ML19330B049
| ML19330B049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1980 |
| From: | Jeffrey Scott TEXAS PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007300116 | |
| Download: ML19330B049 (8) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety & Licensing _ Board In the Matter of
)
cket %-E HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY )
(Allens Creek Unit 1)
)
MOTION FOR DIRECTIVE THAT A SUPPLEMENT TO THE ALLENS CREEK E.I.S. BE PREPARED; Re: CLASS 9 ACCIDENTS Intervenor TexPIRG has recently become aware that the proposed Annex to the Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 has been withdrawn as of and that the Annex "shall not hereafter be used by appli-June 13,1980; cants nor the staff." 45 FR 40101 (June 13,1980)
Accordingly, TexPIRG moves that the Board direct the staff, immediate-ly and with all due diligence, to prepare a supplement to the Final Environ-mental Statement (FES) for Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station (ACNGS) which adequately and thoroughly assesses the impact of worst-case accidents, and other accidents referred to in the FES for ACNGS as The reasons for this request are hereinafter discussed.
" Class 9."
I BACKGROUND At the time the FES and Final Supplement to the FES were prepared for ACNGS, the staf f and Licensing Board stated that they were bound by the policy inherent in the Annex to Appendix D of 10 FFR Part 50, i.e.,
the FES and FS-FES contain little to no evaluation of sc-called " Class and intervenors were forbidden from raising site-related 9" accidents, contentions which spoke to Class-9 scale accidents.
Following the Three Mile Island accident, this Board admitted a number of safety issues directly relevant to that accident; furthermore, naw emergency procedures and site suitability rules were drafted for consideration by the staff which purport to consider the effects of Class 9 accidents.
Gus Speth, Chairman of the Council on Environmental On Mar. 20, 1980, Quality (CEQ), wrote the full Commission, stating that the CEQ urged 8007.900((
e I
2.
1 the rejection of the proposed Annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50.
j Speth stated, in part:
"The past failure to discuss the consequences of the full range j'
of potential accidents and their effects undermines the basic purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act to inform the public and other agencies fully of the potential consequences of federal proposals and to provide a basis for informed decision-making."
(Letter to Chairman John Ahearne from Gus Speth, dated 4
Mar. 20, 1980, p.1)
)
On June 13, 1980, the full Commission withdrew said proposed Annex. Among other findings, the Commission stated that the former policy prevented consideration of Liass 9 accidents which "according to the Reactor Safety Study dominate the accident risk;" and further that the classification systems and assumptions used in the FES for Allens Creek and other plants is "not sufficiently precise to warrant its further use," do not " contribute to objective consideration," and do not "give adequate consideration to the detailed treatment of measures taken to prevent and to mitigate the consequences of accidents in the safety review" process.
The Commission further ordered EIS consideration of the site-specif-ic environmental impacts attributable to accident sequences that lead to releases of radiation that can result from melting of the reactor Core.
However, TexPIRG notes no action by the Staff with regard to revising the FES.for ACNGS. Presumably, this results from staff interpretation of a line appearing on p. 40103 of the aforestated Fed. Reg.:
"Thus this change in policy is not.to be construed... absent a showing of similar special circumstances, as a basis for opening, reopening, or expanding any previous or ongoing proceeding."
II.
However, the staff is bound by the Commission's new policy statement to revise the FES for ACNGS by evaluating " Class 9" accident impacts
.in the manner stated in paragraphs 7 and 8 on 45 FR 40103.
The Cannission states:
"It is the intent of the Commission in issuing this statement of
3.
Interim Policy that the staff will initiate treatments of accident considerations, in accordance with the foregoing guidance, in its ongoing NEPA reviews, i.e., for any proceeding at a licensing stage where a Final Environmental Impact Statement has not yet been issued."
(ibid.) (emphasis added)
Obviously, the staff has an ongoing NEPA review occurring for ACNGS. 1he staff is preparing a "Seabrook-style" alternative site study. According to previous statements by the staff, such alter-native site analysis is intended as another supplement to the EIS.
This, indeed, means that the FES and FS-FES are not truly final documents. Moreover, it is likewise obvious that alternative site considerations are closely related to impacts of site-related radio-logical accidents, as dealt with in the Commission's new policy.
Furthermore, it has long been a matter of NRC policy that revisions, corrections, and " striking the final balance" of the facts and conclusions contained within the FES by the Licensing Board stand as the true final supplement to the EIS-- acting as a revised FES.
1 see also, Citizens for Safe Power v. N.R.C.
524 F.2d 1291, 1294.
The initial decision of the ASLB thus stands as the truly final EIS that allows federal agency action to proceed.
Since the ASLB issuance regarding the grant of a construction permit obviously has not been issued in the instant proceeding, the final environmental impact statement is not complete for this docket.
As such, the staff is obligated to perform as instructed by the
]
Commission's policy, i.e., consider the impacts of " Class 9" accidents.
The significance of earliness in the licensing process and practicality of implementing the assessments are the prime considerations of the Commission's policy as to which facilities should be subject to the further review. The Commission states:
...it is the intent...that the staff takes steps to identify additional cases that might warrant early consideration of either additional Lfeatures or other actions which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of serious accidents. Cases for such consideration are those for which a Final Environmental Statement has already been issued at the Coristruction Permit stage but for which the Operating License review stage has not-yet bee' reached... Staff should also consider the likli-hood that substantive.hanges in plant design features which may compensate further for adverse site features may be more easily incorpor-ated in plants when construction has not progressed very far." (ibid.)
G 4.
As noted previously, ACNGS has not only failed to reach the operating license stage as mentioned in the above passage, it also has not undergone the construction permit review.
Because the environ-mental hearings and site selection have not been completed, the timing 7
of this proceeding clearly falls within the intent of the Commission to initiate accident impact analysis.
III.
Regardless, the FES for ACNGS will be defective, and in violation of NEPA without the requested supplemental analysis.
r The CEQ states:
" Based on our review, we do not believe that the Commission's prior legal justification for severely limiting the discussion of nuclear accidents and their consequences in EIS's is any longer sustainable, assuming it ever was."
(Speth Letter, p. 2)
The Supreme Court has held in Andres v. Sierra Club, 9 ELR 20, 390 (June 11, 1979) that CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to
" substantial deference."
CEQ regulations 40 CFR 1502.14 (b),1502.22 (a), and 1502.22 (b) all require the inclusion of the requested " Class 9" analysis.
Such regu-lations are binding upon federal agencies administering NEPA.
Exec.
Order #11,991, 5 1, 3 CFR 124.
In particular, Part 1502.22 mandates a worst-case analysis when scientific uncertainty exists regarding adverse impacts.
The event at TMI and the Risk Review Group Report should all indicate that scientific uncertainty is now existent. The Ccmmission itself states in its interim policy:
"In promulgating this interim guidance, the Commission is aware that there are and will remain for some time to cane many uncertain-ties in the application of risk assessment methods, and it expects that its EISs will identify major uncertainties in its probabilistic estimates." (45 FR supra)
The EIS must alert all interested persons "to all known possible environmer tal consequences of proposed agency action." (emphasis in original)
Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 325 F. Supp.
749,-759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
See also, Sierra Club v. Froehlke 486 F. 2d
~
946, 951 (7th Cir.1973), Hanly v. Kleindienst 47i F. 2d 823, 836
o 5.
(2d Cir.1972), Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar 394 F. Supp. (O.
N.H.1975), NRDC v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmi ssion 539 F. 2d 824, 843, Allied General Nuclear Services v. NRDC 434 U.S.1030 (1977).
The legal study prepared for the CEQ asserts:
"The full-disclosure requirement of NEPA is not adequately fui-filled where consideration of accidents in Classes 1, 2 and 9 are omitted and where the full range of accident impacts for all classes of accidents is not disclosed."
Environmental Law Institute, Feb. 4, 1980, p. iii, "NRC's Environmental Analysis of Nuclear Accidents.",/
The same report examinre NRC impact statements and concludes:
" Virtually every EIS issucJ af ter Sept. 1, 1971, contains the same boilerplate language written in unvarying format.
Each contains the same types of analysis and each reaches the identical final conclusion..."(supra. p.11); and the " action-forcing NEPA mandates a
cannot be adequately carried out in nuclear accident analysis by the kind of tro_ forma repetition of language and techniques that has been employed in EISs so far." (supra, p. 31)
Furthermore, simply because the NRC interim policy attempts to comply with law on future EISs does not absolve the agency f rom compliance on ongoing reviews. As the D.C. Court held regarding the F.P.C.:
"An agency cannot escape its responsibility to present evidence and reasoning supporting its substantive rules by announcing binding precedent in the form of a general statement of policy."
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC 506 F. 2d 33, 38.
The NRC itself has found severe deficiencies in its past policy--
and thus, logically in the ACNGS FES, too--relating to the precision, procedure, substance, and outcome of NEPA accident impact evaluations.
(See paragraphs 1-4, 45 FR 40103).
IV.
The primary concern of TexPIRG with regard to the failure to address core melt accidents at ACNGS is that impacts upon populations more th n 10 miles from the plant site have been effectively precluded from anGlyses of site suitability and alternative siting.
This Board is, of ;ourse, aware of TexPIRG's views on this matter, because such past contentions have been rejected on the basis of Class 9 prohibitions.
A massive core-melt at a BWR is likely to lead to breach of containment, as even NRC staff documents recognize.
Both the NRC and AEC have recognized that such atmospheric releases constitute potential " worst-case" impacts.
- / The CEQ terms the. report " accurate"aand "important."
(Speth Letter, p.
1)
6.
The AEC's WASH-740 and Update thereto detailed atmospheric releases during a worst-case accident which affect hundreds of square miles and thousands of persons at a typical site.
In NUREG/CR-ll31 (Sandia), figure 5.8 (p.82) indicates thyroid and whold body proposed protective action guides have a 50 % or greater probability of being exceeded within 50 miles of the site, during an atmospheric release. With relatively stricter criteria (doses of 1 and 5 rem), both thyroid and whold body protective action guides are exceeded with 40 % probability for 100 miles or greater, following an atmospheric release.
Juxtaposed against this is the fact the central district of the fastest-growing metropolis in the United States is only 45 miles away from the ACNGS site.
One of the latest, comprehensive analyses of the Houston-area growth trends states:
"Because of the high degree of interaction and the continued strength of petroleum and related industries, the region has performed well recently with growth in employment exceeding 56 % in the period 1970-78. This growth will continue into the future with about 1,000,000 new jobs added between 1978 and the year 2000.
In the year 2000, there will be almost 5 million people in the region and 70 % or 3.47 million of these people will live in Harris County.
Employment in the region is growing at a faster rate than previous studies have indicated, and that growth in population and employment is not concentrated as much in Harris County but is more evenly distributed among counties throughout the region.
The number of employers in the region has increased from 29,000 in 1973 to 51,000 in 1978.
This 57 % growth rate has generated a demand for new employees unparralled by any other region in the country. " (emphasis added)
" Phase One, Economic Base Analysis for the Houston-Galveston Region," Rice Center, April,1979, p. i.
Employment in Austin County, site of the plant, is expected to more than double from 1970 to the year 2000, with employment in nearby Fort Bend County (where the " population center" is located) expected to be increasing ten-fold in the same time frame, and nearby Harris and Waller counties to be experiencing doubling and seven-fold increases of employment, respectively, in the same time period.
(ibid.) Harris County's population will nearly triple in that time; Fort Bend's will increase more than five-fold; and Austin County's will nearly double. (ibid.)
The "far-southwest" fringe of Harris County (the portion nearest Allens Creek) will house 165,900 persons by 2000 if present trends continue.
(See, " Growth Options for Houston, Technical Report," Mar.
T O
a 7.
1978, Rice Center, p. ii).
The construction of ACNGS, itself, will cause nearby forecasts to be outstripped.
In discussing projections for Austin County, Rice Center states:
"If the proposed Allens Creek Nuclear Power Plant clears the final environmental review and construction of this facility is initiated, employment and population growth in the county will undoubtedly escalate." (" Economic Base Analysis," supra., p. 27).
Figure 11 of NUREG 0348 shows cumulative percentages of active nuclear power plant sites within various distances of nearest cities l
with population greater than or equal to 200,000 (as measured from the citylimits). According to that chart, only between 10-20 % of active nuclear sites are closer to a major city than ACNGS.
It should be noted that this chart includes sites such as Indian Point which was terminated due to population distribution.
The Canmission noted:
"In carrying out this directive, the staff should consider relevant site features, including population density, associated with accident risk in comparison to such features at presently operating plants."
Thus, the facts relevant to the site factors of ACN63 also lead one to the conclusion that the staff has been directed to analyze class-9 type accidents for this facility.
The concerns expressed here by TexPIRG are salient issues of public health and safety. However, there are undoubtedly other environmental impacts which should be examined, vis a vis major accidents.
For instance, the facility is -located on Texas' largest river, and possible acquatic impacts should be reviewed too.
V.
CONCLUSION The Commission has undoubtedly identified many reasons why the analysis of Class 9 accidents for environmental reviews serves the public interest. With this background, TexPIRG cannot understand how any possible minor delays and extra efforts on the part of the staff, justify a failure to carry out this policy for Docket 50-466.
- Indeed,
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the staff is presently in the midst of site review and the issue is ripe for consideration by the Licensing Board. The foregoing discussion shows that the staff is mandated by both the Comission and NEPA to make this effort. Therefore, the Intervenor urges the Board to direct the staff to submit a supplemental EIS which analyzes all all possible accidents, per 45 FR 40101, and further review previous environmental contentions of intervenors which were rejected on the basis of inability to litigate Class 9 accidents.
Respectfully Submitted, h,
ames M. Scott, r.
Counsel for TexPIRG CERTIFICATR OF SERVICM I hereby certify that copics of the attached motion have been cerved on the following by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class thic the Z,9 th day o f July,1980:
all partica go Docketing and Service Section f
Office of the Secretary Sheldon J. Violfe,, Ecq., Chairman U.S. Iluclear Regulatory Commiccian ASLB panel flashington, D.C. 20555 US URC Ylachington, DC 20555 Mr. Steve Schinki, Ecq.
US IIRC Staf f Attorney J. Gregory Copeland
- dcq, US N"C Baker and Botta Vlachington, DC 20555 One Shell Plaza Houston, Texas 77002 lir. Guc Speth, Chairman Council on Environmental quality Atomic Safety and Licensing 722 Jackson Place UVI Appeal Board
'7achington, DC 20506 US NRC Ylachington, DC 20555 2
~ h7Wn A2dA,
ydameu iiorgarr scoLt,RGar.
Attorney for Tex PI