ML19331D477
| ML19331D477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331D475 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009030058 | |
| Download: ML19331D477 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES
.e 94 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y, 3 ej( /'9.gE WASHWGTON. D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 60'TO FACILITY OPERATING' LICENSE'NO. DPR-65 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Introduction By applications dated June 26 and July 10, 1980, as supplemented by letters of May 13 and August 7,1980, Northeast Nuclear Er,ergy Company (NNECO or the licensee) requested amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 (MS-2).
The NNECO applications propose to:
(1) add a footnote to Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.'4.1.a.1 to authcrize up to four (4) electrical penetrations of the containment to be removed concurrently with fuel movement or core alterations; and (2) change TS Table 3.1-1 to renumber the access doors to the spent fuel pool area to agree with the security plan.
Discussion end Evaluation During the 1978 and 1979 refueling outages, considerable testing of the contain-ment electrical penetrations and movement of some circuits was necessary to assure that all safety related conductors had insulation resistance greater than 100 megohns.
Prior to issuance of the Cycle 3 reload amendment, dated May 12, 1979, NNECO agreed to propose a permanent type repair of these penetrations. This agreement 13, 1980 in which NNECO states its current was consummatec in the letter of May plans to replace the rodules associated with 32 of the 40 electrical penetrations during the 19S3 refueling outage.
In the June 26, 1980 application, NNECO proposed that the replacement of the penetration modules be allowed during the time core refueling is proceeding.
This would greatly improve the efficiency of the outage, but would require a TS change for the limiting conditions for operations (LCO) on containtent penetrations This TS requires that:
(TE 2.9.4).Eacr. penetration ;, oviding direct access from the containment atmosphere c.
snail be either:
1.
Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2.
Se capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve.
The above TS requirement is to ensure that the potential radioloaical ~.onsequences of a postulated fuel handling accident inside containment (FHAIC) remain within the bounds of the Safety Evaluation.
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. MS-2 While the penetration modules are being replaced during core refueling, NNECO proposes to:
Provide dedicated personnel outside and inside containment to seal e
any open penetrations in the event of a FHAIC.
Direct communications will exist at all times between the control e
roca and the electrical penetration workers both inside and outside the containment.
In the event of a FHAIC, workers inside and outside containment would seal any open electrical penetration upon direction from the control room.
Electrical penetration module work, resulting in a breach of contain-e ment integrity, will be performed on not more than four penetrations In addition, work resulting in a breach of containment at any time.
integrity will be performed on no more than two electrical penetrations at any time in each penetration room.
In the event of a fuel handling accident inside containment, personnel located in the electrical penetration areas would be instructed by the control room to isolate the containment.
This would be done by installing a neoprene tapered plug inmediately following removal of an existing penetration module, according to the NNECO letter of August 7,1980.
They state that this instal-The lation can easily be done in five (5) minutes from any starting condition.
1977) assumes analysis of record for the FHAIC (NNEC0 submittal dated March 21 5
that containment isolation requires ten (10) minutes.
Our review of the FHAIC was an independent analysis with acceptable results as documented in the Safety Evaluations for Amendrent No. 52 (May 12,1979).
In the August 7,1980 letter, NNECO states that justification for the acceptability of this change included the following points:
Frevious evaluations performed by both NNECO and the NRC Staff regarding a (1)
FHAIC would remain valid.
commanications from the control room to personnel located in the (2)
Dire::
electrical penetrations would be maintained.
Fenetration work resulting in a breach of containment integrity would be (3) perforced en no more than four (4) penetrations at any time, with no more than two (2) penetrations in each penetration room.
We find the replacement of containment electrical penetration modules during fuel mvement or core alterations acceptable providec the controls, as described by Un_oD letters dated June 26 and August 7,1980, are implerented by approved We will request the NRC Inspection and Enforcement resi-and tested procedures.
inspector for MS-2 to confirm that Emergency Procedure 2520 has been nodi-dent fied appropriately to provide this control and that satisfactory testing of con-
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o MS-2 tainment isolation using such procedures is completed before fuel handling and module replacement are performed concurrently.
In review of the proposed changes to TS Page 3/4 9-4, we find that modi-fications are necessary to more explicitly define the acceptable LCOs for the core refueling operation.
Such' modifications have been discussed with and agreed to by the NNECO staff.. We find the modified TS changes acceptable.
In the July 10, 1980 application, NNECO proposed changes to TS Table 3.9-1 to renumber the access doors to the spent fuel pool area.
In the current security plan, all Millstone Unit No. I security doors have numbers in the 100 series and, likewise, the Unit No. 2 doors are in the 200 series.
Therefore, a TS change to renumber the security doors is necessary.
Since this renurbering is administrative and no physical modifications are being made, we find the TS change for all doors except Nos. 292 and 207 (new numbers) acceptable.
Doors Nos. 292 and 207 are in different walls of the solidification system Therefore, closing either door will provide ventilation system control room.
in the spent fuel pool area. We find the proposed change to require only one of these series doors to be closed during fuel movement acceptable.
Environrental Ccnsideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Havinc made this determination, we have further concluded that the amenchent involves an action which is insignificant from the stand-point of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR f 51.5(d)(4),
tnat an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Cc :iusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant in-tha t:
crease in the probability or consequences of accidents previously co'sicered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety rargin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consider-ation, (2) nere is reasonable assurance that the health and safety
- c. the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed mannar, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance aicn the Ocmmission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comren defense and security or to the imalth and safety of the public.
Datec: A;;;st 19, 1980
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