ML19329A368
| ML19329A368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1975 |
| From: | Seidle W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Thornburg H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001020950 | |
| Download: ML19329A368 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1975008
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:' ~- fQQp yg -p , UNITED ST ATES , [[/(Aet#, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO , REGloN ll 2 30 PE ACHTREE STREET, N. W. SulTE $18 ATLANT A, CEORGt A 30303 September 19, 1975 H. D. Thornburg, Chief, Field Coordination and Enf orcement Branch, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Headquarters Norman C. Moseley, Director, Office of Inspection and THRU: Enforcement, Region II DELETION OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION - DUKE POWER COMPANY (OCONEE 1, 2, AND 3 , LICENSE NOS. DPR-38, 47 AND 55 - INVESTIGATION REPORT NOS. -269 75-8, 50-270/75-9 AND 50-287/75-9 The enclosed pages of the subject report have been changed to delete Please change the appropriate pages of your proprietary information. 14, 1975, copy of the report initially distributed to you on August to delete the proprietary information as shown on the enclosed pages. a These deletions are in response to the licensee's application of September 3 and 10,1975, requesting that certain information be withheld from public disclosure. . 1 e .W. C. SeidlN, Chief Facilities Test and Startup Branch Enclosures: Page Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the report Page Nos. 7 and 8 of Attachment 1 cc enclosures only:
- PDR
- Local PDR
- NSIC
- TIC
- State
- Corrected pages inserted into copies
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. _ _ _ . . , '- ,i The DPC quality assurance program description is contained in Appendix IB of the FSAR. Paragraph 1B.5.2 states that ". . all drawings and procc- . dures for construction of the station prepared by Duke, consultants, or vendors are reviewed and approved by engineering prior to release to the Construction Department. Any changes to these must be approved by the Engineering Department ." This commitment appears to have not been . . fulfilled in that changes to the instrumant design have not been docu- mented and current drawings are not available. Also, paragraph 1C.3.Sc of the FSAR states ". . All field engineered lines are schematically . " shown either on a diagrammatic, an instrumentation detail or a piping drawing such that mistakes in valving, connection termination points and materials are virtually eliminated . ." For the two safety . related systems examined by the NRC investigators , this commitment appears to have not been followed. Also, the investigators did not find any evidence that a written safety evaluation was performed, as required by 50.59(b) of 10 CFR 50, to ensure that the installed changes from that described in the FSAR do not involve unreviewed safety questions. Failure to conduct a safety evaluation of the safety significance of these changes and to obtain approval of the changes as required by the FSAR is considered an ' item of noncompliance with 50.59(b) of 10 CFR 50. i I 3. Investigation of Allegation 3 Allegation 3 The alleger prepared a signed statement (Attachment 1) , dated May 19, 1975, alleging that equipment, unsuitable for the application, has been used, and purchase of the equipment was based upon friendships and other factors unrelated to the requirements necessary for proper operation. Interview with Alleger _ The NRC investigators met with the alleger on May 19 and June 3,1975, to discuss the allegation. The investigators attempted to identify specific equipment items that could be traced through DPC records as a basis to establish the validity of the allegation. Only the technical , aspects of the allegation were investigated. The alleger stated that DPC awarded contracts to suppliers with no previous nuclear experience. He referred to contracts awarded to ' e -" N% / -. N*-'
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.,$ , for control room equipment and panels at the OE . He stated that M had no previous nuclear experience but could not identify any specific deviations or inadequacies related to this procurement, either contractually or equipment related. In response to, questioning, the alleger said that he had not reviewed the ' procurement contract, had not been involved in the preparation of the procurement specification and had not reviewed the specification in depth. The alleger also stated that DPC had awarded a contract to some other firms, which he could not recall the names, to build panels and then had taken the contract away and gave it tot u . Ii y. ,_ .. .- mm . , , . . , _ . . , , . .,
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______ s ..' ( .- r , t The alleger stated that s:veral hundred ITE Impcrial J13P relays used in DNS control systems required replacement. His opinion wcs that these relays represented a new design and were purchased without any DPC testing. He stated that he had not reviewed or prepared the procurement spec'.fication or contracts. The alleger noted that considerable pur Sasing power resides at the principal engineer level for procurement of relays, switches and cabinets. In his statement, the alleger specifies that " grandfather clauses" effectively restrict the inclusion of new vendors onto approved vendor lists while assuring established vendors of virtual inclusion. He also noted that quality control procedures and requirements are supposed to be major areas of Concern. Investigation and Interviews On June 4,1975, the NRC investigators met with DPC personnel representing Design Engineering and Quality Assurance. The details of the procurement cycle were discussed and the specific procurements related to 6 6 and ITE Imperial relays were reviewed. DPC Procedures EPR-1, EPR-2, and EPR-3 were reviewed as these were procedures in effect during the time period in question. EPR-3 titled, " Criteria for Qualifying Suppliers of Nuclear Safety Related Electrical Equipment and Materials," ' required pre-award and post-award evaluation of the supplier. DPC records were made available for the A review of these records shows that DPC conducted a pre-award contract. survey of (l2[ on October 2,1970, which is documented on an Evaluation and Investigation of Proposed Bidder and Supplier Form. The survey noted that this was the first to perform nuclear work. DPC Specification OS-309-1 for emergency power switching logic panels contained basic QC requirements and test requirements. The records include documentation of subsequent surveillance inspection and witnessing of functional tests at E333 The cabinets were seismically qualified by calculations in December of 1972, and subsequent seismic testing of cabinet and components by Wyle Laboratories qualified them by test. DPC personnel stated that for ONS Unit 3, a competitive bidder was awarded a contract for control room panels and boards. However, the company did not meet schedules. The contract was cancelled and subsequently awarded tol[]b, the second lowest bidder. DPC Design Engineering personnel stated that the ITE Imperial relay J13P was selected by De J ,a Engineering based on design criteria related to physical size, number of contracts and voltage. Previous experience with other manufacturer's relays proved to be disappointing and the design of the newly developed J13P appeared to meet DPC requirements. The relays were procured as a catalog item based on ITE supplied data. . - i .. m - - ,.g - _.y . .3 -- , ,
-10- { , .. - ! . DPC performed functional testing of tha ITE relays including pickup and simulated circuit applications to facilitate time, voltage drop-out, testing of the emergency start circuit. A memo discussing the tests included a recommendation to use the relay in the dated August 21, 1970, start circuit. The ITE records package was reviewed and extensive documentation was available as objective evidence of tests performed, audits conducted and action taken. During functional testing of panels at GEEB in October 1970, several of the relays failed or malfunctioned. DPC, in conjunction with ITE and Wabash Magnetics, conducted an in-depth f ailure analysis, test DPC audited ITE and Wa'oash Magnetics and relay modification program.In June of 1971, DPC concluded from cyclical facilities and programs. tests conducted in a dust environment at elevated temperature and humidity that the ITE relays were not acceptable for the intended application.items Cutler Hammer type M relays were selected as a replacement and test were subjected to cyclical operation under simulated environmental Based on the test results and additional Cutler Hammer data, ! conditions. DPC felt the Cutler Hammer relays were qualified for the intended applica- I All of the ITE Imperial J13P relays were replaced at the ONS and tion. The replacement was accomplished in accordance with a Keowce Station. written procedure, was witnessed by a design engineer and QC inspectors, and is fully documented in QA folder OS-80B. The investigators reviewed As a final step to preclude further problems, the QA folder for adequacy. DPC issued a letter dated November 18, 1971, to remove ITE relays from The investigators selected several pieces of equipment in which stock. the original design incorporated the J13P relays for field inspection to verify that replacement had been accomplished. On June 5,1975, the investigators inspected Keowee Emergency Start Channels A and B at ONS. Relays KB, SIB, and 8ESB in Channel B cabinet and relays KA, SIA, and . 8ESA were Cutler Hammer relays and had been installed in accordance with DPC documentation and records. - - - - -NRP Inspections NRC inspection reports were reviewed for pertinent information related to the J13P relay problem. Reports 50-269/70-12 and 50-269/71-1 discuss DPC reported the relay f ailure to NRC for investi- the relay failures. gation into its possible generic implications. Conclusion The investigators could find no evidence to substantiate the allegation Nor could that equipment unsuitable for the application had been used. any evidence be found to substantiate the charge that procurement contracts l were awarded on f actors unrelated to technical requirements other than those such as cost and schedule which are normally considered in che At the time DPC awarded GEghcontracts,qEEl had awarding of contracts. previous experience in providing electrical equipment for utility power i i i --- ---q-.- . .. .. 7 ,,
. o i -11- l . .. . . plants including Florida Power and Light, South Carolina Electric and Gas and Carolina Power and Light. In addition,GEEE had manufactured equipment such as control panels for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under stringent quality assurance requirements. It was felt that QC was commensurate with the size of the company and that DPC would have to provide Several assistance in interpretation of IEEE-279 and Class IE requirements. other suppliers with previous experience, bid f or the work and considering all factors, DPC selected lE][. 6 I s . O e . . i _m. s. . . - . . . .. .7, .. .. . . _
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-7- The following lists the individuals, firms, and other information describing the situation in which I suspect Duke Power Company's supervisors are involved much more than is acceptable in a legitmate business relationship: Several hundred ITE Imperial series J13P industrial control relays used in Keowee and Oconce control systems required replacement in whole or in part three times. Those relays represented new design, and were purchased without any form of Duke testing, but with the encouragement of S, Principal I Engineer supervisor of Electrical Control and Instrumentation Systems. Consider the believe this was ITE's first attempt to produce such a relay. fact that virtually all the controls for Keowee and Oconee Unit 1 were in- stalled and operative during the exchanges. It was common knowledge that ITE arranged fishing trips for the benefit of its customers. B definitely exercised undue influence and poor judgement in selecting this particular equipment, and possibly received other f avors from ITE for their actions. ! Approval for a purchase requisition varies depending upon the value, but it permits considerable purchasing power at the levels of Principal and Chief - I Engineer, especially if the purchase is piecemeal. Typical of this situation is the purchase of control relays, switches, and cabinets, larger acquisitions , are influenced by an Engineering evaluation of the bidders' facilities, quality control program, prices, and any other information considered necessary. One important criterion is how " closely" the vendor worked with Duke in > ) Grandfather clauses effectively restrict the inclusion of past contracts. new vendors onto approved vendor lists while assuring established vendors of virtual inclusion. Quality Control procedures and requirements are supposed to be major areas of concern. Mill Power evaluates the package and awards the contract to the successfull bidder. has been the questionable recipient of .. ..,.a..## v.~ v~ = + several Duke contracts for building control panels, consoles, etc during the past three or four years. C:CEELB first nuclear experience was at Oconee, with little or no changes made from their previous non-nuclear power i plant designs. (2El) can now claim extensive expertence in nuclear designs without question. In my opinion S, B, C, and T and other Principal Electrical Engineer, with U of Mill Power are deeply involved. The aforementioned individuals as well as other Engineering representatives were visitingtEEC3 on a Thursday and Friday in May or June,1973 for the purpose of inspecting control boards. S, B, C, and T were not inspecting equipment as alleged; rather, they were elsewhere. Deducing from their invitation which V declined to accept and other people's observations, they. remained in Florida af ter Thursday for a combination fishing and/or boating excursion complete with f eminine companions. I feel it would be reasonable to state that other " inspection" trips were equally ficticious, i 2 p % .. - ,-. --
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. . . . . . . . __ W, a dEECF representative located in Charlotte, hosts S, B, C, T and U to lunch at least once each week. Occasionally other persons have been invited when some of the above are absent. W conversations imply that the luncheon is usually non-business related. I realize the above information is brief, but it is a collection of observations by myself and others. So far as we know there will be no written proof anywhere as all arrangements were surely handled in person or via telephone. I i . pm , j , , _ . _ _. . .. .. . -- .. 7.- . r, _ . . . }}