ML19332A871
| ML19332A871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1980 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332A872 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009180506 | |
| Download: ML19332A871 (22) | |
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[p@%qk UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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48 COMt:0mtEALTH EDISON COMPANY DOC /ET N0. 50-237 DRESDEN STATION UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 49 License No. DPR-19 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated May 15, 1980, as supplemented Septer.iber 3 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, _as amended (the Act) and the Commissian's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, tha provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of tne Commission C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all' applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment,' and paragraph 3.B of Provisional Operating License No.
DPR-19 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.49, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
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. This license amendment is effective as'of the date of its issuance.
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'p FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSis-1 J
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Thomas. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 l
Division of Operating Reactors
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 8, 1980 g
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f ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 49 PROVISIONAL OPEP_iTING LICENSE NO. DPR-19 1
DOCKET NO. 50-237 l
Replace the attached pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages.
Remove Replace 151 151 152 152 155 155 i
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M DPR-19 6
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4.10 St:1;V!;1Lt.ANCE ItEt!Ull i;. ENT M
g-1.DitTING CONDITION 0011 OPEllATION 3.10 n
4.10
__t FI'1?MI ING_
1
' 14 I!I:l't?ElISc AIT cability:
li bd Applicabildy:
Applies to the periodic testing of those interlocks' YJ Applies to fuel handling and core reactivity ar41 instruments used during refueling.
M limitations.
Objective:
b Oh}cetive:
}
To verify tiv: operabii;;r of ins'.rumen*ation azul To assure core reactivity is within capability of interlocks used in refueln.7 the co: tsol re la and to prevent criticality during refueling.
,i S;x cification:
Specific:. tion:
4 A.
Itefueling Interlocks 5
A. Refueling Interlocks Prior to any fuel handllr.;. wi;h t'.e '. art r.fi' The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the reactor vencl. the refueli..g ir.tcrinc. 5
~
the "Itefuel" position during core alterations sh311 he fonctionally tested. Thev shall a!s.:
and the sciucting interlochs shall be oferabic be scr.t -.! at v;ectic intare.*is th reefv r t::,:.1 as srxcified in Specifica!!ons 3.10.D no lor.p-r e 9.t!...I a-d io;i-.es:
- m. re;. ir i
c..ce arwl 3.19. E,
work associatel with the int. rlotts.
B.
Core :.lonitorin:
II. Core '.in :isoring Prior to mahir.: any altern: tiom. to ti:c wrc Du.-ins; core z. Iterations two SIOl's shall bc the 8101's shall W. fuactio ully te.sted an !
T;r reaitor.
operabic, one in the core quadrant where checke.I f:,r centron respr -e.
xtrol rods are bein;; moved aiwi onc j
ti,e SiO1's will be chee:ad sl: illy for rcspac.,
fuel or c-In an adjacent quadrant. l'or sa S!OI to be except when the conditiorts of 3.10.B.2.a considered operable. the following conditions and 3.10.B.2.b are met.
shall he satisfied:
i 151
. Amendment No.
49
DPR-19 G
3.10 LD;! TING CONDITION FOft OPERATION 4.10 SURVEILLANCE REQCIRE>lCNT
( ?).
'h
- 1. Ti-c SR>l shall be inserted to the r.cr*.al
{J o;.:rstir; level. (lise of sFccial moveabic, Qakin:: ty;r detectors daric; initial f:.cl
'g leading :n 1 major core siterations in place d
of rarr..at <letectors are permissibic as
}M lo ; as the detcetor is cannected ir.to the
~~3 rern:al SIDI circuit.)
D
- 2. the sies or as*ing type detector shall % a Y
ninisase of 3 cps with all rods ~ar inserted t
in the case except seien both of @ folicneing a
corditions are fulfilled:
iW a) tha ar4e than two fuel h1jes are present in the czare cpandrant associated with the SR"1.
t.)
64511e in core, these fuel aaammedies are
^
in locations adjace.s to the SNt.
C.
F::cl Stora:c Pool Water Level C.
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level Wher.e.cr irra.fiated fuci is stored in the fuel Whenever irradicted fucI is stored in the s!<>ra;c.rm!. the pool w:'tcr Icycl shall be fuct storanc ;not, the pool level shall be m:.in:ainct' ot a level of 3" feet.
recorded daily.
D.
Cm: trol flod an ! Control Rod Drive D.
Control Rod Drive and Control Rod Drive 7.la!n:crance
.Tlaintenance A r.anisase of 30 mad)Eent narrol sca!s f.eparatal ty more than tm cxsitrol cells in any directicri, eey te wittdemen facci the core for the piqose c4 pr-(camang control rod and/or cxantrol rod or are suinterance provided the following cor.liticris are satisfied
- 1. The reactor mode switch shall be locked
- 1. This surveillance requirement is the same in ti.c **re-fuel position. The re-fueling as given in 4.10. A.
i..tcriock v.hich prevents more than one er. trol red from being withdrawn may be L passed for one of the control rods on
/
v.hich mair.:ena::ce i*. Scin; performed.
.11 other re-fueling ir.tc locks sicall be operable.
152 Amer.dnent No. 49
Bases:
DPR-19 A.
Refueling Interlocks excursion or a critical configuration, thus adequate margin is provided.
Ihsring refueling operations, the ree tivity potential of the core is being altered.
It B.
Core Monitoring is necessary to require certain interlocks and restrict certain refueling prc:edures such The SRM's are provided to suiitor the core that there is assurance that inadvertent during periods of station shutdown and to criticality does not occur.
guide the operator duri:;g refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable To minimize the possibility of loading fuel SRM's in or adjacent to any core quadrant into a cell containing no control rod, it is where fuel or control rods are being moved required that all control rods are fully assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant inserted wh.i fuel la being loaded into the during such alterations. Re<piring a minimtsn of 3 reactor core. This requirement assures that counts per secoral whenever criticality is possible during refueling the refueling interlocks, provides assurance that neutron flux is being as desispeed, will prevent inadvertent criti-monitored. Criticality is considered to be impossible cality. The core reactivity limitation of if there are no mnre than two assemblies in a quadrant Specifications 3.2 limits the core alterations and if these are in locations adjacent to the SF%
to assure that the resulting core loading In this case only, the SR4 or dunking type detector can he controlled with the reactivity control count rate is permitted to be less than 3 counts system and interlocks at any time during g per second.
shutdown or the following operating cycle.
C.
Ibel Storage Pool Water Level Addition of large amounts of reactivity t To assure that there is adequate water to the core is prevented by operating procedures, shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies which are in turn backed up by refueling stored in the pool, a minimum pool water interlocks or. M withdrawal and movement of level is established. The minimum water the refueliny, platform. When the mode switch level of 33 feet is established because it is in the " Refuel" position, interlocks would be a significant change from the nomal prevent the refueling platfom from being level (37'9") well above a level to assure moved over the core if a control rod is adequate cooling (just above active fuel) withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. Likewise, and above the level at which the CSEP action if the refueling platfom is over the core is initiated (5' uncontrolled loss of level i
with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is with level decreasing)*
blocked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the refuel position only one D.
During certain periods.
It is desirable control rod can be withdrawn.
to perform maintenance on two control rods and/or control rod drives at the same time.
l for a new core the drupping of a fuel assembly This specification provides assurance that into a vacant fuel location adjacent to a inadvertent criticality does not occur withdrawn control red does not result in an during~ such riaintenance.
155 Amendment No.
49 4
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E' NUCLEAri REGULATORY COMMISSION a
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C020NWEALTH EDISON COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-249 DRESDEN STATION UNIT NO. 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 44 License No. DPR-25 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Ccmission) has found that:
1 A.
The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated May 15, 1980, as supplemented September 3,1980, A
complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and a,11 applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amend-ment, and paragraph 3.8 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-25 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B.
Technical Specification:
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 44, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with cis Technical Specifications.
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This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
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FOR THE fiUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ftti!SSION Qt'?
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l Thom polito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
September 8, 1980 9
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o ATTACHMEi1T TO LICENSE AMENDMll1T NO. 44 l
FACILITY OPERATIMG LICENSE NO. DPR-25 DOCKET NO. 50-249 c
Replace the attached pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with tht:
- hed revised pages.
I Remove Replace 1 51 151 152 152 155 155 4
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DPR-25 g
4.10 SUf!VCILI.ANCE I!EytJiitid!!:NT 7
11ING CONDITION FOR OpEllATION 3.10 i 13:
@D 4.10 it Vrt'_ET.ING g.14 IU:l'ITI l':G Applicability:
CC g': 2 Applicabilitv:
_ Applies to the periodi: testing of those interlocks Applies to fuel handling and core reactivity ai.d it.struments used ihtring refacting..
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liin.tahons.
Objective:
P
- Olocuig:
To verify the operability of int'rumca'.r. tion and To assoie core reactivity is within capability of
. interlocks used in refueling.
the control rots and to prevent criticality during refuelis g.
Specification:
Specific.t wu s
A.
Itefueling Interlocks l
A. Refueling Interlocks Prior to any fu -I hardlin:;. with t'.e 5.r1 Mi the reactor vessel. t:ic ref.: cling ir.terb. hs Tk s e:.ctor mode switch shali be locked in the *% fuel" position during core alterations shall be func'io:ially testtw!. Th<*v shall also
- !.1 be testes! at we Ah-ir.t" rrai.' thereaft"r and the e rfueling interlocks shall be operable l
c c+,9 as specified in Specifications 3.10.D no len:ger req # a.t ard feiii.cir;: r.:r. re;.dr work a. :sociate ! aith the iriterloc.Ls.
s
.sul "L 19. i!
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B.
Core Monitorin:
- n. Cor. '.toanoring Prior to mahir.t: any alter: tioas to the core Den.:.; core alterations two Stol's shall be the SIDi'a shall !w funct'er. illy te-ted a v!
'! ier rea fte r.
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ortra'ile. one in the core quadrant where ch' cked for av utrr.n res! r
,e.
fuc!i,r c mtrol rotis are being ruoved azul onc g
the S!tM's will be ci:ci.:s* i!..ily f ar rchimre.,
ta a;i a.ijacent yt:adrant, l'or an 8101 to be except when the conditions of 3.10.B.2.a considered operable. the following coiulitions and 3.10.B.2.b are rnet.
I sh.all be satisfied:
i 1
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Amendment No.
J.:
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DP4-25
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8 3.16 LD"! TING COSDITION FO!1 OPERATION 4.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE 31EST b)
- 1. The 5331 shall be in.=crted to the r.crr.21 M
og erm ; le.el. (1 se of special moveable.
d;at:; ty;r detectors darin;; laitial fuel le:di.; :r.J major core sitcrations in place Q
cf r.:,rn.at <letectors are permissible as g
lo,- as the detector is connected Ir.to the rr.ry.31 f *DI circuit.)
g
%'--j 2.1he 3R4 cr disikirig type detector shall have a ninisus of 3 cps with all rods fully inserted h'
in the a4e except iden toth of the fo11 caning conditions are fulfilled:
41 !a) ar4e than twa fuet asseselles are pesert an the core spairant, associated tsith the s8tl.
b) thile in core, these fuel assemblies are in locations adjacent to t.t.e S9t.
C.
Fuel Stors;c Pool Water Lcret C.
Fucl Storage Pool Water Lcret Wher.crer irrailiated fuel is stored in the fuel Whenever irr2diated fuel is stored in the stora;;c iml. the pool water Icycl shall be fuct stora;;c ;v>ol the pool level shall be
.m:.in:amed et a level of 3": feet.
recorded daily.
O.
Control Red and Control Rod Drivo D.
Control Rod Driec and Control Rod Drive
>I2in:ena.cc 31aintenr.r.ce a minisian of tw non-adjacent omtrol rcals seprated ty more than two control cells in arrt direction, muy te withdrawn f rtr. tre are for the pur[ose of pr-fctming asstrol rol and/or cx)ntrol rod dr ave mainterunce providet the following crs.$itions are satisfio1:
- 1. The reactor mode switch shall be locked
- 1. This surveillance requirement is the same in the "rc-fuel" position. The re-fueling as given in 4.10. A.
i..tcrlock which prevents more than one c.ar. trol red from beir.:: witintrawn may bc
- 1. ;ussul for one of the control reds on lath it.ai;.tenance is bein.; performed.
- li oth.
- r re-fueling ir.tcrlocks shall be u;e rable.
152 Amendment t;o. 44
-. ~.. -.
1 e
I* M DPR-25 A.
Refueling Interlocks excursion or a critical configuration, thus During refueling operations, the reactivity potential of the core is being altered.. It B.
Core Mo.sitoring is necessary to require certain interlocks and restrict certain refueling procedures such The SRH's are provided to monitor the core.
that there is assurance that inadvertent during periods of station shutdown and to criticality does not occur.
guide the operator during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable
- To minimize the possibility of loading fuel SRM's in or adjacent to any core quadrant
-into a cell containing no control rod, it is where fuel or control rods are being movt-d required that all control rods are fully assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant inserted when fuel is being. loaded into the during such alteratic;ns. Requiring a minirmJa of 3 reactor core. This requirement assures that counts per second whenever criticality is pssible during refueling the refueling' interlocks.
provides assurance that neutron H ux is being as designed will prevent inadvertent criti-monitored. Criticality is considered to be impossible 4
cality. The core reactivity limitation of if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant Specifications 3.2 limits the core alterations and if these are in locations adjacent to the SPM.
to assure that the resulting core loading In this case cnly, the SFf4 or dunking type detector can be controlled with the reactivity control count rate is permitted to le less than 3 counts n.ystem and interlocks at any time during per second.
shutdown or the following operating cycle.
C.
Ibel Storage Pool Water Level Addition of large amounts of reactivity to
,.o assure that there is adequate water to the core is prevented by operating procedures
- shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies which sire in turn backed up by refueling stored in the pool, a minimum pool water interlocks on md withdrawal and movement of level is established. The minimum water the ref ueling platfonn. When the mode switch level of 33 feet is established because it i
is in the ' Refuel" position, interlocks would be a significant change from the nomal prevent the refueling platfonn from being level (37'9") well above a level to assure moved over the ec e if a contral rod is adegnate cooling (just above active fuel) withdrawn and fuel is on a hoirt. Likewise, and above tiie level at which the CSEP action if the refueling platfonn is over the core is initiated (5' uncontrolled loss of level with fuel on a hoist, control rid motion is with level decreasing).
blocked by the interlocks. With the mode 4
switch in the refuel position only one D.
During certain periods. It is desirable j
control rod can be withdrawn.
to perform maintenance on two control rods i
and/or control rod drives at the same time.
for a new core the dropping of a fuel' assembly
'Ihis specification provides assurance that into a vacant fuel location adjacent to a inadvertent criticality does not occur withdrawn contml rod does not result in an during such maintenance.
j 155 Ame dment No. 44 1
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llNITED STATES
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' 'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasmwayon. o. c. rosss
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS M b ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-254 QUAD CITIES STATION UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. SS-License No. DPR-29 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the s
licensee) dated May 15, 1980, as supplemented September 3,1980.
complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1964, as amended (the Act) and the Conmission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the ac?.ivities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without encangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and sec -ity or to the healti and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Spec-ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B of Facility License No. DPR-29 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B.
. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 58, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
_... ~. _
. 2_
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
1 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0Oeppu Thomas 4./ Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
~-
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
September 8,1980 s
i
- ene.
,4
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ATTACHMENT TO LICEiiSE AMEN 0 MENT NO.
5_8 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-29 DOCKET N0. 50-254 Replace the attached pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages.
Remove Replace 3.10/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-4 3.10/4.10-4 4
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man cmrs v,
a r)pp_29
- b. Hoist overload.
High position limitation.
c.
B.
Core Monienrine B.
Core Monitoring Prior to any 11terations to the core, the SRM's During core aherations, two SRM's shall be shall be functionally tested and checked for operable, one in the core quadrant where fuel neutron respimse. Thereafter, the SRM's shall or control rods are being mosed and one in an adjacent quadrant. For in SRM to be consid-be checked daily for response, except when the conditions of 3,10.D.2.a cred operable, the following conditions shall be arid 3.10.3.2.b are met.
satisned:
I. The SRM shall be inserted to the nor-mal operating level (use of special movable, dunkin5 type detectors dur-ing initial fuelloading and major core alterations in place of normal detec-tors is permissible as long as the detec.
tor is connected into the proper ctreui, try which contsins the required rod blocks).
- 2. De SR4 or dunking type detector shall have a mininn of 3 cis with all reds fully incerted l
in the core except when both of the following antitions are fulfilled:
1 1
a) tao pore than tso fuel assemblies are present in th9 core quadrarit acauciated
)
with the Stet.
bl Nhile in cere, these fuel asscwblies are in locations adjacent to the SH.
C.
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C.
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in\\he fuel Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the fuel storage pool, the pool water level shall be storage pool, the pool level shall be recorded maintained at a level of at least 33 feet.
daily.
D. Coostel Rod and Control Drive Maintenance D. Control Rod and Contrul Rod Drive A maximum of two nonadjacent control rods separated by more than two control cells in any direction may be withdrawn from the core for the purpose of performing control rod and/or control rod drive maintenance provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- 1. The reactor mode switen < hell be
- 1. SufFeient control rods shall be with-locked in the Re' fuel position. W u;-
drawn prior to performin6 this main-tenance to demonstrate with a margin fueling interlock which prevents mere than one control rod from being with-of 0.25% ak that the enre can be made drawn may be bypassed for one of the suberitical at any time auring the control rods on which maintenance is maintenance with the strongest opera-being performed. All other refueling ble control rod fully withdrawn and all interlocks shall be operable.
other operable rods fully inserted.
- 2. Specincation 3.3.A.! shall be met, or Alternately, if a minimum of eight the control rod direcimnal control control rods surrounding c:ich enntrol valves for a minimum of eight enntrol rod out of service for mainten.ince are rods surrounding each drive nut of to be fu!ly inserted and have their service for maintenance will be dn-directional control valves c'evrically armed c!cettwally and sumuent mar.
da. armed, the 0.25"c ak marpn will 3.10/4.10-2 Amendment No. 58
. ottan-r: Ties 0
l
- Q DPR-29 J -
3.10 LIMITING CONDITIONS l'OR OPI: RATION llASES.
During refueling operations, the reactivity potential of the core is being altered, it is necco.iry to re A.
certain imerlocks and restrict certain refueling procedures such that there is assurance that inadvertent criticality does not occur.
To minireac the possibility ofloading fuel into a cell containing no control rod. it is required trat all contro' tr ds are fully inserted when fuelis being loaded into the reactor core. This requiremen; assures that during refuehng. the refueling interlocks will p. event inadvertent criticality as designed. The resetivity hmitation ofSpecification 3 2 limiin se core aherassons to anure that the resulting c can be controlled with the rer.ctivity control system and micrfocks at any time durmg shutdown or th following operatmg cycle.
De addition oflarge amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and mmement of the refueling platf When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from be moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist.
Likewise, if the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is bloc i d the interlocks. Wi.h the mode switch in the Refuel positron, only one control rod can he w th rawn.
The SRM are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and in guide the o B.
during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable SRM in or adjacent to a quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of t Reqairing a minLmum of 3 counts per second wbenever criticality during such alterations.
Criticality is is pocsible provides assurance that neutron flux is bring monitored.
considered to be imossible if there are no rnere than t,x) assemblies ir. a quadrant and if these are in locations adjacent to the Srft. In this ca:e only, the met or dunking type detector count rate is permitted to be less than 3 counts per second.
To assure that there is adequate water to shW e.d cool the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool, C.
a minimum pool water level is established The minimum waier level of 33 feet is established hee.nuse it would he a signifcant chance from the normallevel( 37 feet 9 inchest well above a level to awure adequate cooling (just above active fuelh and above the level at which GSEP acuan is inneated (5 feet uncontrolled loss of level with level decreasing).
During certain periods, it is desirable to perform maintenance on two control rods and/or control rod D.
drives at the same time. This specification provides assurance that inadvertent criticality does not occur during such maintenance.
The maintenance is perforraed with the mode switch in the Refuel position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations as explained in Part A of these bases. In order to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at the same time. The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated with the enntrol rods remaining in service ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this maintenanct. The shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that the core is shut down even if the strongest control rod remaining in service is fully withdrawn. Disarming the darctiional control valves does not inhibit control rod scram capability.
The intent of this speciMcation is to permit the unloading of a significani portion of the reactor core for E.
such purposes as inservwe inspection requirements. esamin.ition of the enre support plate. etc This specification provides assuranse that inadvertent (rmeahty does not ouur during sush uprainm.
His operation is performed with the twde swuch in the Refuel pmition to provide the refuchng interlocks normally available durmg refuchng as esplained m the bases for SpecallcJtion 3 to a in order to withdr.sw more shan one contini rod it is necewary to hyp.ps the refueling mterlosk on each withdrawn control ad whhh prevents more thart one comrol rod from hemg withdrawii at a time. The requirement that the fuel awembhes in ine c-:ll comrelled hv the control rod he removed from the react 3.10/4.10-4 Arnendaent No. 58
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLINOIS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-265 QUAD CITIES STATION UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 53 License No. DPR-30 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) dated May 15, 1980, as supplemented September 3.1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atonic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be' inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Spec-ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.8 of Facility License No. OPR-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:
B.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 53, are hereby incorpcrated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
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- 3. - This license amendment.is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Thomas
. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications i
Date of Issuance:
September 8, 1980 i
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 53 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30 DOCKET NO. 50-265 s
Replace the attached pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached _ revised pages.
Remove Replace 3.10/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-4 3.10/4.10-4 1
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High position iimitation.
c.
B.
Core.h.mring B.
Core Monitorir:g During core alterations, two SRM's shall be Prior to any afterations to the core, the SRM's shall be functionally tested and checked for operable. one in the core quadrant where fuel neutron response. Thereafter, the SRM's shall or control rods are being moved and one in an be checked daily for response, except adjacent quadrant. For an SetM to be consid.
when the conditions of 3.10.T3.2.a cred operable, the following conditions shall be and 3.10.9.2.6 are met, satisned:
- l. The SRM shall be in.erted to the nor-mal operatin5 cvel (use of special movable, dunkir.g type detectors dur-ing initial fuelloading and major core alterations in place of normal detec.
tors is permissible as long as the detec-tot is connected into the proper circui.
try which ontains the required rod blocks).
- 2. The sie4 or dunkirs type detector shall have a minirrun of 3 cps with all rods fully inserted in the core excrpt when both of the followino conditions are fulfilled:
a) m nere than tw fuel assernblies are present in thr core quadrant associated with the stet, b) Nhile in core, these fuel aspsblies are in locations adjacent to the sm.
C.
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C.
Fuel Storage Pool Water Level Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the fuel Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the fuel storage pool, the pool water level shall be storage pool, the pool level shall be recorded maintained at a level of at least 33 feet.
da;ly.
D.
Control Rod and Control Drive Maintenance D. Control Rod and Control Rod Driv e M " "*"
A maximum of two nonadjacent control rods separated by more than two control cells in any direction may be withdrawn from the core for the purpose of performing control rod and/or control rod drive maintenance provided the following conditions are satisned:
- 1. The reactor mode switch shall be
- 1. SufEcient control rods shall be with-locked in the Re' fuel position. The re-drawn prior to performing this main-tenance to demonstrate with a margin fueling interlock which prevents more than one control rod from bein5 with-of 0.25% Ak that the core can be made subcritical at any time during the drawn may be byp.issed for one of the control rods on which maintenance is maintenance with the strongest opera-ble control rud fully withdrawn and all being performed. All other refueling interlocks shall be operable.
other operable rods fully inserted.
- 2. Specification 3.3.A.I shall be met, or Alternately, if a minimum of eight the control rod directional control control rods surrounding each control valves for a minirnum of eight control rod out of service for maintenince are rods surrounding eacn drive out of to be fully inserted and have their service for maimerance will be dis-directional contros nivn electrically disarmed, the 25%.h margin will armed electrica!!y.and suincient mar.
Amendment No. 53 3.10/4.10-2 L
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DPR-30 3.10 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OI ERATION !!ASI.S During refueling operations. the reactivny potential of the core is being altered. It is necessary to require A.
certain interlocks and restrict certain refueling procedures such that there is assurance that inadscrient criticality does not occur.
To minimize the possibility ofloading fuel into a cell comaining no control rod. it is required thet all control rods are fully inserted when fuelis being loaded into the reacto'r core. This requirement auures that during refueling, the refueling interlocks will prevent inadvertent criticality as designed. The core reactivity limitation ofSpecification 3 2 limits the core alterations to assure that the resulting core loading can be controlled with the reactivity control system and interlocks at any time during shutdown. r the following operating cyc!c.
The addition oflarge amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platform.
When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist.
Likewise, if the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is bl ded by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the Refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawti.
The SRM are provided to moniter the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator B.
during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable SRM in or adjacen* to any sore quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a mininun of 3 counts per second whenever criticality is possible provides assurance that neutron flux is tving cenitored. Criticality is considered to be 1: possible if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant aM if these are in locations adjacent to the SRI. In this case only, the 2 1 cr dunki',g t/pe detector count rate is permitted to be less than 3 ccents per second.
C.
To assure that there is adequate water to shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool, a minimum pool water level is established. The minimum water level of 33 feet is established because it would be a significant chance from the normallevel(37 feet 9 inches), well above a level to assure adequate cooling (just above active fuel), and above the level at which GSEP action is initiated (5 feet uncontrolled loss oflevel with level decreasing).
D.
During certain periods, it is cesirable to perform maintenance on two control rods and/or control rod drives at the same time. This specification provides assurance that inadvertent criticality does not occur during such maintenance.
The maintenance is performed with the mode switch in the Refuel position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations as explained in Part A of these bases. In order to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod,it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at the same time.The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated with the control rods remaining in service ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this maintenance. The shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that the core is shut down even if the stroncest control rod remaining in service is fully withdrawn. Disarming the directional control valves does not inhibit control rod scram capability.
E.
The intent of this specification is to permit the un:cading of a significant portion of the reactor core for such purposes as intervice inspection requirements, examieation of the core support plate. etc. This specification provides assurance that inadvertent crutcality u es not occur during such operation.
s This operation is performed with the mode switch in the Refuel position to provide the refueling interlocks norraatly availar'ie durine efueline as explained in the hases for Specificatior 3.10A. In order to withdraw more than one contrd rod. it is nece<sary to hyp,4ss the refueling interlock on each withdrawn' control rod which rirevems more than one control rod from being wahdrawn at a time. The requirement that tne fac! memheio m the ec'l controlled hv the wnital rod 5e removed from the reactor Amendment No. 53 3.10/4.10-4