ML19329A375
| ML19329A375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1978 |
| From: | Birkel R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kniel K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001030947 | |
| Download: ML19329A375 (6) | |
Text
.,to Meeting Notice
!Do'cket File J. Knight NRC PDR D. Ross Local PDR R. Tedesco TIC S. Pawl'.cki LWR #2 File I. Sib'eil NRR Reading P. Cher:k E. Case T. Novak D. Crutchfield Z. Rosztoczy R. Boyd T. Ippolito R. C. DeYoung V. Benaraya D. B. Vassallo G. Lainas D. Skovholt F. Rosa R. Denise V. Moore F. J. Williams R. Vollmer J. Stolz M. Ernst
.O. Parr W. Gammill S. Varga G. Knighton R. Clark B. Youngblood T. Speis W. Regan P. Collins D. Bunch C. Heltemes J. Collins R. Houston W. Kreger
'R. J. Mattson R. Ballard H. Denton M. Spangler ACRS (16)
J. Stepp L. Crocker L. Hulman H. Berkow H. Ornstein Project Manager - R. Birkel L. Dreher Attorney, ELD B. Faulkenberry, IE IE-(3 )
Principal Staff
Participants:
J. Lee V. Stello Receptionist Phillips P. Matthews L. Rubenstein W. Butler R. Bosnak R. Ferguson W. Haass D. Eisenhut M. Fairtile R. Reid I
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8001080 7 {
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UNITED STATES
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4 NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION j
W! 4HINGTON, D. C. 20566 APR 131978 Docket Nos. 50-369/370
- andl50'-269/270/287 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Karl Kniel, Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2, DPM FROM:
Ralph A. Birkel, Project Manager, Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2. DPM
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2)
DATE & TIME:
Friday, April 14, 1978 2:15 p.m.
i LOCATION:
Room P-422, Phillips Building Bethesda, Maryland PURPOSE:
Discussion of Duke Power Company's appeal to staff fire protection position for McGuire and Oconee cable spreading -ooms.
Position of applicant and staff are enclosed.
PARTICIPANTS:
DUKE POWER COMPANY (W. Owens, W. Parker, et al)
NRC - STAFF (V. Stello, R. Mattson, R. Boyd, R. Tedesco, V. Benaroya, P. Matthews, W. Butler, R. Ferguson, D. Eisenhut, D. Vassallo, K. Kniel, R. Birkel, M. Fairtile, R. Reid, et al)
Wg, Als Ralph A. Birkel Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2 Division of Project Management
Enclosure:
Applicant / Staff Positions a
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UNITED STATES '
e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 j
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Docket Nos. 50-369 i '
and 50-370 NOTE T0: Attendees Duke Power Company Appeal Meeting, Friday, April 14, 1978
Subject:
Fire Suppression System McGuire/0conee Cable Spreading Rooms 4
Enclosure No.1 - Duke Power Company Position Statement Enclosure No. 2 - NRC Staff Requirements
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Enclosure No. 1
. E 'ek'. k DUKE POWER COMPANY h tt.C. l e g t, ( b O 4t, 4
$4,w FIRE PROTECTION SUPPRESSION SYSTEM oT b"D MRC APFr.AL MEgTipG
' N APRIL 14, 1978 1
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SUMMARY
OF DUKE POWER COMPANY POSITION Duke Power Company has proposed to install a " Standby Shutdown System" at its Oconee and McCuire Nuclear Stations.
These systems would be capable of bringing one or smore units to a safe shutdown condition following postulated fires or esbotage scenarios.
The SSS at each c,tation would be redundant to normal installed plant equipment utilised for shutdown or accident mitigation.
Turther information on the SSS has been presented to the staff on January 18, 1978 (verbal) and Tebruary i
1, 1978 (written) for oconee and on March 23, 1978 (verbal) for McGuire.
A formal' submittal on the McGuire SSS is scheduled for May 1, 1978.
As redundant shutdown capability, the 555 at each station is protected from fires or sabotage such that no currently postulated event could cause the loss of both normal and SSS shutdown capability.
The position has been expressed by the NRC staff, however, that a fixed automatic or i
manual fire suppression system should be provided in areas such as cable apreading rooms and equipment rooms.
Duke Power Company agrees that an adequate level of fire suppreeeion capability should be provided throughout a station, even though redundant safe shutdown capability is provided.
Such ca p bility is demanded by good engineering practice, responsible management to minimize ptoperty loss potential, and recognition of the need for " defense in dep.h" to assure protection of public health and safety.
It is considerei, however, that adequate protection can be assured by providing suppressici capability by other than fixed systems - e.g., portable extinguishers and installed hose stations in and near cable spreading rooms.
This posittor is also considered to be consistent with the staf f's position as expret sed in l
Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 which requires that when a dedicated sl.utdown system is utilized manual fire fighting capability to protect other safety-related systems is required.
The only valid basis, therefore, for a decision is cost versus benefit with regard to installing a suppression system in addition to manual capability.
It is Duke Power Company's position that considering the existence of a standby shutdown system the incremental beneft: of a fixed, versus non-fixed, suppression system is not greater than its associated Standby Shutdown System has little cost.
Otherwise, it appears that a
relative benefit from a fire protection perspective.
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- yj' f Staff Recuiremtnts 1;0-Minimum safe shutdown systems when one division of all safety systems-is not available; 1.1
-Following any fire, the plant can be brought to hot shutdown conditions using equipment and systems thatare free of fire damage.
1.2 The plant should be capable-of maintaining hot shutdown conditions
' for an extended. time period significantly longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
1.3 Fire damage to systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should be limited so that repairs can.
be made and cold shutdown conditions achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Repa$ procedures for cold shutdown systems should be prepared 1.4 now and material needed for strch repairs should be on the site.
1.5 The hot shutdown condition must be achievable with power from the offsite power system, and upon its loss, with power from the onsite power system.
A dedicated power supply may be substituted for the onsite power system.
1.6 The power needed to achieve the cold shutdown ccndition may be obtained from any one of the offsite power, onsite power, and dedicated power system.
1.7 When these minimum systems are provided their adequacy shall be verified by a tnorougn evaluation of:
'a. Systems required for hot shutdown; b.
Systems required for cold shutdown; c.
Fire damage to power distribution systems; and-d.
Interactions caused by fire damage to power and water supply systems and to supporting systems, i.e., component cooling water supply.
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Minimum-fire protection when dedicated or alternate shutdown systems are provided.
2.1 The fire protection systems in areas (such as cable spreading rooms) that contain cables for a large number of systems should consist of:
a.
Fire detection system; 3
- b.. Hose stations; and
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Fixed manual suppression system (gas or water)
NOTE:
Consideration to preventing fire propagation via covered trays, fire retardant coating, barriers or blankets on a case-by-case basis.
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2.2
- Where access is difficult or impossible automatic systems should
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be provided.
i Where_ modifications will not be implemented for an extende'd 2.3 period, interim protection measures should be required to compensate for the lack of protection.
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