ML19331D503
| ML19331D503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Pasternak R POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009030094 | |
| Download: ML19331D503 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES
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KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANI A 19406 August 15, 1980 Docket No. 50-333 Power Authority of the State of New York James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ATTN:
Mr. R. J. Pasternak Resident Manager P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is Revision I to IE Bulletin No. 80-19.
The revision merely clarifies the areas of concern; therefore, the actions, including dates of reports required from you with respect to your nuclear power facility, are not changed.
In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report (s) required by the Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.
Should you have any questions regarding the Bulletin or actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, B y e H. Grier Director l
Enclosures:
1.
IE Bulletin No. 80-19, Revision 1 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins CONTACT:
D. L. Caphton (215-337-5266) cc w/encls:
George T. Berry, President and Chief Operating Officer J. P. Bayne, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Generation A. Klausmann, Director, Quality Assurance M. C. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer J. F. Davis, Chairman, Safety Review Committee C. M. Pratt, Assistant General Counsel G. M. Wilverding, Manager-Nuclear Licensing 1
i
.800903969'/
SSINS No.: 6820 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8006190052 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 August 15, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-19 Revision 1 i
FAILURES OF MERCURY-WETTED MATRIX RELAYS IN REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS OF OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER FLANTS DESIGNED BY COMBUSTION ENGINEERING BACKGROUND:
This bulletin addresses the failures of mercury (RPS) of nuclear power pla
-wetted relays used in the logic matrix of the reactor protective s designed by Combustion Engineering (C-E)ystemExcept for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 and Palisades, both of which use dry-contact matrix relays, the NRC understands that all other operating C-E plants use C.P. Clare Model HG2X-1011 mercury-wetted matrix relays in the RPS.
Mercury-wetted matrix relays manufactured by the Adams and Westlake Company were initially used in the Palisades plant; however, because of repeated failures of these relays, they were subsequently replaced with rePys having dry-contacts.
GTE, the manufacturer of these dry-contact relays, however, nas since discontinued their production.
Thus, although the dry-contact relays used at Palisades have performed without a failure since they were installed, they are not available for the other operating nuclear power plants designed by C-E.
OPERATING EXPERIENCES AND EVALUATION:
To date, operating nuclear power plants designed by C-E have reported thirty-one (31) failures of mercury-wetted relays used in the logic matrix of the RPS.
Most of the reported failures were " failed-closed" type (i.e., the type that could inhibit a reactor trip), and four of the reported events involved multi-ple failures (i.e., three relay failures were detected during two tests; two other failures were detected during two different tests).
Because of the re-dundancy within the RPS, no reported event would have pr : vented a reactor trip; however, the build-up of coincident " failed-closed" failures of certain sets of relays could result in trip failures for off-normal events.
The number of single and multiple relay failures reported gives rise to two concerns: (1) the total number of failures yields a much higher random failure rate than that used in other relay failure estimates *, and (2) the number of
- Other relay failure estimates include (1) WASH-1400, " Reactor Safety Study",
NRC, October 1975; (2) IEEE Std 500-1977,"IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, and Sensing Component Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", IEEE, New York; and (3) NUREG/
CR-0942, " Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System, 1978 Annual Reports of Cumulative System and Component Reliability", NRC.
)
IE Bulletin No. 80-19, Revision 1 August 15, 1980 Page 2 of 2 multiple failures detected suggests the presence of a common-mode failure mechanism. Such a common-mode failure mechanism could result in the build-up of specific " failed-closed" failures which, in turn, could result in antici-pated transients without scram (ATWS). Thus, the relatively high random failure rate and the suggested common-mode failure mechanism, indicate that plants using mercury-wetted matrix relays in the RPS are more susceptible to scram failures than predicted in other studies.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS OR OPERATING LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES:
1.
Review your facility to determine whether C.P. Clare Model HG2X-1011 R(
mercury-wetted relays are used in the logic matrix of the RPS.
If R{
no such relays are used, you should submit a negative declaration to this effect and you need not respond to the remaining items in this bulletin. Your negative declaration shall be submitted to the a?propriate NRC regional office within thirty (30) days of the date of this iulletin and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, Washington, D. C. 20555.
2.
Licensees of o?erating facilities using the above relays in the logic R[
matrix of the kPS should increase the frequency of their surveillance RI<
j tests. Until further notice, or until the mercury-wetted relays have i
been replaced with qualified relays of a different design, surveillance testing of the relays shall be initiated within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin and repeated at intervals not exceeding ten (10) days thereafter. The additional surveillance testing applies when operability R[
of the RPS is required by the Technical Specification. Upon detecting a RTt failed relay, the failed unit shall be replaced with a qualified dry-contact relay or a new mercury-wetted relay.
(The removed relay shall not be reused in the RPS.)
3.
Nuclear 70wer facilities which are using or whose design includes the use of the above relays in the logic matrix of the P2S shall submit either R1 their plans and schedules for replacing the arcury-wetted relays with qualified relays of a different design, or justification for using the mercury-wetted relays. Resaonses to this item shall be submitted to the offices listed in Item 1, above, within ninety (90) days of the date of the original version of this bulletin, July 30, 1980.
R1 Approved ';y GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires July 31, 1980.
(Application i
for renewal pending before GA0.) Approval was given under a blartet clearance j
specifically for identified generic problems.
l
IE Bulletin No. 80-19, Revision 1 August 15, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS
' " -tin Subject Date Issued Issued To Nt.
80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 All holders of a Type W-2 Spring Return power reactor OL or to Neutral Control Switches CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All holders of a Wetted Matrix Relays power reactor OL in Reactor Protective or CP Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All holders of a Minimum Flow Thru PWR power reactor Centrifugal Charging Pumps OL or CP Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All holders of a BWR to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to power reactor OL Failure of Control Rods or CP to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All holders of a to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram BWR power reactor at a BWR OL or CP 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All holders of a to Insert During a Scram BWR power reactor at a BWR OL or CP 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All holders of a Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 power reactor and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or CP with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All holders of a With Loss of Off-Site Power power reactor or fuel facility OL connected to the Emergency Notification System 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All holders of a Discharge Volume Capability BWR power reactor OL or CP
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