ML19327B180

Special Rept 89-002:on 890919,diesel Generator B Declared Inoperable in Order to Perform Planned Maint & on 890920, Condition Discovered That Would Result in Failure of Diesel Generator.Caused by Plugged Surge Line

ML19327B180
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/18/1989
From:	Bailey J WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
89-002, 89-2, NO-89-0182, NO-89-182, NUDOCS 8910260157
Download: ML19327B180 (3)

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W$LF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION 1

John A. temor  !

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October 18, 1909 NO 89-0182 j

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission l ATTH: Document Control Desk

, _ Mail Station Pl-137 Washington D.C. 20555 '

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Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Specia* Report 89-002 Gentlemen: i i

1 The attached Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical  !

' Specifications 3.1.1.3 and 6.9.2. This report concerns an invalid failure l of Emergency Diesel Generator 'B' due to a plugged jacket water surge line.

I It' you have any questione concerning this matter, please contact me or  ;

Mr. O. L. Maynard of my staff. j l' ,

l- 1 Very truly yours, M . M .

John A. Bailey J ')

Vice President i Nuclear Operations l JAB /aem l

, Attachment I

cc: B. L. Bartlett (NRC), w/a '

D. D. Chamberlain (NRC), w/a j R. D Martin (NFC), w/a i D. V. Pickett (NRC), w/a ,-

750

, i P.O. Bom 411/ Burhngton, KS 86839 / Phone: (316) 364 8831 ,

8910260157 091018  ;$ An EW ongcWy EneW'N PDR C __

ADOCK 05000482

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. Attachment to NO 89-0182 l Page 1 of 2  ?

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l Special Report 89-002

- Imalid Failure of Smargency nimmal Gananatzu B"  !

Due to a Plugged Jadwt hter Surge Line j On September 20, 1989, while amtgency Diesel Generator (D/G) *B" was out of l service for planned naintenance, a condition was discovered during t troubleshooting that would have resulted in the failure of the D/G during a l test. 'Ihis special Haport is being sutznitted in accordance with the )

requirunents of Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.  !

On September 19,1989, at 0421 CDT, D/G *B" was declared inoperable in order l to perfonn several planned maintenance activities. One of these activities ma routine cleaning the jacket water expansion tank using a high pressure  !

spray cleaner. After ocmpletion of maintenance activities, D/G "B" was run  ;

without loading for aiproximately 29 minutes beginning at 0350 CDr on (

September 20, 1989, in order to vent the fuel lines. During this run a ,

steady stream of water was observed leaking fran the jacket water punp shaft '

ses1. Initially it was believal the engine driven jacket water systan had i been inadequately ventad, causing the puup to ban =a airbound and i overheating the seal. Acklitional troubleshooting, however, revealed that a surge H ne from the expansion tank was plugged. With the surge line plugged, the expansion tank could not maintain adequate water level for the .

punp suction, which caused the puap to became airbound. 'Ihis caused the  !

seal to fail and in time, would have caused the engine to overheat fran lack  !

of cooling water.  !

h material plugging the surge line was a rusty scale which had been .

loosened fran the interior surface of the expansicx1 tank during cleaning. A >

sanple of the scale has been sent off-site for testing, however, it is l believed that the scale had formed as a result of fuel oil, which leaked i into the jacket water systen, interfering with the corrosion inhibiting l properties of the water treatment cherricals. After the high pressure spray  ;

retoved scune of the scale, it entered the surge line and was not adequately flushed following cleaning, h postulated cause of this failure was the buildup of the rusty scale due  ;

to the fuel oil leak and personnel not recognizing the possibility of the  !

scale plugging the surge line following cleaning. 'Ihe fuel oil leakage into the jacket water was first recognized in April 1988. Due to the length of -

time required to find and repair these leaks, the repair was conducted during the next plant refueling outage in N.nsnber of 1988. During the intervening time, the fuel oil interfered with the water treatmant chenicals in the jacket water eFpanSion tank Iesulting in a large buildup of scale on the interior surface. Maintenance personnel were unaware of this buildup ,

and scue of the scale Wma dislodged during the cleaning operation on Septarber 19, 1989. Unaware that a problan existed, personr,31 did not flush and closely inspect the surge line following the cleaning.

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. Attachment to NO 89-0182

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' Page.2 of 2 i

IMiate cuw.ctive actions were to rsplace the jacket water ptmp seal,

- I unplug the surge line, and throughly flush the systern. Since the fuel oil l

, leaka Weh appear to have originally caused this problan have been  !

repaired, and no fuel oil has been detected in the jacket water since then, '

no additional scale buildup is expected. Although all loose scale has been ,

zumved frun the tank, sczne well-adhered scale is still bound to the  !

interior surface of the tank. For this reason, Maintmianos personnel will bu instructed to closely inspect the surge line and flush the systan l 1

following any cleaning of the tank. If any significant additional  !

inforntion is obtained concerning this event, a supplement to this Special -

Report will be mutanitted.

A valid test of D/G *B" was perfonnad on Septanber 21, 1989, at 2021 CDT i aftar which the D/G was declared operable. 'Iherefore, the D/G was unavailable for a p tely 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br />. Although the event described in this report is not clearly classifiable in accordance with the criteria l contained in Reg. Guide 1.108, Revisicn 1, it is Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's conservative jt*== ant that the event should be '

designated an invalid failure to meet the intent of Regulatory Position C.2.e(7) of Reg. Guide 1.108. Including this event, there have bet:n a total  ;

of 87 valid successful test.% hrsa valid failures, and five invalid failures of D/G *B". Fran tiu .he of the last valid failure cm November ,

11, 1988, there have been 24 valid successful tests of D/G "B". 'Iherefore, i this event does not change the testing frequency of once every 31 days as required in Table 4.8-1 of Technical Specifications.

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