ML19326C669
| ML19326C669 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1975 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Phillips J ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004250487 | |
| Download: ML19326C669 (24) | |
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,9 DISTRIBUTION Docket N RC PDR Local PDR Mi18 1975 ORB #2 Reading
-KRgoller TJCarter 1
Docket No. 50-313 OELD 0ISE (3)
(
DLZiemann
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FDAnderson
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Arkansas Power 4 Light Company RKIngram ATTN: fir. J. D. Phillips VStello Senior Vice President 1Novak Production, Transmission, JRBuchanan
.t.
and Engineering TBAbernathy Sixth and Pine Streets ACRS (14)
Pine Bluff, Arkansas 71601 DEisenhut
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Gentlemen:
The enclosure to this letter identifies information that we ~ require to couplete our review of the ECCS reanalysis you will submit pursuant '
to our Order for Modification of License dated Decer.ber 27, 1974. Some of the information has previously been identified (e.g., potential boron
,'.y precipitation for PWRs, single failure analysis), but has been repeated
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here for completeness.
Sincerely, Origiitl'S Egned by:1 Dennis L. Ziemann
.a Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Reactor Licensing
Enclosure:
Required Information
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(ECCS) cc w/ enclosure:
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS POOR QUAUTY PAGES 4
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- Arkansas Power & Lighc Company.
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.cc w/ enclosure:
Horace ~Jewell-
~-House,'Holms &'Jewell 1550 Tower Building Little Rock,-Arkansas. 72201 Mr. William cavanaugh, III
-Production Department-
- Post Office Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Ark'ansas Polytechnic College Russellville, Arkansas 72801 1
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. Attachment' l-REQU1HED INFORMATION I
-1. 1 Break Spectrum and partial Loop Operation _
The-information'providedifor each plant shall comply with the
- provisions of the attachedL=ctorandum entitled, " Minimum Requircments for ECCS_ Dreck Spectrum Submittals."
- 2.
Potentin) P,oron Precipita-fon-(P'E.'s only)
The ECCS system in cach plant should be' evaluated by the applicant (or licennec)1to show that..significant chcages in chemical concentrations E
,wil). notc occur-durint; thc long term af ter a loss-of-coolant accident s(LOCA) and these potential' cliances have been;specifically addressed by
' appropriate operating procedures.
Accordingly, the applicant should i
. review the system capabilities-and operating procedures to assure that boron; precipitation vould not ec= promise long-term core cooling capability
. f ollowing a: LOCA. lThis review should consider all aspects of the specific-plant ~ design, including co=penent qualification in the LOCA environment in
-addf. tion to a detailed review of operating piecedures.
The applicant
- should.cxamine the vulnerability of the specific plant design to sinp,le failures that would result in any significant boron precipitation.
3.
Sine:le Failure Analysis
- A single failure evaluation of the' ECCS should be provided b:. the t-applicant (or licensce) for his specific plant design, as receired by
-Appendix;K to_ 10 CFR 50, Section I.D.l.
In perf errint; this eval.atien.
.the ef fcc;r'of-a sinr.le f ailure er operet.or. error that cannes any. vin.11y b
controlle.1, electrically-eperated valve to :ove to a posit. ion'that eenid l'
adverse]y affccr the ECCS.ust be considered.
Therefore, li this censid-l'
--cration has -not been specifica11:. reported in the past, the applicana upcoming submittal r.uct addrass this censideration.
Incluce a list of all of the ECCS velve8 that are currently required by the plant Technical Spccificatic.s to have power disconaccted, and any proposed plant nodifications and chng.ca c the Technica:. Specifications that night Se required in order to protect against any less of safety function caused
{
l hy this type of-failute.
A copy of Branch Technical Positien EIC5? 18 from the l'.S. Suelear Regulatory Corr.ission's Standard Ecview Plaa is L
attached to. provide you with guidance.
The -cingle f aliure evalut tioa should include the potential for
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passivo failurcs of fluid.,ystcen during long-term cooling'followin~. a LOCA as well-as sin).le f ailuris of active components.
For Ph'R-plant s,
-the-sinf.le failure analysis lis te censider the potential boren cuneentra-problem as:an integral part of long term cooling.
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Submerfed Valv,es, L
.-The applicant:should review the specific equipment arrangement with-
' n his plant to deterninc if any valve motors within-contain= cat will
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-beceme submerged.following a LOCA.
The review should include all valve-l, x not ers '_tha t may become subnerged, not'only those in the safety'injectien N
- system. ? Valved in other systems nav be needed to limit boric-acid con-
. centration?in the reactor, vessel during_long term cooling or.may be l
3reqdired for~eentainment3 isolation.
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[TheLapplicant)(or licensec)'is;to provide the following information, for
.each. plant:
' - '(1) iUhether or not any valve motors will be submerged following a LOCA in the* plant being reviewed.
- (2)- -If nny valve motors"will be flooded in their plant, the applicant (er
-licensec)-is to:-
.(a) identify the valves that will be submerged.
.(b)- Evaluate the po'tential consequences of flooding.of_the valves for both the short terrt and long term ECCS functions and containment isolation.
The long term should consider the potential problem of cscessive concentrations of boric acid in i
PWR's.
(c)
Propose a interim solution while necessary modifications:are being designed and inplemented.
(currently _ operating plants only)'.
-(d)
Propose design changes to solve the potential flooding problem.
Containnent Pressure-(P:?R's Oniv) 5.
. fThe containment pressure used to evaluate the performance capability of the ECCS shall be calculated in accordance with the provisiens of Branch Technien1'.Positica CSS 6-1. which is enclosed.
- 6. -Lw ECCS iMf 3 nod
".a r c ('.?'.W in t"N e 555S Onl y)
'Pinnts that havu~a '..*cstinc. house nucicar s t e e~t supply sh:?l perfe m
'their ECC.i analysco ytilizing, the preper version of the evaluatien nede't, l
i as defined below:
t, (1) 1he Dccenber 25, 1974 versien of the '.?cstinghouse evalu: tion
- nodel, 1.c., the version'without the nodificatiens described in VCAP-8471 is acceptabic for stevicusly analyzed plants for which
'the peak clad temi,crature turnareund war identified prior to the L
refloodfrate decreasin; bele 3.1 inches per second or for which the refloed rate was identified te remain abeve 1.0 incP ner second;- conditicus ' for which the 'ecember 25,'1974 and." arch 15,.
l 1975 versions weeld be ec,nive'ent.
(2) Thej! arch 15, 1975 version of the t?cstinghouse evaluation mode) l is-an acceptable codel to Se used for all previously analyzed plants _ior which the peak clad tenperature turnaround was identi-4 fied to occur:after the reflood rate decreased belew 1.1 fnches per.:ccond,'and.for which stcan ceoling conditions (reflood rate less-thdn 1 inch per second) exist prior to the cine of peak clad temperature turnaround. The March 15.-1975 version will-be.used for all future plant' analyses.
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t MINIMUM RE00'N.'iENTS FOR ECCS BREAK SPFCTRUM GU3MITTALS I.
LINTRODUCTION 1me.following outline shall be used as, a guideline in the evaluation of LOCA These guidelines have been formulated for break' spectrum submittals.
d when new reactor
.cantenporary rcactor designs only and must be re-assesse concepts arc submitted.
ECCS cooling performance The current ECCS Acceptance Criteria requires that be calculated in--accordance with an acceptab]c evaluation todel and for a number of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents of different sizes, locations to nrovide assurance that the entire snectru=
and other properties sufficientacciderts is coecred_.
In Oddition, the of post.ilated loss-of-coolant three values of a discharge 1 cast calculation is to be conducted with at (C ) applied to the postulated break area, these values spanning coefficient D
the range from 0.6'to 1.0.
Sections IIA and IIIA define the acceptable break spectrum for most operating Sections II3 and IIIB define the plants which have received Safety Orders.CP and OL case work (execptions noted break spectrun requirements for most Sections IIC and IIIC provide an outline of the mini:un requirements Inter).
Such a complete break spectrum for an acceptablu complete break spectrum.
Sections IIID and II1E could be appropriately referenced by so:c plants.
provide the exceptions to certain plant types noted above.
i sly subnitted all A plant: due to reload a portion of its core vill have prev ou or pert 'ef a break spectrue analysis (either by reference or by sp I
.cniculatiens).
If it (no ecch:nica design differences.unich
- fuel with ncv fuel of the canc design could af fect therral and hydraulic performance), and if the Licensee -intends l
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to operate the-reloaded core in cc 711ance with previously approved Techn ca If the reload core Specifications, no additional calculations are required.either of Sections I!A er TIC, R
-decinn has changed, the Licensee sha]l adept as appropriate to the plant i
or of. Sections IIIA or IIIC of this document,The criterion 'for establishing whether type (n7R or PWR).shall be satisfied will-he determined on the basis of whether can-demonstrate that the shape of the PCT verrus break si:c curve han not When l
been nodified as.a consequence of changes to the reload ccre design.
l the relead' is supplied by a source other than the 5SSS supplier, the break l
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spectrum analyses specified by occtions IIC or IIIC shall-be sub.m.itted as a l-mininu (as appropriate to the plant type, L*43 or PWR).
Additional connitivity i
studies.nay be Tcquired to assess the sensitivity of fuel changes in such areas E
as sierla #ailures and reactor coolant punp performance.
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II.
PRESSURI7.ED WATER RV. ACTORS L A.. 'Operatini Reactor Reanalvs'es (Plants for which Saf ety Orders were issued If' calculational changes *. vere maae to the LSM** to make it wholly in 1
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- Calculational changes /Model changes -those revisions nade to' calculational l
trum.
.. techniques or fixed parameters'used for the referenced comp ete spec j.
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- LBM--Large BreakjModel; SBM--Small Br,cak Model
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-10CFR50, Appendix K, the foll' 'ng minimun number of break
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-conformance wl-Each sensitivity study' perf ormed during the sizen-should he reanalyzed.
development of the ECCS evaluation model shall be individually verified 'as
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remaining applicabic, or shall be repeated.
A plant may reference a break
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if it is the same configuratio:
- spectrum analysis conducted on another plant
.and core design..
PCT:
- 1. 'If the largest break size results in the hichest Reanalyze the limiting break, a.
P[eanalyze two smaller breaks.in the large break region.
b.
2.
If'the largest break size does not result in the hinhest PCT:
Rcanalyze the limiting break.
a.
Reanalyze a break larger and a break smaller than the limiting-b.
If the limiting break is outside the range of Moedy
. break.
nultipliers of 0.6 to 1.0 (i.e., less than 0.6), then the limiting break plus two larger breaks must be analyzed.
If calculational changes have been made to the SBM to make it wholly in smal l b r c a" conferrance with 10CFR50, Appendix K, the analysis of the worst (SBM) av previously determined from paragraph C below should be repeated.
B.
Scw CP ::nd 01,_ Case tlork A complete bre0k spectrum should be previded in accordance with paragraph below, execpt for the following:
used as a is of the same general design as the plant If a new plant 1.
basis for a referenced comp'_ete spectrum analysis, but operati'y parameters-bave changed waich would increase PCT cr metal-water reaction, or approved calculational charges resulting in mere tra" 20 ECCS model edcd for the referencer change-in PCT have been made to the the analyses of paragraph A above shouh be "rev:.J.c complete spectrum, (SLM), one of which is the plus a minimum of three smil breakr"he shape of the break spectrum in transition' break.*
including the analysis should be justified as ' remaining applicable, sensitivity studies used as a basis for the ECCS cvaluation model.
(configuration and core design) is appl,1 cable to all 2.
IT:a new plant generic studica because it is~the same with respect to the gencric plant design'and paranators used as a basis for a referenced complete
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. spectrum defined in paragraph C, and no calculat ional changes resu2 t in more than 20"F change in PCT-were made to the ECCS model used for the: referenced complete spectrun, then no new spectrum analyses are The new plant may instead reference the applicable analys:
required.
- Transition Break.(TB)--that break size which is analyzed with both the LBM and SSM.
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C.
Minienn'Nec$irements for-a' Complete Break Spectrum
.Since Lit is' expected that. applicants-wi11' prefer to reference an applicabic this complete; break spectr'um.previously. conducted on another plant, paragraph defines.the nini un' number of breaks required for:an acceptable complete break-spectrum analysis, assuming the cold leg pump discharge is-
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establishedEas the worst break-location.
The worst singic failure and worst-case reactor coolant pump status:(running or tripped) shall be established, utilizing appropriate sensitivity studies. 'These studies should show that' the vorst single _f ailure has bcen justified as a function Ecch sensitivity study. published during the development
.of break size.
of ; the ECCS cvaluation model shall _bc individually justified as remaining Also, a proposal for partial loop
.applicabic,~or:shall be repeated.
operation shall'bc-supported by identifying and analyzing the worst break size and-location (i.c., idle loop versus operating loop).
In addition, i
. suf ficient justification shall be provided to conclude that the shape of
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' the PCT versus Break 'Sizo curve would not be significantly altered by the
' partial loop configuration. Unicss this information is provide', plant d
[.
. Technical Specifications shall not permit operation with one or core idle reactor coolant pumpr..
It must.be demonstrated that the containment design used for the break It spectrum anal'ysis is approprinto for the specific plant analyzed.
should be:noted that this analysis is to be performed with an cpproved cvaluation model.. wholly in conformance with the' current ECCS Acceptance l
1 Criteria.
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-1.
LEM--Cold Leg-ncactor Coolant Pump Discharge Three guillotine type breaks spanning at least the range of a.
j' Moody nultipliers between 0.6 and 1.0.
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One split type break equivalent in size to twice the pipe L
cross-sectional area.
c.
Two internediate split type breaks.
I d.
The large-break /small-break transition. split.
i 2.
LBM--Cold Leg-Reactor Coolan Pump Suction Analyze-the largest break size frca part 1 above.
If the analyses in' 1 above should indicate that the worst cold leg break is an part lintercediate break size, then the largest breck in the pump suction should:be analyzed'with.an explanation of why the same trend would
-not apply.
3.- LilM--Ilot Leg Piping Analyze-the largest rupture in the hot leg piping.
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s A 'T SBM--Splits Analyze five different small break sizes..One of these breaks must include the transition split break.
The CFT line break must'bc analyzed.for B6W pinnes.
This break may also be one of the five small breaks.-
III. - BOILI. G VATER REACT 0!1S The: generic nodel developed by Ceneral Electric for SWRs proposed that split and guillotine type breaks are equivalent,in determining blowdown phencrena.
The: staf f concluded this was acceptable and that the break arca cay be
- considered at the' vessel nozzle with a zero loss coef ficient using a two phase critical" flow model.
Changes in-the break arca arc equivalent to changes in'the Moody cultiplier.
.She r.ininum number of breaks required for a co=plete break spectrum analysis, assuming a suction side recirculation line break is the design basis accident (DBA) and the worst sing 1c' failure has been established utilizing appropriate
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Also, a proposa] for.
sensitivity studies, arc shown in paragraph C below.
partial loop operation shall be supported by identifying and analyzing the worst i
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In addition, break size and location (i.e., idle' loop versus operating loop).
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' sufficient justification shall be provided.co conclude that the shape of the be significantly citered by the partial PCT versus Dreak Size-curve would not loop configuration., talers this information is provided, plant Technical' l
r Spesifications sha!1 not porrit operetion with one or cote idle re.cter l
coclant purps.
BL'R2. D':R3. and 3'.:24 Reanalysis _ (Plante f or which Saf ety Orders were issucd)
I A..
If the ref erer.ced.lcsd' plant analysis is in accordance with Section III, l
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paragraph C below, the followins mininr= number of bre.ak sizes should be L
it is to'be noted that the lead nlaut analysis is to be
' reanalyzed.
l-perforced with an approved evaluation model wholly in conformance with
- the current.FCCS Acceptance Criteria.
A plant-nay reference a break spectrun analysis conducted en another plan: if it is the saac ceniscuratier and core design.
Each sensitivity study published-during the development of the ECCS cvaluation =odel shall be individually justified as remainin.g applica51c, j
or shall-bcLrepeated.
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If the largest break results in the Fichest PCT:
Rcanalyac-the limiting break with the appropriate referenced a.
sing 1 c ' f ailur'c.
.b'.~ReanalyEctheworstsmallbreakwiththeappropriatereferenced
-sing 1c. failure.
c.
-Reanalyze.the transition break with the singic failure and model titat; predicts 1the highest. PCT.
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- 2. -. If ' th'e - la rr~ " t break " docs not result in the ;1ghest PCT -
. Reanalyze the limiting break, the largest break, and a smaller break.
- a.
If calculational chances have been made to the SBM to make it wholly in conformance with 10CFR$0, Appendix K, reanalyze the small break (SBM) in accordanecLwith Section'IIIC.
B..
. A complete break spectrum should be provided in accordance with Sectica III, paragraph C-below, except - for ;the following:
o 1.
If a new plant is of the same general design as the plant used as a basis for the lead plant analysis, but operating parameters have changed which would increase PCT or cetal-water reacti' n, or approved calculational' changes have been made to the ECCS model.csulting in more than 20 F change in PCT,'the analyscs of Section III, paragraph A above should be provided plus a minicum of three small breaks (SBM),
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one of which is the transition break.
The shape of the brcak spectrum in the lead niant analysis should be justified as remaining applicable, including the censitivity studies used as a basis for the ECCS cvaluation raodel.
2.
If.a new plant (configuration or core design) is applicabic - to all gencric studies because it is the same with respect to tSc generic l
plant des'gn and paramuters used as-a basis for a referer.ced co:P utt spectre-deiined in parapraph C, and no calculational channes rem !!in?
in more than 200F change in PC7 were m dc to the ECCS rodel used fer the referenced couplete spectrum, then no new spc:trum analyses are requirG The.new-plant tny instead reference the applicable analysis.
C.
Minimum Recu!rements for a Complete 9_ red Spectrum This paragraph defines the mininer ne:Ser of breaks required for an acceptable complete spectrum analysis.
This conplete spectrum ana!y.nis is required for each of the lead plants of a given class ( Bb p.2, Sk'R 3,
".2:N, c
Bh'K5,:aud BW'M).
Each sensitivity study published during the develepasnt of the ECCS'cvaluation model sh-ll be individually justified as remaining applicable, or shall be repeated.
1.
Four recirculation line breaks at the worst location (pump suction or
- discharge), using the LSM, covering the range from the transitica
= break (T3) to the D3A, including Cp coef ficients of f rom
- 0.6 to 1.0
' times the DOA.
~ 2.
Five recirculation line breaks, using the SBM, covering the range from the smallest line break to the TB.
3.- The following, break locations assuming the worst singic failure:
1 a.-
largest steamline break b.
largest feedwater'line break
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largest more' spray line break c.
largest! rec ~irculation pump discharge or suction break (opposite
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side of worst' location)
D.
B'r.n4' with "!todified" ECCS
- Same as Section IIIC.
k E.
IIVR5
- Same as Section IIIC.
F. - EWR6 Sanc as Section IIIC.
-IV.
LOCA PAPJ.'.:ETERS OF I::TEREST On. cach' plant-and f or each break analyzed, tl.c f ollowing paraccters A.
(versus time:unless otherwise noted) should be provided on engineering j
graph paper of a quality to_ facilitate egiculations.
--Peak cied-temperature (ruptured and unruptured node)
--Reacter vessel pressure
--Vessel cnd dodnconer water level (PWR only)
--Water level inside the chroud (Sk'R only) l
--Thermal power V
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--Containment pressure (PUR only) i l
Por the worst Srcak analyzed, the following additlenal parancters B.
(verson tine unless otherwise noted) should be provided on engineer:r.c,.
The worst. sing,le graph paper cf a qu.111ty. to f acilitate calculations.
failure and worst-case reactor coolant pump status will have been established utilizing appropriate sensitivity studies.
--Flooding rate (PWR-only)
--Core.flev (inlet and outict)
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--Co'ref nlet enthalpy-(SWR only) i
--IIcat' transfer coefficients
--}!APLHGR ve'rsus Exposure (LWR oniv)
--Reactor coolant temperature (PWR only)
--}ians released to containment -(PWR on)y)
--Enert,y releasedL o. containment (PWR only) t u.
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--PCT versus Exposure (BWR only)
--Containment condensing heat transfer coefficient (Pi!R only)
,-liot spot flow (PWR only)
--Quality (hottest assembly) (P'<!R only)
--Ilot pin internal pressure
--llot spot pellet average temperature
--Fluid temperature (hottest assembly) (PUR,only)
A tabulation of peak clad Lc=perature and actal-water reaction (local C.
and core-wide) s. hall be provided across the break spectrun.
Safety Analysis Ecports (SARs) filed uith the NP.C chall identify on D.
the run date, version number, and version date of the computer each plot r.odel utilized for the LOCA analysis.
Should differences exist in vernion number or version date from the cor,t current code listine,s c.de aval.labic to the NRC staff, then cach modificatlan shall be identified of inpact upon PCT and metal-water reaction (local with an assessment and core-wide).
Se A tabulation of ti.cs at vhich sit;nificant events occur shal)
E.
provided on each olant e.d for er.ch break analyzed.
The followinr, events shall be included as a r:ini-c-:
--End-of-hypass (P'.R caly)
--Ecginninc, of core recovery (PUR only) 4 1
--Tinc_of rupture
--Jct pumps uncovered' (SWR only)
--MCPR (SWR only)
--Time of rated spray (DWR only)
--Can quench (D'.'R only)
--End-of-blowdovn
--Plane af interest uncovery (LWR only) 4 I
s
Possible groupir.g of plants for the purpose of performing generic as well as individual plant break spectrum analyses.
CURRE.'T DOCKETED APPL I C AT IO.'S '
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s BABC0CK AMD WILCOX -
177 FA w/ Lowered Locos Arrangement _
CATEGORY I:
i Re-analysis (Safetygder Plants)_:
Oconee 1, 2,'3
-- IIA 1 These plants cust resubmit at 2568 ieast 3 breaks. ~(They wi 70 Three l'.ile Island 1 -- IIA so by reference to a complete 2535 break spectrun reanalysis sub-h? kansas Power 1
-- IIA mitted generically by Bl.W.)
~2563
-- IIA Rancho Seco:
j 1-2772 New Ols:
Three Mile Island 2 --IIB (2) \\
Since these plants are the aoie 2772 design as the above plar.t,- tiwy Crysta. River 3
--IIB (2) may reference the same reanalysis i
i 2452-of the complete spectrum abo.
Midland 1, 2
--IIB (2)/
New cps:
.None CATEGORY ]A._IJ7 FA w/Eaise_d._j_ cop Arrenec~ent New Cl.s:
Davis Besse'l
--IIB Complete spectrum reovire
New cps Davis Besse 2, 3
--IIB Complete spectrum required.
CATEGCRY '1::
205-FA Plants New Ols,:
None 4.
-s
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'Q,
o geCPs:
Bellefonte 1, 2
-- 11B )
Complete socctrum recuired.
(Plans are for all to reference Greenwood 2, 3
-- IIB
(
a complete spectrum submitted f
probably on WPPSS.)
(IPPSS1,4
-- IIB Pebble Springs 1, 2 --IIB)
CIsTEGOP.Y IV:
145-FA Plants liew Ots:
lione itew cps.
liorth Anna 3, 4
-- IIB Comolete scectrum recuired.
(One will probaoly reference Surry 3, 4
-- IIB the other.)
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CPACH TECHNICAL POSIT!C.l CIC5818 APPLICATION CT THE sl'n'.C TA!LtDC CRiitD:t'" 10 MA' DALLY-CONTROLLC3
[LCCIRIC*LLY CPIRATED VALVES A.
Cf;C,5?40"N3 Khere a sing)6 failure in an electrical syster can result in less of capability to perferr.
This is necessary re ard-a safety fur.ction, the ef fect on plant s!fety tust be evaluated.
less of whether the Icss of safety function is caused by a co. ;.anent fciling te rerfe>~ a requisite rechanical rotion, or by a coTponent performing an ur.desirabic r.echu.ical otion.
This position establishes the acceptability of discenrecting power to electrical c:';.onents of a fluid sysic9 as cne reins of designing against a single failure that richt cause in un-desirable co poner.t actien. These provisions are based on the assu~ption that t>e cc-:?r.c<.t is then equivolent ic a siniler co-ocner.t that is not ecsigned for electrical crerstion, e.g., a valve that can te crene cr closed only by direct rar.ual creration of the valve.
11.cy are alse bastd kn t ie assu stics that no sir.gle feil.re can both restere rc er to the electrical systen and cause rec'cnical rotien Of t'.e co ?;ntnis servcd by the electeic>l The validity c' tv.se esso 9tions sS?.sif t" vceified t.'en erslying t'.is r?iition.
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t e. m
- .f l.
leiluics it bet- ;6 e ' feii to f.m tien" suse ccd t'+ "u-dniraM e funct;c" cor.pocer.ts in electrical syste s cf selves end otaer 'Ivid sys.e cc acr.-
s s
.11 tie consid(ref in dts' M r.; a ;;" 4 ' e sin;le failure, e,cn t*: urn it c.:h e c..
ot'. c i
fluid syste-cc-conent r ey not.e callcd.::a te f.nction in a :..cr saf( t.
- g ryt terni sequente.
- cir :a.9 2.
K5cre it is ce cr irted that failure e' an cicctrical syste ; cc rrn undesircd rech2nict) at an of a v3he er et*ec fluid sysic, ci-r:: c.t 7"? t'.f s rotion results in loss ei the sy:- safct, fu.ctic", it is i:ccrirdIe, ia lieu c' design ch!nges that also ia) be 7: ept:Sle, to distcnnect ;?..er to the c1(c'.ric syst s 9> s' O.I r of the velve er other fluid systen cc ?: rent. Ibc plant technical s c:iceti:
l'nclede a list of all ciectricrily crerated volves, and 'the recuis ed resitic"s of u t se valves, to which the re uirem:nt for rer. oval of electric pewer is applied in crder te satisfy the single failure criterien.
Electrically ocerated valves that are classi<ied as " active" vahes, i.e., are reavired 3.
to open er close in socious safety sysic eperational sequences, but are ranually-
~
controlled, should be cocrated frc, the T.ain control ree*:.
Such valves rey not be included a-ong these valves from which, o.<er is re oved in order to r.cet the single failure criterion unless: (t) electrical tower can te restored to the valves f rom the main centrol roem,(5) valve operation is not necessary for at least Tu ninutes k
following occurrence of the vent requiring such operation, and (:) it is demonstrated g.
I 7A-?7
9 s
s that there is reascrabic assurance that all r.ecessary operator actions will te per-forned within the ti-c shown to be adecuate by tre analysis. The plant technical specifications should include a list of the required positions of cunually-controlled.
electrically op, crated valves and sh;uld identify those valves to which the recuire-r.cnt for reroval of electric po.er is applied in order to satisfy the single failure criterion.
4.
When the single failure criterien is satisfied 'y rer. oval of electrical poner fro:-
a valves described in (?) ar.d (3), above, these v31ves should have red;ndant positico indication in the rain control roo.,and the ;osition indication syste-should.itself.
reet the single f ailure criterion.
The phrase "cicctrically o erated valves" ir.cludes both valves c:erated directly bj en 5.
g electrical device (e.g., a rotor-escreted valve or a solenoid ope ated valve) and these valves operated indirectly bf en ciectrical d2vice (e.g., an air-c:erated valse m50sc air supply is controlled by an electrical solenoid valse).
C.
Eif Ef:E'.CE S 1.
Pereranduti to R. C. DeYoung and Y. A. :' core f t om V. Stello. 0:tcber 1. I?73.
l e
7A 23 e
CRANCH TCCH'ilCAL P051i10't CSB 6-1 Hl!;1"U:'. C'/4TAl!.E!ii pM5YRE FXEL F0;t P'. R ECCL PCPTO'Jt".'.CC Lu,'.t Ai!CN CAC r 0RC'J.'.3 A.
Paragraph 1.0.2 of Antndix r. to 10 CFP. Part 5') (Ref.1) requires that tPc contair.cnt pressure used to evalu te the perfer-an:e capability of a pressurized u?tcr rea: tor (in
.I e ergency core coolin'y s/ste (CCCS) r.ot exceed a pressure calculated ceaservatively It further, rec,uires that tr e calculation include tre ef fects of eseraticn cf that purpc,se.
Therefore, the follo..in; tran:h all installed ;ressure-rcducita syste-s and prc: esses.
tecnical position has been develc ad to previd2 guidance in the perfor-cnce of "ini :,:
containment r.ressure analysis. The espec.ach dc',cribed t:elo.e a 41ics orily to the [CCs.
related contair7nt pressure evelt:atien an f r ot to the contain..ent funct:c'ial ca;3 bili'.y eval.itico for pettulated design b sis cccidents, t
i B.
Omtit 1FO".!C* L F051110*;
4 1.
Input b ft. 3 tier. 'e< ";fel a.
Initici Cc'.M i': ?at h.crml C: fiticos f
lt.e r:ini-;, cen'sii v i e s s tc ;,crat;rc, Y ;- conteir.rert :.r( s succ.
}
ard
- m.i:.u-tunic'i ty tu t : s j t ' en:t-;.t e red u%: r l i..i t ir..
- ?1 c: :r yt: r I
4
./
co%itiens Wuld be used, t
b.
Initit ! bt(ide Ce ntai," cat I-t ic-t C: "i. m
- *. i pe;14 t e ta < ;.
j
'.y Ic.. : 'ir s tc re e ture < ter: 31 te the cc :t ri-A reasc-j l.
.C_x_ _t_0_.8 r__e. i Y e h_..?.
I c.
The raxin;:: r.ct f rre c; nir?*'t v0hr e 90uld !? t,5 c d. Ibis 3ri s - 'rce volu 3 should t e dct.
dr.ed f re m tN c c 5-cr : ' -en r A; e ur;s :-e.
- '. es
- ent,
.0 15 rad fl;;3rs, str.cctural 5;cfl,.s,c.
e..
of internal strc:t,res sc:h :s in l
The triivi.~.sl volu-e calculaticas s?.culd reficc; the u :rrtr e '
i and pipir.;.
the cc parent velu-cs.
{
P 2.
.A_c t i v.e H.c t. t Si n's.t
.So.ra_.v _e.nd Ten Coal iso sv s t.f :s
)
a.
The 0;'eratien cf all cr..-incered safet, feature contc.inment heat reroval syt.ters s
I f
operating at r'asirum h st re-Oval cap? city; i.e., with all containrent spray ran cc010e units I
trains opc"ating at ca.simum fic., conditions and all crerge.cy In additien, the nini. a, ter:pe.a:ure of the storcd m
operating, Should be assumed.
water for the spray coo'.ing syste, and the cooling water sup;) lied to ite faq coolers, based on technical specificatien limits, should t'e assumed.
I h
l J
6.7.1.5 3 i
9
a Ocviations tren the foregoing will be accepted if it can be shown thaB the worst Conditions regarding a single aClive failure, stored water temperature and cooling water temperature have been selected from the standpoint of the overall CCCS r.odel.
b.
Centair ent Ste>9 Miriei With Sp _illed fCCS Veter
)
The spillaq? cf sutcooled ECCS water into the contain-er.t proiides an additional heat sink as the sub:coled C".CS water mixes v:ith the sican in the ennta:r ent.
The ef ftet of the stean-Sater nixir.g snoald te cerisidered in the contair. ent j
pressure calculations.
c.
Contain*cnt Sina, Mir ira L'ith '.'a ter f r; ' !ce P< fit The water resulting from ice reiting in en ice co.dcr.ser ccStair.n.cnt presides en additional heat sinh as the sub:coled water rtixes with the steam v.hile decinir.g from the 4.c condecscr into the lower contair :nt volene. T!.c cffcct Of tte g
stern.;ater nixing shoJld be c0r.sidertd in the cCntain er.t Orcssure c6lcul;ti0ns.
3.
bstive 5' eat Sir.ks a.
Identificatica.
lhe r,assive hect sirJs that should b2 included in it e contair. ent cerlusti:n nodel should be estcblis'.ed by ide itifyie.; t*ose structures e id cc-ene.ts witt 4 the ct r.t n ir-C *,t t*
t crul/ in'lurf:0 the pre!.te e re p;-Ae t.? 1. f r.d s c ' s i r s -
tures and (0~;0-tits t'.a t s t02't
't ircluded er. listed in table 1.
Data eq :.cssive teat sin'r s have ! r. c /;iled fre" ;-c.i
,5 rr.'ec.s i d..
been used as a besis '~er the si ?lified
- dc e s *.1 c d
- 210.:
T,is
-dc' is accepteble fer e in'r e centair cnt d css.,rc ar? lyses 'er c;nstex*ie, -
rpplicc ticns and until such t'.-c (i.e., at
.'.e,e;. crc *.ing iicc r:.0 -c.'c.'
.-at co,plete ieenti'ica.ien of aveilcbie cat sin
I Sectie'i 10..0 (a}' ) Of 10 CT; Pcrt 50.
Ter 5,
- c:ses, and for cr 4t -- --
1
- s.'
9in 1*.e cc 1 -
permi t revic..s.
ere a deta i'c0 listire c*~
c?!
5.
of ten taneet t>c ; r v'ded. t'e # :.:1r0 precedere 2y be used to dtl 1 c 25s' heat sinks wita.in t'e c:r.tairrecnt (1) L'se the surf ace crea ar.d thickness of t e prir.2ry :?.tair ?nt steel s ell er steel liner and associated ar:9ers crd ::ncrete. as 30 pre riate.
.i j
(2) Estimate ibe escesed surface area-c'f ct'er steel heat sinis in ace:rd:cce j
uith figure I and assu c an average thi:iness Of 3/S inch.
i.i s
f (3) Model the internal centrete t'ructures as a sicb with a thickness of I feet
?
and expo. sed surface of 160.000 ft l
The heat sink therr: physical properties that would be acce.7 table are shewn in j
Tab,1c 2.
6.2.1.5-4
}i s
t
I s
'A ovide a detailed list of At the operating license stage, appilcants thould passive heat sinks, with appropriate dir.cnsions and properties, b.
' Heat Transfer Coefficients The.following conservative condensing t. cat transfer coef ficients for teat transfer I
to the exposed possive heat sinks during the bicwdos.n and rost-blowdo,.n phases of -
'1 l
the loss of-coolant accident should be used (Sce figure ?):
i (1) During the bic;<do.-i phase, assume a Itnear ir. crease in the cond:rring teat 2
transfer cCefficient frot.hgg*3 Ct>/hr-f t
- F, at t = 0, to a peak
'value f our thms greater t'pn the raxt:;., calculated condensing he.at trans-
/
fer coefficient ao ite end of bio.dc..n, using the Tagar.1 correlatten (Ref.2),
, o,gp
,. b h
= 72.5 rax VtD.
7 where h,, = r.sxiru i f. eat trensfer ceefficient, Stu/hr-f t
'F a
s y
Q
= prir.ary coolar.t energy, Otu
-3 I
V
= riet free con'.ainment voh.7, ft tirse interval tc cnd of dia:d wn, sec.
t
=
p (2) During the icng-tern post bleadown rSase cf the eccident, c*.eracu rized by
~
cor.densin; ' fat tre' ster 10.4 turh:lence in' the coa.tcirrent et-Ochere, atst.-i-
{
cceffitte'.ts 1.2 ti.e' crater tha'i t' O',e ;'redic ut t v t t ;;hi:'a Ca'.c
- t (Ref. ~3) cnd eiven in 1rtle 3.
~
l
{
3}.
D. iring tt.e tr:.si tien t;'.?.* e of t' e ar tifvt, reta en the (*d c' M: 4. '
t'd (3) l the leng ite ; est-Oc..de.M ;' ase, a riitcNbly ce'M ervative c=;
- 4; transitien in t'.c condensing hcat tr
- rsfer cecf ficier.; $ culd ::
8 a ss:rc::
p I
-($ce figure 2).
1 ite calcultted ccedensir.; heat transfer c:efficic.ts tasca en the at ve et*;d rc.0.
and
. should t e a:mlied te 'all ecosed rassive
- cat sints, tot *. retal r.nc ::
i I
I' for both painted and unpainted s r' aces.
e Peat transfer betucen adjoinig raterials in rassive h:st sint.s skeuid be l'aird An on the assumption cf to resistar.:e to bcci flew at the naterial int (.rfnes.
exrvle of inis'is the contairment liner to cencrete interface.
C.
- REFfpr;; cts 10 CFR 550.46, "Acceptar.cc Criteric for Er.ergency Core Cooling Syste s for lignt ;;2ter 1.
Nucicar rewer Reccters," and 10 CFR rart 50, 4 endi,x K, "ECCS Evaluatice :'edels."
2.
- T. Tagami, "Interin Rep:rt en Safet3 Assessnen' -cnd facilitics Establisb.+cnt Pro.icct i
in Japan for Period Ending June 1955 (No.1).
.repared for the National React ~ Testing Station, February 28 1950~(unpublished itorki J
6.2.1.5-5 t
y
~
r w r e
ir i
e
a
=
3, II. Uchida. A. Oy.
, and Y. Tega, " Evaluation of Post-Irit nt Cooling Systems of LigSt-Water Power Reactors," Proc. Ihlrd International Conference en the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Volurre 13, Session 3.9 United Nations Ger.cya (13C4).
l e
h d
1 a
t i
i i
I, I
i
)
1 l
1 l
i l
i
.s.2.1.5-c I
s 8
.g s.
TADLE 1-l' ItitttT!r1 CAT 10?t OF C0 4TA!'?!NT HEAT 51!:r.s l~
q i
i
~ Containment Building (e.g., lince plate and, external concrete walls, floor, and sump, and 1
_1.
liner _ anchors).
Containment Ir',e M1 Strvetures (e.g., internal separation walls and ficors, refueling 2.
posi aad fuel transfer pit walls, and shiciding walls).
Supports (e.g., reactor vessel, steem generator, pump;, tents, rajor compor.cnts, pipp sup; orts, and stcrage rac,ks).
I Uninsulated Syste.s and Components (c!g., cold water systens, heating. ventilatten, and l
4.'
air conditioning systtes, puips,t.otors, fan ecolcrs, recombiners, and tants).
Piscellaneous Equipent (e.g., ladders, gratings, ciectrical cadic trays, and cru.cs).
5.
I u
j a.
.<)
?
./
l l.
l
(
l l'
l" D
- t.
t i.
l.
{
L 1
l=
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l l'
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)
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- j
,L 6.2.,1.5-7
/
t-
. j'
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b -..
TABtE_2
((AT SINM THER"OsvyslCAL p20prpy;[s Specific Thernal Fest Con'uctivity Censi3y
!,atert#I Iti/ f t Btu /15 'r gtu /hr.f t. s'r 8
i Concrete 145 0,156 0.92
[
Steel 490 0.12 27.0 d
1 i
)
1 E
I I
I q
l m
6.2.1.5-8 4
m
.7.
TABLE 3 UCitIDA HEAT TRA*:srER C0Crr! Cit'tTS Mass
!! cat Transfer
. Pass Heat Transfer Ratio Coefficipt
. Ratio
. Coefficignt Qbair/lbsteft.Q, (Btv/hr f t 'F)
Qbair/lbstefd (Blu/_hr-ft - *Q 50 2
3 29 20 8
2.3 37 18 9
1.8 46 10 1.3 63 14-10 14 0.8 98 7'
17 0.5 140 5-
?)
0.1 280 4
24 4
6 9
9 4
e.
,)
~
I t
e 6
9 a
].
. 6. 2.1,. 5-9 r
'g' l
l ui.
a a
tw s
N e4 a1uo
<e4 Oc:
a 4J s:
U 13 c:
=< t c:u ao M
O JJ c
'T e
0
.-i c:
~
m x
e.
s U,.%'
o i :.
t;
~
- i 4.
- * *
~
Q lie 4J c:
O o
f v
I 6.
A ed w
cc f.b
$d c,
v N
f:
=
W O
g tj O
a u
c e.
o U
l I
I
~
m o
m n
3 0T x 71 g roay y,u1 S-3 Poli T oo:S f riuo:t:1 4
c.i.,.sio
.