ML19332D296

Responds to Generic Ltr 89-07, Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs. Short-term Plan to Protect Against Attempted Radiological Sabotage Included in Plant Safeguards Contingency Planning

ML19332D296
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	11/27/1989
From:	Nandy F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-89-07, GL-89-7, NUDOCS 8911300300
Download: ML19332D296 (3)

Text

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'F.R,NANDY TELEPHONE.

. bef. NAGER OF NUCLE'AR 1.lCENSING ~

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Attention:' Document Control-Desk

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. Gentlemen:'

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Subject:

. Docket'Nos. 50-206, 50-361 and 50-362 1

Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface J

Vehicle Bombs -. Generic: Letter 89-07.

1

. San Onofre. Nuclear Generating Station 4

. Units 1, 2 and 3-y 1%

References:

- l1.. NUREG/CR-5246, "A Methodology to Assist in Contingency Planning for Protection.of Nuclear Power Plants Against Land Vehicle Bombs," April'1989

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l2. ' October 27,.'1989 letter:from H. E. Morgan (SCE) to Document Control Desk (NRC);

Subject:

Docket 50-206,

'50-361 and 50-362; San Onofre Nucle'ar Generating Station Units 1,!2 and 3; 10 CFR-50.54(p) Changes; Safeguards

'6 Contingency Plan, Revision 7 LThis11etter provides;the response. from Southern California Edison (SCE) to NRC

Generic' Letter.89-07: " Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency P1anning for

. Surface Vehicle Bombs" for San.0nofre Units-1; 2 and 3.

As requested by this b

' Generic Letter 89-07, SCE hereby confirms that short-term actions that could j

be taken'to prote'ct against attempted radiological sabotage invo'Iving a land

vehicle bomb

if such a threat were to materialize have been included in San l!

Onofre safeguards contingency planning.

The methodology used for examining the potential vulnerability of San Onofre E

L and developing the defensive contingency planning strategy followed the X

Jrecommendations of Reference 1 which was provided with the Safeguards

'Information: Addendum to Generic Letter 89-07. This methodology included the following:

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.5007 8911300300 891127 0

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ADOCK 05000206 PDC 1

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7, November 27, 1989

_ Document Control Desk,

1.-

The system options used.in this evaluation as available to establish and maintain safe shutdown _were the options identified and evaluated by.the NRC in the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) evaluation report of November 1985.

Each system option includes a set of front-line and support systems and is capable of. establishing and -

maintaining a safe shutdown condition in accordance with Reference-1, Section 2.

- 2..

The_ buildings containing components and equipment associated with each system option were identified by walkdown of the protected and vital areas.

3.

Site features were reviewed to evaluate land vehicle access approach paths and possible defensive perimeters.

Based on this review, a defensive perimeter was selected to establish standoff distances for

. evaluation of system option vulnerability. This defensive perimeter generally approximates the site owner controlled area (0CA) boundary west of Interstate Highway 5 (1-5).

4.

' Survivability envelopes" for system options were determined by performing a computerized analysis. This analysis confirmed that

.o stopping surface vehicle bombs at the defensive perimeter, given the-location of critical system components and the blast resistance of the specific structures which house them, is adequate to ensure safe standoff distances so that at least one system option will survive to ensure safe shutdown.

5.

Short-range measures which can be implemented within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after notification by the NRC to protect against unauthorized vehicle access closer than safe standoff distances were identified.

6.

A short-range contingency plan was prepared and advance arrangements have been made to facilitate the short-range contingency measures in the event a land vehicle bomb threat arises.

It is understood that the NRC.will notify SCE in the event that the threat level changes in a manner which warrants implementation of these contingency measures.

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~ 3-November 27, 1989 Document Control. Desk Specific short term actions developed from 'these evaluations have been included in the San Onofre Safeguards Contingency Plan and were provided to the NRC by Reference 2.

In addition, appropriate San Onofre Unit 1 Abnormal Operating Instructions will be revised by December 22, 1989 to require that the following action be completed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after notification by the NRC to protect against unauthorized land vehicle access closer than safe standoff distances:

Confirm or establish full operation of systems which are redundant to safe shutdown systems vulnerable to a land vehicle bomb.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please let me know.

Respectfully submitted, By:

F. R. Nandy f

Manager of Nuclear (Licensing Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7/Ah day of'Xiud~ia !%'O.

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Notary Public in the State

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of California

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cc:

J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V E. W. McPeek, Security Specialist, NRC Headquarters Washington, D.C.

C. W. Caldwell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector (Acting),

San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 I