ML19329F808

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IE Insp Rept 50-482/80-09 on 800429-0502.Noncompliance Noted:Improper Storage of safety-related Items,Failure to Identify Nonconforming Conditions & Failure to Provide Adequate Test Procedures
ML19329F808
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1980
From: Crossman W, Oberg C, Tapia J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19329F804 List:
References
50-482-80-09, 50-482-80-9, NUDOCS 8007110198
Download: ML19329F808 (9)


See also: IR 05000482/1980009

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

This Report Contains Investigation Information

(See Paragraphs 4 and 5)

Report No.

STN 50-482/80-09

Docket No.

STN 50-492

Category A2

Licensee:

Kansas Gas and Electric Co.

Post Office Box 208

Wichita, Kansas

67201

Facility Name:

Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

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Inspection Conducted: April 29-May 1, 1980

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Inspectors:

M/

_ Date

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C. R. Oberg, Reactorgnspector, Projects Section

(Paragraphs 1, 2, 7, 4, 5, 6, 11 & 12)

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. I. Tapia, Reactor / Inspector,, Engineering Support

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Section

(Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 & 10)

Approved:

" 4,5W ~Y$

b~?f9 TO

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p1'W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section

Date

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SD

'R. E. Hall, Chi 6f, En'gineering Support Section

' Date

800 711 OliI

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on April 29-May 1, 1980 (Report No. STN 50-482/80-09)

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A_ ryas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection and investigation of licensee

construction activities, including licensee action on previous inspection

findings; allegations of construction problems; construction deficiencies;

ultimate heat sink dam; and review of nonconformance reports. The intpection

involved forty-four inspector-hours on site and in office by two NRC

inspectors.

Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified

in two areas. Four items of ncncompliance were found in three areas.

(infraction - improper storage of safety-related items

paragraph 3; infraction -

failure to identify nonconforming conditions (2 examples) - paragraphs 2 and 8;

infraction - faflure to provide adequate test procedures - paragraph 9; and

infraction - failure to provide a timely 9ritten report for a construction

deficiency

paragraph 7).

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees (KG&E)

M. E. Clark, Manager, Quality Assurance, Site

  • G. W. Reeves, QA Engineer
  • D. W. Prigel, Assistant QA Manager, Site

S. L. Wamsley, QA Technician

  • G. L. Fouts, Construction Manager, Site
  • R. M. Stambaugh, QA Engineer

. Daniel International Corporation (Daniel)

  • W. E. Hitt, Project Manager

47. J. Turner, Project QA Manager

D. L. Jones, Project QC Manager

V. McBride, Civil Engineer

  • J. M. Ayres, QA Engineer

T. Damashek, Civil QC Engineer

C. Mitchell, Civil Engineer

Other Personnel

R. Seiple, Geotech Consultant, Dames & Moore

D. F. Fenster, Project Geologist, Dames & Moore

The IE inspectors alst talked with and interviewed other licensee employees

and contractor personnel including members of the QA/QC and engineering

staffs.

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) UnrescIved Item (STN 50-482/80-06):

Verification of Construction

Supervisor Experience. On April 30, 1980, an interview with Mr. Watson,

Personnel Director, of Daniel International Corporation (Wolf Creek

site) disclosed that employment verification had been completed for the

two employees whose qualifications were questioned.

Mr. Watson provided

documents containing information on the employees' past performance and

experience, which supports their current positions.

This matter is censidered resolved.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (STN 50-482/79-20): Fuel Transfer Canal Concrete.

During a site tour on November 28, 1980, the IE inspector identified

broken concrete in the fuel transfer canal around Nelson studs and

vartical rebar. This discrepancy had not been identified by QA or QC

personnel.

Based on the number of areas involved, the occurrence of the

concrete cracking was determined to be significant and should have been

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reported to Quality Control or Engineering.

The failure to report

is contrary to the requirements of Daniel Procedure AP-IV-02, Section

4.1.1, and to Appendix B of 10 CF2 50, criterion V.

This unresolved item is thus upgraded to an item of noncompliance.

The IE inspector noted the final disposition of the NCR (lSN1874C

dated 3/26/80) had not been determined as of the date of the NRC

inspection. Daqiel site engineering had initially determined that

the event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

This item is considered unresolved and will be reviewed during a

subsequent inspection.

3.

Site Tour

The IE inspector, accompanied by a licensee representativo, conducted a

general tour which included all or part of the following areas:

Ultimate Heat Sink Dam

General Lake Impoundment

Containment Building

Auxiliary Building

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Control Building

Fuel Building

The following blueprints were checked in the field for control and

issuance of proper revisions:

E-0R 3511 (Q), Rev. 10, issued 11/13/79

E-OR 3613 (Q), Rev. 1, issued 12/19/79

-E-OR 3713 (Q), Rev. 2, 1-sued 11/6/79

The purpose of the tour was to observe the general state of construction

activity and to observe housekeeping practices.

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During the tour of the Auxiliary Building, stainless steel spool pieces

and fittings, including IEJ-01-S-010/112 and 1PCl-EN-01-S008/112, wera

observed to be improperly stored.

They were found standing in water and

dirt, not on cribbing or otherwise protected from physical damage or

environmental contamination.

ANSI N45.2.2 specifies that items requiring

" Level D" stcrage are to be stored on cribbing or equivalent to allow

for air circulation and to avoid trapping water.

This condition is in

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noncompliance with requirements of Appendix B, 10 CFR 50.

The specific

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items identified during the tour were im:.ediately corrected and stored

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properly.

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4."

Investigation of Allegations Made by a Reporter Regarding Wolf Creek

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Construction Problems

On March 21, 1980, Region IV received a telephone call from a newspaper

reporter who stated that three allegations had been made to him by an

anonymous individual.

The allegations and the result of the investigation

made by the IE inspector are given below:

Allegation No. 1: A number cf construction supervisors were dismissed

as a result of some primary cooling system piping being damaged on

site. The anonymous individual did not believe this was reported to

proper supervisors.

Investigation Results:

Three supervisors had been dismissed but for

reasons other than what the allegation stated and which are not

relatei to the safety of plaat construction.

There were not any

reports of damaged primary coolant piping. No additional information

could be obtained from the source of the allegation on this item.

Allegation No. 2:

An employee had stated that he was fired by

Daniel because he reported construction problems caused by poorly

qualified supervisors.

Investigation Results:

The IE inspector reviewed the charte and action

taken on a case filed with the National Labor Relations Board (dated

February 28, 1980) by the discharged employee.

The case (#17-CA-9483)

was investigatri by the NLRB and an action filed on April 8, 1980.

The results of the investigation indicated that no further proceedings

were warranted because of insufficient evidence to show that the

employee was terminated in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the

National Labor Relations Act.

No appeal was made on this action.

Allegation No. 3:

Some sequence of parts in the Auxiliary Building

and Turbine Building were installed backwards.

The informant

believed (emphasis nrovided) that this was covered up by employees

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and not reported to proper supervisory levels.

Investigation Results:

Several noncenformance reports (NCRs) and

deficiency reports (DRs) were reviewed by the IE inspector indicating

that the sequence of installation of some specific items were not

correct. However, they were reported to the proper level of

supervision, and were corrected in accordance with the QA program.

More specific information could not be obtained from the source

of the allegations.

Based on the information made available on these allegations and the

results of the investigation, the IE inspector concluded that although

the allegations had some basis, they have no merit.

Since more specific

information could not be obtained, the items are considered closed.

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5.

Allegation Regarding Wrong Weld Rod Being Used in Fuel Transfer Canal

Liner Plate

An allegation was received by Region IV on April 25, 1980, in regard

to improper welding of the Fuel Building transfer canal liner plate.

The alleger stated that the plates were welded with carbon steel rods and

finished with stainless steel rods. The welds were rusting after the

stainless steel was ground off. A specific seam was identified.

The IE inspector determined that the fuel pool and fuel transfer canal

liner plate is nonsafety-related. The allegatica information was given

to the KG&E QA Site Manager for verificatica and follow-up action.

On

May 9, 1980, the licensee QA Manager contacted the IE inspector and

reported that the discrepant wald had been located.

Corrective action

for the specific weld will be taken as well as action to correct any

generic problem for control of weld rod issue.

They also reported that the

weld had been previously identified and reported by a QC inspector.

(Deficiency Report No. IND3864M dated April 29, 1980)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6.

Potential Construction Deficiency - Essential Service Water (ESW) Spool S011

On April 24,1980, a 42" ESW spool, ICK 205 - S011, was rejected by QC

due to the large number of unacceptable linear indications found as a

result of visual and magna-flux >.xaminations.

The IE inspector examined the spool en May 1, 1980.

Subsequently, the

IE inspector was informed on May 8,1980, that the licensee considered

this deficiency to be potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

The licensee is currently evaluating the event for safety / generic signifi-

cance.

This item is considered unresolved and will be reviewed during a subsequent

inspection.

7.

Review of 50.55(e) Construction Deficiency Reactor Cavity Concrete

An inspection was conducted of the physical condition of the construction

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deficiency addressed in paragraph 4 of NRC Inspection Report No. STI: 50-482/

80-07.

The deficiency concerns the spalling of concrete in the reactor

cavity collector trench. This condition is identified in Nonconformance

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Raport No. ISN1808C.

The concrete has been chipped back to sound material

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and awaits the engineering evaluation of required repairs.

The KG&E Quality Assurance Site Manager notified the IE principal inspector

on March 7, 1980, of the determination by the licensee that the spalling

of concrete in the reactor cavity was reportable within the context of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

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10 CFR 50.55(e)(3) states that:

The holder of a construction

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permit shall also submit a written report on a reportable deficiency within

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thirty (30) dsys to the appropriate NRC Regional Office .

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interim final report was, therefore, due on April 7,1980.

As of the

date of this inspection no report had been submitted.

This is an infraction in that it is a failure to satisfy conditions of the

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construction permit.

8.

Identification of con.cruction Damage

During the inspection of spalled concrete (paragraph 7) on April 29, 1980,

the IE inspector observed that cracking had occurred in the area adjacent

to the spalling.

Closer observation disclosed that the refueling cavity

stainless steel seal ring had been pulled away from the concrete. The

plate war pulled away by means of a force apparently transmitted through

a mild steel plate lug which had been welded to the seal ring. This lug

showed a gouge mark on the outside edge of the eye.

Another mild-steel

plate lug was welded to the reactor vessel cover and oriented directly

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opposite the lug on the seal ring.

It too showed a gouge on the outside

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edge of tha lug's eye.

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Through discussions with the Daniel QA Manager, it was determined that the

purpose of the lugs was to provide lateral restraint of the reactor vessel as

it hung in place prior to final setting.

This precaution was intended to

prevent swaying of the vessel.

During the process of setting the vessel

wear plates, a come-alcag was apparently left attached to the two lugs

as the vessel was lifted.

The resulting damage to the concrete, although

visible, had not been reported by any construction or licensee personnel

who were present and were aware of the damage.

Daniel International Construction Procedure No. AP-VI-02, Revision 8

"Nonconformance Control and Reporting," Section 4.1.1 requires that all

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project personnel identify any material nonconformance or nonconformance

activity and bring it to the attention of Quality Control or Engineering.

The damaged concrete was not brought to the attention of responsible

personnel, but rather, was identified by the IE inspector.

This represents an infraction in that it is a failure on the part of

project personnel tc. follow approved reporting procedures as required

by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

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9.

Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

a.

Observation of Surface Feature

A tour of the Ultimate heat Sink area was conducted with the Dames &

Moore Project Geulogist for the purpose of observing the Plattsmouth

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limestone surface which showed signs of separation of the interbedded

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shale layers along joints parallel to the surface. Through' discussions

held by the Dames & Moore Project Geologist with a representative

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of the Kansas Geologic Survey the day prior to the beginning of this

inspection, it was agreed that this geologic feature was a result of

mechanical weathering.

This conclusion is supported by the fact

that.this portion of the UHS excavation has undergane repeated cycles

of inundation and drying. The affected area has been mapped and a

report will be submitted to the NRC by KG&E.

b.

Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) Dam

This portion of the inspection involved observation of the completed

construction and a review of randomly selected quality control

documentation. The construction controls and field density test

requirements are delineated in:

(1) Sargent & Lundy Specification A-3854, ksendment 2, " Lake ark"

(2) Sargent & Lundy Spacification A-3853, Amendment 3, " Earthwork

Testing"

The IE inspector reviewed fifty-six randomly selected Civil QC

Daily Inspection Reports covering the period from September 6, 1979,

to April 21, 1980.

In addition, twenty-four Moisture and Density of

Soil In-Place Reports from April 9-17, 1980, were reviewed along with

four Proctor Density determinations dated bewteen October 11, 1978,

and April 9, 1980.

During in place relative density testing of the UHS Dam, the

referenced acceptance criteria (based on ASTM D698A, " Moisture-Density

Relations of Soils Using 5.5-lb Rammer and 12-in.

Drop") on a

second retest (Field Test No. LQ 223) of an in place density test

was found to be different from that of the original test (Field

Test No. LQ 220) and the first retest (Field Test No. 222).

In

addition, the referenced acceptance criteria were based on material

used in nonsafety-related 3affle Dike "A".

Field Tests No.LQ 220 and LQ 222 referenced Proctor Density No. LW-60,

while Field Test No. LQ 223 referenced Proctor Density No. LW-81.

Proctor Density No. LW-60 was performed on material sampled from the

UHS stockpile whereas No. LW-81 come from material taken from

Baffle Dike "A".

Since the specification for compaction requires

that the dry density of the compacted soil mass be a stated

percentage of the laboratory Standard Proctor Compaction for that

material, the referenced Proctor Density Number would not be expected

to change to reflect nonsafety-related material on a retest of a

safety-related material after reworking.

Discussions with cognizant QC personnel revealed that the change in

criteria was due to a visual interpretation of . change in the soil

composition and therefore the acceptance standard by the Level I-Soils

QC inspector.

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A review of the Quality Control procedures and specifications appli-

cable to the UHS relative density testing program was conducted by the

IE inspector. No reference was ida'tified which allowed for the

changing of in place density tes'

eptance criteria by a Level I -

QC Soils inspector. Neither wa-

, reference identified which

permitted the visual interpretat.;n of soil composition by a Level I -

QC Soils inspector.

The above activities represent an infraction in that they are a departure

from those documented procedures which require that testing is

accomplished to the requirements and acceptance limits contained in

applicable design documents.

10.

Nonconformance Report (NCR) Review

The IE inspectors reviewed seventy-two randomly selected nonconformance

reports for the purpose of validating conformance to the construction

deficiency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and with Daniel

Procedure No. AP-VI-02, Revision 8, "Nonconformance Control and Reporting."

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required

in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-

compliance, or deviations.

Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection

-are discussed in paragraphs 2 and 6.

12.

Exit Interview

The IE inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the site inspection on May 1, 1980.

The IE inspector

summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The items of non-

compliance were acknowledged.

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