ML19325D376
| ML19325D376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1989 |
| From: | Fitzpatrick E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8910230168 | |
| Download: ML19325D376 (4) | |
Text
j l
4 OPU Nuoleer Carperstlen oe outh Forked Awr, New.lersey 00731-0388 609 971 4 000 t
Wrner's Direct D.al Nurnber; J
October 13. 1989 l
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission f
Attn Docum6at Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 l
l Dear si;r i
t subjects oyster Creek Nuclear Generating station I
Docket No. 50-219 Response to Inspection Report 89-20 and scenario Review dated August 15, 1989
?
This responds to your Inspection Report No. 50-219/89-20 dated September 12, i
1989, pertaining to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station's annual emergency preparednose exercise conducted August 29, 1989.
The inspection report states "This exercise pas condacted because your exercise on June 7, 1909 utilised a scenario which was known to the participants..."
A like statement also appeared in Inspection Report 50-219/89-11. We would i
like to clarity the record with respt,ct to the June 7, 1989 exercise scenario.
l The exercise participants were not aware of the scenario used during the June 7,
1989 exercise.
The exercise scenario development team Wt*tsed features of I
a p;evious drill in.'eveloping the June 7th exercise scenar us however, they l
believed the scenarios were sufficiently dissimilar.
Subsequent to the exercise, the WP.C staff expcessed concern with the similarities between the i
scenarios, and it wan agreed that the exercise participants would be re-evaluated by the NAC,during our third quarter drill of August 29, 1989.
It is importent to note that at no tires were exercise participants ever told of l
the scenario details, and strict mersures were taken to prevent the compromise of scenario confidentiality. While the NRC may have disagreed with the l
judgement exhibited by the scontrio development team, at no time was doubt i
expressed about the integrity of the scenario development team or the exercise l
participants. We believe the exercise participants responded exceptionally well in both exercises.
t 8910230160 891013 I
PDR ADOCK 05000219 i
O PDC g3f j
i t
' I GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsdary of General Public Utr t es Corporation t
I
j With respect to section 3.3 ' Areas for Improvement
- of the inspection report, we have carefully reviewed our logs and procedures used during the exercise and have comments on four of the nine improvement items.
The attachment to the letter provides specific details for each of these items.
We would like to extend our appreciation to your inspection team for their professionallem throughout the inspection, sincerely, j fi E.E. Fitspatrick Vice President and Director - OC CJo/EEF/rtn Attachment I
does\\bdem\\ir89-20 cc:Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 I
Mr. Alex W. Dromerick, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 NRC Re.-sident Inspectr' l
Forked River, NJ 08<a1 l
l i
(
t 9
1 i
i l
ATTACHMENT i
Ite.n 3 states " Shift control room operators and controllers prompted exercise operators." It should be noted that drills and esercises are conducted in the OCNGS Control Room. This are; is severely limited by size. Scenario data is provided by two PC's to enhance continuous data flow. Given the limitations of available space and data display ability, it is necessary for the control Room Controller to provide additional or supplemental information to the control Room operators.
The controller stated that the feedpumps had tripped due to low hotwell level as this information would be immediately available from control Room l
instrunentation.
section 3.2, Item 2 of the Third Quarter Exercise states i
"The controller will also provide information on the status of plant systems to the extent that such status would normally be indicated in the
[
Control Room."
The additf.onal data is readily available to the operating j
crew on a front panel indication, however, it is not an indication provided l
as scenario data. We do not view this example as prompting.
t With respect to non-participating operators " prompting" the exercise
)
operators, this lapse of drillomanship was observed on two occasions when i
non-participants offered suggestions to participants. The suggestion provided was specific to event assessment based on scenario conditions at the time. The non-participating operators were not aware of the exercise scenario but were more?.y " assisting" the exercise operators. We agree that they should not have done this.
Item 4 states "Coro damage ascessments were not coordinated with the Parsippany Technical Functions Center due to failure to communicate plant l
data in a timely manner;" a review of the exercise paperwork detailed the I
following: Message TSC-022 (18:40) requested PTPC to perform core damage estimates. Drywell atmosphere and reactor water activity results were transmitted from the TSC to the OSC, EOF, PTFC, and EACC at 18:44 and I
19:16. PTFC subsequently requested additional Drywell atmosphere and torus water activity at 20:13. Torus water activity results were available at 7
21:10 and Drywell atmosphere activity results at 21:25.
Core damage estimates were chiculated at 21:40 and trancmitted at 21:43.
In light of the above record, we do not agree with this improvenent item.
i t
i k
i
i j
t Item 7 states "There was confusion at times as to whether the radioactive release was monitored or unmonitored.* In discussions with the RAC and EAC, both state that at no time was there any confusion that the release would be monitored.
soth clearly understood that the release point was the main stack and would be monitored by the RAGEMS system. This is supported by a review of contingency release calculations and dose projections. All were done using the main stack release point. Also an entry in the Group Leader R&EC's log book states " Release is and has been monitored." This d
comment may have stemmed from the fact that the EOF communicator in the process of filling out the offsite notification forms asked the ESD if the release was monitored or unmonitored. The ESD responded that it was monitored.
In light of the above record, we do not agree with this imps
, vent item.
Item 8 states 'The EOF staff did not initially recognize the pressure spike in the Drywell due to the hydrogen burn.'
The hydrogen burn was recogniaod by the Tech Support group almost immediately.
Because trending is not available to them at the EOF, they sought confirmation from the TSC and control Room that there actually had been a pressure spike.
A review of the ESD's log indicates that at 20:55, ten minutes af ter the burn, he briefed the entire center. The log remos:
Small spike in Drywell.
Appears hydrogin burned off.
no containment effects...".
Based on the above, we do no?. agree with this improvement item.
Finally, in addition to the above concerns, we would like to address a comment contained in your correspondence of August 15, 1989 regarding our Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).
The scenario used for the drill held on August 29, 1989 contained an incorrect statement regarding PASS Sampling.
A limitation for sampling from the PASS for the drywell and torus gas samples of 2.4 psig was originally written into the PASS procedure five years ago. The 2.4 psig was the drywell isolation pressure at the time.
In 1987, this limitation was investigated and found to be overly conservative. There was no reason not to put the drywell isolation valves in bypass during an emergency situation.
The procedure was changed in August 1987. The scenario generator software will be corrected to reflect this change.
l
.