ML19332C731
| ML19332C731 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1989 |
| From: | Jocelyn Craig Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332C732 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8911280482 | |
| Download: ML19332C731 (11) | |
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UNITED $TATEs I
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COMMONWEALTHEDISONCOMAg AND 10WA-ILLIN015 GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY D0_CKET NO. 50-254 QUADCIT)ESNUCLEARPOWERSTATIONJgTJ AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.121 License No. OPR 29 1.
The I:uclear Fegulatory Cormission (the Cors,ission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Conrenwealth Edison Company (the licensee)datedAugust3,1989,complieswiththestandardsand requirementsoftheAtor.icEnergyactof1954,asamended(theAct)and the Coonission's rules and regulatiens set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i
D.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the act, and the rules and regulations of the Cornission; C.
Thereisreasonableassurance(1)thattheactivitiesauthorizedby this an.endment can be conducted without endangering the health and sefety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Cornission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the conson defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and l
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Concission's regulation and all applicable requirements have been l
satisfied.
L 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical l
Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 is hereby I
amended to read as.follows:
89it2{hokk P
PDR l
P L
2 B.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A ano B, as revised through Amendment No.121
, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amenoment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
U%
Lohn W. Craig, Director Project Directurate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - 111, IV, Y and Special Projects
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: November 15, 1989
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ATTACWENT TO LICEkSE AP.Et$l4ElT NO.121 L
FACILITY OFERATIt'G LICENSE NO. DPR-29 DOCKET NO. 50-254 Revise the Apptodix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by ttt captioned amendrent number and contain margir41 lities indicatitig the area of char.ge.
REMOVE INSERT 3.2/4.2-8 3.2/4.2-8 3.2/4.2-15 3.2/4.2-15 a
f 6
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QUAD-CITIES DPR-29 setting of 140% of rated steam flow, in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steamline valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel temperatures remain less than 1500*F, and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 200 guidelines (reference SAR Sections 14.2.3.9 and 14.2.3.10).
Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steamline tunnel to detect leaks in this area.
Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded cause closure of Group 1 isolation valves.
Its setting of 200'F is low enough to detect leaks of the order cf 5 to 10 gpm; thus it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks.
For large breaks, it is a backup to high-steam flow instrumentation discussed above, and for small breaks with the resulting small release of radioactivity, gives isolation before the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 are exceeded.
High radiation monitors in the main steamline tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure.
This instrumentation causes closure of Group 1 valves, the only valves required to close for this accident.
With the established setting of 15 times normal background (without hydrogen addi-tion) and main steamline isolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident (referente SAR Section 14.2.1.7).
Pressure instrumentation is provided which trips when main steamline pressure drops below 825 psig.
A trip of this instrumentation results in closure of Group 1 isolation valves.
In the Refuel and Startup/ Hot Standby modes this trip function is bypassed.
This function is provided primarily to provide protection against a pressure regulator malfunction which would cause the control and/or bypass valve to open. With the trip set at 625 psig, inventory loss is limited 50 that fuel is not uncovered and peak cladding temperatures are much less than 1500'F; thus, there are no fission products available for release other than those in the reactor water (reference SAR Section 11.2.3).
The RCIC and the HPCI high flow and temperature instrumentation are provided to detect a break in their respective piping.
Tripping of this instrumentation results in actuation of the RCIC or of HPCI isolation valves.
Tripping logic for this function is the same as that for the main steamline isolation valves, thus all sensors are required to be operable or in a tripped condition to meet single-failure criteria.
The trip settings of 170'F and 300% of design flow and valve closure time are such that core l
uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.
3.2/4.2-8 Amendment No. 121
1.,
QUAD-CITIES DPR-29 TABLE 3.2-1 INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS.
Minimum Number of Operable or Tripped Instrument Channels [1]
Instruments Trip Level Setting Action [2]
4 Reactor low water [5]
>144 inches above top of A
active fuel
- 4 Reactor low low water
>84 inches above top of A
active fuel" 4
High drywell pressure [5]
1 5 psig [3]
A 2
16 High flow main steamline(5) 5140% of rated steam flow B 16 High temperature main 1200'F B
steamline tunnel 4
High radiation main
<15 x normal rated power B
steamline tunne1[6]
Eackground (without hydrogen addition) 4 Low main steam pressure [4]
>825 psig B
2 High flow RCIC steamline
<300% of rated steam C
Tiow[7]
4 RCIC turbine area high 1170*F C
temperature 2
High flow HPCI steamline
<300% of rated steam D
T10w[7]
4 HPCI area high temperature 1170'F D
Notes
[1] Whenever primary containment integrity is required, there shall be two operable or tripped' systems for each function, except for low pressure main steamline which only need be available in the Run position.
3.2/4.2-15 Amendment No. 121
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o, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 0
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L COMMONUEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND 10WA-ILLIN0l$ GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 00CKET N0_.,50,-26,5
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SU..AD,,CI,TI,E_S NUCLE,A,R, POWE,R, $_TATION. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FAtlLITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No, 117 License No. DPR 30 3.
The Nuclear Reguletory Cors,ission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Comonwealth Edison Company (the i
licensee)datedAugust3,1989,complieswiththestandardsand requirements of the Atomic Energy act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulaticns set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; t
C.
Thereisreasonableassurance(i)thattheactivitiesauthorizedby this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliar.ce with the Connission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will nct be inimical to the corr.on defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulation and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
E.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-30 is hereby an. ended to read as,follows:
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B.
Technical Specifications The Technicc1 Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as re'lised through Amendpent No.117. are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendnent is effective as of April 15, 1990.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ohn W. Craig, Director Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - 111, IV, V and Special Projects
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
flovember 15, 1989
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDkENT NO. 117 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPk-30 DOCKET N0.-50-265 Revise the Apperdix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages
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identified below ano inserting the attached pages. The revised p6ges are i
identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of charge.
REMOVE INSERT 3.2/4.2-6 3.2/4.2-6 3.2/4.2-6a 3.2/4.2-11 3.2/4.2-11 b
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QUAD-CITIES OPR-30 l
Venturi tubes are provided in the main steamlines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel i
during a steamlire break accident.
In addition to monitoring steam flow, instrumentation is proviced which causes a trip of Group 1 isolation i
valves.
The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steamline, thus only Group 1 valves _are Closed. For the worst-Cast l
accident, main steamline break outside the drywell, this trip setting of 1407. of rated steam flow, in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steamline valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel temperatures remain less than 1500'F, and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10 CFR 100 guidelines O eference SAR Sections 14.2.3.9 and 14.2.3.10).
Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steamline tunnel to detect leaks in this area.
Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeced cause closure of Group 1 isolation valves.
Its setting of 200'F is lo'w enough to detect leaks of the order of 5 to 10 gpm; thus it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks.
For large breaks, it is a backup to high-steam flow instrumentation discussed above, anc for small breaks with the resulting small release of radioactivity, gives isolation before the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 are exceeded.
h High radiation monitors in the main steamline tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure.
This instrumentation causes closure of Group 1 valves, the only valves required to close for this accident. With the established setting of 15 times normal background (without hydrogen addition) and main steamline isolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident (reference SAR Section 14.2.1.7).
Pressure instrumentation.15 provided which trips when main steamline pressure drops below 825 0519 A trip of this instrumentation results in closure of Group 1 isolation valves.
In the Refuel and Startup/ Hot Standby modes this trip function is bypassed. This function is provided primarily
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to provice protection against a pressure regulator malfunction which would cause the control-and/or bypass valve to open.
With the trip set at 825 psig, inventory loss is limited so that fuel is not uncovered and peak cladding temperatures are much less than 1500*F; thus, there are no fission Droducts available for release other than those in the reactor water (reference SAR Section 11.2.3).
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i 1216B/04712 3.2/4.2-6 Amendment No. 117 l
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n QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 l
The RClC and the HPCI high flow and temperature instrumentation are proviced to detect a break in their respective piping.
Tripping of this instrumentation reswlts in actuation of the RCIC or of HPCI isolation alves.
Tripping logic for this function is the same as that for the main v
steamline ' solation valves, thus all sensors are required to be operable or in a trigged condition to meet single-failure criteria.
The trip settings of 170*F and 300% cf design flow and valve closure time are such that ccre l
uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.
The instrumentation which initiates ECCS action is arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic circuit. Unlike the reactor scram circuits, however, there is one trip system associated with each function rather than the two trip systems in the reactor protection system.
The single-failure criteria are met by virtue of the fact that redundant core cooling functions are provided, e.g., sprays and automatic blowdown and high pressure coolant injection.
The specification requires that if a trip system becomes inceerable,'the system which it activates is declared inoperable.
For enamole, if the trip system for core spray A becomes inoperable, core spray A is declared inoperable and the out-of-service
$Decificat$ons of Specification 3,5 govern.
This specification prese ves the effectiveness of the system with respect to the single-failure criteria even during periods when maintenance or testing is being performed.
The control rod block functions are provided to prevent excessive control rod withcrawal so that MCPR does not go below the MCPR Fuel Cladding-Integrity Safety Limit.
The trip logic for this function is one out of n; e.g., any trip on one of the six APRM's, eight IRH's, four SRM's will result in a rod elock.
The minimum instrument channel requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure that the single-failure criteria are met.
The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RBM may be reduced by one for a short period of time to allow for maintenance, testing, or calibration.
This time period is only - 3% of the operating time in a month ano does not significantly increase the risk of preventing an inadvertent control rod withdrawal.
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l 1226B/4712 3.2/4.2-64 Amendment No. I17 j
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OVAD C191tl Ope.30 TABLt 3.2 1 I
W5teL*t%?at:04 TM&T IN!Tlatt$ Pe!'iAev CohT AINwtNT !$0t ATICN FUNCT!QN$
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t winimum Nutter
- ;ttrabit or
- 'tpec
- nstrumept l
&a" eis d latteuments trie Level tetting gLigy.d e
4 eestter low waterII}
Dise inches above top of A
active fuel' t
4 Reatter low low water 264 inthes above top of A
active fuel' Hign crywell pressureII) 12.5psigI3)
A a
16 Mtgn flow main steam 11neII) 1140% of rated steam flow 8 i
16 Hign 'empe'ature main 1200* F 8
steamline tunnel i l a normal rated power 8
)
l 4
Hign radiation mpig steamitne tunne166J backgrounc (without byerogen accition)
Low main steam pressurel8}
2825 plig 8
4 Hign flow e:2C steamline 1300 *Iof rated steam C
flow e
l 4
eCIC turoiae area hign 1170' F C
temperature 2
High flow MPCI steamline 1300 f rated steam 0
flow 4
HPCI area high temperature 1170' F D
!t 1M I
1 Wnenever primary containment integrity is recuired, there sha11 be two operable or trippec systems for each function, except for low pressure main steamline which only neee be available in the eun position.
2.
Action, if the first column cannot be att for one of the trtp systems, that trip system shall be trippec.
If the first column cannot be met for Doth trtp systems, the appropriate actions listec below sna11 be taken.
A.
Initiate an creerly shutdown and have the reactor in Cold Shutoown condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
8.
Initiate an oroerly loac reputtion anc have reactor in Hot Staneby within 8-hours.
C.
Close isolati>n valves in RCIC system.
D.
Close isolation valves in HPCI subsystem.
j 3.- Need not be operaole wnen primary containment integrity is not recutres.
4.
The isolation trip signal is bypassed when the moet switch is in Refuel or Startup/
Hot $hutoown.
5.
The. instrumentation also isolates the control room ventilation system.
6.
This signal also automatically closes the mechanical vacuum pump discharge line 150-lation valves.
'. Incluces a time celay cf 3 1 t 3 9 seconcs.
l.
' Tot of active fuel is definec as 360' above vessel tero for all water levels used in
.the LDCA analysis (see Bases 3.2).
l amencement No.117 07408/03382 3.2/4.2-11
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