ML19329F210

Forwards Partial Response to Requests for NRC Review of Util Position Re Miscellaneous Category Reg Guide Implementation

ML19329F210
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	09/29/1976
From:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Howell S CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
NUDOCS 8006230734
Download: ML19329F210 (13)

Text

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~ ~~ MIDLAND PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 REGULATORY GUIDE REVIEW 1. Regulatory Guide'1.1 " Net Positive Suction Head For Emergency Core Cooling And Containment Heat Removal System Pumps" - (Safety Guide 1, -11/2/70) This guide describes a suitable relationship between increases in containment pressure caused by postulated loss-of-coolant accidents and the net positive suction head of emergency core cooling and con-tainment heat removal system pumps which may be used to implement Gene'ral Design Criterion 41. The applicant has used a standard computational method for determining the net positive suction head (NPSH) available to the pumps. An assumption used in the analysis is that the sump water temperature equals the saturation temperature corresponding to the containment pressure. The available NPSH is the.1 a function of the static head and the system friction losses. This calculational method assures a conservative calculation of the available NPSH. We therefore find this approach to be acceptable and we conclude that j the design is in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.1.

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.s-2. Resulatory Guide 1.4 " Assumptions Used For Evaluating the Potential Raciological Consequences of a Loss-of-Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors" - (Revision 2, June 1974) This guide gives acceptable assumptions that may be used in evaluating the radiological consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident for a pressurized water reactor. The staff has reviewed the applicant's February 13, 1976 response to our letter of January 13, 1976 concerning the implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.4 by Midland in the preparation of their FSAR. We find the applicant's proposed method of analysis of evaluating the radiological consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident to be unaccept-able. It is the staff position that the applicant present a conserva-tive analysis of the radiological consequences of a LOCA based on the " semi-infinite cloud" assumptions contained in Regulatory Guide 1.4. The applicant may use the " finite cloud" model described in the February 13, 1976 letter for a realistic analysis of the consequences of a LOCA, if he so chooses. 'The staff recently has revised the model for calculation of whole body doses for judging acceptability with respect to 10 CFR Part 100. The revised model considers the dose from low penetrating beta radiation as a skin dose, rather than as a contributor to the whole body dose, as the former model did. The staff considers only that radiation which penetrates the body to a depth of 5 cm to be a contributor to the whole body dose. ) I ~

i. -s 3. Regulatory Guide 1.7 " Control of Combustion Gas Concentra.t.i.on.s.J.n Containment followino a Loss-of-Coolant Accident" - (Safety Guide /, 3/10/71 with Supplement dated October 27, 1971) This guide describes an acceptable method of implementing General Design Criterion 41 as regards provision of systems to control the concentrations of hydrogen, oxygen and other substances that may be released into the reactor containment following postu-lated accidents. The applicant has committed to comply with the design guidance and assumptions for snalysis contained in Regulatory Guide 1.7 as supplemented by Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.5 and Branch Tech-nical Position CSB 6-2, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations for Containment Following a LOCA," for the design of the combustible gas control system. We find this approach to be acceptable. We will review the combustible gas control system design and supporting analyses in conjunction with the application for an operating license. O e e l ~ d p.

i s s ,4, 4. Regulatory Guide 1.13 " Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis" - (Safety Guide 13, 3/10/71) This guide describes an acceptable method of implementing General Design Crfterion 61 as regards the design of spent fuel storage and handling systems. The initial plant design did not include charcoal filters in the exhaust system for the spent fuel storage facility. During discussions with the applicant, the applicant agreed to install charcoal filters in conformance with the guide. On the basis of this commitment by the applicant, the staff finds that the design is in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 and is acceptable. I m w-m <.,y-, g w -.w

m 5. Regulatory Guide 1.25 " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential . Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors" - (Safety Guide 25. March 23, 1972) This guide gives acceptable assumptions that may be used in evaluating the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident in the fuel handling and storage facility for a boiling or a pressurized water reactor plant. The initial design did not include charcoal filters to limit possible iodine release following a postulated fuel handling accident. Following staff questions, the applicant agreed that suitable charcoal filters would be provided in the design in conformance with the recommendations of the guide. On the basis of the applicant's commitment to provide adequate charcoal filters, the staff finds that the design is in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.25 and is acceptable. i I l ~^

-5 3 , 6.- Regulatory Guide 1.27 " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants" TKev1ston 1, March 1974) This guide describes an acceptable basis for implementing General Design Criteria 44 and 2 with regard to the ultimate heat sink for a nuclear power plant. In response to our request, the applicant provided the results of a transient heat analysis for the ultimate heat sink. The applicant stated that the analysis perfonned was more conservative than our Branch Technical Position APCSB 9-2. This more conserva-tive method was used to allow for lack of station auxiliary heat loads data. We compared the calculated heat rejection data with other plants of similar si e and design whose data included auxil-iary heat loads. While it appears that the Midland core decay heat curves are conservative with respect to BTP-APCS 8 9-2, data from other plants indicates that the final analysis may not be conserva-l tive when the auxiliary heat loads for the Midland Plant are added f to the decay heat removal requirements. The applicant will include the station auxiliary heat loads in the FSAR. The applicant's analysis of the Midland emergency pond (ultimate heat sink) for thermal performance and water loss was performed in accordance with the criteria outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.27. The resulting peak pond temperature of 108.5'F is 3.5'F above the present service water system design temperature, which conflicts with Position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.27. The design temperature will be exceeded for approximately 24 hours. An independent staff analysis, using meteorological and heat rejection rate data supplied by the applicant, confirms the calculated peak temperature of -108.5'F for the emergency pond. As a result of our review, we have concluded that during the OL review, the applicant must demonstrate that all safety-related equipment whose design temperature is exceeded will be able to function for as long as the emergency lasts. If this cannot be accomplished, we will require the plant Technical Specifications to j ..w,e--- w.,,9- ..w._..,---r,.,,.,ow.,..-,,.,.,,w.,*. ,.,_,ww.-. o e e,..,...v.w..+

^ 'N 7 J 1 include a power level limit to conform with Position C.4 of Regu-latcry Guide 1.27, when the ultimate heat sink reaches a prede-temined temperature. 1 4 i I i e a 09 Q 9 p' W - 1 s r-,w-w vvu w v e --we m a w-ew,~ --m n , - v em e<w -v --n+we<'-?w ~ v -r

O m i 7. Regulatory Guide 1.42 " Interim Licensing Policy on as low as Practic-able for Gaseous Radiciodine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors" - (Revision 1, March 1974) This guide provided guidance on implementing the interim criteria for keeping radioactive iodine release in gaseous effluents from light water reactor plants as low as practicable. The applicant has indicated that Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 supersedes Regulatory Guide 1.42, and therefore, Regulatory Guide 1.42 is no longer appropriate. We find this position to be acceptable. l l ~~ e-- +rw

~. ~ ^ 8. Regulatory Guide 1.49 " Power Levels of Nuclear Power Plants" - (Revision 1, December 1973) This guide describes acceptable maximum power levels for all nuclear power plants, implementing the Commission's policy state-ment of March 5,1973, which stated that the size of all new nuclear power plants accepted for licensing review would be subject to a maximum power limit. The proposed licensed power level for each of the Midland units is 2452 MWt, which is well within the maxitum set by this guide. On the basis of the information furnished by the applicant in the letter of November 7,1975, and discussions during the meeting on December 19, 1975, the staff agrees that the applicant intends to conform fully to this guide. g' pp 6 _y

-s 9. Regulatory Guide 1.52 " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Atmosphere Cleanuo System Air Filtration and Adsorotion Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" - (June 1973) This guide presents acceptable methods of implementing the re-quirements of General Design Criteria 41, 42 and 43 with regard to air filtration and atmosphere cleanup systems in light-water-cooled nuclear power plants for the purpose of mitigating the consequences of postulated accidents. The applicant's design is in conformance with the positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 with two exceptions. We do not consider the justification given for deviating from Regulatory Guide 1.52 accept-able. We recommend that the applicant revise his design to conform with the following positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52. C.2.a Demisters should be provided in the design of the Emergency Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Units since there exists the potential for water droplets to be entrained in the air stream after a fuel handling accident. C.3.j A low flow air bleed system to inhibit adsorber fires is acceptable. However, the design should satisfy the single failure criterion for providing low' humidity (less than 70% relative humidity) cooling air flow. I I I + pp - 9

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10. Regulatory Guide 1.59

" Design Basis Floods for Nuclear power Plants" -_(August 1973) This guide describes an acceptable method of determining, for sites along streams or rivers, the design basis floods that nuclear i power plants must be designed to withstand without loss of safety-related functions. ] The applicant has proposed an alternative to position C.2.d of Regulatory Guide 1.59 which states that structures, systems, and components necessary for cold shutdown and maintenance thereof be designed with " hardened" flood protection. The applicant proposed sand-bagging certain entrances where permanent protection is not considered feasible due to access requirement for trucks and train cars, or due to the current stage of construction and building. design. Entrances would be sand-bagged to an elevation of ~635.5 feet mean sea level (ft MSL) (1.5 ft above plant grade). The 635.5 foot elevation was estimated from the Probable Maximum Flood on the Tittabawassee River plus coincident wind-generated wave action. We have independently estimated the run up and concur with the selected level. Based on the duration of runup on the plant island (less than one day) and the shallow depth of estimated runup (1.5 feet), we will accept the proposed alternative to position C.2.d., provided that a technical specification referencing acceptable emergency procedures that assure acceptable sand-bagging procedures for flood protection be provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Also, we will require that the applicant demonstrate (in the FSAR) that erosion of the Tittabawassee River bank adjacent to safety-related facilities will not endanger ' systems necessary to shutdown and cool down the plant. e ,_-....y m... -- - -,. ~ -....,, ,__,,-_w,- ,w v}}