ML19329E206
| ML19329E206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1972 |
| From: | Howell S CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006110577 | |
| Download: ML19329E206 (4) | |
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. i Stephen M. Howel!
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General offices: 212 West Micnigan Avenue. Jackson. Micnegan 49201. Area Cede 517 788 0550 Nc October 31, 1972
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G r.wt :ECTicst Effects of Failures in DocrIT CLEM e
Non-Category I Equipment
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~1 Mr. R. C. DeYoung i
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Direccorate of Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission "l
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Washington, D. C.
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Dear Mr. DeYoung:
We have reviewed the proposed design of the Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2, as requested in your letter of September 29, 1972. It is our eenclusion that failure of any non-Category I (Seismic) equip-ment will not adversely affect the performance of safety-related equip-ment required for safe shutdown of the facilities or for limiting t.he consequences of an accident.
Our stated conclusion is based on the analysis of specific systems and equipment including the circulating water system, the fire protection system, the chemical storage systems and other on-site and off-site equipment failures.
Circulating Water System. Failure of the circulating water system will not affect safety-related equipment because all safety-related (ie, Seismic Category I) equipment is located within the flood protected Auxiliary Building, Service Water Structure and Diesel Gener-ator Building. As noted in our response to AEC-DRL Question 5.1.28
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(PSAR Amendment No. 8), there is no safety-related equipment located within the non-Seismic Category I, non-flood protected structures.
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Flood protection of safety-related equipment is provided within their l
enclosing structures to elevation 634 feet. This is two feet above the top of the cooling pond dike. Normal operating level of the pond varies from 618 feet to 627 feet. In addition, piping connecting equipment in the Turbine Building to equipment in the Auxiliary Building is routed through.two separate pipe tunnels which are fitted with watertight, Seismic Category I barriers. All piping is attached to the watertight barrier so as to prevent leakage by the barrier. Hence, flooding of safety-related equipment is precluded from all water sources external to the Auxiliary Building, including ruptures of the circulating water i
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October 31, 1972 system. Any water from a ruptured circulating water line would leak out of the non-flood protected Turbine Building before its level would reach elevation 634 feet.
Fire Protection System. As indicated in the response to AEC-
,DRL Questions 9 5 and 9.7 (PSAR Amendment Nos. 5, 6 and 7), the Midland fire protection system will be designed to preclude loss-of-function of safety-related systems upon fire protection system failure. If barriers are used, they will be designed for the potentially damaging conditions.
Once the fire protection system is fully designed, analyses will be per-s formed to ensure that the above design criterion has been met.
Chemical Storage Systems. Large quantities of chemicals such as sulfuric acid, boric acid, aannonium and caustic solutions contained in Seismic Category II tanks will be surrounded by beams or curbing suf-ficiently sized to contain the entire contents of the tank. Also; lined pits will be provided under sulfuric acid tanks in addition to curbs.
Further, only chemicals connected with Reactor Building spray and reactor coolant system chemistry control (principally boric acid) will be stored in the Auxiliary Building. In the case of boric acid tanks in the Auxil-iary Building, the susceptible floor drainage piping will be provided with caps or plugs such that the obstruction of drains due to crystallization of boric acid is prevented. These plugs or caps will be removed only dur-ind periodic washing or flushing of equipment area ficors. Small quantities of sodium hydroxide, sodium thiosulphate, lithium hydroxide and hydrazine will also be stored in the Auxiliary Building; provisions will be made such that release of these chemicals will not have deleterious effects on any safety-related systems. Finally, studies will be made before final equip-ment location to ensure that tank rupture or inadvertent release of any hazardous chemicals will not adversely affect the operation of safety-related systems.
Other Equipment Failures. Other non-Category I equiInnent fail-ures have been studied to see if there would be any effect on safety-related equipment. These types of failures include missiles, pipe whip-ping, explosions, and off-site rele'ase of toxic gas. As indicated in our response to AEC-DRL Questions 4.11, 4.14 and 4.16 (PSAR Amendment No. 5) we will protect the primary system and all engineered safety features from damage that might be caused by missiles generated as a result of equipment failures within the Reactor Building. Protection against missiles and pipe whip will be provided by physical separation, restraints and missile shields such as the Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building external walls and internal separation walls. The effect of turbine missiles on safety-related equipment was analyzed in our response to AEC-DRL Question 13 3 7 (PSAR Amendment No. 5). Our responses to AEC-DRL Questions 13 5 1, 13 5 2, 13 5 3 and 2.00 (PSAR Amendment Nos. 5,11 and 12) analyzed the effects of explosions and release of toxic gas at the adjacent Dow Chemical facilities.
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Mr. R. C. DeYoung 3
October 31, 1972 i
We will continue our analysis of potential hazards to Category I systems throughout the design phase of the Project which 4
is about 50 Percent complete at this time.
Yours very truly,
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AEC DI.nIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCXET MATIAL
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(E MPORARY FORM)
COHTROL No:
5999 FII2 FROM DA'E OF DOC:
DATE REC'D LTR MF.M0 RP2 OniER Consumers Power Company Jackson, Michigan 49201 10-31-72 11-02-72 X
Stephen H. Howell 1
TO:
R. C.,DeYoung 1
CIASSI yPROPINFO INFUT NO CYS REC'D DOC;GT no GO-32D50-330' 1
DESCRIPPION:
ENCLOSURES:
Ltr re our 9-29-72 ltr... furnishing responses
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l Category I (Seismic) equipnent with regards to the performance of safety-related equip.
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