrected all jurisdictions have met the first six year cycle objective requirements. The new objective 36 involves the periodic requirement of off-hours / unannounced drills or exercises. By conducting off-hours / unannounced drills in October 1988, all periodic requirements for the first six year cycle were accomplished by the jurisdictions in the Prairie Island area. This objective will need to be demonstrated again in the current six year cycle. l l l 1 i 22 l

TABLE A Prairie Island Exercise June 22, 1988 GM EX-3 Objective MN State Goodhue Co/ Dakota Co Red Wing GROUP A

1. Use ECLs D

P D

2. Mobilize & Activate D

P D

3. Direct & Control D

D D

4. Communications D

P D

5. Facilities Equipment Displays P

D P 6. Emer Worker Exposure Control D D D 7. Field Monitoring D NA NA

8. Airborne Radjoiodine Measure D

NA NA 9. Particulate Sample / Lab Analys D NA NA

10. Plume Dosage to the Public D

NA NA

11. Plume Protective Action Decia D

NA NA

12. Initial Alert: 10 mile /15 min P

D D

13. Coordinate Emer Info /Insruct ND D

D

14. Brief Media D

ND ND

15. Rumor Control P

ND ND GROUP B

16. KI - Emergency Workers D

D D

17. KI - General Public NA NA NA

13. Implement Plume EPZ PARS NA D

D

19. Implement Plume Schools PARS NA NS NA

20. Traffic / Access Control D

D D

21. Monitor /Decon of Evacuees NS NA NA

22. Adequacy - Congregate Facility NS NA NA

23. Transport Contaminated / Injured *

24. Med Facility Contamina/ Injured *

25. Decontamination /Emer Workers NS NS NS GROUP C

26. Federal Assistance D

NA NA

27. Ingestion Pthwy Sampling /Trans NS NA NA

28. Ingestion Pthwy Lab Ops /Proced NS NA NA

29. Ingestion Pthwy Dose Proj/ PARS NS NA NA

30. Implement Ingestion Pthwy PARS NS NS NS

31. Est Total Population Exposure D

NA NA

32. Determine Controlled Reentry D

NA NA l

33. Implement Controlled Reentry D

ND D

34. 24-hour Staffing / Shift Change P

P P

35. Coordinate Onsite Evacuation NA NS NA

36. Unannounced Off-hours Activat l-

• Deaonstrated during Emergency Medical Drill-July 19, 1988.

l

1. Demonstrated during drill-Oct. 19, 1988 for 1st 6-yr cycle.

l LEGEND-D: Fully Demonstrated P: Partially Demonstrated l ND: Not Successfully Demonstrated NS: Not Selected for Demonstration this Exercise NA: Not Applicable l 23 l l l

l I TABLE B Prairie Island Exercise June 22, 1988 1 GM EX-3 Objective WI State Pierce Co GROUP A

1. Use ECLs D

D

2. Mobilize & Activate D

D

3. Direct & Control D

D

4. Communications D

D 5. Facilities Equipment Displays D D i

6. Emer Worker Exposure Control D

D 7. Field Menitoring D NA

8. Airborne Radiciodine Measure D

NA 9. Particulate Sample / Lab Analys D NA 10._ Plume Dosage to the Public D NA 11.' Plume Protective Action Decis D NA

12. Initial Alert: 10 mile /15 min D

D

13. Coordinate Emer Info /Insruct D

ND

14. Brief Media D

D

15. Rumor Control ND ND GROUP B

16. KI - Emergency Workers D

D

17. KI - General Public NA NA

18. Implement Plume EPZ PARS NA D

19. Implement Plume Schools PARS NA NS

20. Traffic / Access Control D

D

21. Monitor /Decon of Evacuees NS NS

22. Adequacy of Congregate Facility NS NA

23. Transport Contaminated / Injured

24. Med Facility Contamina/ Injured

25. Decontamination /Emer Workers N S ','

NS GROUP C

26. Federal Assistance D'

NA

27. Ingestion Pthwy Sampling /Trans NS NA

28. Ingestion Pthwy Lab Ops /Proced NS NA

29. Ingestion Pthwy Dose Proj/ PARS NS NA

30. Implement Ingestion Pthwy PARS NS NS

31. Est Total Population Exposure D

NA i L

32. Determine controlled Reentry D

NA

33. Implement Controlled Reentry D

D 34, 24-hour Staffing / Shift Change D D l

35. Coordinate Onsite Evacuation NA NA l

36. Unannounced Off-hours Activat

/

• Demonstrated during Emergency Medical Drill-July 19, 1988.

1. Demonstrated during drill-Oct. 20, 1988 for 1st 6-yr cycle.

LEGEND-D: Fully Demonstrated P: Partially Demonstrated ND: Not Successfully Demonstrated NS: Not Selected for Demonstration this Exercise NA: Not Applicable 24

p r NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

1. State of Minnesota Activation and Staffing The call from the Prairie Island Nucicar Generating Plant (NGP) to activate the EOC came at 0911 when the State was informed of the ^ Alert emergency classification declared by the Prairie Island NGP at 0901. The duty of ficer verified the call from the plant. Mobilization procedures for the EOC staff were demonstrated by the Minnesota Division of Emergency Management (DEM) duty officer when she used an updated call list. The staffing of the EOC was complete at 0947 when the EOC operation chief declared the EOC operational. Pr[or to the EOC being operational the Prairie Island NGP uses commercial telephone lines to call the DEM duty officer and the County warning points. Once the EOC is operational the plant is to use the dedicated telephone line into the binnesota EOC. The commercial telephone lines were used by the plant to call in the escalations to the Site Area.and General Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs). AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recommended that the plant use.the dedicated hotline telephone during the change in an ECL notifications to the State EOC. Organizations represented in the EOC were the following: Minnesota l Division of Emergency Management; Department.of Health; State Patrol; Department of Transportation; Department of Agriculture; s Department of Public Safety-Office of Public Affairs; the Governor of Minnesota Public Information Officer;' liaison personnel from Goodhue County; the Prairie Island NGP; the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government; and the Civil Air Patrol which provided back-up radio communications between the State EOC and Goodhue County, the Red Cross, and the Department of Human Services. The first shift EOC staff, in general displayed adequate training and knowledge of their EOC function. Around-the-cim k staffing capability was demonstrated by the Emergency Medical Service personnel and the Governor's Public Information Officer. The Minnesota Division of Emergency 1 Management partially demonstrated a shift change. The remaining EOC staff did not conduct a shift change. The second shift I incoming staff were briefed individually by the person they were replacing. Upon assuming their duties these replacement EOC staff member demonstrated adequate training and knowledge. Since the utility was represented at the EOC the State of Minnesota did not send a representative to the utility's emergency operations facility. 25 a

p c AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items A.1.e. and A.4.) The ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was not completely demonstrated. RECOMMENDATION: Identify and train sufficient personnel to be able to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change of every operational position during the next full-participation exercise. Emergency Operations Management Minnesota demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and l control emergency activities. The individual identified in the State plan was effectively in charge. Periodic briefings were held to update staf f on the situation. These briefings did not describe in detail the radiological threat offsite. No dose data at various distances were included. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recommended that a more complete description of the radiological threat offsite be given during future EOC briefings. The EOC Staff were part of each briefing and were part of the decision-making process. Copies of the State plan and written procedures were available in the EOC. Messages were developed, reproduced, and distributed. A log of all messages was maintained and message handling within the EOC was efficient. Access to the EOC was controlled by State Patrol personnel assigned to the Capital. At 1100 and again at 1123 (Controllere, Message Numbers 24 and 32), Dakota County asked what had happened at the plant to cause-the change in EAL classification. No direct reply was generated. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0645 criteria items A.l.d. and A.2.a.) State EOC Staff did not provide a prompt response to two Dakota County requests for information on the plant status. RECOMMENDATION: Revise operational procedures to ensure prompt response to County requests for information. Personnel in the State EOC demonstrated their ability to monitor, understand and use ECLs. Appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities for the ECLs were accomplished. The Minnesota State EOC was notified of the following ECLs levels at the times reflected below: Alert - declared at the plant at 0901 and received by the State at 0911. The affected sectors were NPQ but no protective action recommendation was given to the State since the steam generator release did not leave the site boundaries. State radiological 26

monitoring teams were activated at 0924. Site Area Emergency - declared at the plant at 0944 and received by the State at 0955. No protective action recommendations (PARS) were initially recommended by the plant. The Governor issued a declaration of a " State of Emergency" for Dakota and Goodhue Counties at 1010. Due to a wind shift, the area effected was changed at 1040 to sectors PQR. Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Prairie Island NGP, using the three way conference call, discussed PARS from 1041 to 1051. The recommendation of sheltering in the j 2-mile radius was determined. The first sounding of the sirens by the Counties was to be at 1101 to coincide with the State's activation of the EBS. General Emergency - Declared at the plant at 1106 and received by the State at 1120. The Minnesota Department of Health developed a shelter /ovacuation PAR that was given to the EOC at 1129 and approved by the individual in the EOC playing the Governor at 1131. The State of Minnesota and Wisconsin conducted a coordination call on the second sounding of sirens at 1141. With a one day time advance the ECL at the plant was de-escalated to Site Area Emergency at 1331. The plant cancelled the General Emergency classification and entered the Recovery phase at 1405. Facilities 1 The Minnesota State EOC is a facility that has been in existence for several years. It had received FEMA funds and approval. There is sufficient furniture,

space, lighting telephone, and other amenities to support intended operations.

Back-up power was available but was not tested during the exercise. Emergency classification levels were posted in the EOC. Posting the chhnged emergency classification, at times though, was slow. The status board in the EOC, consisting of a portion of one wall, was used and updated throughout the exercise. Appropriate maps (plume EPZ With sectors posted, evacuation routes, relocation center, cccess control points, radiological monitoring points and population by evacuation area) required by NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. I were posted in the EOC and used during the exercise. The method used to depict the shelter / evacuation area on the EPZ map in the EOC was to basically use a grease pencil to darken the evacuation area. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recommended that consideration be given to developing different color plastic overlaps that could be placed on the EPZ subarca display map to better depict the shelter / evacuation areas. 27

4 Communications The EOC communications room was well equipped and separate from operations. The EOC primary communication system is land-line with one dedicated telephone to each County, and ono dedicated to the TSC and EOF. Back-up radio systems include both the high and the low bands. Communications with FEMA include telephone (commercial), FNARS, FTS and FNETS. EBS stations primary system e is through the National Weather Service Radio System (NOAA) via FAX and by land-line (commercial). The State EOC calls NOAA, announces a test exercise and either airs the message or advises NOAA that a FAX will be coming immediately over the wire. This process in turn triggers the EBS message at the point of entry station-WCCO-AM. An EBS-mobile patrol unit can act as a back-up system, but was not be activated in this exercise (EDS-RPU). Dose Assessment Emergency Operations Management A Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) staff member was identified and in charge of the dose assessment activities in the EOC. Periodic briefings, approximately once-per-hour, were provided by the MDH Coordinator to the main EOC staff. Additional briefings were held as the situation warrantedi Primary MDH Dose Assessment staff, present in the Eoc, participated in discussions on potential PARS. Multiple copies of the MHD portion of the Minnesota Emergency Plan were available for use in decision-making activities. Written procedures were employed by the Dose Assessment staff to perform offsite dose calculations. Telephone logs of all calls made by the Dose Assessment staff were maintained and referenced throughout the exercise. Messages to be distributed to the Dose Assessment staff,were incorrectly routed during the early stages of the exercise, due to the configuration of the work areas. Two contacts were made by the MDH with the U.S. Department of i Energy, Chicago Operations Office's Radiological Assistance Program l during the exercise. A request for assistance was made during the 1000 telephone call. The request for assistance was based upon the increasing potential for of fsite consequences due to the emergency i at the Prairie Island NGP. Dose Assessment Facilities u The physical space used by the MDH staff to perform dose assessment activities during an exercise or emergency is part of the general office space of the Division of Emergency Management's offices in the basement of the State Capitol. The single room is located off of the main EOC. The work area was very poorly organized. Work spaces were segmented, limiting the ability of the staff to discuss information without leaving their work areas. Telephones for direct communications with the utility were physically separated 28

from the work areas. Use of the direct ring-down telephones by the Dose Assessment staff blocked one of the exits to the room. Insufficient desk space was available for all staff assigned to the room. Non-emergency equipment, unrelated to the present use of the room, cluttered the work spaces. Noise levels in the dose assessment areas were extreme at times. Noise sources included other non-nuclear emergency equipment, the fiold team radio operator, and other EOC staf f. The radio operator noise source was eliminated, during the exercise, through the use of a head set. The non-nuclear emergency equipment noise was created by a teletype weather announcement machine and the printer for another weather monitoring computer. The noise of other EOC staff was caused by up to 15 individu&ls in the dose assessment room. The normal staffing level in the dose assessment room, during the exercise, was 7. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (HUREG-0654 criteria G.3.a. and H.2.) The physical space used by the Minnesota Department of Health Dose Assessment staff is very poorly laid out, work spaces are segmented, emergency direct-line telephones with the utility are located separately from the work areas, insufficient desk space is available for working and noise levels interfered with work activities. RECOMMENDATION: The MDH and DEM should revise the organization and operations of the dose assessment room to ensure that adequate work areas are available, free from excessive noise, both from personnel and equipment. Emergency communications should be located near those individuals responsible for use of the equipment. Some lapses were noted in the posting of emergency classifications in the dose assessment room during the exercise. The individual responsible for this activity was participating in his first exercise, was aware of this responsibility, but was not always aware of changes made in the emergency classification level, other staf f in the dose assessment room were aware of the emergency classification level throughout the exercise. Adequate numbers and types of status boards and maps were displayed in the dose assessment room. Some display boards, such as the ones used to display field data and the present status of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)', were used throughout the exercise. Maps displaying the subareas used to describe the PARS and the expected located of a radioactive plume were not used during the exercise. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The MDH Dose Assessment staff should develop a system to ensure that important information such as the areas with PARS issued, the location and extent of the 29

i e I radioactive

plume, and the present level of the emergency classification are kept current throughout an exercise or emergency.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Offsite exposure levels and potential integrated population doses, for the expected period of the emergency, were calculated by the MDH Dose Assessment staff. Calculations were made throughout the

exercise, using both computer programs and manual calculation methods.

Calculated results were compared with readings received from Minnesota, Wisconsin and utility field teams and with calculations made by the utility and Wisconsin. j i Field monitoring data, received over the radio, was displayed on a status board in the dose assessment room. Individual hot spots l or the general outline of the plume were not displayed on the maps 1 available in the room. The general outline or extent of the plume was not determined and posted by the Dose Assessment staff during the exercise. I l Prot.cctive Action Recommendations (PARS) were made by the MDH Dose Assessment staf f at each stage of the emergency. Initial PARS were based upon plant conditions and the potential for degradation in the plant's status. PARS, made at the start of the General Emergency classification, were based upon scenario releases and projected offsite doses. An excellent level of coordination was displayed by the MDH, Wisconsin and utility staffs during the formulation of uniform PARS for the general public. PARS, made by the MDH staff, were not routinely approved by the Governor, or his representative, as required by the Minnesota Emergency Plan. MDH PARS were distributed outside the State EOC,.by EOC staff, without Governor approval of the recommendations. PARS made during the de-3 escalation of the emergency were approved by the Governor or his I representative prior to their distribution. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIOll: (NUREG-0654 criteria item A.1.d. l and A. 2.a. ) PARS made by the MDH staff were not routinely approved by the Governor, or his representative, as required by the Minnesota Emergency Plan. MDH recommended PARS were distributed I outside the State EOC, by EOC staff, without Governor approval of the recommendations. l RECOMMENDATION: The State should develop a procedure to ensure j that their policy requiring the Governor's approval of PARS is l fulfilled prior to the distribution of the PARS to the EOC of l others. This information should be provided to the MDH Dose Assessment staff to ensure continued coordination of PARS with the State of Wisconsin and the utility. The need for distribution of potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers was discussed by the MDH staff at numerous times during 30 i

I the exercise. The decision to distribute KI to eme.rgency workers was made at 1155. The recommendation was immediately communicated l to the EOC staff and the MDH field staffs. This recomrendation was not coordinated with either the utility or the State of Wisconsin. i AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Although the decision to distribute KI effects only emergency workers in the State of Minnesota it should be coordinated with the other emergency L organizations involved in the response to the emergency. ~ The sensitivity of emergency workers to KI has not been evaluated by the MDH since the most recent Prairie Island exercise. This was an item recommended for improvement during that exerciso. However, during this exercise, an individual team member identified horself as being allergic to iodincs after the recommendation on KI was mado. This individual was " rotated" out of the evacuated and sheltored areas after an evaluation by the MDH Dose Assessment staff. This situation was handled quite effectively by the MDH staff. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Emergency workers who may be requested to take KI during an emergency have not been evaluated to determine their sensitivity to iodino. 'In order to enhancre performanco, the State of Minnesota should determine if any of its prosclected monitoring team members have any medical problems with taking iodine. Since KI could cause an adverse reaction, it is advisable to identify any possibly allergic individual prior to an actual event. Field Team Mobilization , ~. Mobilization of the field teams was not demonstrated. The teams were pre-positioned at the National Guard Armory in Hastings. The Team Captain received a call there at 0924 from the Department of Health in Minneapolis directing activation of the teams. The equipment the teams use is packed for rapid deployment at the MDH in Minneapolis in duffel bags and suitcases. In Hastings, the teams chocked that all of the equipment was in the kits by means of a checklist. (This is usually dono in Minneapolis.) At deployment, the teams were briefed on the current plant conditions, emergency classification, and meteorological conditions. They were directed as to their roles but were not briefed on exposure control procedures or exposure limits. In the event of a real omorgency, the teams could be assembled at any time by means of avsystem they have worked out with pagers. Six employees arc on call at one time on a week-to-wock basis. The team members on call at one time include the following: Team Coordinator, Team Captain, EOC Assistant, Radiation Assistant (2), 31

and Laboratory coordinator. These team members assemble the other members, after being contacted. l Field Team Equipment The Minnesota State Plan contains a detailed list of equipment for the monitoring teams that adequately reflects the equipment they carry. This has been updated sinco the last exerciso here. A checklist of this equipment is located in each field kit for easy use. The vehicles used for the exercise are MDH cars. These cars are not used in a real event. Instead, each field team, composed of two members in most cases, would ride with a State Highway Patrolman, in his vehicle. These vehicles are expected to be suitable for all terrain and weather conditions that would be encountered. However, during the drills, without State Highway Patrol -participation, the team members are performing the patrolman's jobs (driving and communications) as well as their own duties. This makes it logistically difficult to practice. For example, the " dirty person" must fill out the log and the " clean person" must get out of the car to perform his duties. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item I.8.) Field teams used dif ferent vehicles and radios in the exercise than they would in a real avent. Thus they perform more functions.in the exercise, and cannot practice their assigned duties fully or accurately. RECOMMENDATLON: State Highway Patrol should participate in full scale exercises with the field teams. The radiation monitoring instruments inc1'uNed in the field kits are an Eberline E-520 Geiger-Mueller counter and an Eberline RO-2A ionization chamber ratemeter. They also had a RADECO air pump, that operates off the car battery, to draw air samples. The pump was calibrated recently, and is used for particulate samples and iodine sampling (silver zeolite) and air sampling (charcoal canister). The sil'ier zeolite cartridges were sealed nicely in aluminum cans to ensure a longer life than usual. According to the calibration labels on the instruments, they had been calibrated recently. The kits also contained all the necessary equipment for soil and vegetation sampling, including scoops, different sizes of plastic bags that are pre-marked for easy use, plastic containers for milk and water, identification labels that are large and very self-explanatory, and extra paper and pencils. Additional items located in the kits included, a flashlight, tweezers, band-aids, baby powder, grass clippers, and petri dishes for the air filters. 32

7: 4 i Field Team Technical Operations Batteries had been installed in the instruments just prior to leaving Minneapolis. The battery check was performed before field deployment, but the instruments were not checked with a radioactive source in the field for proper operation. CS-137 sources are available at the Department of Health, but are too strong to carry in the kits. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item I.8 and I.10) The field teams have no available radioactive source to field check instrumentation operation. RECOMMENDATION: Radioactive check sources should be acquired that can be placed in the field team kits. Written SOPS are also available for use in setting up the instrumentation and operating it, but were not needed. The teams use the G-M counter only in all cases, unless instructed to use the ion chamber, or if the G-M goes off-scale. They monitored the air only (per instruction) in both the window-open and shielded positions. A 15-minute air sample was collected following the written SOPS. A silver zeolite canister or charcoal canister is available for use, behind a particulate filter, to collect the sample. This is adequate for detection of low concentrations of iodine. An iodine team uses a dual channel analyzer (SAM-2) to count the samples immediately. They can specifically see I-131 using this procedure. The samples would also be transported to the lab for counting. Onememberofthefieldteamwasveryfamilfarwiththeemergency area being monitored. In a real event, the teems would be travelling with State Highway Patrol who also have detailed maps available for use when needed. Both team members were familiar with these maps and the monitoring points. Although the objective relating to collection and transportation of samples was not selected to be demonstrated during this exercise, the team collected a soil sample, a vegetation sample and a water sample. The proper techniques were demonstrated in all cases, including double-bagging of the samples. The labels were filled out and placed in%between the two bags. All of the double bags were taped at the top, and placed in a larger clean

bag, for ease of storage and handling.

The samples were transported to the hot-line during this drill, and were placed in the hot area of this line to be checked for contamination. 33 s

9' Field Team Communications Radio contact was maintained with the Controller for most of the exercise. The controller usually is located in the communication van, which was not available at this time; it is being upgraded. There was a problem with his radio at the beginning, and the iodine van (with a 100-watt radio) relayed messages, as needed. The teams communicated with the team captain nest of the time and the State EOC as needed. Radio contact was maintained throughout the exercise, despite these problems. The EPZ has a number of " dead spots" in it because of the hilly terrain. A repeater would take care of this, but was not demonstrated due to the communication van 1 upgrade. The new van is suppost.d to have a repeater, like the previous one. Field Team Exposure Control The field teams carry the following protective equipment in their kits: Tyvek cuits, 2 types of booties, 3 types of gloves and Sunvivair half-mask air-purifying respirators. The field teams carry three bottles of KI in their field kits with directions on when to take it. They were aware that they were not to take it unless advised by their team captain"(State EOC). Teams nad two self-reading dosimeters (low and high range) and a charger, in their kits. The mid-range dosimeter (0-20R) is not included, but the Minnesota State Plan, Annex C, page 35 indicaten mid-range dosimeters are included in the 8 Emergency Team Kits. They also have TLDs assigned to them at the deployment area, and an exposure control log. The team members knew to read their dosimeterr. at regular time intervals, especially in a plume area. However, they were unaware of the maximum doFe they allowed without authorization, and they were not briefed 'on this point at the beginning of the exercise. If they were told they had an excess dose, they know to go to the hot line. They were aware of procedures for decontamination and would be prompted by personnel at the hot line when needed. They were aware to go to the hot-line if they suspected contamination. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items K. 3. a. and K. 3. b. ) The field team kits do not include medium range (0-20R) self-reading dosimeters. RECOMMENDATION: Since this range can be crucial for determining exposure limits, these dosimeters should be included in the field kits. Emergency workers should be provided with dosimetry which meets the evaluation guidance contained in the evaluation form for Objective 6 of FEMA Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM): direct reading dosimety's, which meet one of the follpg/ing conditions should be provided to emergency workers: (1) if two direct-reading dosimeters are provided to each emergency corker, one dosimeter should be able to measure exposures as low as a 1R and 34

up to at least SR, but no more than 20R. The second dosimeter should be able to measure exposure from SR and up to at least 100R; or, (2) if one direct-reading dosimeter is to be provided to each emergency worker, it should be able to measure exposure as low as 0.5R and up to at least 20R. State and local plans should be reviewed and any incensistancies with evaluation guidance should be corrected. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items 1 K.3.a. and K.3.b.) Field teams are unaware of maximum allowable exposure limits without authorization, and reference to this level is not included in their emergency plan carried with them. RECOMMENDATION: Provide training to field teams on exposure limits, and brief them on this level before deployment.

Also, include a reference of this level in the State plan.

Radiological Laboratory Equipment and Staffing The MDH radiochemistry laboratory is staffed by three individuals who are sufficiently educated and trained (masters level-sciences) to function as Director and two assistants. Six other laboratory staff with experience in the radiochemistry lab are available to be called up as assistants. However, there is only one individual available to function as Director. (A second individual with the background to serve as Director was recently laid-of f due to budget cutbacks.) It is unlikely that the lab could sustain around-the-clock operations. AREA REOUTRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items A.1.e. and A.4.) A back-up Radiochemistry Laboratory Director is needed. RECOMMENDATION: Identify and train a second individual to function as a back-up for the Director of the Radiochemistry Laboratory. The MDH laboratory is well equipped to analyze air particulate, air iodine, and other environmental and feed samples. Equipment is in good operating condition and calibrations are routinely performed with NBS traceable standards. The lab participates in the USEPA cross check and Safe Drinking Water Act Quality Assurance Programs. All equipment has back-up units available with the exception of the Digital Equipment computer which controls the multichannel gamma analysis. .This unit is under service contract and the Director estimates that it could be repaired in 24 hours if it failed. However, if f ailure of this unit occurred staff would have to operate the multichannel analyzers manually to sustain gamma analysis capability. According to the Director, the staff are not familiar with manual analysis of this type, and SOPS are not developed. 35

I 4 AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Manual operation of the gamma analysis system is needed as back-up. Develop SOPS and train staff in manual operation. There is a variety of accessory equipment for sample preparation and analysis available, however, the accessories needed for sample exchange, bagging and storage are incomplete and no inventory list of this equipment exists. Items which are missing include a variety of plastic bags (needed to improve the geometry of counting small and large sized samples), a spill absorbtion and decontamination kit, rope for controlling the sample storage area and radioactive material signs for posting the same area. The list of laboratory equipment in the MDH portion of the State Plan is outdated. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items I.B. and 1.11. ) At the radiochemistry laboratory, various materials are needed for an accessory kit for sample exchange, packaging and storage. The inventory lists in the State Plan must be maintained i current. RECOMMENDATION: Make a current inventory list and incorporato it into the State Plan. The materials *needed for the accessory kit should be acquired. Radiological Laboratory Technical Operations The radiochemistry laboratory Director and one assistant adequately demonstrated the intake, preparation and counting of the following samples: air particulate filter, air iodine cartridge, and milk. Soil, vegetation, water, meat and feed sample preparation were discussed. SOPS were available and were followed for sample intake (logging in,

scanning, identification,-

bagging and sample screening).

However, the sample exchange pad was positioned directly next to an operating air conditioner exhaust where contamination could easily be spread.

Sample preparation was adequately demonstrated,

however, the procedures which were followed (no routine prepsration of soil and other samples by drying-rapid counting of high activity samples) as the SOPS for routine low activity analysis.and procedures which were demonstrated are not written down.

Storage of counted samples was discussed, however there are no plans or materials available to isolate and post the area in the building where counted samples would be stored. While the overall technical operation of the laboratory and the counting equipment as demonstrated are adequate to meet the laboratory operations / procedures objective the following corrective actions are needed: l 36

4 - i AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (NUREG-0654 criteria items I.8. and I.11.) At the radiochemistry laboratory, the sample exchange pad was improperly positioned near a source of moving air. There are no written SOPS for the sample preparation and counting procedures used for radiological emergencies (as demonstrated). There are no plans or SOPS to post or isolate the counted samples l storage area. RECOMMENDATIO)D Revise SOPS and train staff to locate sample exchange points correctly. Develop SOPS for sample preparation and counting procedures. Revise SOPS, acquire equipment and train staff to store counted samples in a controlled area. The radiochemistry laboratory demonstration occurred out of sequence and samples demonstrated did not fit the scenario, but were necessary to evaluate the lab. Public Alerting and Instruction At 1051, the initial PAR was determined and involved sheltering in the 2-milo radius of the plant. The activation of public alerting was partially demonstrated by the use.of sirens (1101 and 1141) and EBS-radio and TV at 1101. A call wart made to NOAA at 0940 to make them aware of the exercise. The emergency public instructions were drafted, however an inconsistency was found in EBS no. 3 where sheltering and evacuation recommendations were advised in the same zone. Had this message been correctly given+to NOAA, it still would have been delayed by staff receiving it. They (NOAA) were unaware of the exercise and the need for simulated priority for the EBS messages. The f ax for the NOAA telephone was persistently busy at very inopportune moments. Only re-routing their NOAA general telephone number expedited some message sending. One procedural error was observed that created an 8-minute ' delay in faxing an EBS message. This was part of a signing-off or initialing by the preparer omission. The procedures for the development and approval of the EBS message were unsatisfactory and led to confusion in the development of the l message. Each message was developed by a different individual and organization. The coordination of EBS messages with county sirens was unobserved. DEFICIENCY: (NUREG-0654 criteria items E.5. and G.4.b.) l Dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public was not demonstrated by the State of Minnesota. Part of a general emergency level EBS message describod the shelter and evacuation area as the same area. No corrective information was released to EBS. RECOMMENDATION: Pevise EBS message development procedures to insure accurate and timely messages are developed and include a system to verify accuracy of content before transmission of message 37

to the public. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: The State of Minnesota partially demonstrated the ability to initially alert and inform the public within the 10-mile EPZ with the 15 minute decision deadline. Federal evaluators had difficulty determining the time of the governors approval of the Department of Health's recommendation of protective actions. The siren and EBS activations were not synchronized. The time lapse between the siren activation and message announcements was unacceptable. RECOMMENQATION: Procedures for the coordinatien, activation and EBS approval should be corrected to ensure this process is smooth and easy to implement. AREA REOUTRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Protective Action Recommendation developed by Department of Health personnel were not routinely approved by the governor as required by the State Emergency Plan. RECOMMENDATIONl Operating procedures should be reviewed to ensure that compliance with State policy is followed. Protective Action M The establishment of the traffic control points was coordinated with the State Patrol and Department of Transportation representatives in the State and County EOC.

• Adequate equipment and personnel are available to staff these locations.

The Department of Transportation stopped all rail, air and river traffic in the effected area. The reception and congregate care center was not activated for this exercise. The Human Services and Red Cross representatives notified staffs and followed procedures from the State EOC. Media Relations Space for press briefings is set aside at the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in the State Capital in an area separate from the EOC. Activities at the JPIC are controlled by the Governor's Public Information Officer (PIO) who is located in the State EOC. This person is responsible for coordinating information with EOC staff and other spokespersons prior to the briefings given to the media at the JPIC. ThisGvas done by holding a pre-briefing of various spokespersons (States, Utility, Local) assigned to the JPIC. This pre-briefing was conducted in the office of the i Director of the Minnesota Division of Emergency Management, which is located in the EOC near the Operations Room. Each department represented at the EOC also has a PIO located in the EOC. Departmental PIO news releases and bulletins were coordinated with the Governor's PIO and given out at the JPIC. A more complete description of activities at the JPIC can be found in the JPIC k 38

portion of this report. Recovery and Reentry MDH was notified of downgrade to recovery status by utility. MDH cancelled sheltering of people and livestock (1415) in all areas except low due to field team test results. Sheltering continued in sub area 10W until 1453. The Department of Agriculture (DOA) continued stored feed and well water restriction for livestock. PAGs for evacuated areas remained in effect. At 1515 evacuation 0-2 (subarea 2) and 2-5 miles in sectors NPQR (subarea SW) was cancelled. Persons returning are told not to harvest or consume locally grown vegetables (garden) until further notice. At 1531, MDH notifies local EOCs, Wisconsin and FEMA that the exercise has terminated. ( 4-4 A ** I i D 39 l l

O

2. Goodhue County / City of Red Wing Activation and Staffing The primary communications link between the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County and the Prairie Island NGP is via commercial telephone.

The initial communications link is located in the communications center of the County Sheriff's Department which is also the County Warning Point. Several high-and low-band radio systems are available as back-up. The communications links are monitored around-the-clock (24-hours), seven days a week. Upon activation of the County EOC, incoming calls from the utility and State EOC are transferred to the County EOC. The call initiating activation of the County EOC was received at 0913 from the shift communicator at the Prairie Island NGP. The call was verified by a telephone call back to the Utility. Staff mobilization procedures were initiated by personnel of the County Sherif f's Communications Center by use of an up-to-dato call-up roster.

However, the County EOC was never fully staffed as reflected in the County plan.

Key staff that were not present in the EOC consisted of representation frcm the County Health Department, County / City School Board (s), Red Cross, Salvation Army and State representation from the Minnesota Department of Health and Department of Natural Resources. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item E.2.) The Goodhue County / City of Red Wing did not demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions. The County / City EOC was never fully staffed as reflected in the plan. l RECOMMENDATION: Full staffing as reflected in the plan needs to i be demonstrated the next exercise. l l According to EOC exercise participants, the use of a call-up roster l is the system in-place to receive calls directing emergency I activation of the Goodhue County / City of Red Wing EOC. Communications personnel of the County Sheriff's Department are I responsible to contact key individuals of the EOC staff. The key I individuals then become responsible to notify and/or mobilize staf f of their respective organizations. All staff positions in the EOC did not demonstrate a shift change although a number of the positions were double staffed and/or provided rosters of personnel for subsequent shifts. Positions in the EOC that did not reflect a shift change nor double staffing were the County Agriculture / Extension agent, State Police, PIO, and the Amateur Radio Club. 40

AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items A.1. e. and A. 4. ) The Goodhue County / City of Red Wing did not fully demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by an actual shift change. RECOMMENDATION: An actual shift change needs to be demonstrated during the next exercise. A survey of the staff showed that the County Extension Agent was on vacation and had sent his secretary to represent him. After a discussion on the responsibilities of the position the secretary stated that she had received no training for the position and did not know what she was supposed to do. Another EOC representative (designated for " Messing and Living") was vague on the responsibilities of the position. The individual stated that her first shift supervisor had taken the only copy of the SOPS for the position when she departed after the shift change. It is required J that individuals participating in emergency response be properly I trained. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item 0. 4.g. ) EOC staff requires training in emergency response and their respective responsibilities. Copies of all Standard Operating Procedures must be available in the County EOC. RECOMMENDATION: Train EOC ctaff of their emergency response l responsibilities. l Emergency Operations Management The County / City Civil Defense Directors, as Chiefs of Staff, were l the first and second shift (respectively): individuals in charge of the EOC operations as designated in the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County plan. During the first shift, briefings were held to update the staff on the situation. The EOC staff were actively involved r in the briefings and participated in decision-making. However, EOC briefings, staff participation, and direction and control deteriorated during the advent of the second shift. The second shif t Chief of Staff depended on his first shif t counterpart (who had remained in the operations area after the shift change) regarding his responsibilitiestbnd what to do next. This, coupled with the on-going training of other second shift staff representatives, resulted in first shif t representatives continuing to control and supervise activities. Several first shift EOC Staff remained in the EOC after the shift f change and continued their participation. Their continued presence gave the appearance of training their respective second shift relief. i 41 s j

p 3 ( j 1 AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG 0654 criteria items A.l.d and A.2.a) The EOC second shift management staff did not fully demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. RECOMMENDATION: Provide additional training and experience for the second shift EOC management staff to develop the necessary depth of qualified management personnel for a 24-hour operation. Copies of the plan were available in the EOC for reference and most of the staff present (excluding the aforementioned second shift Messing and Living staff person) had excerpts of the plan that portained to their respective responsibilities. Message logs were kept and messages were reproduced and distributed, as necessary, by use of an effective message-handling system. Access to the EOC was controlled by use of a roster of the EOC staff, personal identification and a sign-in roster. The City of Red Wing /Goodhue County E'OC staff were notified of the Alert status at the utility at 0913, Site Area Emergency at 0958 and the General Emergency at 1123. Facilities The City of Red Wing /Goodhue County EOC is located in the lower level of the County Public Safety Building. The EOC facility has sufficient furniture,

space, lighting, telephones, back-up electrical power and other amenities to. support extended EOC operations.

Emergency classification levels were posted and a status board was clearly visible to the EOC staff. However, the staff chose to use a flip chart to record the sequence of events and other important information. Significant events on the status board were erased and the writing on the flip chart was small and difficult to read without walking up to it. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG 0654 criteria items G.3.a and H.2. ) EOC staff did not fully demranstrate the adequacy of displays to support emergency operations. The status board was not effectively utilized. RECOMMENDATION: The procedures for displaying the key events on the status board need to be improved. 42 s

oCT B5 % 11:09 FEt% CHMW e & F i The required maps were posted in the EOC. The maps depicted the plume IPZ with sectors labeled, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, i and population by evacuation areas. The EOC was noisy, due to extraneous conversations being carried on during briefings, the State Police radio and staff movement in and out of the area. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT To assist in reducing the noise level, the State Police radio should be relocated outside the operations area or be operated with a headphone, and management controls should be instituted to reduce private conversations during briefings. Communications Staffs of the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County EOC and the Red Wing Fire Department demonstrated primary and back-up means of communications by use of commercial telephone and radio to the State IOC, Dakota and Pierce Counties, State and County field staff, and the JPIC. Present in the EOC and the' Red Wing Fire i Department were amateur radio operators from the Hiawatha Valley Amateur Radio Club and the Civil Air Patrol (CAP). The CAP and Hiawatha Valley Amateur Radio Club, which are fully equipped, served as additional back-up means of communications to the City of Red Wing /Goodhue County. The EOC is - also equipped with a datafax capability to the State EOC and the'JPIC. The datafax was ' reliable and reasonably fast. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recolphndations l Dose assessment is the responsibility of th'e Minnesota Department of Health. Protective action recommendations are provided to the County, by the State, for implementation. Public Alerting and Instruction l l The EOC staff responded to initiate the activation of the. siren systems (two separate systems) for the City of Red Wing and Goodhue County upon receipt of the Site Area Emergency notification from the State EOC. The State had informed the County, via telephone, when the EBS would be activated and the time to sound the sirens in the County. At 1100, the protective action recommendation was to shelter in all sectors 0-2 miles from the plant. The Chief of Staff relayed the information to the Sheriff's Dispatcher for sounding the sirens. To insure that siren systems were activated simultaneously, the Sheriff's dispatchers coordinated the information with the Red Wing Fire Department, Dakota and Pierce Counties. The initial sounding of the sirens was at 1101. The initial siren activation was implemented in accordance with the 43 i 'e y

f emergency plan. However, after the third counding of the sirens (at 1137) the dispatcher received a radio transmission from Dakota County. The transmission from Dakota County informed the dispatcher that Dakota County would be sounding their sirens again at 1141. The dispatcher had not received notice from the County EOC for an additional sounding of the siren system for the General Emergency PARS, which had been relayed to the County by the State EOC. The Dispatcher's response to Dakota County was that he had just sounded the sirens at 1137. The information and instructions to sound the sirens were subsequently telephoned to the dispatcher and the sirens were sounded again, in Goodhue County, at 1145. Protective Action At the site Area Emergency notification, the county Sheriff and Red Wing Police Departments simulated, in thu EOC, the manning of traffic and access control points and actually dispatched patrols for route alerting in the 0-2 mile radius of the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant. Subsequent route alerting and stalfing of traffic and access control points were implemented upon receipt of protective actions after the General Emergency notification. A traffic and access control pointP vas staffed at U.S. 61 and County Route 7 and the intersection in tho ' V111 age of Welch by personnel of the Goodhue County Sherif f's Department. Federal evaluators determined that the patrolman at U.S. 61 and County Route 7 had been issued dosimetry, potassium iodide and the necessary record keeping and instruction cards. While on assignment, the patrolman received radio instructions to ingest the K1 which had been issued to him prior to his departure for the route alerting assignment. The - patrolman was aware of the evacuation routes, the location of the Reception / Decontamination Centers and the Congregate Care. He had r6dio capabilities with his counterparts at other traffic and access control points, and the County EOC. The patrolmen were polled by radio on the need to read and report their respective dosimeter readings to the Sheriff's dispatch center. Radiological Exposure Control The EOC staff of the County Sheriff's Department and Red Wing Police and Fire Departments demonstrated their capability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. The ability to implement appropriate protective actions for special needs population, handicapped and institutionalized persons was also' adequately demonstrated. Media Relations The County has a room designated for media briefings in the EOC. However, the area was not prepared for that purpose and there were no maps nor displays in the room to enhance briefings. Upon 44 l l

p .L ' inquiry by evaluators, near the end of the exercise, the Mayor and Chief' of. Staff stated they were prepared to brief media representatives, however no media came to the EOC. The County's inability-to brief the-media is a repeated weakness identified in Goodhue County from the last exercise on June 17, 1986. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG 0654 criteria items G 3.a. and G.4.a.) The EOC staff did not demonstrate ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner, RECOMMENDATION: The ability to brief the media needs to be demonstrated the next exercise. The EOC staff did not successfully demonstrate the rumor control objective. The selected objective stated that the EOC staff would coordinate rumor control with the State EOC Liaison, the EOC operations Chief and the Red Wing /Goodhue County PIO. There was no indication to the evaluators that this action was taken. The City of Red Wing /Goodhue county received one message from the State that reflected the rumor control position as it's origin. Although =the message contained information regarding an offer of assistance and~ had nothing to.do with. rumors, it could have prompted consideration of rumor control action. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG 0654 criteria item G.4.c.) The EOC staff did not demonstrate ability to establish and. operate rumor control-in a coordinated and timely fashion. RECOMMENDATION: The rumor control function needs to be demonstrated the next exercise. b Recovery and Reentry % -l '~ 1 l The EOC staff did not demonstrate the' reentry and recovery l objective, although the information was provided by the State. EOC. l The County EOC staff, without making the materials a part of any L briefing, posted the information on the flip chart in the EOC. p Upon notification that the exercise was terminated, the second L shift Chief of Staff announced the termination and dismissed the staff. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG 0654 criteria item M.1.) l The EOC staff did not demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery. RECOMMENDATION: A complete demonstration of the recovery and l reentry considerations should be conducted at the next exercise. 45

3. Dakota County Activation and Staffing Dakota County was notified of the Alert at 0913. Notification was made by the-utility to the County Warning Point located in the Dakota County Sheriff's Dispatcher's Center. This call was verified by the Sheriff's Dispatcher's call to the State EOC duty officer. The dispatcher also notified the Chief Deputy and EOC Operations Chief who began their respective call-outs to staff the EOC and activate operations. This notification and activation system has 24-hour capabilities and it is based on the use of a written call list. With the exception of the Economic Assistance staff, all designated EOC staff were in place and EOC operational at 0944. Additional staff were requested or put on stand-by following the notification of a Site Area Emergency and the procedures specified in the county plan or specific departmental guidelines. A liaison to the JPIC was not available. All participating EOC staff were knowledgeable in their duties, very familiar with their procedures and effective l in their interaction with the other participants. 1 During the exercise a shift change of the entire staff was not demonstrated. Five EOC staff did conduct a shift change. 1, AREA REOUTRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item A.4.) A complete shift change of all EOC staff was not demonstrated. I 1 RECOMMENDATION: A complete shift change for all EOC positions designated in the county plan must be demonstrated during the next exercise.

• 3' i

Emergency Operations Management t l The designated decision-maker, the County Administrator, was in i-place following the Site Area Emergency notification. He implemented procedures assigned to him in the plan and discussed the emergency situation with the EOC department heads. EOC l operations, during the Alert and escalating emergency classifications, were managed by the Operations

chief, who effectively coordinated information flow among the participants and briefed the County Administrator on the status of County emergency response activities.

EOC access was controlled. L Emergency plans were used and operational procedures referenced. l Message logs were maintained for all incoming and outgoing information from the EOC operations area. Individual telephone logs were compiled by the individual EOC department heads. Notification of the Alert, Site Area Emergency and General l Emergency classifications were received at 0913, 0958, and 1123, l respectively. The first PAR was received at 1100 recommended l-46 L l l

sheltering of people and livestock in the 2-mile radius of the plant (sub-area 2). The second PAR was received at 1133 and recommended evacuation of the 2-mile radius ~and 2 to 5 miles in sectors N, P, Q and R (sub-areas 2 and SW in MN) with sheltering to 10 miles in the same EPZ sectors. The second PAR affected portions of the Dakota Coonty population. The EOC managers responded to the PARS by a coordinated sounding of sirens and initiation of route alerting (simulated).

However, the EOC requested more information on the changing plant status that was driving the timing and development of these PARS.

By 1100, a direct response had not been received from the State; although the requested information was contained in a later EBS message transmitted to all Minnesota counties. Facilities A new Dakota County EOC operations area has been planned for in an addition being completed to the Government Center. This new facility should be available for the next exercise. During this

exercise, a

basement hallway was utilized for a temporary operations area. The temporary facility was crowded, noisy, and congested by traffic to other offices. Furniture, lighting, and telephones vere adequate for emergen'cy operations. Extended use of the cu mnt and new facility could be accommodated at the Government Center. A kitchen is in-place and space is available for sleeping areas. A large generator provides necessary back-up power in case of electrical failures although this system was not demonstrated during the exercise. All required maps and graphio 'ere available on wall boards or as rolled maps. Maps include the Plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, traffic control points, and population by evacuation areas. Communications The primary communication system inter-linking Dakota County with the Red Wing /Goodhue County EOC and the State EOC is a dedicated line. A f ax machine and commercial telephone provide back-up capabilities. The commercial telephone links the EOC and the JPIC with the fax machine and dedicated line as the back-up. Both commercial telephone and radios are available to coordinate manpower and equipment needs through the respective dispatch centers. The dedicated and commercial telephone systems operated efficiently. However, message delay did occur with hard copy where the fax system malfunctioned at other locations. The fax system inter-linking the counties and State should be periodically tested and appropriate repairs made. 47

i Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Protective actions implemented in Dakota County involved the distribution of KI. The recommendation for its use was determined by the State and issued to the Counties. The County Radiological Officer informed all'EOC department heads to order field personnel to take KI. In the case of this exercise, only fire and sheriff's personnel were involved. KI was available at their respective dispatch points. Where emergency workers were being simulated being sont into the evacuated area, worker stay times were not available from the State. EOC managers did not request the times, but they were aware that sheriff personnel would patrol the evacuated area for security. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item K.3.a.) EOC radiological staff were not aware of stay times for emergency workers carrying out activities in the evacuated area of the County, RECOMMENDATION: EOC managers should request State recommendations for stay times for emcrgqncy workers assigned to enter the evacuated area of the county. Public Alerting and Instruction The system of public alerting and instruction currently in place, calls for siren activation at the Dakota County Sheriff's Department at each new PAR in coordination with Goodhue and Pierce Counties. All the EBS broadcasts were arranged through the National Weather Service were issued by thel State EOC. The first PAR of sheltering was received at 1100 and the coordinated siren sounding was at 1101. The second PAR of evacuation and sheltering was received at 1133 and the siren l activation was at 1141. The public alerting was demonstrated in a timely manner. Route Alerting l l No actual route alerting was performed but the procedures were discussed with the evaluator. The County plan calls for a total l of five route alerting route s'.': Four of these routes were to be driven by members of the Dakota County Sheriff's Department. The remaining route was placed under the responsibility of the Hastings l Police Department. The routes themselves were clustered in sector's N, Q, and R, between the 5-mile and 10-mile EPZ boundary i lines. Each route alert driver was supplied with a booklet of route descriptions and route maps for all five planned routes, i 48 1

Protective Action Evacuation p.gr gg, was the special responsibility of the Hastings Fire Department, which by virtue of a mutual assistance pact, could call upon as many as 16 additional Fire Departments (in neighboring Townships) for aid in evacuating populations from PAG activity areas. The Incident Commander described his units' responsibilities in the evacuation of mobility-impaired and other tranr>it-dependent populations. Maps of the general population-distribution were available, as were maps of all traffic control points (in both the County EOC and Hastings Fire Department). The staffing of traffic control points appeared to be satisfactory, although there may be complications for those staff members who are ascigned to perform both Route Alerting and Traffic Control Point Duty in the event that Route Alerting would have to be repeated. The evacuation of schools was not an issue in the Dakota County, given that the only school located within the 10-mile EPZ (at Miesville) was no longer open. Traffic and Access Control All traffic control personnel are mustered from the Sheriff's Department. Both persons interviewed (on scene'at the TCP's) were l pre-positioned. Both workers interviewed were aware of the location of the Primary Reception Center for evacuated. populations (Minn. State Fairgrounds). Both emergency workers hadl working knowledge of Dakota County evacuation routes. All communications between the l L TCP's and the EOC were indirect; all informstion was channeled from l the TCP's through the Dakota County Sheriff's Department dispatcher. Both TCP's were equipped with lightweight fluorescent l cones, but heavier barricades were available. Traffic obstructions were to be dealt with by commercial towing companies, although an emergency vehicle at one TCP was equipped to move small traffic obstructions. At each TCP, emergency personnel were aware of the need to structure their positions so that emergency vehicles could gain admittance to restricted areas. Emergency vehicle access was,"? in their estimation, a standard aspect of traffic control, l' Distribution of KI was demonstrated when personnel manning the TCP's were instructed to ingest KI (1202). This was recommended l for all emergency workers at the TCP's regardless of relative l distance from the 10-mile EPZ. l 49 1 l L

Radiological Exposure Control When questioned regarding dosimetry for emergency workers, the Radiological Specialist was unable to provide specific information regarding the types of direct reading dosimeters provided to specific responders. Pre-designed kits were distributed to-emergency workers from the Dakota County Sheriff's Department and the Hastings Fire Dept. Each dispensed its own dosimetry to their respective emergency workers. Initial readings or zeroing was performed by each group, and initial records kept by lieutenants, who then would forward this information to the EOC, along with serial numbers for each device. Appropriate instructions were issued at the same time as the dosimetry. There was an adequate supply of dosimeters, including low-range (0-200mr) and high-range (0-200R) dosimeters, chargers and record l keeping cards. TLD's are available at the Dakota County Sheriff's Department and the Hastings Fire Department. The Operations Chief in the EOC explained that TLD's were not dir,pensed during the exercise due to the expense involved in using the devices, j Dosimetry is issued to all emergency workers regardless of whether they all actually enter the 10-mile'EPZ or not. The Radiological Specialist essentially relayed directions made by the Minnesota State Department of Health to emergency workers regarding dosimetry monitoring, KI administration, and authorizations to exceed maximum allowable exposures..The dosimeter checks were authorized by the Health Department, and relayed by the Radiological Specialist to emergency personnel (e.g., at the TCP's). KI ingestion was dealt with similarly. This is in keeping with Annex H, pp. 4-5 of the Dakota Co. plan. Personal dosimetry checks of the emergency orkers were requested twice during the exercise. All reading's were relayed to the Radiological Specialist on his request. Neither the TCP personnel nor the Radiological Specialist knew of any standardized, periodic dosimetry monitoring rule (e.g. once every 15 minutes) nor did any " maximum dose allowed without authorization." All direction in matters of personal dosimetry came from the State Department of Health. The Dakota Co. Sheriff's Deputies who staffed the two TCP's were similarly equipped with: 1 0-200 MR DRD; 4 0-200 R DRD's (CD 5-742); 1 Charger (CD 5-750); 2 survey meters (CD 5-700 and CD 5-715) and a " Handbook for Radiological Monitors" (FG-E-5.9, April 1963). Each of the two deputies were seen wearing the low-range (0-200 MR) dosimeter only. There was independent agreement by the deputies that the 4 high-range dosimeters (0-200R) in their respective kits were for use by other emergency workers who were to pick up the devices at the TCP's before entering the 10-mile EPZ, or af fected areas. Nevertheless, there was no system in place 50

for dispensing the dosimeters at the TCP's. -Each deputy possessed sufficient knowledge of dosimetry to zero, charge, and read their personal dosimeters. They also understand the function'of Potassium Iodide. However, neither deputy could provide information regarding steps to be taken in the event that decontamination was required (where to go, etc.). AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item-K 3.a.) The Dakota County Traf fic Control field staf f demonstrated insufficient knowledge to properly use the personal dosimetry assigned to them in the plan (0-200R and TLDs) and to carry out procedures for reporting to monitoring and decontamination facilities. RECOMMENDATION: EOC field staff should receive more training in emergency worker exposure control equipment and procedures. (See exercise report page 34 for dosimetry requirement guidance) Media Rel'ations No direct media relations were conducted at the-EOC. The procedures established call for a Dakota County Representative to be assigned to the JPIC in order to carry out media relations activities for the county. The designated JPIC liaison would report first to the EOC, and would later go to the JPIC upon its activation. This process was not demonstrated during this exercise. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item G 4.a.) Dakota County did not dispatch a selected spokesperson to the JPIC as required by their Plan, Annex *G,l paragraph iia. RECOMMENDATION: Dakota County should' select two or more individuals to represent them in the JPIC. The people should be trained and should be available to participate in exercises. 1 The rumor control function also was not demonstrated this exercise. The County Plan requires inquiries concerning rumors be referred to the County Spokesperson in the JPIC. During this exercise, there was no discussion by the EOC staff of referring such inquiries. l AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item l G.4.c.) The EOC staff did not demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control. l RECOMMENDATION: The rumor control function needs to be l. L demonstrated the next exercise. l 51 e

x. S. Recovery and Reentry The County EOC received the cancelling of - the sheltering PAR at 1435. Approximately 190 persons remained evacuated from sector SW included in Dakota' County. Procedures for the pass system to gain admittance to restricted areas through the Traffic Control Points,- to tend cattle', etc., were. discussed. At 1515, the evacuation PAR was cancelled. 4. State of-Wisconsin l Activation and Staffing l The Wisconsin State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has a direct-communication link to the utility; using the National Warning i System (NAWAS). It is positioned in the communications room of the State EOC in Madison. Other locations on the system are: Pierce l County, the Utility and the State Patrol Districts. The NAWAS drop L is continuously monitored at the State by State staff during;the working hours and work week. Outside that time the system is I . monitored by the State Patrol at their control console. Division ~ of Emergency Government (DEG) has a" duty officer who is contacted l 'by the State Futrol to notify them of any message traffic. The call initiating the activation of the EOC vas received from the utility technical support center (TSC) at 0910. The call Yas verified and staf f mobilization procedures initiated. Current call 3-L lists were used to notify emergency operations staff to report to L the State EOC. There appeared to be no problem with the numbers used on the list. Staffing to the EOC was completed' with the arrival of-the.Public Services Commission

• representative at 1034.

l Present in the State EOC were represent:atives from Wisconsin ' Department of Transportation / Wisconsin State Patrol ~ Emergency L Police, Wisconsin Department of Transportation / Highway, Wisconsin Military. Affairs, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Wisconsin Health and Social

Services, Red

Cross, Wisconsin Public Services Commission, Minnesota Division of Emergency Services and staff of the Wisconsin DEG (Officer In' Charge, Public Information Officer (s), Operations l

Officer, Communications personnel and others in supporting capacities).

The first and second shifts performed their responsibilities in responding' to a radiological emergency as specified in their procedures. Around-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by a shift change with the ' f ollowing exceptions: (1) the Public Information Officers presented a roster of personnel and (2) there was no replacement for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation nor were they able to present a roster of personnel. 52

4 4-4 l.. AREA REOUIPXNG CORRECTI'VE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria items E.1. and E.2.) The Wisconsin Department of Transportation did not provide a relief 'for the representative nor were they able to present a roster of personnel. The replacement for the first shif t person was unable'to attend. s RECOMMENDATION: It is necessary that a - demonstration of this capability be presented at the next full-participation exercise in the State of Wisconsin. t The State elected not to send a representative to the utility i Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). l Emergency Operations Management l The Officer. in Charge, who was so designated in the plan, effectively controlled the exercise and conducted several briefings. He was relieved at shift change by his back-up designee. I-At the beginning of the exercise, a considerable amount of his time was devoted to dictating entries on the status board. Copies of. the plan were'available and used by the staff. However, some confusion was experienced in time and dates recorded on messages. Dates on some messages received af ter;the 24-hour date advance were dated June 22 instead of June 23. The State EOC received the Alert classification on NAWAS at 0910. y The notification was immediately confirmed. The site Area i Emergency copied over NAWAS from the Prairie Island Plant arrived -at 0944,.was not confirmed by the communications operator,'but by I the Operations Officer more than ten minutes later. The Pierce County EOC notified the State EOC of General l Emergency. No action was taken until a commercial telephone message'was received at 1121.- NAWAS lines to the EOC were not used to communicate the General Emergency classification. Protective Actions were ordered L at 1125 to shelter to 10 miles all sectors and evacuate 2 miles all sectors and evacuate 5 miles, sectors N, P, Q & R. Contact was made by the Wisconsin DEG to FEMA Region V requesting. that FEMA be the single point of contact for Federal assistance. Later in the exercise, a request for additional support was made to provide a source of hay for animals due to the drought [ condition. 4 Facilities The State EOC located in the basement of the office Building in Madison is fully equipped and spacious. Each staff group has a designated area identifiable by large name plaques suspended from the ceiling. Carpeted floors and other acoustics improvements have minimized noise. Emergency

cots, blankets, and cafeteria facilities exist within the EOC.

Emergency generator with fourteen 53 a 4

4 days stored fuel serve.to provide auxiliary power. Each Thursday, the emergency back-up system is tested, but was not demonstrated during the exercise. The emergency classification level was' suspended from the ceiling by wires near the Operations officer desk. In order to change the classification card it necessitated an individual to retrieve a ladder to remove and replace the card. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recommended that the classification level cards be placed on the wall in the vicinity of the large status board which is a central point of eye contact. The status boards are in a good location and clearly visible by those in the EOC. The boards were not kept up-to-date in a timely fashion, nor did they contain accurate, complete key information necessary on keep the EOC staff aware of current emergency activities. Message posting lagged several minutes. Many times message distribution was completed before the message was posted on the boards. Some message content, which,could be considered important to the emergency response, never reached the board. .The problem is compounded by the message handling procedure. Because the General Emergency notification came into the EOC via the radiation assessment group over commercial telephone, the " Message" form was j not expeditiously prepared and distributed. AREA REOUIRING COERECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item H.3.) Status boards were not kept up-to-date with prompt postings of message identification and content. Some EOC staff members did not ensure information communicated to them wasl, in turn, introduced into the message handling system. RECOMMENDATION: All messages coming into the State EOC should be recorded-on the status board promptly. The posting should display the month, day, time and message number with a brief description of the message content. Maps were positioned around the room and mounted on the walls. The following maps were present in the operations room: plume Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points;Gradiological monitoring points and population by evacuation areas. Communications Communication in the State EOC were handled by a designated Communications staff. The systems used consisted of the following: to local EOC's - primary telephone, back-up State Patrol

Radio, (TIME) Transportation of Information for Management Enforcement; 54 s

v +v,--

m ) to contiguous States , Primary FNATS, backup State Patrol Radio, primary, NAWAS, secondary, secondary telephone; to licensee commercial telephone; to EOF - primary NAWAS, secondary commercial telephone; to FEMA - primary FNATS, secondary commercial telephone; to Media - primary FAX, secondary telephone. .conferencing was demonstrated by a three-way conferencing system between the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota and the utility. A hard copying device was available to and from the media center which was-reliable but not fully utilized for transmitting messages. Dose Assessment Emergency Operations Management The dose assessment staff worked for the State Radiological Coordinator (SRC) in support position in supplying information as it came in by telephone and fax. The staff kept maps and boards up-to-date. The professional staff were a part of all recommendations. Dose Assessment Facilities The dose assessment room was a largalroom, and was equipped with tables, chairs, map stands, wall maps, chalk board and status boards. Telephones were plugged in as needed. The dose assessment computer worked and the fax machine worked to receive. Copy was sent thru communications room as staff did not want fax tied up in l sending copy. l Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Dose assessment was done efficiently and -l quickly. Once dose projection was completed, the entire professional staff entered the discussion and a recommendation for protective action was made, communicated to executives for egreement and then coordinated with the Minnesota Radiological Coordinator. Af ter coordination and agreement with Minnesota to institute the protective action, it was communicated to the field. Briefings were given to the EOC and executives when changes in the situation occurred. L Field Team Mobilization L The mobilization of the field team was not to be demonstrated on l a real-time basis. M Field Team Equipment l' The State radiological emergency response teams had the necessary portable instrumentation available to measure gamma and beta radiation and to collect environmental samples. The teams had lists of equipments, which included a Reuter-Stokes pressurized ionization chamber, Model RSS-111 for gamma radiation detection. 55 l l

e The equipment was calibrated' in September, 1987. They had equipment for soil and vegetation sampling, as well as for taking milk and water samples. Field Team Technical Operations [ The field team members were experienced personnel who demonstrated proper sample collection procedures and health physics techniques to minimize their own exposure. They made operational checks.of ~, their instruments using written SOP's as a guide to insure accuracy. They collected air samples and demonstrated their. procedure for measuring radioiodine in the air. The team members were familiar with the area, but used a map to facilitate finding - the monitoring points. They also collected soil and vegetation samples. The samples were collected within a 10-15 minute time-frame and were transported to the mobile lab in another 10-15 minutes, depending upon the sample location point. Field Team Communications Excellent radio communication was maintained with the field teams throughout the exercise. Radio contact was maintained from Ellsworth to Prescott and Red Wing. Field Team Exposure Control s. Field team members were knowledgeable regarding personnel radiation safety techniques, exposure guidelines and the rationale for taking KI. ' Team members read their direct reading dosimetry at every ! sample collection point and reported this to the mobile laboratory. Individual dosimetry included both a low-rangeqand a medium-range dosimeter, as well as a TLD. They were aw)re'of procedures for decontamination. I Radiological Laboratory Equipment and Staffing The mobile laboratory contains gamma spectroscopy and TLD systems necessary to perform field measurements of the radionuclides of interest during a nuclear power plant accident. Calibration standards are available and records are maintained on the system operations. Experienced personnel are available to perform the necessary measurements and have academic backgrounds in radiochemistry and nuclear engineering. Log books are maintained for routine maintenance, energy control (linerity and window), efficiency controls and energy calibration. These checks are made prior to system start up and on a daily basis through extended operation. Radiological Laboratory Technical Operations The mobile laboratory staff and radiological emergency response field teams maintain and refer to, as necessary, SOPS for 56

m. collecting and analyzing environmental samples. Effective communications were maintained between the mobile laboratory and field teams. They demonstrated, correctly, procedures for . preparation and measutament of air, soil and vegetation samples. The field samples were properly logged in, handled and evaluated.. Public Alerting and Instruction The State EOC plays a limited role in the public alerting process. They coordinated the timely activation of the notification system with Minnesota and forwarded the information to Pierce County, who, in' turn, has the responsibility to activate the system. Beyond this activity the State had no further participation other than updates of information and limited direction. Messages for release over the EBS were prescripted and in the County for use. Protective Action The State Patrol simulated the positioning of traffic control points which were coordinated with the radiation assessment group. Traffic volumes were not discussed in that the demonstration was table-top. (simulated.) Provisions are made, in the Plan, for the removal of stalled vehicles and special vehicles to clear the roadway in the event of inclement weather. ' Road blocks, re-routed air, water and rail traffic were measures taken by Pierce County Sheriff. There are traffic-handling resources available from the State Patrol to assist local jurisdictions with traffic control. ' i' Reception Centers were ordered activated iri a timely manner by the County with the assistance of the State Health and Social Services personnel. Special evacuation problems were handled by Pierce County. Media Relations The State EOC does not handle the media at their location. There were two PIOS positioned in the operations room of the EOC. An additional-Wisconsin PIO was positioned in the JPIC in St. Paul and another PIO was positioned in the Pierce County EOC in Ellsworth, Wisconsin. Information coordination for media purposes took place by the PIO at all locations via FAX. Reentry and Recovery Briefings were given by the SRC in the operations room of the EOC. Based on these briefings the classification levels of the exercise de-escalated. Commensurate with the de-escalation, contact was 57 s

p 4 l 1 r i made by the representatives in the EOC coordinating with their I counterparts to begin removing restrictions, providing for eventual j reentry. 5.-Pierce County j t - Activation and Staffing l This activity was well conducted. The Sheriff's Dispatcher l received the notification Alert at 0910. She was assisted by another officer in making the calls to alert the EOC_ staff and other personnel and organization are called for in the plan. Both had copies of the lists directly from the plan and shared the work. No incorrect numbers were observed. The EOC staff calling was - completed in about 20 minutes. The EOC was fully staffed (first shift) in 30 minutes and the initial briefing took place five j minutes later. j Emergency Operations Management Emergency Operations at this EOC were effectively conducted. The { Operations Chief was in charge, fully

• Board Membersupported by the County Board.

l Chairman (first shift) and a County (second Shift). l In addition, a Wisconsin State person, who was pre-positioned due l to exercise time constraint at the EOC, but who would normally-arrive within a couple hours, also provided valuable assistance. I Periodic round table briefings were conducted where each principal staff member would review the status of his/her responsibility or function. Thus,.all participants were 3nvolved in the decision-making and carrying out of appropriate emergency response j activities. Participants all had written propedures and all seemed to be fully competent and eager to do what,is necessary. i. Message handling was good. A message controller desk was i established and a complete log was maintained. Security of the EOC was strictly enforced. 1 Although no field activities took place (all were simulated), the participants in the EOC made appropriate calls and simulated reception of reports, etc., in a manner that made it appear that field activities were actually occurring. Facilities G The Pierce County EOC is adequate for a County of this size. The primary operations room is large enough for the staff assigned, well lit, comfortable (air conditioned), and essential amenities nearby in the building. Displays and status boards were placed and generally located where they could be easily seen by the staff. The status boards were 58 1' l' s

(. 4r i I.- kept up-to-date with significant conditions and events, that could be referred to. Noise was generally kept under control. Communications Communication capabilities for the Pierce County EOC appeared ample. The Sheriff's Dispatch office served as the communication center, and' messengers delivered to the EOC message control desk (little deley occurred). Telephone (commercial), fax equipment (in P10 room adjacent to EOC) were primary means utilized in the exercise. No communication difficulties were observed on terms of equipment or procedures. Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation Dose assessment is a responsibility of the State of Wisconsin. Protective action recommendations (PARS) were developed by the i State and communicated to the County EOC. PARS were provided twice during the exercise. The initial PAR of two mile sheltering was given during the Site Area Emergency at 1100. After the accident scenario escalated to General Emergency (as of 1106 and received the PARS were revised 1133 to include 2-mile evacuation 2 to 5 miles *at at-1121), in sectors N,P,Q and R, with l evacuation, sheltering in the rest of the EPZ. Livestock in the EPZ were I sheltered and put on stored feed and covered water. PARS were I reviewed, announced to the EOC staf f, posted and actions were taken as necessary by EOC representatives. + Public Alerting and Instruction The Pierce County EOC has the primary role in alerting the public and issuing emergency instructions when ther# are PARS determined, i The first PAR of two mile sheltering of persons and livestock was - received in the County EOC from the Wisconsin State EOC at 1100. The siren activation was coordinated with Goodhue and Dakota Counties and was initiated at 1101. The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message was composed by the PIO using prescripted messages - and issued at 1108. The EBS message included a accurate geo-political description of the area to be sheltered and a definition ] of sheltering. The second PAR was received in the County EOC at 1133. The sirens were activated at 1141 and the E,BS message was beginning to be read by the PIO to the radio station at 1145. Although the public alerting and instruction for the second PAR was done in a timely manner, the areas to be evacuated and sheltered were not accurately described. The EBS message stated "THE EVACUATION ORDER ALSO APPLIES TO PERSONS LIVING ANYWHERE IN OAKGROVE TOWNSHIP INCLUDING THE CITY OF PRESCOTT AND DIAMOND BLUFF TOWNSHIP WEST OF COUNTY TRUNK HIGHWAY E." This statement ordered evacuation in an area to be sheltered and included the City of Prescott which is outside the 10 mile EPZ. Also, the PIO had mistakenly used an obsolete set of 59 J .~

descriptions which did not use the newly developed scheme of sub-areas. The area to be sheltered was just described as 10-miles from the plant and.not by geopolitical boundaries. Once_the error was recognized, a follow-up message was issued to correct this description. DEFICIENCY: (NUREG-0654 criteria item E. 7. ) In the second EBS

message, the areas to be evacuated and sheltered were not accurately described.

Although the PAR called for a 5-mile evacuation, the-message described an area beyond the 10-mile EPZ. The sheltered area was not described in geopolitical boundaries. The sub-area system in the plan was not used. RECOMMENDATION: Revise procedures for developing the EBS messages to clarify and simplify process including a method to verify accuracy. 'The sub-area system should be utilized with the PAR conversion to sub-areas being given to the PIO. Consideration should be given for this conversion to be made at the State EOC and to be communicated with the PAR decision. Training on the revised procedures should be given to the EOC management and PIO. Protective Action The EOC staff demonstrated the implementation of the protective actions recommendation of sheltering and evacuation by effectively simulating their responses. The County Highway' Department and the Sheriff's office coordinated the location and maintenance of the traffic access control points. A thorough procedural discussion of assisting the evacuation of the mobility impaired was given by the social service representatives. Activation and staf fing of the Plum City congregate care f acility was simulated. The social and health ser representatives in supporting co, vices service, American Red Cross ngregate care. Even each discussed _their roles though school is not in session, the arrangements for notifying and coordinating evacuation of schools was reviewed with the evaluator. Radiological Exposure Control An excellent demonstration of emergency worker exposure control was given by the county radiological officer. When the site Area Emergency classification was received, he distributed dosimeters and TLDs to all emergency workers in the EPZ together with written instructions and registration cards. Periodically throughout the

exercise, the radiological officer asked the department representatives for dosimeter readings.

When KI was recommended, instructions were given on the initial distribution. Sufficient quantities and types of dosimeters,

TLDs, KI, and monitoring equipment are stockpiled in a

room adjacent to the EOC. Arrangements for identifying evacuated f armers as emergency workers and establishing a pass system to allow their reentry into the evacuated area for feeding livestock were developed. 60

4 1 Media Relations The objective was met through the demonstration. Pierce County operates a briefing room for local media in addition to the JPIC. The County Board Room. was designated for conducting press briefings. This room is not ideally suited for such activity and will. likely be too small in a real event. No displays were l-available, and the only briefing aid was a roll of maps of the EPZ carried in by the briefer. Because the intended purpose of this briefing room is to serve local media representatives, there was i no other space designated for supporting the media, such as working space, telephone, etc. Three briefings were conducted during the exercise. No media L representatives were present, although the observer acted as a member of the press by asking questions. The briefings, whi'le mostly -accurate and generally covering most major activities, p seemed sketchy, and the briefer could have been more fully armed l with essential information. For example, while reporting on the number of evacuees registered at the Plum City center up to that time, he was not aware of the maximum number of evacuees involved l (located in the areas directed to be evacuated). The rumor control function was not demonstrated during the exercise. A l AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria. iteni i G.4.c.) The EOC staff did not demonstrate ability to establish l' and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. RECOMMENDATION: The rumor control fu$ction needs to be demonstrated the next exercise. t Recovery and Reentry l When the sheltering and. evacuation protective actions were cancelled, residents of the area that had been evacuated were advised not to eat garden produce until samples could be tested. This precaution was communicated to the public in a news release. An orderly reentry process was discussed which included closing the congregate care center, transportation coordination, and -traffic control. 6. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) The Joint Public Information Center is located in the Minnesota State Capital Building in an area separate from the State EOC. This JPIC serves the State of Minnesota; Dakota and Goodhue Counties in Minnesota; the City of Red Wing, Minnesota; the State of Wisconsin and; Pierce County, Wisconsin. With the exception of the State of Minnesota, each of these governmental sub-divisions l 61 c v .w-m m-m. .4 m

.1 s' operates a media briefing room to serve as an immediate point for media to'get information until the JPIC is functional. At that point in time, the JPIC serves as the single focal point for mass j media, although Pierce County continues to operate their briefing - room for their local media' representatives. Each State and local-EOC retains responsibility to provide staff representation to the 1

JPIC, to input information related to current status and to coordinate-with.the JPIC on any internally generated information to be released.

The related activities occurring in the various EOC's have been discussed in previous sections identified as " Media Relations" under the appropriate and respective governmental ~ entity. The following paragraphs address those functions organic to the JPIC itself. Our comments are arranged by individual governmental entity to present the broad overview, yet focus for j the individual organization's interest. STATE OF MINNESOTA Activatkonand-Staffing The activation and staffing proceeded according to - the plan. J Because this was a day-time exercise, many of the participantsL were at or on their way to the EOC. The system used to send the staff to the emergency situation worked well, and the JPIC-was fully-staffed, except Dakota, within one hour of notification. Dakota County did not have a spokesperson representative at the JPIC. This is cited as an Area Requiring Corrective Action within our comments concerning Dakota County. j Facilities M The State Emergency Operations Center and th( JPIC were essentially one offico. Even though parts of the JPIC' were. set aside (Wisconsin Staff and Rumor Control), the arrangements made both the EOC and JPIC seem as one. Additionally, arrangements for the media, with the exception of the briefing room itself, were poor.. The briefing room is a : legislative hearing room borrowed as a briefing room for the exercise period only. No other space'is available for media work areas or for telephones etc. Also, the room is not always available so pre-arranging telephones, interview space, and other work areas is not possible. As mentioned above the EOC and the JPIC are co-located in the EOC. This leads to confusion as to leadership and role of the exercise participant. For example, it is not clear who is in charge of the JPIC, the Director DEM, the MN PIO, or someone else. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACT_IOH: (NUREG-0654 criteria items A.1.d. and G.3.a.) There was not a clear operational separation between the emergency response function of the MN State EOC and the public information function of the JPIC which interfered with the function of the JPIC. There was not a clear demonstration of 62

A.- l a' specific individual who was in charge of the JPIC function for E the State of Minnesota. RECOMMENDATION: The solution to this problem would be to physically separate the two different functions. This would allow the organizations to function without interference from each other. If space outside the EOC cannot be found, it is suggested that an area of the EOC (4 or 5 rooms) be designated JPIC and staffed by the appropriate elements and operate as an independent organization. The State of Minnesota staf fing organization for the - 'JPIC should designate a specific individual by ' title to be in charge of the Minnesota portion of the operation. l As mentioned in the discussion above, work space for the media of L outside the briefing room is non-existent. At best, the media has L to conduct interviews in the Capital Halls, must use scarce public phones and has no area for typewriters and other media necessities. This lack of work area does not endanger lives or property, but it L does make it very difficult for the media to perform their function. 1 AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item G.3.a.) There was no designated work space for the media or for ( conducting interviews, l' L RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Division of Emergency Management attempt to acquire additional space near the EOC. This space should be equipped to meet minimum standards for media work l . space and include such items as good lighting and sufficient phone 7 outlets that can be activated in an emergency and arrangements made p for other required equipment. g t 4 l Communications c l Communications from the JPIC to those who had to be contacted were i generally good. Because of the association with the EOC, ECLS and I other information was available to JPIC staff as it came into the l EOC. Informational Functions The purpose of the JPIC is to assemble, coordinate, and distribute to the media, information needed by the public to take necessary l actions to protect life and property. There were problems associated-with the JPIC and its physical and organization arrangements. There was question as to who was in charge of the JPIC. Physical layout of the area made coordinated efforts very difficult. Lack of coordination and consultation between States and among the groups represented caused some friction and l frustration. The fact that the Minnesota PIO representative to the i JPIC was physically located in the operations room away from the rest of the JPIC staff added to the organizational confusion. This 63 l

W. g C contributed to some of the problems. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item A.1.b. and G.4.b.)~ The current concept for the JPIC does not provide for a commonly acceptable method of joint operation by the States of t Minnesota and Wisconsin and Northern States Power Company to provide a coordinated presentation of'public information. RECOMMENDATION: The concept of the JPIC should be revised to provide a method for joint operation which insures coordination. An initial lack of-coordination between MN and WI-JPIC staff 1 personnel resulted in a host-guest atmosphere wherein.the WI-JPIC staff was not notified of the first media briefing, did not receive any copies of press releases or other message play through the MN-EOC-JPIC distribution system for almost two hours at the start the exercise, and the WI-PIO had no opportunity to coordinate releases of 'information. This was not a real joint public information center operation. Rather, it was a full scale MN-PIO and reduced size WI-PIO operating under one roof with the activities of both l largely directed and scheduled by the MN-DEM Director. Public Instruction a Public instructions are developed and transmitted to the public by the EOC using the Emergency Broadcast System. In addition to EOC message flow, the JPIC receives copies-of the EBS transmissions, includes the information in briefings, makes sure that hard copy 'is available for the media and answers any and all questions L related thereto. Therefore, in addition to the emergency methods j .used to disseminate information to the public, the public media is used as a channel for those who may have missed the emergency J

systems, a1 l

Rumor Control Minnesota rumor control at the EOC and the JPIC consisted of one DEM staff member assigned to answer questions from the County EOC's in Goodhue and Dakota Counties. Calls were few in number (eight), however, two of the incidents which came in as rumors, prompted response in the play of the exercise. Both fire and explosion were l asked about which later resulted in messages denying that such events had taken place. Even though a few rumors were handled, it was apparent that there would be a large number of rumor calls during an actual emergency. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: To handle the anticipated rumor load and to begin building a capability, it is recommended that the Minnesota DEM initiate a cooperative effort with the State of Wisconsin, the Counties and the utility to assign and instruct a reasonable number of staff in the technique of rumor handling. l 64 l l

I STATE OF WISCONSIN Activation-and Staffing The - PIO's and other staff members representing the State of j Wisconsin in the JPIC were from various State Departments according I to the plan. The Wisconsin JPIC staff members were aware of mobilization procedures to'be used in the event of an actual emergency and i represented full staffing for the JPIC. The staff consisted of three PIO's, a radiological safety officer and a staff support assistant. The staff displayed adequate training and knowledge. A roster indicated a 24-hour staffing capability could be accomplished in an actual emergency. Facilities' 1 The facilities are provided by the State of Minnesota. Communications The JPIC is located within the MN-OC and received information relating to emergency classification levels over the public address system as they occurred. The extensive use of the open-dedicated telephone line between WI- 'JPIC-staf f and WI-EOC resulted in very little hard copy being produced. Often, only the person actually.using the telephone was aware of what was discussed, decisions made and actions being taken. Except for three summaries produced during'the work day, there is no record of JPIC-EOC activity available. Much information came in (hard copy) from the MN-EOC during the day, but little WI-EOC or WI-JPIC informat' ion was available or distributed. This is not conducive to joint operations. Communications were adequate using an open dedicated telephone line from the JPIC to the State EOC. Facsimile was also available and used mainly to receive hard copy from Pierce County. Commercial telephone was also used between the JPIC and Pierce County as a primary capability and as a secondary capability for communicating with the State EOC. Conferencing was available on lines to the State EOC. M Informational Functions The WI-JPIC staff had media kits available that included background information on the utility, nuclear power plants, the local area and radiation. Although five media briefings were held in the JPIC, the WI-JPIC staff participated in only three. The briefings were complete, accurate, avoided technica] jargon, and used maps 65 s

and other displays effectively. Hard copy news releases were provided.by_the MN-JPIC staff and the utility but not the WI-JPIC staff. AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recommended that the WI-JPIC staff provide hard copy of news-releases for the JPIC media and EOC's. Publ'ic Instruction No emergency. instructions were drafted at the media center, according to the Wisconsin Plan this is a county function. The media center did play a role in distributing instructions to the public through recurring media briefings. The WI-JPIC staff did receive and review all information releases to the public by Pierce County and were'kept apprised of upcoming releases by the county. Rumor Control No rumor control number for Wisconsin was activated during the exercise. In response to an area requiring corrective action relating to rumor control in the previous exercise, Wisconsin proposed to handle rumors during exercises through. press briefings conducted at the JPIC. Also, the State PIO would maintain at the JPIC, telephone message device which local residents could call for j official information. These activities were not done. AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item G.4.c.) During the exercise no rumor control was mentioned, no number was published or announced for the ariswering machine system. RECOMMENDATION: The rumor control function needs to be demonstrated during the next exercise, d 66 s

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF ' EXERCISE ' FINDINGS - SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 d. STATE OF MINNESOTA

1. Deficiencies

_NUREG 0654 Proposed Estimated Criteria Summary Statement Corrective Action Date E.5. Dissemination of accurate information Operating Procedures will-April 28, 1989 G.4.b. and instructions to the public was not-be reviewed. Any necessary changes will be made to demonstrated by'the State of Minnesota.. ensure timely and accurate Part of a general emergency level EBS message described the shelter and EDS messages. Sufficient evacuation area as the same area. No staff will be trained to corrective information was released to perform this task. Pro-EBS. cedure will be demonstrated in a remedial table top exercise. O. 9 e; 1 68 5 m. m.a -s u A 4

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS ^ SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT-JUNE 22,-1988 s STATE OF MINNESOTA

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action NUREG 0654 Proposed Estimated Criteria

Summary Statement Corrective Action Date A.I.e.

The ability to maintain staffing on a ' 24-hour staffing will be 1992 Prairie A.4. continuous 24-hour basis by an actual demonstrated at a future Island Exercise shift change was not completely demon-exercise strated. A.I.d. State EOC Staff did not provide a prompt Operation procedures will 1989 Monticello A.2.a. response to two Dakota County requests be reviewed to ensure Exercise for technical information on plant status prompt response ~to county and the' protective action recommendation. requests. E.6 The State of Minnesota partially demon-Procedure will be demon-1989 Monticello strated the ability to initially alert strated at next full exercise the public within the 10 mile EPZ and scale exercise disseminate. instructions within the 15 minute decision / deadline by appropriate State officia1(s). However,Jederal evaluators in the EOC had difficulty determining when the individual playing the governor approved M.D.H.'s protective action for EBS. The siren and EDS activation were not synchronized. EDS messages were announced "several minutes" after sirens were activated. i l A.I.d. The PARS (Protective ction Recommenda-Operating procedures will 1989 l A.2.a. tions) made by MDH (Minpesota Department.of .be reviewed to ensure

Monticello l

Health), Staff were not routinely approved by : compliance with state exercise policy. Procedure will I the governory be demonstrated at next full: scale exercise. l l ._. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _,.

.a. 1

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 STATE OF MINNESOTA

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Proposed Estimated NUREG 0654 Criteria Summary Statement Corrective Action Date

.or his representative, as required by-the 3 Minnesota Emergency Plan.. MDH recommended PAR's were distributed outside the State EOC, by EOC staff, without Governor approval of the recommendations. F. Field teams use different vehicles'and The State Plan will be 1989 radios in the exercise then they would revised to reflect changes Annual in field team transportation Plan in a real event. Thus they perform more and communications. Update functions in the exercise, and cannot practice their assigned duties fully or accurately. K.3.a. The field teams have no avaliable radio-Appropriate check sources 1989 Monticello k.3.b. active source'to field check intrumentation will be purchased and kept Exercise in.the field team kits. operation. K.3.a. The field team kits do not include medium The field team kits contain. Already K.3.b. range (0-20) self-reading dosimeters. both low range (0-200mR) and met medium range (0-20R) dosimeters. K.3.a. Field teams are unaware of allowable K.3.b. exposure limits without authorization, and Exposure limits will be re-1989 reference to this level is not included emphasized during future train-Annual Plan in their emergency plan carried with them. ing and will be highlighted in SOPS. Update A.1.c. A backup radiochemistry laboratory director The laboratory will evaluate 1992 its staff and make the appropriate Prairie A.4. is needed. 3 ~

f. J changes in its SCPs. Objectives Island will be demonstrated'at a future Exercise 70 exercise when a shift change is-demonstrated.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS ~ SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 27, 1988 STI MINNESOTA

2. Areas nec

, Corrective Action NUREG 0654 Proposed Estimated Criteria Summary Statement Corrective Action Date G.3.a. The physical space used by the MDl! Dose This ARCA should be an ARFI H.2. Assessment staff is very poorly laid out, since there are no NUREG-0654 work spaces are segmented, emergency requirements regarding the 1989 direct lines telephones with the utility physical set up of the Accident Monticello are located sparately from the work areas, Assessment Room. Efforts will be Exercise insufficient desk space is available for made, however, to improve the working and noise levels interfered with work space to increase staff work activities. efficiency. I.8. At the radiochemistry laboratory, an Equipment to set up an area near Annual I.11. inventory list and various materials the laboratory to receive and Update Plan are needed for an accessory kit for store environmental samples will sample exchange,' packaging'and storage. be procured. An inventory' list of these supplies will be maintained in_the SOPS. I.8. The list of laboratory equipment in the I.11. MDH portion of the State Plan lis outdated The list of laboratory equip-1989 and a more current list is available at ment will be updated and put into Annual the State Plan. Plan Update the laboratory. I.8. At the radiochemistry luboratory, the sample Procedures to handle incoming 1989 I.11. exchange pad was improperly positioned near samples will be written and Annual a source of moving air. There are no written placed in the SOPS. Equipment Plan SOPS to post or rope off-the counted samples will also be procured to Update. storage area and there are no signs or rope adequately define and post the in stock. designated storage area. 71 I . s z .-e m . - + -..

2. i 1:

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND - NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT ~ JUNE 22, 1988 STATE OF MINNESOTA '~ ~

2. Areas Requiring _ Corrective Action _

Proposed Estimated NUREG 0654 Corrective Action Date Criteria Summary Statement There was not a clear operational separation 'JPIC Staff will continue 1989 Monticello J. ..d. between the emergency response function of to be located in the E0C exercise .the MN State EOC and the public information complex. Procedures are function of the JPIC which interferred with being revised to clearly the function of the JPIC. There was not a address direction and demonstration of a specific individual who control of the JPIC. was in charge of-the JPIC function for the State of Minnesota. s There was no designated work space for the According to Minnesota's '1989 G.3.a. media or for conducting interviews. Emergency Response Plan, Monticello Rooms B12 and 859 are exercise. designated workspace for media. Interviews will be conducted in the briefing room and i erounding ~ hall space. A.I.b. The current concept of operation for the JPIC procedures are.being 1990 JPIC does not provide for a commonly agreed developed by a task force Prairie to method of joint direction and contol consisting of representatives Island C.4.b. by the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin from Minnesota, Wisconsin and Exercise Northern States-Power Company to' provide NSP. The new procedures will be a coordinated presentatiqn of public demonstrated at the next Prairie Island exercise. information. The rumor control capab'ilities demonstrated The State of Minnesota feels that a process for coordinated rumor control was successfully G.4.c. would not be sufficient during an demonstrated during the Prairie Island exercise and emergency. that this should be reduced to an ARFI. Arrangements-are being made for emergency phone installations 72 and increased. staff power in the event of an actual emergency. ~-

_o s. SUMMART LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 1 STATE OF MINNESOTA

3. Areas Recommended for Improvement

1. It is recommended that the plant use the dedicated telephone during the change in ECL notifications to the State EOC.

2. It is recommended that a better description of the radiological threat offsite be given during furture EOC briefings.. 3. All displays in the dose assessment room should be kept current throughout an exercise or emergency. Maps displaying the subarcas used to describe the PARS and the expected location of a radio active plome were not used during the exercisc. 4. Although the decision to distrhbute KI effect only emergency workers in the State of Minnesota it should be coordinated with the other emergency organizations ivolved in the responsc'to the emergency. ..V 5. Emergency workers, who may be requested to take KI during an emergency, have not been evaluated to determine their sensitivity to iodine. In order to enhance per formance, the State of Minnesota should determine of any of its presclected monitoring team mernbers have any medical problems with taking iodine. 6. Manual operation of the gamma analysis system is needed as back-up. Develop SOPS and train staff in manual operation. 7. The field teams should be briefed on tho' role of the Departnrent of Agriculture in collecting food and milk sampic, and should be aware of their SOP's for this. This is important if they are out in the field working together. 8. To enhance performance in exercises and possibly in a real emergency, a " clear" radio frequency should be available for use. 9. Recommend better description of the offsite threat be given during EOC briefings. 73 wm __m

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 STATE OF MINNESOTA

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement 100 It is recommended that consideration be given to developing different color plastic overlays that could be placed on the EPZ subarca display map in th EOC to depict the shelter / evacuation areas.

ol. It is recommended that a review be made to shorten the time of these f re-briefings and/or whether or not the current system of using prebriefings -should be cc.stinued. 12. The MDH Doise Assessment staff should develop a system to ensure that important information such as the area with PARS issued, the location and extent of the radioactive plume, and the present level of the emelgency classification are kept currenct throughout an exercise,or emergency. 13. It is recommended that arrangements be made for televising the press $ briefings into the JPIC work space and possibly into the EOC itself. e 4 I e O 74 4 = -,u m -m r = m m..-...m -~. m.m -,____mw

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEhR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 GOOD 11UE COUNTY / CITY OF RED wit 3G

1. Deficiencies MUREG 0654 Proposed Estimated Criteria Summary Statement Corrective Action Date There were no deficiencies identified for Goodhue County / City of Red Wing.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT SITE: JUNE 22,.1988 COODHUE COUNTY / CITY OF RED WING

2. Arcas ncquiring corrective Action Proposed Estimated NUREG OG54 Corrective Action Date Criteria __

Summary Statement Goodhuc County / City of Red Wing did h'ersonnel identified in They are not listed in not demonstrate the ability to fully the critique were liason the Annexes or given .2. alert, mobilize and activate personnel personnel and were not responsibilitics in the for both facility and ficid-based assigned duties in the EOC. Basic Plan. We have emergency functions. The Count / City Therefore, it was not never staffed them in the necessary to staff their past, nor been EOC was never fully staffed as positions in the EOC. criticized. reflected in the plan. Goodhue County / City of. Red Wing did not A complete shift change 1990 Prairie fully demonstrate the ability to main-was demonstrated with Island Excrcise A.I.e. a.4. tain staffing on a continuous 24-hour the exception of one basis by an actual shift change. position. EOC Staff of the County Agriculture / Additional training will 1990 Prairic Island Extension and Messing and Livin<f requires be focused in this area. Excrcise O.4.g. training in emergency response and their respective responsibilitics. We feel that second shift 1990 Prairic Island The EOC Management staff' did not fully staff appeared unable to Exercise A.I.d. demonstrate the ability to direct, direct and control the A.2.a. coordinate and control escrgency activities activities due to a slow scenario. during the second shift. We will focus the attention on an active second shift scenario in the next full scale exercise. We feel that the status board 1990 Prairic Island y Co3.a. EOC Staff did not -fully demonstrate the maintained sufficient informa-Excrcise H.2. the adequacy of facilitics, equipment, tion for departments to do their displays and other materials to support jobs; however, we will review current emergency operations. The status board procedures and demonstrate this was not effectively utilized. objective at the next full scale 76 everrie.e. .. ~,. _...

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT SITE: JUNE 22, 1988 GOODHUE COUNTY / CITY OF RED WING

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Estimated

. Proposed Date NUREG 0654 Corrective Action Summary Statement Criteria _ We feel that we gave out 1990 Prairie EOC Staff did not demonstrate ability to timely, accurate, and Island Exercise G.3.a. brief the media in an accurate, coordinated information G.4.a. coordinated and timely manner. altho *39h we should have Used more displays, EOC Staff did not demonstrate ability to C.4.c. establish and operate rumor" control in a There was interaction be-1990 Prairie coordinated and timely fashion. tween State and County /EOCs Island Exercise on the rumors. All rumors were checked out, and~we feel the rumors were handled adequately. The previous two objectives were demonstrated; however, they may not have been + bbserved by the federal evaluator. 77 J

?

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE ~22, 1988 GOODHUE COUNTY / CITY OF RED WING

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement To assist in reducing the noise

' level, the State Patrol radio should be relocated Eoutside the operations area or be operated with a headphone, and management controls should be instituted to reduce private conversations during briefings. a o O eg 78

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF-EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR-GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 DAKOTA COUNTY

1. Deficiencies Proposed Estimated NUREG 0654 Criteria Summary Statement Corrective Action Date There were no deficiencies in Dakota County.

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c + SUMMhRY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22, 1988 DAKOTA COUNTY

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Proposed Estimated UUREG 0654 Corrective Action' Date Criteria Summary Statement Objective will be demon-1990 A.4.

A complete shift change of all EOC st'aff strated at next full Prairie Island was not demonstrated. scale exercise. exercise K.3.a. EOC radiological staff were not aware of procedures will be reviewed, 1990 Prairie stay times for emergency workers carrying training will be conducted Island exercise out activities in the evacuated area of and objective will be demon-County. strated at next full scale exercise. 4 K.3.a. The Dakota County Traffic Control, field Procedures will be reviewed, 1990 Prairie staff demonstrated insufficient know- . training will be conducted and Island exercise ledge to properly use,the personal dosimetry and objectives will be demon-assigned to them in the plan (0-200R and TLDs) strated at next full and to carry out procedures for reporting to scale exercise. monitoring and decontamination facilities. G.3.a. Dakota County did not have representation Objective will be demonstrated 1990 Prairic Island i at the JPIC. 'at next full scale exercise. exercise i The EOC staff did not' demonstrate ability to Objective will be demonstrated 1990 Prairie G.4.c. establish and operate rumor control in a at next full scale exercise. Island exercise coordinated and timely fashion. O 80 < < ~, r

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS. - SITE: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT JUNE 22,'1988 DAKOTA COUNTY

3. Arcas Recommended For Improvement-There were no areas recommended for improvement.

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I,ISTING' GF. EXEECISE FINDINGS; ' E , ^ ~ ^ SITE. PEAIRIE : ISLAND NUCLEAR.':ENERATING PI ANT ' '; - - w s.>3.E , 1g29 a. e. ~. ~. ~ STATE or wisconsin 4 - . l.- D e 1 2.c r e n c a n s. NUREO 0654 Propose'd-Cr'.teria Surnary Statement. Correct.ive 7ction~ ' Estineated: 'i Date . u ~

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-,t!f S',ffd.M, : c : m .w s t'4 W'SII-tMARY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGG ~ <- /?'.' ESITE-PRAIRIE. ISLAND NUCI. EAR GENERATING PLANT . I- ~m -:@.x..? w. E g#@;:-? ;e-n;ty, JUNE 22, ..s,.- M. L< h -X C.c.. 1988 ? .,W. e.% g&., r w?7 STATE OF WISCOMSIN 4" . p' . s.:. t. x # *y ~ r - s- --..,-;;.:M'; 2.' Areas Eccuiring Corrective Action C y $_"$ ',-raw:" pcic....- W;.. f $.c.'. 9. 3 M'-l ;m' 9k < h.-" Estimatcd.'. ' ' a..,. p; m: REG 0654 Proposed ^-..,g ~".... -. Criteria .. ? rSummary State:nent:.. Corrective Action, Cate c.- r

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E.1. The Wisconsin? Department;of Transportation The A partment of 10/IS/89 t. E.2. ' did not provide'a relief for. the Trsnsportation will show g , representative.nor were they'abic to a shif t change during the ,. C present a. roster'ofl personnel. Thc-Prairic IsInnd exercire. replacement'.for;.the first shift was unable I ~ to attend..'9.,,,;.r . M ~ H.3. Message posting lagged several minutes. Trainingvillbehebdto 5/3/89 . Many times nessage distribution was poi"t out the importance of completed before the message was posted following established :sessage on the boards.'- Sonc nessage content fondling procedures, <.nd sIso never reachedithe board {which could to stress the pronyt posting be considered :inportant' to' the t,f all mportant messages. cmergency response.i. The problem is I compounded by the message handling 4 procedure.: Because the General Emergency notification came info,t,hc g EOC via the'radiationiassessment group over cor:srercial._ telephone, { a ~

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=, 's :' *), .'e :- O...** I I=. ^ t' t.' a :*.. .SID?tARY LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS -' fQ - eos ."J-SITE:-; PRAIRIE ISI,AND NUCLF2R GENERATIDG PLANT . WW.-, -. jf5. *.' ;,e:c M.- JUNE 22, 1982 ,* -; if; y,7.,g. ' 1;; *~. . f7 ~ STATE OF WISCON313 ,',; ; (e..;.I..".2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action

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4 q n.:Ep W.v 4 ,k. 'T. %y ' Ni; ' ~ ' ' m. Froposed. Estimat*zd,' 3 UUREG 0654 h r Criteria c." Summary' Statement. Correctihe Action Dat<' N. 4 '*.4 JJ ; Viyt.cnsin, Miru.esota and !!SP held S/S? -:g A.I.b. The current concept o, operat2cn for the ,.. t meet s.n's or. IIr.I1/So. and ,/15-10,,90 csn .,1 JPIC does not provide for a c or:r:on agreec. 1.u a,....,89 to.r.rk on resolving these to j.oint direct 2on and coritrol by the r ou. cms. There va.rI t-one acre - States of Minnesota and Wisconsin ano .' c:-t reatin' to verk on the revised 'l, Northern States Power Company to prcr2de prrcoduras before they are recieved for a coordinated presentation of pub 12c final opproval. The revised Ji'.t,, ri o< edures i 2 n forma tion. sill be inserted in the August. I'JS? plan update and demonstrated in tha 1990 Prairie Island G.4.c. During the exercise no rux.or control exercise. was trentioned, no number was published or announced for the answering machine Emerr centrol vill be derons: rated 5/15-16/90 sys.cm.- at the next Prairie Island exercise. 1.. ~ + c '~,. c s .tt. ... w .e ,.J. ;;. ;....

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e s.;e. :v.. y .g. :.. * .gv,..: g :v t.; - 3- '.i> : '.34 . l. SUK4AR'I LISTING O' EXEFCISE PINDINGS SITE: PRAIRIE ISI,AND JiUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT . _, j. - JUNE 22,-1988 .c... F STATE OF WISCO'2 SIN Areas - Ecco:r.r.icaded For Tmprovr rent a. ~ 1. It is recommended that the classificatien level ccrds. be placed on the wall in the vicin.ity of the.largeastatus, board which is a centrol point of cyc.c.qntact. 2. It is recommenddd-that entries recorded on the. status board be limited-solely to display the month and day time and nessage nuriber with-a brief titic of the ucssage conter.t and that it be written. in bold wide r.crl:crs by a person designated full tirac to that task. 3 -+ .~

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF EkERCISE FIEDINGS a....,. ..s. n.- e KM*,;; SITE:}fPRAIRIEISLANDNUCLEARGENERATINGPLANT

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ilUNE 22,.1983 .rM p 4. PIERCE COUNTY

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Y - ~ C rit.cria Proposed Estimated . Summary Statement i Corrective Action Date c. Q E. 7. In the second IBS message the creas to be evacuated and sheltered were not 2 e procedon-s f or develeping /./4/89 ^ accurately described. Although the .^ the EBS reassages will be revised P1.R called for a 5 mile evacuatice. 'acJ cisri fied. A training sessica ~ the message: described an arco beyond to ren ev the new proce<tures, and , the 10 mile EPZ. The sheltered area a tabletop exercise vill be held en Acril 4, 1989. was not described in geo-political bounda ries..'.The sub orca system I in the plan.was not'.used. ~ ...y...,, i.s.'.'.',. .'- -..y c.. o n. af. 1.~ 4. . y,:. +, - 1 : 4 , t- .cl. D . ~. ' - ~ .ri w r c. r e u

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2. Arcas Reg'. siring Corrective Action

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Summary Statement Corrective Action Date

'{ w G.3.a. The Pierce County media center did not T'e Pierce County Mia n have sufficient support. staff, displays center win r,ot be used in and rnedia work spcce to ful3y der:onstrate it,ture exercises -the function. G.4.c. The EOC staff did not demonstrate ability. Rueer control vill be 5/15-16/90 to establish and operate rumor control in demonstra cd during tr,e next a coordinated and tiinely fashion. Psairie 3sland exercise. g 4 4 O g 5 : a', O A, ~ e O e t** T*

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t v-PRAIRIE ISLAND WISCONSIN REMEDIAL EXERCISE j April 12, 1989 i A remedial Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise for Pierce County Wisconsin was conducted on April 12, 1989. The exercise was conducted to correct a deficiency issued during the June 22, 1909 exercise. In the second EBS message the areas to be evacuated and sheltered were not accurately described. The message described an area beyond the 10-n11e EPZ for evacuation i and the sheltered area was not described in geopolitical boundaries. The activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification Systems for Pierce County Wisconsin, Goodhue County and Dakota County i Minnesota are synchronized by the Wisconsin and Minnesota State EOCs. At that time the Protectivo Action Recommendation (PAR) is passed -to the County and they are provided with the exact time to begin public alerting. The Pierce County Emergency Planning Zono (EPZ) is divided into sub-areas for the implementation of PARS. These subareas are described by familiar landmarks, highways and political or geographic boundaries. The County plan has pro-scripted messages for each sub-aroa and combinatien of sub-areas for each protective action or combination of protective actions. Training was conducted by State staff during the morning prior to the exorcise. County pocple were instructed in the operation of the local EDS system and in the procedures for translating area covered by protective action recommendations received from the State into pro-identified geographically-described sub-areas which the public can understand and then transmitting the appropriate messages to the EDS system for broadcast. The County Public Information officers (Pios) have this responsibility during an exercise or actual event. In attendance, from Pierce County for the tral'ning and remedial exercise were the County Sheriff, the County Civil Defense Director, four Public Information officers and several other members of the County EOC. staff. For the purpose of this drill four PARS were received from the State. After the County Executive Group had reviewed the PAR the message was given to the PIO. The PIO consulted the plan and selected the appropriate pro-scripted Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message for the PAR. When the ESS message had been approved by the executivo Group the PIO called NOAA Weather service by commercial telephone (simulated). The Pl.O identified himself as being from Pierco County and that he hac an EBS mossage relating to an incident at the Prairio

7 o i 'O. i Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The PIO informed NOAA that the i i message should be rebroadcast every 15 minutes and asked NOAA to standby to prepare a broadcast tape. When the alert signal vas activated the PIO again identified himself and read the message. At the close of the message the PIO again identified himself, announced that the message be repeated in 15 minutes. The PIO also said that the alert signal would-again be activated if there was a change in the PARS. In addition to-the description of the area impacted by the PAR the message included satisfactory information and instructions to advise people in the affected areas. These instruction included sheltering procedures, evacuation procedures and agriculture advisories. The first protectivo action message was received from the State at 1147, routed to the executive group and the PIO. The PIO was ready to read the approved EBS message to the NOAA station at 1151. The PIO had completed the reading of the message to the Weather Bureau by 1155. Copies of the message were distributed to-the EOC staff and transmitted to the State EOC and the JPIC. s The second PAR was received at 1159, processed and ready for relay to the Weather Service at 1205. The taping of the message was completed by 1208 and again copies were distributed in the EOC. - The fourth message was received 1229 and processing was completed at 1236 when the broadcast tape was completed and copies distributed. The activities demonstrated during this remedial exercise correct the deficiency regarding accuracy of infor'mation and instructions to the public in EBS messages. i Y l M

e o ~~ PRAIRIE ISLAND MINNESOTA REMEDIAL EXERCISE i 1 April 28, 1989 A remedial Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise for the State of Minnesota was conducted on April 28, 1989. The exercise was conducted to correct a deficiency issued during the June 22, 1988 exercise. The deficiency was issued because the State of Minnesota EOC staff releasedan4 Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message containing erroneous information that could j have adversely affected the health and safety of the public in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant. Specifically, part of a GENERAL EMERGENCY level EBS message described the area to be sheltered and the evacuation area as the same area. No corrective information was released to the EBS during the

exercise, i

The State of Minnesota portion of the Prairie Island Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is divided into sub-areas for the implementation of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS). The sub-areas are described by familiar landmarks, highways and political or geographic boundaries.,, The State Plan has pre-scripted messages for each sub-area and combination of sub-areas for each protective action or combination of protective actions. 1 \\ As corrective action to prevent recurrence, training was conducted by the REP staff for those State staff members involved with the development and delivery of EBS messages. The training t included review of the deficiency identified during the 1988 i exercise, procedures for the development and delivery of EBS messages, a review of the EPZ maps, procedures for translating areas covered by PARS into pre-identified geographically-described sub-areas which the public can understand, transmitting the appropriate messages to EBS for broadcast and sending copies i of the EBS nessage to the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and the-Counties. The training addressed the need for prompt i attention and rapid dissemination of the information, while emphasizing the paramount importance of accuracy. Following a question and answer period, a table-top exercise was. conducted. In attendance for the training and the remedial exercise were the L DEM Director, the DEM Operations Chief, Communications Controller, the EBS message writer, PIO Coordinator, a Plotter, the Minnesota PIO and the Department of Health PIO. For the purpose of the remedial exercise four exercise messages containing escalating PARS were received in the State EOC. A fifth message was used to terminate the exercise. Following the procedures in the State Plan, the PAR messages were referred to the Department of Health for analysis, verification l of the areas that would be impacted by the PAR and coordination _,..}}