ML19325C955
| ML19325C955 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325C954 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8910180209 | |
| Download: ML19325C955 (2) | |
Text
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"^4-UNITED STATES i y y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~ y t;- <g - wAsmNGTON, D. C. 20065 L - -{ 4..i. / October 6. 1989 r / SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION l RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.163 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR l IOWA-ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY CENTRAL IDWA POWER COUPERATIVE CORN BELT POWER COOPERATIVE DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER DOCKET NO. 50-331
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By. letter dated October 13, 1987, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, et al. . (the ~ licensee), submitted an application for an amendment to Facility Operating License ho. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold: Energy Center (DAEC). The proposed- ' amendment would: revise Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.2-B, " Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment Cooling Systems." The revision of TS Table 3.2-B would reflect the Containment High Pressure trip level setting to greater than 2 psig, rather than the current setting of 1 -greater than 1 psig but less than 2 psig. Additionall:, the remarks section of 1 TS Table 3.2-B would be revised to state, " Prevents inadvertent operation of containment, spray during normal operation," rather than during "... accident condition."~ These revisions are necessary to resolve an inconsistency between l the DAEC Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the, DAEC TS. .2.0 EVALUATION LThe Containment High Pressure trip level setting in TS Table 3.2-B is currently required to be between 2 and 2 psig. The proposed TS change will not allow containment spray. operation at a containment pressure below 2 psig. While the currentLTS-allows this operation, it is not in agreement with the FSAR. In the DAEC FSAR, the analysis of suppression pool to reactor building vacuum relief
- system assumes the trip level setting to be greater than 2 psig.
It-further . states that the design basis limiting transient for this system is the inadvertent initiation of containment spray when the containment is at 150*F maximum operating temperature. According to the FSAR analysis of the vacuum relief -system, the vacuum breakers are of adequate size to prevent either the drywell i or torus from exceeding their negative design pressure (-2 psig) should contain-ment spray be inadvertently initiated above 2 psig during the worst case operating conditions. i L G910180209 891006 PDR ADOCK 05000331 _P pm l - - = - - - -
I ( 1 l 2 The inadvertent initiation of containment spray below a drywell pressure of 2 psig is prevented by four pressure switches that sense drywell pressure. These pressure switches operate an interlock that isolates the containment spray header from tne residual heat removal system when the pressure is below the 2 psig setpoint. -Since the DAEC TS is not in conformance with the DAEC FSAR, the licensee asked the NSSS vendor to perform an analysis to determine the results of initiating containwnt spray)as low as 1 psig (which is the lower setpoint limit specified in the current TS during the design worst case transient. The analysis showed that under these conditions, the design negative pressure of the primary contairment would not be exceeded and the design basis was met. The proposed amendment would resolve the inconsistency between the TS and the FSAR and allow the pressure switches to be set to actuate at a drywell pressure of greater than 2 psig. Accordingly, the remarks section would be revised to state the purpose of the new setpoint. The remarks would reflect that the revised setpoint prevents the inadvertent operation of containment spray during normal operation rather than during an accident condition. ' Based upon the information presented, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility componen; located within the restricted crea as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or c1anges a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant changeinthetypes,ofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite,andthat there is no significant increase in indbidual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendnent meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental im>act statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with tie issuance of the amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the puolic will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Principal Contributor: Lawrence E. Kokajko Dated: October 6, 1989 -}}