ML19326A828
| ML19326A828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1969 |
| From: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003050738 | |
| Download: ML19326A828 (45) | |
Text
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.g UNITED STATES OF AERICA 4
AT01EC ENERGY C0h2ES3 ION In the Matter of THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING i
COMPAUY Docket No. 50-346 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station APPLICAUTS'. PROPOSED FIUDINGS OF FACT AND CONCIUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF l.
AN INITIAL DECISION-i f
PRELIIENARY STATEENT 1.
On August 1,1969, The Toledo Edison Company j
(Toledo Edison) and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Applicants) filed j-with the Atomic Energy Commission ( AEC or Corsassion) a joint j
application for a license to conatruct and operate a nuclear 11 power station.
The proposed station, to be known as the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, will utilize a pressurized water nuclear power reactor with an initial core power level of 2633 thermal megawatts (Mwt) and an ultimate expected level of 2772 Mwt. -The station is to be located on the south shore-of Lake Erie in Ottawa County, Ohio, 20 miles east of Toledo.
The station will be jointly owned by the.two Applicants as tenants-in-common,.with Toledo Edison assuming responsibility for the design,_ construction.and operation.
08:050g
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2.
Following review of the application by the Commis-sion's Regulatory Staff (Staff) and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the Commission, pursuant to the Atomic
- Energy Act of 1954, as amended, ( Act) and its own regulations, announced by publication in the Federal Register on November 4, 1/
1970,-
that a public hearing would be held before this Atomic Safety and-Licensing Board (Board) to consider whether a construc-tion permit should be granted to the Applicants.
The notice of hearing established the time and place of the hearing and provided for a prehearing conference.
It also explained how interested persons could petition for leave to intervene in the proceedings as parties and how persons wishing to express their views at the hearing could do so without becoming intervening parties.
3 In accordance with the notice of hearing, a public hearing was held before this Board on December 8-10, 1970, Janu-ary 5-7, and 25-29, 1971, and February 8-12, 1971, in Port Clinton, Ohio, about nine miles from the site, following a prehearing con-ference which had been held in Port Clinton on November 23, 1970.
The parties to this proceeding are the Applicants, the Staff, the Coalition-for Safe I!uclear Power (Coalition), Mr. Glenn Lau, a local resident, and Living in a Finer Environment (LIFE) along with two individuals, Dr. Irwin I. Oster-2/ and Mr. William E.
Reany.
The Coalition, Lau and LIFE intervened in the pro-ceeding in opposition to the proposed station.
The hearing was a contested proceeding within the meaning of section 2.4(n) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.
The issues to be considered
'b 1/ 35' Fed. Reg. 16999 2/ By letter dated February 8,1971, ti the Eoard, Dr. Oster withdrew as an intervenor in opposition to the station.
Tr. pp. 1608-15 by this Board in a contested proceeding as the basis for deter-mining whether a construction permit should be issued to the 1l Applicants were set forth in the notice of hearing.
3/ The Commission's notice of hearing published on November 4, 1970, at 35 Fed. Reg. Ic999 specified the following issues to be considered in the event the hearing should become a contested proceeding.
1.
Whether in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 550.35(a):
(a)
The applicants have described the proposed design of the facility including, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and have identified the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public; (b)
Such e"-+'
- technical or design information as may be req-._.
uo complete the safety analysis and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report; (c)
Safety features or components, if any, which require research and development have been described by the applicants and the applicants have identified, and there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components; and (d)
On the basis of the foregoing, there is reasonable assurance that (1) such safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facility, and (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed fac*.lity can be con-structed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
2.
Whether the applicants are technically qualified to design and construct the proposed facility; 3.
Whether the applicants are financially qualified to design and construct the proposed facility; and 4.
Whether the issuance of a permit for the construction of the facility will be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of th a public.
4 4.
The Coalition, consisting of a number of organiza-
'tions and individuals in north central Ohio, filed an initial petition for leave to intervene in the proceeding on November 18, 1970.
As a result of a Board order at the prehearing confer-ence granting the Coalition leave to amend its petition which did not conform to the requirements of section 2.714 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, an amended petition was filed on December 7,1970,. setting forth a number of contentions in opposition to the proposed nuclear power station.
The Coali-tion's amended petition was granted by the Board on December 9, 1970, subject to conditions, pursuant to section 2.714(d),
limiting the matters in controversy to those of the Coalition's contentions which were relevant to the issues in the proceeding, set forth in reasonably specific detail as required by section 2 714(a), and listed in the original petition.-4/
5 The notice of hearing specified that petitions for leave to intervene must be received by the AEC not later than November 18, 1970.
Lau's petition, filed December 8 but dated November 18 and represented to be an extension of a letter which Lau had sent to the Commission on November 18, was accepted as timely.
Lau was also given the opportunity to amend his petition which was deficient and was admitted as a party _on December 9 on the basis of the amended petition
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dated December-8,1971,. subject to conditions limiting the matters in controversy to those of Lau's contentions 4/ Tr. pp. 384-7.
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which were relevant to the proceeding and which were presented 1/
in reasonably specific detail.
T 6.
The two co-chairmen of LIFE, a student group from Bowling Green University, submitted an undated letter, docketed by the AEC on November 16, 1970, which indicated the wishes of LIFE to intervene in the proceedings.
The letter did not relate the petitioner's interests or how its interests would be affected.
At the prenearing conference on Hovember 23, 1970, it was noted that LIFE appeared among the list of Coalition members in the Coalition's petition for leave to intervene, and the co-chair-man of LIFE announced that LIFE would participate in the pro-ceeding as a part of the Coalition rather than as a separate intervenor.
When the hearing commenced on December 8, LIFE, along with Dr. Oster and hr. Reany, (hereinafter collectively T
referred to as LIFE) filed a separate petition for leave to i
intervene in the-proceeding.
The petition was denied for not being timely filed and because of the absence of a showing y
the petitioners of good cause for failure to file on time.
On December 26, LIFE filed a petition for reconsideration of the Board's rulings relating to the denial of LIFE's inter-vention.
The petition for reconsideration recited LIFE's reasons for late filing of its intervention petition and set forth two contentions, the first relating to AEC's 4
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA_), _ and the second relating to the jb/ Tr. p.
-382.
- 6/ Tr. p. 349
adequacy of the radiological safety standards in Part 20 of the Commission's regulations.
LIFE was allowed to intervene-7/
for the purpose of pursuing these two contentions to the extent that such challenges are permitted in adjudicatory proceedings as set out in the Commission's regulations and, in particular, th,e Commission's memorandum dated August 8,1969, in the Calvert Cliffs proceeding.-8/
7.
A petition for leave to intervene filed by Richard E. Webb, a resident of Columbus, Ohio, alleging the unconstitutionality of the Act was denied at the prehe'aring conference.
The constitutional question was beyond the scope of the proceeding and the petitioner had failed to set forth his interest in the proceeding and how it would be 9_/
affected by the proposed issuance of the cons'truction permit.
Pursu'nt to section 2,715 of the Commission's 8.
a Rules of Practice, limited appearances were granted by this Board to allow the presentation of unsworn statements on be, half of the Ohio Department of Health and by a number of other persons on~their own behalf and on behalf of organiza-tions they represented.
Applicants and the Staff responded
/
10
- to the matters raised by the limited-appearors. -
i s
7/ Tr. pp. 608-11, 618-20.
-8/ In the Matter of Baltimore Gas and Electric Comoany, AEC Docket.!os. 50-317 and 50-31o.
9/ Tr. pp. 10-18. '
g, Tr. pp. 518-525, Applicants' Exhibit No. 10, and Staff
'. Exhibit No. 15 4,
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED IN THIS PROCEEDING AS A BASIS FOR DETERMINIUG ISSUAUCE OF A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT Is sue No. 1( a ).
Whether in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 550.35(a) the applicants have described the proposed design of the facil-ity including, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and have identified the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
9 The application and the recard of the proceeding contain a wide range of information about the proposed facility.
This informat[on includes detailed information about the site and the. basis of its suitability, the design of the facility including the principal architectural and engineering criteria, and the features, components, and systems incorporated in the facility for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
Features of the station requiring additional informa-tion to be developed by the Applicants prior to completion of c6nstruction of the facility are described in the application and the record of the proceeding which also includes the Applican.ts' technical and financial _ qualifications, the Applicant s ' quality assurance program, and the proposed 11/
station's bearing upon the common defense and security.--
11/ Applicants ' Summary Description of Application for Licenses Under the Atomic, Energy Act of 1954, as amended,)for Davis-Hovembe Besse Nuclear Power Station ( Applicants' Summary 1970, pp. 1-3, 37.
Tr. p. 472.
o o
The Staff's safety evaluation explains the considerations which were given by the Staff to the important safety features of the proposed facility.--12/
The intervenors did not controvert the testimony and evidence in support of an affirmative finding on Issue Ho.1( a).
Is sue Ho. 1( b ).
Whether in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 550 35( a) such further technical or design information as may be required to complete the safety analysis and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report.
10.
Applicants have testified,--13/ and the Staff
- agrees, that such further information as may be required to complete the safety analysis and which can reasonably be left for later consideration will be supplied in the final safety analysis' report (FSAR).
The'FSAR is prepared by an applicant in an AEC licensing proceeding as part of its appli-cation for an operating license and is usually submitted about a year and a half prior to the scheduled date for initial fuel loading.
The intervenors did not controvert the testimony in support of an affirmative finding on Issue No. 1(b).
4 12/-. Safety Evaluation by the Division of Reactor Licensing Staff Safety Evaluation), November 2, 1970, pp. 1-4, Tr. p. 494.
13,/ Applicants ' Sunmary, p. 37.
14/ Staff Safety Evaluation, p. 86.._
Issues Eo.1( c) and 1( d)(1).
Whether in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 550 35(a) safety features or components, if any, which require research and develop-ment have been described by the applicants and the applicants have identified, and there will be conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components and, on the-basis of the fore-going, there is reasonable assurance that such safety questions will be satisfactorily resolved at or before the' latest date stated-in the application for completion of con-struction of the proposed facility.
11.
Applicants'and the Staff recognize that, in order to complete the final detailed design of some components, additional information will be needed.
The research and develop-ment programs, most of which have been completed since submission of the application, consist primarily of proo.f testing of engincered designs, confirmatory tests to confirm analytically
.i predicted conditions, or analytical studies to evaluate design or accident conditions.
The areas of development include core xenon instability analyses, core thermal and hydraulic design, the effects of fuel rod clad failure on core cooling, control-rod drive testing, prototype testing of the once-through J
steam generator, testing of self-powered neutron detectors, and analyses-of the effects of blowdown forces on core internals.
The programs are timely, are reasonably designed to accomplish their objectives before completion of construction of the
' station,.will provide adequate information on which to base analyses of the design and performance,-and should lead to
,. ~. -
4+-
3 +, -.--
-acceptable designs for the systems involved.--15/
The inter-venors did not controvert the testimony and evidence in support of affirmative findings on Issues Ho.1(c) and 1(d)(1).
Issue No.1( d)(ii).
Whether in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 550.35(a),
on the basis of the foregoing, there is reasonable assurance that, taking into consideration the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Site Considerations 12.
The proposed Davis-Besse Huclear Power Station will be located on the south shore of Lake Erie in Ottawa County, Ohio, approximately nine miles northwest of the City of Port Clinton, the Ottawa County seat.
The City of Toledo is twenty miles to the west and the Village of Oak Harbor is six miles southwest of the site.
The site consists of at least 900 acres of which about half is marshland which will be leased to the U. S. Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife for management as a national wildlife refuge.
The site and surrounding area terrain is virtually featureless with marsh areas along the lake shore and with farmland further inland.--16 /
13.
The minimum distance between the reactor and the outer boundary of the exclusion area (the area in which M/
Applicants ' Summary, pp. 29-32, 37; Staff Safety Evalua-tion, pp. 75-81, 80.
' W 1 Applicants ' Summary, pp. 4-6;. Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 5-6.
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the Applicants have the authority to determine all activities for purposes of 10 CFR Part 100 of the Commission's regulations) is 2400 feet.
No one resides within the exclusion area.
The low population zone surrounding the station, with a radius of two miles, has a permanent resident population of approximately 650' and a 1969 summer population of 1564.
The nearest popula-tion centers (population greater than 25,000) are Toledo and Sandusky, each of which is approximately twenty miles from the site.--17/
14.
The station design takes into account site geology, meteorology, hydrology and ground water conditions and the possibility of tornados, floods, and earthquakes.--18/
The containment and engineered safety features of the station design, and all other components of the facility which bear significantly on the acceptability of the site under site evaluation factors identified in 10 CFR Part 100 have been analyzed and evaluated by the Applicants and the Staff for a core. power level of 2772 M' the ultimate power level expected for the reactor.
15 Lau contended that the exclusion area and low population zone around the site, and the population center distance, as defined in 10 CFR Part 100 of AEC regulations, were incorrectly calculated in contravention of the Commissica's IL/ Applicants ' Summary, pp. 4-6; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 5-6.
18/1 Applicants' Summary, pp. 6-10; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 6 -9 12/ Applicants ' Summary, p. 2; Staff Safety Evaluation,
_pp. 1-2.
~ 11
mi.w.
9 own guidelines.
Similarly, the Coalition contended that the
-Commission had violated its own guidelines for siting reactors.--20/
The purpose of Part 100 of AEC regulations is to provide guide-line criteria for determining the adequacy of a specific site for a specific facility.
Part 100 references an AEC document (TID-14844) as a point of departure for calculating particular site requirements.
The intervenors apparently misinterpreted Part 100 and the method with which TID-14844 is to be used, and extrapolated the exclusion zone radius and low population zone radius directly from a table set out in TID-14844 which was based on an assumed reactor having a simple containment and no other engineered safety features.
The calculational model in TID-14844 does not reflect the numerous engineered safety features of the proposed facility, such as the emergency core cooling system, the concrete shield building surrounding the steel containment vessel, and an emergency ventilation system with redundant full capacity fan and filter systems.
Part 100 allows the substitution of engineered safety features and favorable site characteristics for distance in determining 21/
site paraneters.'--
20/ Tr. pp. 809-19, 1274-76,1399-1412.
21/ Section 100.10 makes it clear that a number of factors, including engineered safety features, are to be considered in evaluating proposed reactor sites.
Section 100.10(d) specifically provides that a site with unfavorable site characteristics'may be acceptable if "approcriate and adequate compensating engineered safeguards" are used.
A: note at the end of Part 100 which references TID-14844 states that the calculations described therein "may be used as a point of departure for consideration of particu-lar site requirements The Statement of Considera-tion which accompanied. the publication of Part 100 on April 12,1962, _ stated that~the Applicants are " free and indeed' encouraged to demonstrate to the Commission the applicability and significance of considerations other thtm those ' set forth in the guides".
( 27 Fed. Reg. 3509 ).
I
~
L.
-In this regard, we_ find that the Staff has been consistent with
'the provisions of Part~100 and its past regulatory practices in evaluating the suitability of the proposed site for the Davis-l Besse Nuclear Power Station.
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16.
Lau contended that Applicants' meteorological studies of the site were inadequate in that they (1) analyzed data for only six months and (2) ignored two recent severe storms in the area.
The application contains eighteen conths of temperature data.through February 1970 at three levels and eighteen months of-wind data at the 300-foot level.
It also contains six months of wind data at the 20-foot level.
The Staff noted that the Applicants will provide a year's data at the twenty-foot level prior to review of the application for an operating license, and, for purposes of this proceeding and to determine the suitability of the site, evaluated the site using a calculational model with diff"usion parameter assumptions more conservative than the Applicants ' six-month data at the twenty-foot level would indicate to be warranted.
In regard to dispersion, "mo're conservative" means the assumption of lower wind speeds and other factors which would indicate less dispersion of the gasses in-the atmosphere than the actual observed meterological conditions would indicate.
The. Applicant has subsequently collected well over
- a year's worth of data at the twenty-foot level which confirms the conservatism of the calculational model used.23 Severe storms werel considered relative to the structural adequacy of the station.
The reactor ' structures' are being designed to withstand tornadoes
- of'substantiallyfgreater magnitude than any windstorms 22
-Tr.-pp. 645-52, 696-702, 834-41, 1094-1100, 1126-46, 2
.Tr.-pp. 655-61, 700-2.
4
- lre, measured in the area of the site, including the two storms mentioned by Lau.~ W
- 17.. Lau also contended that inadequate considera-tions had been given to population growth in the area.
Appli-cants and the Staff testified, however, that the application indeed contained population growth projections for the area through the year 2000 based on U. S. Census figures.
The Staff also noted that the AEC -retains close and continuous regulatory supervision over the plant throughout its lifetime and the AEC is empowered to take regulatory measures which might be necessary to deal with any unexpected population increase.
18.
Applicants have provided the information required.by Appendix E of Part 50 concerning preliminary plans for developing emergency procedures to be implemented in'the unlikely event of an accident condition which would require evacuation of people within the low population zone. _k/
2 Lau. contended, however, that evacuation of residents from the low population zone could not be accomplished in periods of flooding or heavy storms and produced a number of local resi-dents of the nearby Sand Beach area who testified to the severity of the winte:" snowstorms with resultant snow drifting which caused private local streets to-be blocked by snow for at least several days during several years. W The record shows there are no residences 24 Tr. pp. 660, 700-2.
2j/ ~Tr. pp. 654, 836-41.
2b/ Tr. pp. 1650-58, 1712-14, 2179-82.
& Tr. pp. 2052-2106.
r within the exclusion area and that.there was a fluctuating population of from 637 to 1,564 during 1969 in the low popula-
- tion zone, with a projected population growth rate of 1.6 percent per year.
Detailed emergency _precedures to provide for an orderly evacuation will be fully prepared prior to operation of the station in coordination with local and state 4
law enforcement agencies, the Cttawa County Civil Defense Corps, and the U. S. Coast Guard.
Applicants have made preliminary contacts with the Ottawa County Commissioner, the Ottawa County Sheriff, the Ottawa County Engineer, the Civil Defense Director, the Oak Harbor Fire Department, the Highway Department, and the Ohio Highway Patrol, all of whom have indicated a willingness to cooperate with Applicants in formulating a detailed evacuation plan.
Suit.able vehicles 1
will be available to aid'in the timelf evacuation of individuals under the adverse snow and flood conditions expected in the
--28/
area.
The testimcny of Lau's witnessec indicated that,even 1
though the residents were often snowbound in the sense that they were unable to use their automobiles, egress' on foot or by other suitable vehicles was not precluded.
Applicants' expert testimony demonstrated that initially, under maximum hypothetical conditions requiring evacuation, only a selected, downwind portion of_ the low population zone would have to be promptly I
evacuated.
This would involve moving a small number of people over distances of under a mile.
Although.the testimony indicated 28/
Tr. pp. 653-4, 1093-94, 1100-1109, 82-84., 1648-50, 1118-26 2044-51, 2149-50, 2152, 2165-66, 21 i
=
=. -. -
L that evacuation could be undertaken-during the ccurse of
- violent weather. conditions, such evacuation would not have to ocer.r during such conditions because of the favorable disper-i sion characteristics afforded by the high wind speeds associ-2_9_/
ated with such conditions.
The Ottawa County Engineer, an elected official in charge of snow removal in the area, testi-fled that, with proper notification, it is feasible to evacuate i
the low population zone under any' weather conditions within
--30/
short tine periods.
Testimony by the Staff cenplemented A/
and corroborated Applicants ' testimony.
19 Lake Erie surface areas and certain air spaces in the vicinity of the station have been established by the U. S. Corps of Engineers and the Federal Aviation Agency as restricted. areas reserved for use by segnents of the armed services and-industrial organizations located within the Erie Industrial ~ Park for training and testing activities of air-4 craft, ground weapons, and airborna weapons.
The Coalition contended that these activities constituted an unacceptable hazard in relation to operation of the facility.
The Staff s
i and the ACRS had given special attention _to these activities during their review of.the application and both had' concluded that no significant hazard existed as a result of these 5
activities.
Evidence: presented at the hearing by both 22/ Tr. pd. 2184-92, 2193-97.
30/- Tr. pp. 2143-66.
E/ Tr. pp. 2193-97, 2197-99, 2200-2206', 2207-08.
l
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.i
the Staff and the Applicants concerning the frequency of flights in the area, types of aircraft, flight paths, types of weapons tested, locations of firing ranges, and procedures for controlling aircraft and weapons testing activities in the areas confirmed the conclusions of the Staff and the ACRS.
In addition, Applicants introduced letters from David Packard, Acting Secretary of Defense, and from Dana L. Stewart, The Adjutant General, State of Ohio, providing assurance that all military and ordnance testing activities in the atrea will be carefully controlled to avoid hazard to the health and safety
-32/
of the publie. -
Features of the Station 20.
The nuclear steam supply system for the Davis-Besse Euclear Power Station is a two-loop pressurized water reactor supplied by the Babcock & 'dilcox Company (35W) similar to other B&W pressurized water reactors such as Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 for which construc-tion permits have been issued by AEC.--33/ The reactor will be fueled with slightly enriched uranium dioxide pellets sealed within zircaloy tubes.
Core reactivity is controlled by a 32/
Applicants ' Summary;83-6, 712-19p. 10; Staff Safety Evaluation,11-13t Tr. pp. 0 1-50, 1036-43, 1715-17, 1908-14,731-49, 751-56, 33/. Applicants ' Summary, p. 29; Staff Safety Evaluation,
- p. 14.
i 1 '
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combination of movable control rod assemblies, a neutron absorber dissolved in the reactor coolant water, and burnable N
poison rod assenblies.
The two-loop reactor primary coolant. system includes the reactor vessel, four reactor coolant pumps, two steam' generators, a pressurizer and inter-connecting piping.
The water circulating in the primary system is used as a heat transfer medium to transfer heat from the reactor core to the steam generator where steam is produced 35/
in the secondary system to drive the turbine generator.
The reactor containment, consisting of a free standing ~
steel contain.went vessel and a reinforced concrete shield building, completely enclosesthe reactor and the primary coolant system-and is designed to withstand the peak pressure which could result in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant 36/
accident.
In' addition to the reactor containment,
- the station has a - number of engineered safety features designed for limiting the consequences of accidents, including the highly unlikely-loss-of-coolant accident.
These engineered safety features include emergency core cooling systems, con-tainment atmosphere cooling systems, and an emergency ventila-tion system. _The station has a reactor protection system designed to shutdown the reactor when preestablished limiting 37/
safety. system settings are reached.
_ $ Applicants ' Summary, pp. 16-17, 31/ Applicants ' Summary, p.15 36/ Applicants' Summary, pp.16-17; Sthff Safety Evaluation, pp. 26-30.
E/ Applicants ' Summary, op.17-20; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 35-54.
Tr. p. 511.
21.
During the course.of the proceeding the Board raised a number of questions relating to some of the safety features of the station.
In response, evidence 'fas presented, for example, that main steam and feedwater penetrations of the containment. vessel will be tested for leakage and can be repaired, if necessary, when the station is shutdown for 38/
refueling.
Other evidence relating to station safety features was presented in response to Board inquiries relating 3.9l to the adequacy of multi-component piping and valves, the S2/
functioning of the atmosoheric dump valves, the emergency 41/
diesel cooling system, and the design of the reactor 42/
coolant pump f-lywheels.
Radioactive Effluents 22.
Radioactive gaseous and liquid wastes will be treated by the radwaste disposal system which is designed to reduce radioactivity to a level which will permit reuse of the decontaminated waste water and release of effluents s
at levels well below applicable regulatory limits.
Pro-cessed effluents will be isolated and sampled prior to release to the environment to ensure that adequate provisions for safe discharge are made.
In addition, effluents will be continuously monitored during release, and if their activity
-jdb/ Applicants' Response to Questions Asked by the Atomic
' Safety and Licensing Board at the Prehearing Conference
( Applicants ' Resuonse), December 4,1970, Q. 4, Tr.
pp. 474, 500, 506-7
-31/ Applicants Response, Q. 5, Tr. pp. 474, 500.
40/ Applicants' Response, Q. 6, Tr. pp. 474, 500, 507-10, 690-91.
41/. Applicants' Response,-Q. 7, Tr. pp. 474, 500.
. 4g/ Tr. pp. 516-17, 687-90.
- l. -
n
should exceed low preset values, their release will be stopped automatically.. Applicants testified that gaseous wastes will normally be held for a period of sixty days, and in no event less than thirty days, before being filtered and released.
This processing and hold-up time for decay ensures that radio-
.nuclides of biological concern, including Cesium-137, Cesium-138, and Strontium-90, will not be released in the gaseous effluents and will not result from decay of any of the radionuclides in the gaseous effluents.
Applicants' testimony also indicated that the design of the liquid radwaste system, which employs degasification, filtration, ion exchange, and distillation, incorporates the most efficient proven technology availaDie for reducing the radioactive content of the liquid effluent.
The capabilities for sampling and monitoring, along with the in-herent capacity and flexibility of the system, permit the exer-cise of positive control over liquid and gaseous releases from the station to ensure-that all discharges of radioactive material from the site will be maintained as low as practicable and well below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.--43/
23 The Coalition contended that there had been an insufficient examination of the critical exposure routes in 44/
considering the effluent discharge. ~~~ Testimony by Applicants and the Staff bearing on the Coalition's contention and La 43/
Applicants ' Summary,83-84, 790-91, 799-804, 854-61, pp. 22-23; Staff Safety Analysis, op. 55-56; Tr. pp. 7 863-67 1940-4k,1253-541958-68.1269-74, 146h-85, 1643-47, 1897-1904, 44/ Tr. pp. 235, 768-804, 815-16,1227-74,1277-1330,1386-90, 1647
?
response to questions ' asked by the Coalition on cross examina-tion and by the 3 card indicated that the Applicants had adequately taken into account the critical exposure routes and that, using extremely conservative assumptions pertain-
-ing to reconcentration in the food cl.ain, resultant doses 45/
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would be far below AEC limits.
Accident Analysis 24.
In determining the safety of the reactor
-design, detailed safety evaluations and analyses were made by Applicants and the Staff, and reviewed by the ACRS, to determine the' capability of the station to mitigate the con-M/
sequences of a loss-of-coolant accident should it occur.
The Coalition contended that the analyses by the Applicants and the Staff are inadequate in that they did not include the consequences of an uncontrolled ' meltdown of the nuclear fuel.
The Coalition contended that there is no reasonable assurance that a meltdown can be avoided but offered no direct evidence which
~
supported the contention.
Evidence-intrcduced by Applicants and the Staff, however, indicated that a ' core meltdown is pre-
.cluded by the incorporation into the station design of highly M/ Applicants' Response, Q.1, 2, Tr. p. 474; Tc. pp. 499, 677-81, 707-12, 1662-75, 1917-71, - Applicants ' Exhibit No. 7.
36/ ~ Applicants ' Summary, pp. 24-25; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 62-67 31/ Tr. - pp. 820-33,1659-60.
redundant systems of engineered safety features to cool the core in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
These safety features also assure the integrity of the containment system S.$/
for mitigating the release of fission products to the atmosphere.
Nevertheless, for conservatism, the Applicants ' evaluation and the Staff's evaluation of the radiological consequences of the maximum hypothetical accident take into consideration a fission product release which would result from an arbitrarily postu-lated core meltdown and which would be far greater than calculated for the worst loss-of-coolant accident.
Safety evaluations by both the Applicants and the Staff demonstrate that the doses frcm such a remote and hypothetical accident ER/
are well within the guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100.
Environmental Monitoring 25 A comprehensive environmental monitoring program will be commenced prior to operation of the Davis-3 esse liuclear Power Station to determine the magnitude of the natural radio-activi'y in the surrounding environment.
The program will include environmental sampling of lake and well water, soil, air particulate matter, farm products, lake biota, and lake bottom sediment s.
This program will continue after station cperation begins, to detect and evaluate any change in radioactivity of the environment due to operation of the station.
The planning 38/ Tr. pp. 661-76, 702-3, 862-3, 884-903 32/ Applicants ' Summary, p. 25; Staff Safety Evaluation,
- p. 63,
O and conduct of this program will be done in cooperation with interested' federal and state agencies and will take into acccunt the recommendations of the Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S. Department of the Interior.
Additionally, Applicants have been. conducting a study of the local Lake Erie area since 1968.
One purpose of this study is to determine the type and nature of the lake biota to ascertain the extent that these biota could concentrate radionuclides which might be discharged from the station during operation.
Informa-tion obtained from this continuing study and from the environ-mental monitoring program will be used, among other purposes, to assure that the small amount of liquid radioactive releases will not adversely affect aquatL ecological systems and will not prevent normal utilization of the lake environment.--50/
Quality Assurance 26.
Applicants have established a comprehensive quality assurance program to assure that the station n'.11 be fabricated and constructed in accordance with all appli-cable codes and standards.
The program, which meets the requirenents of Appendix B,10 CFR Part 50, " Quality Assur-ance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," is implemented by.
R/ ' Applicants ' Summary, pp.10-11; Staff Safety Evalua--
tion, pp. 10-11.
m a quality assurance organization under the direction of Toledo Edison's Quality Assurance Engineer.
- Bechtel, Toledo Edison's architect-engineer and construction manaEer, acts as Toledo Edison's agent in monitoring the-quality assurance programs of The Babcock & Wilcox Company and other equipment suppliers, and of the con-struction contractors.
The quality assurance program functions independently of construction responsibilities and the Quality Assurance Engineer has the authority to stop work in the event of nonconformance with drawings, specifications, or procedures.-
In response to inquiry by the Board, the Staff testified that the detailed quality 1
assurance program will be under surveillance by the Division of Compliance and will be audited throughout the construction of the station.5.2) i 31/ Applicants' Summary, pp. 26-28; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 72-75.-
'jg2 / Tr. p. 513 s
t 4
n Issue No. 2.
Whether the applicants are technically qualified to design and con-struct the proposed facility.
26a.
Of the two Applicants, Toledo Edison has the responsibility for the engineering, design, construction, and i
operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.
Toledo Edison, in addition to being qualified and experienced in the design, construction, and operation of fossil fueled generating stations, has participated extensively in the Enrico Fermi Fast Breeder Project and has key personnel who have had considerable d
experience in all phases of that project.
Toledo Edison has 90 engineers on its staff, including employees with degrees in the nuclear discipline, and has employees with nuclear operations experience.
In addition, an extensi're training program has been established which will ensure that a highly competent and fully trained staff will be available for operation of the Davis-Eesse station.
The nuclear steam supply system is to be designed and supplied by the Babcock & Wilcox Company, a highly j
experienced nuclear reactor supplier whose reactors have been incorporated into many plants approved for construction and operation in-this country and abroad.
Bechtel will perform the architect-engineering services and will act as construction manager.
Bechtel is extensively experienced in the nuclear 4
industry and is presently engaged in the design and construction of 23 nuclear power units. E2/
This issue was not a matter-in controversy in the proceedings.
53/fApplicants' Summary, pp. 33-35; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp.,68-72, Tr.-pp. ll34-35.
r y--
1-. -,
g-
/
+
y Issue No. 3. -Whether the applicants are financially qualified to design and con-struct the proposed facility.
4 27.
The two Applicants will share ownership of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station as tenants-in-common with Toledo. Edison holding a 52.5 percent share and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company a 47.5 percent share.
Each Applicant is in a strong financial position with sound financing,.
adequate resources, and a high level of earnings, and anticipates financing its share cf the construction costs from internal sources, from the sale of debt securities, and from the issuance 3
of capital stock in such a manner as to maintain. its sound and 54 conservative capital structure.- /
This issue was not a matter j
1
.in controversy in the proceeding.
Issue No. 4 Whether the, issuance of a permit for the construction of the facility will be inimical to the common defense and security or to the-health and safety of the public.
{
28.
The application reflects that the activities to.be conducted at-the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station would i
be within the jurisdiction of the United States.
All the directors and principal.cfficers of each Applicant are citizens of the United States.
The Applicants are not owned, dominated or controlled by :an alien, a foreign corporation or a foreign government.
The activities to be. conducted do not involve any : restricted data; but. the Applicants have agreed to safeguard 4
any such data which might become involved in accordance with the 24/; Financial Qualifications of The Toledo Edison-Company, November 6, 1970, Tr. p. 478; Financial Qualifications of 'The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company,84-5 November 27,.
L1970, Tr. p. 478; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp..-
_4
?.
~
4 requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.
The Applicants will rely upon cbtaining fuel as it is needed frca sources of supply available for civilian purposes, so that no diversion of special nuclear material for military purposes is involved.
f 29 The findings'in paragraphs 9
through 27 1
apply also to this Issue No. 4.
AEC RADICLOGICAL SAFETY STAUDARDS 30.
Intervenor-LIFE contended in its petition for reconsideration that "the proposed facility will not be 1
operating without undue risk to the health and safety of the public" even if it-complies with the radiological safety standards in 10 CFR Part 20 of the Commissicn's regulations,
" Standards for Protection Against Radiation."
LIFE contended
~
that the - AEC standards are " outmoded and inadequate" and, as such, do not constitute a reasonable exercise of the broad s
rule making discretion given the Commission under the Act.
s 31.
A challenge to the validity of the radiation standards. in AEC regulations is unusual, although it was attemeted once before in the Calvert' Cliffs proceedings in I5/
^
1969
- A. Commission memorandum in -that case, dated August 8, 1969, clearly stated that findings in an adjudicatory proceed-ing-such as this mustEbe made in accordance with AEC regula-tiens which establish-the standards for reactor constructicn 35/. Applicants ' Summary,. p. 36; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 83-4.
.36/l Suora, note-8. -.
permit' determinations, and that such regulations, whi,ch are general in nature and which are established in public rule making proceedings where the Commission may consider the views of all interested persons, are not subject to amendment by i
Atotic Safety and Licensing Boards in individual licensing proceedings..The memorandum did, however, permit a challenge to the validity of AEC regulations in licensing hearings such as this. on" limited grounds if the contcsted regulation relates to an issue in the proceeding".
The three limited grounds were.(1) "whether the regulation was withir the Commission's authority," (2) "whether it was promulgated in acccrdance with applicable procedural requirements," and (3) "as respects the Commission's radiological safety standards, whether the standards established are a reasonable exercise
.of.the broad discretion given to the Commission by the Atomic Energy Act for implementation of the statute 's radiological safety objectives."
LIFE's challenge to the validity of 10 CFR Part 20 was limited to the third of the three limited grounds for challenge, namely, that the Part 20 standards are not a reasonable-exercise of the Commission's broad discretion.
To establish that the radiation standards are invalid, LIFE would have had to show that.the Part 20 standards represent an arbitrary and. capricious exercise by the Commission in abuse of~its broad. statutory discretion.
This LIFE has failed to do.
l F,,
,__ I
32.
Testimony challenging the validity of Part 20 was presented by Dr. Ernest Sternglass testifying on behalf 31/
of LIFE and by Dr. Arthur Tamplin who testified at the 5.$/
invitation of the Board.
33.
Citing studies that were initiated in England in the 1950's and which have been continued through the last decade of mothers who had been exposed to diagnostic X-rays during pregnancy, Dr. Sternglass asserted that at least with regard to fetal exposures there is evidence of a linear relaticn-ship between the number of X-rays given and the chance of cancer and ledkemia.
He also asserted that such studies demonstrate that the early embryo in the firct trimester of pregnancy was more sensitive to radiation than is the fetus in the latter stages of pregnancy.
34.
Dr. Sternglass also recited the results of his studies in which he alleged'a causal relationship between fallout deposition and infant mortality and a causal relation-ship between low level radioactivity releases from certain 60/
nuclear facilities and infant mortality in neighboring counties.--
In support of his argument Dr. Sternglass also mentioned certain animal and laboratory studies including studies at 31/ Tr. pp. 1335-87, 1387-92, 1414-36, 1437-56. 1457-61.
31/ Tr. pp. 1499-1511, 1523-58, 1558-60.
32/ Tr. pp. 1337, 1341-47 60/ Tr. pp. 1347-9 2.
the University of Rechester involving exposures of rats during pregnancy to "small amounts of tritium".
Dr. Sternglass re-ported that such studies showed detectable effects on fetal l
and infant mortality due to low level radiation and that other animal studies have also shown strontiwn 90 "which was believed i
to reconcentrate only in the bone of animals actually leading to severe damage to the ova,1/the testes, and other organs that 6
had.not been anticipated." ~
35 Dr. Sternglass incorporated in his testimony, on behalf of LIFE's contention, his earlier testimony which 62/
he presented on behalf of the Coalition. ~~ This testimony related to reconcentration in the food chain of certain iso-topes such as Cesium 137 and 138 and strontium 90 which Dr.
Sternglass associated with gaseous releases from nuclear facilities.
36.
Dr. Tamplin urged an immediate reduction in the radiation protection guides of 500 millirem per year for whole body exposure of individual members of the public and 170 millirem per year to the population based on his allega-tien' that such exposures will result in much tigher carcinogenic effsets than had heretofore been assumed.
He cited the 1969 1
61/ Tr. pp. 794, 8c3, 1367-68, 1442-44.
p2/ Tr. p. 1387 :
--r-,
-n.a e,
Publication No.14 of the International Commission on Radio-logical Protection.
Dr. Tamplin also asserted that the radiation standards fail to take into account the biological concentrating mechanisms in the food chain.
In support of this point of view Dr. Tamplin presented the results of his dosage calculations based on the presence of Cesium 137 in the environment at the maxiutum per!!.issible cencentration specified in Table II, Appendix 3 of Part 20, which he claimed results in doses higher than the radiation prctection guides due to such concentrating mechanisms.~~63/
37.
Crcss examination of Dr. Sternglass and Dr. Tamplin and rebuttal testimony by experts testifying on behalf of the Applicants and the Staff demonstrated that:
(a)
The AEC's radiation protection standards are based upon and fully consistent with the recommendations of the Federal Radiation Council (FRC), a statutory body established by the Congress to provide guidance to all Federal agencies in the formulation of radia-64-/
tion standards.
(b)
The AEC's radiation protection standards and the guidance of the FRC are compatible with the recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (UCRP), an organization chartered by 63/ Tr. pp. 1501-11.
6g Tr. pp.1693-96,1717-53 Congress to bring current and expert scientific knowledge to bear on the problems of evaluating the biological effects of ionizing radiation, and with the recommendations of the International Commission cn Radiological Protection (ICRP).
(c)
The National Academy of Sciences - Hational Research Council Advisory Committee to the FRC, which is currently reviewing the whole state of knowledge of the effects of ionizing radia-tion, in 1970 reviewed the allegations of Dr. Tamplin and his colleagues and concluded that there is no justification for an immediate revisicn of the existing radiation protectica i
~66/
standards. ~
(d)' UCRP Report No. 39, dated January 15, 1971, based on a reevaluation and a comprehensive survey of the latest work done in the area of radiation effects, recommended retention of the present standards as they apply to the general population and recommended only a small number of 2
adjustments in the standards as they apply to 6F workers employed in the radiation industry.
The Board presumes that these very recent recommendations currently are under review by the AEC and the recently established Environ-mental Protection Agency.
~
Y Tr. pp.11690-93, 1717-26.
'6 g Tr..pp.~1696-99'.
61/. ACRP Report no. 39, 55247, 251; Tr. pp.1690-93,1800-C4,
-1990-96, 1997-2003, 2023-25
(e)
The ICEP, UCRP, FRC and AEC, for purposes of conserva-ism and in the absence of conclu-sive proof that there is a threshold level of expcsure below which no harm will result, have long used a work'ing assumption of a linear relationship between doses and somatic 68/
and genetic harm.-~
Similarly the extra radio-sensitivity of fetuses and children has long been recognized in scientific literature 5
and by the standard setting bodies. 1/
(f)
While UCRP Report No. 39 dated January 15, 1971, reccmmended a reduction of the permissible dose to fertile women employed in the radia-tion industry to assure that the maximum dose equivalent to the fetus from cccupational exposure to the expectant mother does not exceed SCO millirem, that Report recctmended retention of the radiation limits applicable to the general population, including fertile women.
The average population dose limit 70/
recommendation considers genetic effects.
(g)
The studies by Dr. Sternglass alleging a causal relationship between fallout deposi-tion and infant and fetal mortality utilize
$8/ Tr. pp. 1681, 1779, 1789 52/ Tr. pp. 1693-96; ICRP Publication No. 6, 549(a).
10/ Tr. p. 1691.
statistical and analytical methods which are 21/
deficient in a number of important respects.
Some examples of these deficiencies are (1) a postulation of an association between leukemia incitance and fallout deposition based on the nutber of leukemia cases observed over a period of time without relating the number of cases to a base population, (ii) assumption that patterns of fetal and infant mortality rates are independent of well recognized influences such as epidemics, advances in medical science and changes in socioeconomic conditions, (iii) utilization of fetal mortality data from areas I
in the United States using different statistical reporting requirements, (iv) the unexplained omission of certain data points in fetal death rates for New York State, and (v) the arbitrary i-selection and presentation of data for certain time intervals arbitrarily ignoring diirerent results which would be obtained by examining data for other time intervals.
Upon evaluation i
of the data presented by Dr. Sternglass, expert epidemiologists in the Environmental Protection Agency concluded that Dr. Sternglass 's data "do not appear to indicate any relationship between the change in rate of decline of I
))./ Tr. p'p. 1821-53, 1950-57, 2014-17 i
u 34 '-'
infant mortality and the deposition of fallout 72/
in the United States. " -
(h)
The Committee on Environmental Hazards of the Accrican Academy of Pediatrics evaluated Dr. Sternglass's study of the alleged relation-ship betueen fallout deposition and inf ant mortality and concluded that "his conclusions are completely unfcunded and unsubstantiated".
(1)
Dr. Sternglass 's studies of the relationship between emissions from the Dresden Huclear Power Station and infant mortality in the nearby counties are based on a mistaken calculation of the actual external radiation exposure to the population in the environs of that plant which ignored the effect of the variable wind direction at Dresden and on an erroneous e'atermination by Dr. Sternglass of those nearby counties that are predominantly down-1Sl wind from the Dresden plant.
Experts previously employed by the U. S. Public Health Service and currently employed by the Environ-mental Protection Agency testified that their
" analysis of the epideniologic data presented by Sternglass does not support his contention 22/ Tr. p. 1847 D / Tr. pp. 1223-1229 23/ Tr. pp. 1854-1871.
or that an association exists between exposure to radioactive emissions-from Dresden and n11l infant mortality.
(j)
The "small amounts of tritium" fed to rats in the University of Rochester study referenced by Dr. Sternglass which'the experimenters in Rochester believed to demonstrate significant effects is equivalent to about 2000 times the maximum permissible dose fcr tritium to in-dividuals in the general pcpulation under the current standards.-76/
(k)
A ten-year experiment investigating possible hazards from strontium, utilizing beagle dogs, has disclosed no pathologic effects at doses below 2000 millirads a day and that it is physiologically impossible to get substantial doses to the testes, seminal fluid and ovaries without first seeing rapid and lethal effects from the bone and bone carrow irradiation.--77/
(1) 'The gaseous radwaste system in the Davis-Besse station which provides for a minimum hold-up tite of 30 days for radioactive decay before discharge to the environment precludes the dis-Tr. pp. 1869-1870.
Tr'. pp. 1673-75
. Tr. pp. 1871-88.
6 !
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7 charge of cesium 137 and 138 and strontium 90.
There will be no radioactive materials
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emitted in the gaseous wastes other than the noble gases.
The noble gases are not re-concentrated in the food chain.
s
' (m)
ICRP Publication 14 does not support Dr.
i.
Tamplin's assertion that the present standards for whole body exposure is high by a factor 4
I of ten.
It provides that the concept of a doubling dose for somatic hazards such as 4
, cancer, which is a foundation premise of Dr. Tamplin's thesis, is "a specific example of the misuse of the ratio of cancer rates.'
(n)
It is highly improbable if not~ impossible to i
expose a significant portion of the general population in the vicinity of a nuclear power I
-plant to more than a very small fraction of the 170 millirem per year radiation protection guide if the 500 millirem per year guide for
.i individuals is met.
NCRP Report No. 39 agrees.
The Tamplin thesis rests largely on the assump*. ion jF h/ Tr. pp. 1251-63, 1662-71.
~
J Z2/ Tr. pp. 1681-87.
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that a significant portion of the total population can be exposed to an average dose of 170 millirems per year.SS[
(o)
Section 20.106(e) of the current standards in Part 20 allows the AEC, and indeed is used by the AEC, to anticipate the possibility of reconcentration in the food chain or sensitive body organs of radioisotopes which may be released from nuclear facilities.
(p)
AEC regulations provide that all AEC licensees are required to make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures and releases of radioactive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas as far below the Part 20 e2/
limits as practicable.
38.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the radiation protection standards in 10 CFR Part 20 are a reason-able exercise of the broad discretion given to the Commission by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, for inplementation of that statute's radiological safety objectives.
Among other things that Act calls for the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes consistent with protection 8
T:. pp. 1676-79, 1684, 1691-2, 1728-29, 1893.
6 Tr. pp. 1676-7, 1730, 1893 1904-08.
d 10 CFR 920.1(c and 550.36(b); Tr. pp. 1731-32, 1735-40, 1744-46, 1893 of the health and safety of the public.
There is no sub-stantial question as to the validity of 10 CFR Part 20.
39 This Board's finding of no unreasonable exercise of the Commission's discretion in establishing the Part 20 standards is dispositive of LIFE's contention.
We would go further, however, becauce we recognize that this is the first case involving a challenge to the validity of Part 20 since the Comnission issued its Calvert Cliffs memorandum, and we feel that the challenge put - forth in this hearing has been broader than that contemplated by the Commission.
The Calvert Cliffs temorandum specified that a licensing board cannot 1
amend Part 20 and that the limited challenge permitted must be related to an issue in the proceeding.
Accordingly, this Board cannot conduct a general inquiry into the validity of Part 20 independent of any other considerations in this pro-ceeding.
We are limited to an inquiry into the validity of Part 20 as-it applies to the Davis-3 esse Nuclear Power Station.
40.
The Challenge to the validity of Part 20 cannot be based on radioisotopes that will not be released from the Davis-Besse facility.
Similarily the challenge cannot be based upon an examination of the reascnableness of the naximum peraissible concentratien value set forth in Table II, i
Appendix B of Part 20 for any single isotope which may be released from the Davis-Eesse facility, if that isotcpe is not physically releasable without accorpanying isotopes.
. 8g _ Sections 3d and 161b.
.I
Due regard must be taken of the note at the end of the tables in Appendix 3 of Part 20 which provides that where there is a mixture in air or water of more than one radienuclide, the permissible concentration for each such radionuclide is reduced to a value which is less than the value set out in the tables for that radionuclide.
Thus, much of the testimony by Dr. Sternglass and Dr. Tamplin insofar as they discussed the effects of Cesium 137 and 138 and strontium, which will not be released in the gaseous effluent from the Davis-Besse facility, was irrelevant.
LIFE did not demonstrate th?.t the maximum permissible concentrations for isotopes, which will be released from the Davis-Besse facility, taking into account both the note at the end of the tables in Appendix B of Part 20 and the provisions of Section 20.106(e) of Part 20, were unsafe.
This Boar.d finds therefore that, within the framework of the Commission's memorandum in the Calvert Cliffs proceedings, the evidence in this proceeding does not present a substantial question as to the validity of 10 CFR Part 20 and that the challenge to the validity of Part 20 by LIFE was not related to an issue in the proceeding NATIONAL EIP/IRCIGEliTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 41.
(The Applicant will propose findings and conclu-j sions on this matter in its brief on this subject which will be filed on March 4, 1971)
REVIEW OF APPLICATI0Il BY THE REGULATORY STAFF AND THE ACRS 42.
Since'the filing on August 1, 1969, the application has been under constant review by the Staff.
In the course of the evaluation, during which eleven amend-3 ments to the application were submitted with additional and clarifying-information, the Staff held numerous meetings with representatives of the Applicants to discuss and clarify the information submitted. 8h/
4 Approximately thirteen Staff engineers participated in the major part of the review during the sixteen-month review period, consuming an estimated 625' man-days of effort. U The Staff made use of studies by independent experts in its evaluation of such aspects as site geology and hydrology (Geological Survey, U. S. Department of Interior),N air dispersi.on of gaseou,s effluents (Air Resources Environ ~. ental Laboratory, U. S. Environmental Science Services Administration) site seismicity (U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey), 8W ecological effects (Fish and Wildlife Service, U. S.
Department of the Interior),
and seismic design criteria (John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers).
The results of the Staff's review and evaluation of the application are con-tained in the Staff Safety Evaluation which has buen made available to the public and which has been admitted into Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 2-3.
Tr. pp.~513-16 go/ Staff Safety Evaluation, App. D, pp. 96-99.
. g/ -Staff Safety Evaluation, App. E, pp.
Staff Safety Evaluation, App. C, pp. 94-95 6,eq 100-103.
g-Staff Safety Evaluation, App. F, pp. 104-118.
0J/ - Staff Safety Evaluation, App. G, pp. 119-126.
~
- 41'-
,m evidence in this proceeding.
The Staff, in finding in the affirmative' for Issues Hos.1 - 3 in this proceeding and in the negative for Issue No. 4, has concluded that the proposed
' facil'ity can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the 50 /
- public.
43 The ACRS also conducted an independent review of the application and, after identifying several items for
~
resolution between Applicants and the Staff during construction and making several recommendations, concluded that the staticn can be constructed with reasonable assurance that it can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the
.9.W public.
.The items identified by the ACRS have been considered by.the Staff in its evaluation of the application, and have been specifically responded to by the Applicants by 9.3_/
submission of Amendment No. 11 to the application.
CONCLUSIONS
- 44. 'On the basis of this Board's review of the 1 entire record:in this proceeding and of the foregoing findings, this Board ~euncludes that:
1.
In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 550.35(a):
_gJs/ Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 85-87.
ogs/ Letter from' Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairnan, ACRS, to the Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy j
. Commission, August' 20, 1970.
03;/ Applicants' Summary, p. 2; Staff Safety Evaluation, pp. 82-83.
^ 42 -
r
,+
e
(a)
The Applicants have described the proposed design of the facility including, but not limited ^o; the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and have identified the major features 3
or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public; (b)
Such further technical or design informa-tion as may be' required to complete'the safety analysis and which can reasonably be left for later consideration, will be supplied in the final safety analysis report; (c)
Safety features gr components, if any, which require research and development have been described by the Applicants and the Applicants have identified, and there will be conducted, a research and development. program reasonably designed
'to resolve any safety questions associated with such features or components; and (d)
On the basis of the foregoing, there is reasonable ascurance that (1) such safety questions will be satisfactorily
' j
~
resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facility, and (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed facility ca*.1 be constructed and operated at the pro" posed location without undue risk to ';he health and safety of the public.
2.
The Applicants are technically qualified to design and construct the proposed facility; 3.
The Applicants are financially qualified to design and construct the proposed facility; and 4.
The issuance of a permit for the construction of the facility will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
ORDER 45 Pursuant to the Act and the Commission's regula-tions, IT IS ORDE?.ED that the Director of Regulation issue a construction permit to The Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company substantially in the form of the 1
4 proposed construction permit introduced as Staff Exhibit 2.
IT IS FURTIER ORDIRED in accordance with 10 CFR 2.760, 2.762, 2.764, 2.785 and 2.786 of the Commission's Rules of Practice that this Initial Decision shall be effective immediately upon issuance and shall constitute the final decision of the Commission subject to the review thereof pursuant to the above cited rules.
ATCMIC SAFETY AID LICENSIIIG E0ARD
.