ML19326C802
| ML19326C802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1973 |
| From: | Bernero R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004280737 | |
| Download: ML19326C802 (7) | |
Text
,h, UNITED ST ATES ff[f '
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION j
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3E Docket No. 50-313
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R. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Pressurized Water Reactors, L THRU:
A. Schwencer, Chief, Pressurized Water Reactors Branch No. 4, L MEETING WITH ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, BABCOCK & WILCOX AND BECHTEL, CONCERNING REVIEW OF THE OPERATING LICENSE APPLICATION FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - UNIT 1 Enclosed is a report of the meeting held on November 2,1972 with Arkansas Power and Light Company. The agenda and attendance list are also enclosed.
A R. M. Bernero, Project Leader Pressurized Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Directorate of Licensing
Enclosures:
1.
Meeting Report 2.
Agenda 3.
Attendance List cc w/encls:
A. Giambusso R. S. Boyd THIS DOCUMENT CONTAIN3 P00R QUAUTY PAGES RP Asst. Directors TR Asst. Directors PWR Branch Chiefs RO (3)
V. H. Wilson (2)
R. W. Klecker M. Rosen R. Bernero B. J. Youngblood Attendees from REG F. Miraglia AEC PDR Local PDR s
8004280 7 3 )
A Enclosure No. 1 Arkansas Power & Light Company _
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 pocket No. 50-313 Report of Meeting - November 2,1972 Summary The meeting followed the attached agenda and included detailed discus-sion of the Emergency and Industrial Security Plans, review of the Reactor Protective System drawings, and the discussion of electrical and control topics. Other technical matters of current interest to this application were also discussed.
As a result of this meeting, the applicant received direction for revision and publication of the Emergency and Industrial Security Plans. The Reactor Protective System drawing review was completed; no major design problers were identified.
Industrial Security Plan The Industrial Security Plan was reviewed and discussed in detail. The Applicant was requested to confine the scope of this plan to industrial
- security, i.e., protection against industrial sabotage.
Lighting and security measures were discussed. The Applicant apreed to revise the Industrial Security Plan as indicated and to resnbrdt it.
Emergency Plan The Emergency Plan had been subudtted for review in draft form since there was some question in the Applicant's mind about the scope and detail of this document.
The Applicant was informed that the scope and content of the draf t Emergency Plan were appropriate for publication as part of the FSAR.
The Applicant was also informed that publication of the Emergency Plan in a separate binder is preferred since this facilitates its use.
The detailed Staff commente on the Emergency Plan were reviewed.
The categorization of area emergencies was discussed.
The Applicant had proposed to make unilateral recommendations (before arrival of State personnel) for evacuation of public areas if individuals beyond the site borndary were expected to receive a whole body dose greater than 5 rem (or 15 rem to a child's thyroid, skin of the whole body, or any organ).
The Staff commented that these values are too high; and that values of 2 rem and 10 rem respectively would be considered acceptable.
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Use of Emergency Diesels for Peaking The Applicant reviewed his long-standing proposal to use the emergency diesel generators to supply power to the grid during peak load periods.
The highlights of the Applicant's presentation were:
The diesels and the emergency buses are protected f rom the grid by a.
high current, ground fault and anti-motoring devices.
The Technical Specifications already call for synchronizing the b.
diesels to the grid and loading them once per month.
Although the diesel generators are a relatively inef ficient way to generate additional power, they are a meaningful addition to the c.
Applicant's reserve capacity and af ford some economic benefit even if not actually used for peaking.
The details of diesel generator operation and testing were discussed at The Applicant noted that the ability some length but to no conclusion.
to use even one of the two diesel generators for peaking would be of The matter was lef t for staff significant economic benefit.
consideration with the staff position to be stated to the Applicant by letter in the near future.
Use of a Swing Switch on 480 V Motor Control Centers The Applicant had been questioned on the use of a manual throwover (swing) switch to furnish alternate 480V power supply f rom bus B5 or B6 The question asked how such a switch could meet single to MCC B55/56.
The Applicant explained that no safeguards loads are failura criteria.
on MCC B55/56, only loads important to plant operation which require continuous power supply such as the third service water pump and vital In the course of this discussion, the Applicant lube oil pumps.
explained that Arkansas I uses a two color system (rei and green) for Where a third component is involved (e.g.,
safeguards system wiring.
The entire topic was lef t for the 3rd HPI pump) green is used again.
resolution in the safeguards actuation drawing review scheduled later in the month.
Steam Line Break-related to steam Two basic questions were presented to the Applicant line break accidents; they were:
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- a.
A major seismic event could cause f ailure of both steam lines downstream of the main block valves.
Since these valves are closed only by manual actuation and the transient return to criticality ocEurs in less than one minute, the plant should be analyzed for blowdown of both eteam generators, not just one as at present, b
When one steam generator is disabled by a steam line break, it appears that a number of single failures can frustrate the supply of emergency feedwater to the intact steam generator.
Some were identified:
1.
The motor-operated feed inlet valve fails to open.
2.
The failure of one emergency fead pump can cause the other to fail by mechanical or flooding damage. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) shows the two side-by-side in the same room.
3.
The feedwater control system (the Integrated Control System (ICS)) might fail.
These questions were discussed and the Applicant requested that both be transeitted by letter.
Flooding of Safety Related Equipment In the October 20, 1972 response to a generic question on the effect of Class II system failures, AP6L had said that accidental flooding of safety areas such as the diesel generator rooms is precluded because the fire protection system sprinklers are manually actuated. The letter did not state whether the isolation valves are located insida or outside of the room affected; this question was raised with AP6L telephone af ter receipt of the letter. At this meeting AP6L stated that all such sprinkler system isolation valves are outside the spaces affected.
Steam Line Breaks in Auxiliary Buildings The current concern for steam line breaks in auxiliary buildings was discussed with the Applicant. The Applicant noted that the steam lines in the Auxiliary Building are seismic Category I but have no special anti-whip restraints or barriers.
Reactor Protective System Drawing Review The Reactor Protective System (RPS) was reviewed by detailed discussion of one of the four redundant protection channels using the B&W as-built logic drawings and the FSAR figures and text. Numerous drawing errors
' were pointed out to the Applicant and he agreed to correct them.
Review of these drawings showed the need for others which the Applicant agreed to provide; these drawings included:
1.
Logic for protection channel bypasses.
2.
Control rod drive power breaker drawings.
3.
Power range channel test module logic.
4.
Reactor coolant pump contact monitor and test module logics.
.5.
Reactor coolant flow channel test module logic.
~
6.
Reactor coolant-outlet temperature and pressure test module logics.
RPS power supply (+15V) internal logic.
7.
8.
NonNuclear Instrumentation (NNI) plug and jack arrangement panel i
details.
The drawings on hand were gone: over in detail and the items noted included:
Drawing 8042122B It was noted that the rod withdrawal inhibit logic as implemented did not meet the single failure ctiterion.
The Applicant indicated that this logic has no safety significance.
Drawing 8042074B The reactor coolant flow transmitter power supply fuses were noted as being incorrectly connected; the Applicant agreed to modify.
Drawing 8012221E It was noted that there was inconsistency between the instrumentation identification here and in the FSAR functional P&ID's (piping and instrumentation drawings). The Applicant agreed to make the RPS logic conform to the identification used in the P&ID's.
Drawina 8042095B It was noted that the~ power and intermediate range detectors power available alarm was combined in a single annunciator. The Applicane justified this combination by explaining that the power range trips on 9
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Enclosure No. 2 AGENDA Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 November 2.19 72 1
Industrial Security Plan 8:30-9 :30 A.M.
II Emergency Plan 9 :30-10:30 A.M.
III Break 10:30 A.M. - 10:45 A.M.
IV Electrical & Control Topics 10:45 A.M. - 11:45 A.M.
V L U N C H 11:45 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
VI Reactor Protective System Drawing Review 12:45 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
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Enclosure No. 3 ATTENDANCE LIST Arkansa?s Nuclear One - Unit 1 November 2,1972 USAEC - DL Arkansas Power & Light Co.
R. M. Bernero W. CA.naugh
- C. W. Moon D. Rueter
- F. A11enspach J. Marlin
- A. Schwencer J. Grisham
- T.
Ippolito
- J. Calvo
- L.
Riani
- F.
Ashe
- D. Basdekas Babcock & Wilcox
- T. Johnson
- H. Baker
- A. B. Lloyd
- C, C. Strempke USAEC - RO
- R. J. Brockman R. F. Warnick M. S. Kidd
- V.
Thomas Bailey Meter Co.
. *T.
Beans
- E. Miskovic Bechtel T. S. Burr G. Katanics
- Denotes Part Time J. Haidinger J. Oszewski t
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