ML19329C515
| ML19329C515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1976 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Lear G, Purple R, Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329C513 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002140888 | |
| Download: ML19329C515 (5) | |
Text
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o rso UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3fy WASHINGTON. o. c. 2c555 h
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P@.I21976 R. A. Purple, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 1, OR D. L.-Ziemann, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 2, OR G. E. Lear, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 3, OR R. W. Reid, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch 4, OR
'R. L. Baer, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch, OR s
THRU:
D. G. Ei enn ssistant Director for Operational Technology, OR ECCS REVIEWS IN {dE ELECTRICAL, INSTRL"AESTATION AND CONTROLS AREAS The attached "Ceneric Infor=ation Request for Reviews of ECCS in the Electrical Instrumentation and Control Areas" defines the information requirements for and the scope of PSB review in these areas.
The develop-ment of this information request was coordinated with the Reactor Safety Branch and the Electrical, Instrumantation and Control Systems Branch, DSS.
Its purpose is to insure a complete and uniform ECCS single failure review in the areas indicated.
The information request addresses the follouing specific concerns:
1.
ECCS actuation system conformance to single failure criterion.
2.
Onsite E=ergency Power System conformance to single failure criterion.
3.
Environmental and seismic qualification of electrical equipment.
4.
Submerged electrical equipcent (due to LOCA).
5.
Critical single electrically-operated fluid system components, including manually-controlled electrically-operated valves.
6.
Interlocks between redundant portions of ECCS and supporting subsystems.
7.
Electrical and physical separation criteria 8.
Proposed mcdifications.
1 9.
Required drawings.
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8002140
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MAR.1 2 1976 R. A. Purple 2
D. L. Zicaann G. E. Lear R'. W. Reid R. L. Baer The'PSB reviewer will require this information to be available fron the licensee.
It should be understood that a response to this information request which
- references (and thus verifies the validity of) infor ation presently on the docket is acceptable as a basis for our review.
Therefore, if there is any doubt with regard to the completeness or validity of existing docketed information, the complete information request should be transmitted to the licensee.
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NW A.'$chwencer, Chief Plant Systems Branch Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
V. Stello
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R. Tedesco D. Ross T. Ippolito (4) 3 j
T. Novak (4) 1 F. Rosa P. Atherton 3
J. Knight 4
D. Mcdonald l
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MAR.1 2 1976 GENERIC INFOP'!ATI'"*' REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF ECCS IN ' 'E ELECTRICAL, INSTRt2IENTATION A.
CONTROLS AREAS The Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactory, 10 CFR Part 50.46, requires that an analysis of possible failure modes of ECCS equipment and of their effects on ECCS per-formance be performed. This analysis should deconstrate that your ECCS and supportins subsystems meet the single failure criterion. We require that doc-umentation of this analysis 'oe provided in sufficient detail to enable the staff' to (1) verify that the analysis demonstrates that the ECCS and supporting subsystems meet the single failure criterion as defined in IEEE Std 279-1971, and (2) determine the acceptability and verify the implementation of any proposed design modification required as a result of your analysis.
Therefore, we require that the following information be submitted to support the single failure analysis of the ECCS and supporting subsystems:
1.
'l Describe the design of the ECCS actuation system.
Identify any non-conformance of this design with the single failure requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971. Describe any changes proposed for meeting these i
require =ents.
1 2.
Describe the design of the onsite e=crgency power system, a c d-c.
Identify any non-conformance of this design with the single failure 3
requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971. Describe any changes proposed for meeting these requirements.
3.
Identify all the electrical equipcent required for the ECCS and supporting subsystems to enable performance of the ECCS safety function.
De-fine the qualification status (ability to withstand the design basis seismic and environ = ental conditions) of this equipment, and the basis for such qualification, to provide reasonable assurance that the equipment will be capable of performing its safety function. Describe e
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s any proposed design codifications, analyses, or test programs for meeting the environ = ental and seismic qualification requirements.
- 4. _ Identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, that may become submerged as a result of a LOCA. For all such equipment
'that is not qualified for service in such an environment, provide an analysis to deter =ine the following:
(1) the safety significance of the failure of the equipment (e.g., spurious operation, loss of function, loss of accident / post-accident monitoring, etc.) as a result of
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flooding, (2) the effects on Class IE electrical power sources serving
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this equipment as a result of such failures, and (3) the proposed design changes resulting from your analysis. Your response to item (2) should specifically address breaker and fuse coordination and the isolation capabilities of this aspect of your design.
5.
Identify any single electrically operated fluid system component, including manually-controlled electrically-operated valves, whose failure could result in loss of capability of the ECCS to perform its safety function.
Failure in both the " fail to function" sense and in the " undesirable function" sense should be considered, and this should apply even though the component may not be required to function in a given safety operational sequence.
6.
With regard to the equipment identified in item (5), provide a detailed description of any proposed design changes deemed necessary by your analysis for meeting the single failure criterion. Your response should specifically address but should not be limited to changes made to meet the single failure criterion by conformance to Branch Technical Position EICSB 18, " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to 9
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s Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves", of Appendix 7A of the Regulatory Standard Review Plan. This position establishes the acceptability of disconnecting power to the electrical components of a fluid system as one means of meeting the single failure criterion.
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- 7. ' Identify any electrical interlocks between redundant portions of the ECCS and supporting subsystems. Define the consequence of failure of any interlock on the capability of the ECCS to perform its safety i
function.
Describe any proposed design modifica,tions resulting from
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this review.
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8.
Provide the electrical and physical separation criteria for your design of redundant safety equip =ent and functions.
Include the features in your design that minimize the vulnerability of the ECCS and supporting subsystems to coccon failure modes.
9.
Provide the following drawings for the ECCS and supporting subsystems:
Piping and Instrucent Di'agrams (P&ID).
a.
b.
Electrical Control Sche =atic Diagrams, One Line Diagram of the Onsite AC Power Distribution System.
c.
4 d.
One Line Diagram of the DC Power Distribution System.
One Line Diagram of the Vital Instru=ent Power Distribution System.
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