ML19329A108

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Confirms That Tech Spec Limit Is Required for Coolant Flow. Facility Should Not Be Allowed to Start Up W/O Well Documented Tech Spec Limit
ML19329A108
Person / Time
Site: Oconee 
Issue date: 03/19/1976
From: Rosztoczy Z
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Baer R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7912300128
Download: ML19329A108 (1)


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AB P.dg. File 3O~1 Robert Baer, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch, DOR I can not concur with the T-H writings on Oconee. We require a Tech.

Spec. limit on coolant flow.

See, for example, Pebble Springs or all standard plants. It is even more important to issue a Tech. Spec. on flow when a plant is taking credit for measured flow instead of design flow. Typically, the Tech. Spec. limit is 5% higher than _the flow used for safety evaluation. The 5% accounts for errors in the continuous monitoring device, drift and calibration errors. In addition to this 5%,

the applicant usually retains a 2 to 3% operating band. If the flow drops below the Tech. Spec. limit, power reduction is required. For details, see the Omaha or BG & E Tech. Spec.

The total 1% margin prop'o~sblon Oconee is o'aviously inadequate. There is no mention in the write-4 p of continuous monitoring and the uncer-tainties of continuous monitoring. Instead, reference is made to a three year-old measurement, that is not relevant to the new core. I am aware of the flux / flow trip; this trip, however, provides no help for occurrences when the primary protection is not the overpower trip.

There is no mention of how the uncertainties of the continuous flow

. measurement are accounted for in the setting of the flux / flow trip.

In light of the flow anomalies observed during the past few years, (BG & E, for example) I do not think we should let Oconee start up without a well-documented Tech. Spec. limit on coolant flow. The matter requires urgent attention.

Zoltan R. Rosztoczy, Chief Analysis Branch Division of Systems Safety y-cc:

D. Ross P. Norian R. Purple D. Eisenhut f.

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