ML19323H803
| ML19323H803 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/06/1980 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T, NUDOCS 8006160209 | |
| Download: ML19323H803 (40) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS e
5 E
N h
6 242nd MEETING R
OPEN SESSION l
a 8
d Room 1046 q
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
1717 H Street, N.W.
10 Washington, D.C.
E 11 Friday, June 6, 1980 3
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12 The Committee met in Open Session, pursuant to recess,
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13 at 2:25 p.m.
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l 14 BEFORE:
g 15 Dr. Milton S.
Plesset, Presiding
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y 16 Dr. J.
Carson Mark W
d 17 Mr. Myer Bender
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18 Dr. Max W. Carbon i
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Mr. Jesse Ebersole n
20 Dr. Stephen Lawroski 21 Dr. Harold W. Lewis
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22 Mr. William M. Mathis 23 >
Dr. Dade W.
Moeller
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24 Dr. David Okrent 25 Mr. Jeremiah J.
Ray
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DR. Paul G. Shewmon 2
Dr. Chester P.
Siess 3
Mr. Harold Etherington 4
Mr. James M.
Jacobs e
5 Dr. William Kerr 34 3
6 Mr. William Fraley R
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NRC STAFF PRESENT:
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Mr. Richard Savio dd 9
Mr. Thomas G. McCreless iof:
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2 DR. PLESSET:
We' regoing to. have an open session to 3
discuss auxiliary feedwater and its seismic capabilities.
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is just a short session.
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MR. BAER:
Let me start witha bit of an introduction 0
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about our longer-term plan regarding decay heat removal systems.
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The Task Action Plan IIE 3.2 and 3.3 will involve a study of M
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an alternate decay heat removal system.
The ACRS review of the dd 9
draft Action Plan commented that there is a need to look at all b
10 decay heat removal requirements in a comprehensive raanner.
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11 staff agrees with this comment and plans to interpret Task Action 3
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12 Plan II E 3.2 and 3.3 in a broad manner to encompass the breadth
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13 of treatment that we think is desirable and that we believe the m
h 14 ACRS think is desirable.
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15 We plant to meet with the appropriate ACRS subcommittee x
j 16 to go over with them all aspects of the problem.
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18 systems.
Then, the functional requirements we expect to be
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g 20 We anticipate that this is going to be a two to three-year program j
21 total, at the end of which there will be firm recommendation
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22 leading to possible requirements for additional decay heat 23 capabilities, not only on new plants but, to some extent, on O
24 older plants.
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three year period about those plants that do not have fully GkJ seimically qualified auxilitary feedwater systems.
And we have 2
3 some concerns about these plants, and I've been assigned by 4
Roger Mattson to look at some methodology trying to provide some e
5 guidance for the Division of Licensing, from the Division of A
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System Integration and Division of Engineering so that they can e
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take some appropriate action on these plants.
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that we can show that there's a reasonable basis for allowing n
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15 this, and really just for a matter of a couple weeks; his father 5
16 is very ill and he was called away.
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18 what he's doing but not all the details.
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E 19 I do want to emphasize, after the Subcommittee's presen-A 20 tation, someone pointed out to me that I probably didn't emphasize 1
21 the f act that this methodology, if it works, is still going to
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And our goal is to try and do something in the next two to three
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24 months.
There's no use taking three years to judge whether 25 it's safe to allow these plants to continue to run. So ' the ef fort ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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will have to be rather brief.
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Basically, the overall scope of effort is to identify those plants and those pieces of equipment in the auxiliary
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feedwater system which are not designed to meet Category 1 riteria.
The first cut of this was made several weeks ago, and 5
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there appears to be about 10 plants that fall'into this class.
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Now, that number has to be confirmed.
There are a couple others n
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9 MR. RAY:
Do you mean 10 of those that you've examined 9
io r 10 of the total installations in the country?
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MR. BAER:
I didn't do the examinations. It was 10 in 11 p
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It was 8 stations, and one of the stations was the d
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so it's a total of 10 plants at the first cut x
but thatanumber has to be confirmed.
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15 The next step is to evaluate the importance of safety w
and that's a risk assessment,and then, recommend appropriate B
licensing action.
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18 DR. SHEWMON:
As part of appropriate licensing action E
is it conceivable that they would never need to have an SSE j9 qualified aux feedwater system if they felt there was a seismically-qualified other system for removing decay heat?
g MR. BAER:
I certainly wouldn't say never because it's g'
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a rystal ball at this point.
But I think that two or three years 23 hence we're going to say there's got to be additional decay heat 24 25l rem val apability.
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example, a bleed and feed system that we thought would work, that 2
might be an acceptable alternative.
DR. SHEWMON:
The six of the eight or five of the eight O
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a majority, apparently,of what you're going to be looking at and a
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probably the basis for my question.
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MR. BAER:
I was told just yesterday by Dennie Allison N
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that those plants are to have within three years, the SET plant a
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to use.
MR. RAY:
Is it your present thinking orhaven't you E
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gone far enough yet, that this additional cooling capacity be 2
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MR. BAER:
Going to the long-term approach, that W
certainly,I think, will be a candidate system.
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'8 MR. RAY:
But this hasn't been resolved yet.
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MR. BAER:
No.
In fact, earlier -- we still want to n
20 meet with the Committee and agree on an objective and function 21 and then a candidate system.
Maybe it's muddled in my mind,but
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22 I've heard objectives quoted that I think some of the systems can 23 '
meet and I've heard other objectives that other systems can meet
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2 compare the risk of a core meltdown due to a seismic event to 3
the other risks of core meltdown.
This is a rational way to make
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4 a judgment for this several-year period.
And we hope to come up 5
with a two-step process which oatires the prbobability of a given 9
6 value of g and we planned to use (inaudible)
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combine that with a probability of a system failure at that 3
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particular value of ground acceleration.
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probability and it includes a redundancy or would consider the o
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In other words, you don't need --
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I've got a problem with redundancy M
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identical and perfectly redundant, you could have 60 of them and n
20 they will all fail at the same place at the same time.
So you 2I don't have the benefit of time spread in the failure mode.
And
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I guess you're talking about functional systems here.
You're not 23 '
talking about trains.
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So, redundancy may no.t be, in fact, as good as single-24 25 track systems with immense factors of safety.
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MR. BAER:
If I use the blackboard, maybe I can add 2
a little bit to what I said.
It may be helpful.
3 It's my understanding -- it's certainly going to take
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But my under-5 y
standing is that one -- (inaudible.)
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And b3 iudgment, you can say this is a 15% probability 7
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to an overall risk.
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look at equipment and judge that this is a pretty high g value x
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and it's a kind of SSE that we're talking about that's down in x
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only been a couple of weeks, is complicated.
So by that time n
20 people are more confident of their ability to judge the struc-21 tural integrity of the major components than they are of some of
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the auxiliary.
23 We hope to factor this into our event tree type thing
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by looking at probability of instrumentation failure and then 25 whether there's any reasonable probability of operator action ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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urve is going to be highly judgmental.
I think we see the value 3
f this approach as being systematic and it leads you to at 4
least some conclusions that you can justify on a relative basis, e
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MR. EBERSOLE:
I hope this will lead to a kind of a 7
balanced design which I'll describe roughly as maybe a single 8
N pipe with two pumps and 15 valves and 40 relays, to accomplish 9
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Because these have different reliability 10 a
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I do want to emphasize that we plan to use d
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a:o udgment for just this several-year period.
I think, Jesse, S
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Bob, how are you going to do this and j7 b
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Do you have some resources E
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MR. BAER:
I hope so.
I'm in the awkward position 20 of heading up a small group that's been assigned to try and 2) develop a methodoJogy.
I can' t really say off the top of my 22 head.
As I said before, we're talking about a two to three-23 year peri d in which we're going to make a final decision.
24 25 l DR. OKRENT:
It seems to me if I was going to try to 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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do it in that time period, I would try to get the people who 2
have looked at auxiliary feedwater systems, because there have 3
been some people who have looked at them, and then get the LRL G%)
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3 a reactor under a research program, and ask some some of them to n
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put aside what they're doing and work together and come up with e
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see how you'll do it in anything like the time period you're i
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Bob, at the risk of giving what might m
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just envisioning a gross change in auxiliary feedwater systems to x
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low pressure secondary site functions analogous to the SAR's on t
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21 a little bit of seismic upgrading and electrical qualification of
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22 circuitry, rather than as an interim measure, before one goes out 23 l and in a wholesale way makes seismic aux feedwater systems in
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24 their present configuration.
25 If you were to do this, you would convert the boilers ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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from a system that requires quite difficult evolutions to keep O
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virtually any source, of which you have many, and you would 4
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If you did lose that you would still face the feesI/ bleed
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problem and the electronic aspects of having non-seismic valving al 8
inside containment, which is a modest fix to take care of.
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MR. BAER:
We envision the effort right now,and are Y
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First, we'11 try and decide O j i3 ehe some of these g1enes ere eccegteb1e.
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14 the suggestions you made, Jesse, make a lot of sense for those g
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Dj 18 I think your suggestion is a good one.
E 19 DR. PLESSET:
I think we've had about enough on this; g
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I just want to close i
21 with one remark.
You're not alone in the world.
You know, there O
22 are these me111 ties out there, they shou 1d xnow we.re concerned 23 about this problem.
They have a responsibility, they should do O
24 a 1arge part of this, ane if they can.t de it themse1ves there.,
25 a thing called INPO or whateve:: you call it; they ought to get l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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2 It's not just yoar job; it's their responsibility.
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3 MR. BAER:
We do expect to have a fair amount of 4
industry involvement.
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It's more that that; it's their 9
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responsibility, and I think everybody should make that quite clear R
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8 Well, I think we'll have to go on, Jesse.
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9 MR. EBERSOLE:
I just wanted to say you have a piece of zog 10 paper in your hand that says industry has done something.
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That's fine.
I think this is a way that B
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13 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's a measure, m
l 14 DR. PLESSET:
Fine.
Thank you, Bob.
I think we'll
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15 have to go on with our agenda.
We're going to go into a closed x
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and so on.
We'll go into closed session.
m 18 (Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m.,
a short recess was taken and E
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the Committee resumed in Closed Session.)
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cont.
(Whereupon, the hearing resumed in open session.)
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2 MR. SHROEDER:
I would like to give an introduction.
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DR. PLESSET:
Sure, fine.
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4 MR. SCHROEDER:
I am not sure what we came down to e
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we wanted to go over with the committee the activities that we a7 have going on in connection with the identification of new l
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unresolved safety issues for our report to Congress.
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committee is aware, we have a statutory requirement to report g
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annually to Congress on the status of the USI's and on new E
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we stated that because of the activities associated with 2
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16 not ready at the time of publication of that report to identify 17 y
new USI's in the annual report, as would be the normal custom.
18 We committed in the annual report, however, to supply 19 8
to the Congress a supplemental report by July that would identify e
20 new unresolved safety issues.
21 Well, on formation of the Generic Issues Branch about 22
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a month ago, the reorganization we began to turn our attention 23 to meeting that commitment to get a report into the Congress.
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13 screening and evaluation of a large number of candidate issues.
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course the Three Mile Island action plan itself, ACRS letters and
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individual staff members throughout the past year.
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definition of unresolved safety issues that we presented to d
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for this exercise, and the review group started work screening d
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issues and evaluating them shortly thereafter.
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to present its recommendations on these issues to the NRR 2
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division directors for review and comment, and once we get those l:
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g review the recommendations we will be sending a paper down to the 18
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Commission, probably in late June, with the results of our 19 study and a description of the methods we use to come up with our 20 conclusions.
And then we will be meeting with the Commission 21 in early July to get their approval so that we can prepare the (g
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report to Congress and get it in by the end of July, 23,
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14 opportunity for meaningful review of our work by this
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3 We would have preferred to be able to get their advice and comments before we move forward to the Commission and e
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then the Congress.
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Today, for example, all we are prepared to do for En 7
you is describe the process that we are using to identify n
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candidate issues.
But I would hasten to add that this is not the a
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after we issue the July supplemental report to Congress we have 6
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candidate issues that as a result of this screening, which you 20 will hear described in just a moment, are being left in the July 21 exercise for further consideration where we were not able to
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decide for sure that they met the USI category.
We will be 23l addressing those again in time for the annual report towards the
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15 generic issues that a year or two ago we went through and picked
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the USI's out of.
We are going to go back and take another 3
quick look at all of those issues to see if there are any that
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we feel in light of today's experience need to be elevated to e
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September for your reactions on that screening exercise, d
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C 15 Hank George from the Generic Issues Branch is going to y
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make this presentation.
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Carl Neil, the branch chief, and Mick Aycock, who has 5
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played a heavy hand in this, are here to help answer any 19 k
questions you have.
20 Hank?
21 MR. GEORGE:
Before I get into some of the specifics
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on the process that we were using, I will cover a little 23 background information.
The first such report on unresolved
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safety issues was NUREG 0510. This was the first one that 25 ;
identified the unresolved safety issues.
In that there were 17
. ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
271 16 identified, which the staff of course is ongoing right now.
3 2
the evaluation and resolution of those items.
3 In NUREG 0510 we had a definition of the unresolved
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This is one which was developed to satisfy the e
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intent of the Section 210 amendment, the Energy Reorganization N
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Act.
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Commission modified it, and this is essentially what was agreed d6 9
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definition.
An resolved safety issue is a matter affecting a d
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number of nuclear power plants.
It is generic.
It poses a c
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number of questions concerning the adequacy of existing safety E
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requirements.
So it is a safety issue.
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Important questions imply it is a significant safety j
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17 Resolution has not yet been developed, and it involves J
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conditions not likely to be acceptable over the lifetime of the 19 plant.
20 In implementing, in trying to implement this 21 definition, the staff expanded on what we felt was meant by 22
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important questions concerning the adequacy of existing safety 23 requirements.
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Now this also was in NUREG 0510 and used in identifying 25 the initial set of unresolved safety issues.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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17 The first element is that it compensates for a
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2 possible major reduction in the degree of protection.
3 The second element is that it could be an issue that
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health and safety.
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first one is really intended to be a deficiency.
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that we subsequently find does not really measure up to what we 06 9
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item is more forward looking.
We find that it is something that c
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may not have been in the design basis.
If we include it, there fT d
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could be a significant reduction in the risk to public health E
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and safety.
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DR. SHEWMON:
Would you explain number one to me?
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16 You are saying some way we have greatly -- in some major way 6
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reduced the protection of the public, and now we want to 18
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compensate for it somehow.
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Give me an example, will you?
20 end 21 Tape 14 B,t'mpell 22
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OPEN SESSION 2
N MR. GEORGE:
An example could be one where we find s
O enet, for exempie, instrument e1r systems wnicn mer oe usee to support safety-related systems, it may be assumed that the safety-related systems are independent and redundant, single-failure proof; and if, in fact, we find that here is 7 a common instrument air system, that a. single failure in that can cause loss or redundant equipment, we find that we 9 really didn't do our job well enough originally, that it was 10 something in the original design basis and we really ought 11 to go back and upgrade that and improve it.
12 The process that we developed, as Frank indicated, 13 was one that had to consider a number of constraints.
One 14 is that we have certainly a large number of issues over the 15 past year.
We have a limited time frame available.
Another important element is that what we would have preferred to I
do, I guess, is something similar to what was done last 18 year, and do very detailed risk-base analysis of the isues.
Unfortunately, the PAS staff is quite busy and 20 they were not available on this short a time period to do 21 this on this large number of issues.
This chart here illustrates just kind of the basic 23 elements, I guess, of the review process that we laid out.
O 24 The first element is identifying all of the issues.
The 25 things that were considered at this point were, of course, j
O i
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1 all of the elements in the TMI action plan, all of the 2 recommendations made by the ACRS since January of 1979, any
(])
3 recommendations from the str.f f, abnormal occurrences over 4 the past year.
5 So this was the large group of issues that we 6 started with.
It was on the order of 425 issues, although 7 within that there are certainly some ouplications.
8 Something recommended by the ACRS is also in the action plan.
9 The second step that we had to go through was an 10 initial screening.
What we did at this point was to try to 11 screen out those items that did not meet some of the basic 12 elements of the definition of a USI, not considering the 13 safety significance of the item, just whether or not the O
14 issue is generic, some of those basic elements.
15 If we flip to the next page, you will see what the 16 initial screening criteria were that we used.
Some of the 17 critical ones, ones that were used quite frequently, were 18 ones like staf f position is already developed.
I remember 19 in the definition it says "for which a resolution has not 20 yet been developed."
21 There are a large number of items in the action 22 plan where the fix is identified and it is a matter of 23 implementation.
The issue is not generic.
It may have been
()
24 specific to just a very limited number of plants.
25 Another item that showed up frequently were some
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1-recommendations related to reorganization of NRC.
And we 2 really alon't consioer that those type things would have to
(])
be considered unresolved safety issues.
3 4
Certainly other items were related to number 6 5 where we already had a USI, ano the recommendation was 6 related to expanding the exieting USI to pick up some other 7 elements.
8 Those are the main ones.
9 OR. SIESS:
The two that I am the most interested lo in are numbers 5 and 7.
I would like to explain why simply 11 because it is going to take a long time, it is not an 12 unresolved safety issue.
13 MR. GEORGE:
In number 5, it was not so much the 4
14 time element as it was -- there really is not an issue 15 de fined.
It is just do some additional research in a 16 certain area, see what we find.
But there was not a 4
17 specific issue identified.
18 DR. SIESS:
What you have there is not right.
19 MR. GEORGE:
Pardon me?
20 DR. SIESS:
What you have there, in plain English, 211s wrong.
The first three words say " resolution of the i
221s su e. "
If an issue is not defined, then it does not exist, 23 right?
()
24 MR. GEORGE:
Yes, that is probably a poor choice 25 0 f words.
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1 DR. SIESS:
Yes, quite poor.
2 MR. GEORGE: It is more related as someone thinks
)
3 they may have a concern --
4 DR. SIESS: Okay.
5 MR. GEORGE:
I might point out that we use that 6 very infrequently.
There are only just a few items.
We 7 tried to make sure that other items, other criteria will 8 screen it out.
9 DR. SIESS:
With that clarification, I understand 10 i t.
You don't know it is an issue; you just suspect it.
11 MR. GEORGE:
That's correct.
12 OR. SIESS:
Now, what about 7.
The fact that it 13 requires a policy decision rather than a technical solution, O
14 doet su make any difference to the Congress.?
I know it 15 might make a dif ference if you were a technical man and it 16was something the Commission had to decide, but your list 17 does not include matters that have to be decided by the 18 Commission rather than the engineers?
19 MR. GEORGE: Yes, I think that is right.
Number 7, 20 again, was not used very frequently, which is why I didn't 21 touch on it.
22 DR. SIESS:
Could you give me an example of it?
23 DR. SHEWMON:
Let's take instrumentation to follow
()
24 the course of an accident, for example, which many of us 25 thought was the generic issue, yet it is no technical O
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1 solution.
It is the policy of how many instruments over 2 what scale you are going to require people hang on their 3 reactors.
4 MR. GEORGE: Yes, but it certainly does depend on 5some input from technical individuals, identifying what 6 parameters they want instrumentation on.
There would be 7 some input, although it may be --
s 8
OR. SHEWMON:
I see.
Policy decisions are those 9 decisions that have no technical content and require no 10 technical input.
11 MR. GEORGE:
That's right.
One of them, for 12 example, that I do recall was a recommendation from the 13 committee which had recommended some increer:0 involvement O
14 by ACRS in the licensing process, or some recommendations 15 that were along those lines.
16 DR. SIESS:
You see, I would c16ssify a 17 backfitting decision in many cases as a p alicy decision.
18 The technical solution is available, it is known, everything 19 is known, a decision has to be made to dc it on this reactor 20 or not, or this group of reactors.
That, is what I would 21 call policy.
22 MR. GEORGE:
That question wo;1d certainly be a 23 policy decision, but if the position is xnown, that would
()
24 have been screened out up here.
We would say that is not an 25 unresolved safety issue because you now have the defined fix.
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1 oR. stess: 1 eidn t sey tne position wes known.
1 2 said the fix was known, and somebody has not yet decided 3 whether to put backfitting or not.
Backfitting is a policy 4 decision.
5 MR. GEORGE:
That is right.
What I was referring 6 to, I guess, on the position or the fix is the one that 7 resolves the issue and says this is what needs to be done to 8 resolve that issue.
Once that is agreed upon, we are saying 9 that is screened out at number 2.
Subsequent to that there 10 be some policy decisions such as backfitting.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
One problem with this method of 12 resolution is that it tends to cause what were considered 13 legitimate issues to simply evaporate into space and O
14 disappear, and then regenef ate it x years later, because no 15 historical record was made of their disposition.
16 Do you have a method that'will provide that 17 historical record sd that when somebody in the new 18 generation comes along and raises the question, you can tell 19 him he doesn't need to worry about it?
20 MR. GEORGE: Let me point out a couple of things on 21 this.
First of all, because it gets screened out here does 22 not necessarily mean that it is not important or that 23 nothing needs to be done.
In number 2, it could be an item 24 that is in the TMI action plan, that there is some position 25 on something that has.to be done.
In the action plan tnere O
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1 is an implementation schedule, so that that is the means 2 there of getting that item resolved.
3 But it is not one that you need to call it an
({}
4 unresolved safety issue for because you have the position t
5 defined.
We are not saying that it is unimportant if it 6 gets screened out at this point.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess what I am just looking for 8 is some kind of continuous record of disposition.
9 MR. GEORGE: Okay.
I don't know if Frank would 10 want to touch on it.
There is a new branch within Safety 11 Technology which I don't exactly remember the name of, but 12 they do have responsibility for establishing priorities.
13 Some of the things they will have to consider would be O
14 things that were screened out, that they were not USIs, but 15 you don't want them to fall in a crack.
16 Some of them could be items like Frank mentioned 17 where we are not sure yet whether it is USI and we need to 18 get some more information on the item, and someone is going 19 to have to follow those also.
20 MR. SCHROEDER:
Let me jump in here just with one 21 clarification, perhaps, on the role of the Generic Issues Z28 ranch.
It really has two functions. One is the management Z3 of resolution of items identified as unresolved safety
()
241ssues, and correspondingly, the identification of new 25 ones.
But secondly, it has a role to keep track of other O
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Igeneric issues at NRR that are being worked on not by the
)
2 task managers in that branch but by the other technicpl
(])
3 branches, keep book on what the status of those is so they 4 don't fall in a crack.
That is one of the functions of that 5 branch.
6 They will be working, obviously, with a heavy 7 interface with Bob Baer's Safety Program Evaluation Branch, 8 who will be identifying the need for work on other issues 9 that don't meet the definition of unresolved safety issue, 10 perhaps.
11 DR. SIESS:
You do have a list of generic issues, 12 don ' t you?
13 MR. SCHROEDER:
Yes.
()
l 14 DR. SIESS:
Why don't you examine those to see if 15 any of those have escalated into --
16 MR. SCHROEDER:
As I said a minute ago, we will do l
17 that in our review for the annual report this fall.
We are 18 not attempting to do that in this special July report.
19 There are a couple that have surfaced that are included 20 here, but we have not made a systematic study of all those 21 issues in this exercise, but we will in the f all' exercise.
22 MR. GEORGE: I will go back one chart just 23 brie fly.
The third step in here, of course, is evaluating
()
24 sa fety significance.
After going through the initial 25 screening criteria, it looks like we are ending up with on
()
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1 the order of about 45 issues that appear that they could 2 satisfy the definition of a USI. We now have to evaluate
(])
3 them for safety significance t1 see whether they really fit 4 within the definition.
5 U.a result, of course, is identifying USIs, those 6 items that art not USIs, and items requiring further study.
7 I will add again that this further study again would have to 8 be items that someone has to follow and get a little more 9 information to determine how significant the issue is.
At 10 that point it would either be identified as a USI or one 11 that is not a USI.
12 In the process that we developed because of the 13 short time frame, we had to rely on a number of qualitative O
14 or objective-type decisions.
What we tried to aim these 15 towards is looking at something like a simplified risk 16 assessment formula, I guess you could call it, recognizing 17 that risk can be affected by any one of these three 18 factors.
Any of the issues that we are looking at, we 19 wanted to see to what extent they may impact any one of 20 these factors. We wanted to be careful we didn't fall into 21 the old trap of just looking at, say, safety functions, Z2which would be the mitigation function, but also something 23 that could affect the frequency of accidents or frequency of
()
24 transients, or something that is related to consequences, 25 any of those items.
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1 If you flip to the last page in the handout, you 2 have a figure which more or less illustrates what this
(])
3 process was.
It shows some of the upper elements that we 4 have already discussed, the input, where the sources were 5 for those issues, the initial screening; and if it passes 6 the initial screening, what we would then do is determine 1
7 whether it is backward or forward looking-type fix.
8 If, for example, it is one that we identify as a 9 deficiency, it is one that comes towards the left on this 10 figure, we would determine whether it is an equipment 11 concern, operator concern, or one that is related to l
12 emergency reponse.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: I notice you oldn't include any O
14 industry input at the top.
I wouldn't disagree with that 15 very much, but it looks like it ought to be there.
16 MR. GEORGE: I am not sure to what extent we had 17 some industry input under those others.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
I know of one.
The tumble-down of 19 the main steam systems at the B&W plant recently cropped up 20 as an issue at the moment unresolved, but I am sure a quick 21 fix will be made of that.
Isn't there an industry input to I
22 these things?
23 MR. GEORGE:
Yes.
Mike, maybe you could address 24 that section.
1 25 MR. EBERSOLE:
That is not really an unresolved
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1 issue. I guess an unresolved issue can be a very short-term 2 thing which is fixed in a few months.
({}
3 MR. GEORGE:
If it is in six months, it doesn't go 4 --
5 MR. AYC0CK:
That's right.
We try to keep from 6 reporting those types of things to Congress.
Those are --
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Aren't there any long-term 8 industry-originated ones?
9 MR. AYCOCK:
Many of these issues in the other 10 issues category, and certainly the abnormal occurrence 11 category or the ACRS recommendations come from operating 12 experience, some of which were reported by industry.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
I don't mean operating experience O
14 industry-origina ted.
I am talking about sp6culative or --
15 MR. AYCOCK: I can give you one example.
The one 16 that Westinghouse reported, I guess it was last fall, with 17 regard to the possibility of failure of certain control 18 systems in site containment during a main steamline break 19 because they are not environmentally qualified.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
But that is in the short-term fix 21 category, isn't it? I mean that will be fixed without Z2becoming a --
23 MR. AYCOCK:
As far as I know, they did a otick
(
241ook, a quick survey from all of the vendors to determine if 25 they coulo find any significant problems, and they didn't.
O ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC, 300 7th STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554 2346
284 1 I think what we were considering is maybe some more in-depth 2 study of that particular situation to see if more needed to Q
3 be done.
4 MR. E8ERSOLE: Just looking at the input here, this 5would --
6 MR. AYC0CK:
We didn't go to industry and request 7 do you have any unresolved safety issues that we might ought 8 to be considering. No, we didn' t do that.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think that is interesting that 10 here I don't see any input from industry about an unresolved 11 safety issue.
I guess that really reflects the attitude 12 that all their plants are that good.
13 MR. AYC0CK:
Let me clarifv.
- o 14 DR. SHEWMON:
If they had an issue, they probably 15 wouldn't come to the NRC for its resolution.
16 HR. EBERSOLE:
I think it would be fair to say 17 they would recognize it and say it's one that we face 18 squarely.
This merely says they never mention it to you.
19 That is what this says.
This thing says they will never 20 tell you if they have one.
21 MR. AYCOCK:
Part 21 notifications and those types 22 of things the industry is required to come to us with.
If 23 one involved an issue which was generic and longer term, we 24 would consider it.
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i nere, if 1 sex enet is e11 ene input enere is.
it sevs 2 industry never has had an unresolved safety issue, doesn't 3 it?
4 DR. SIESS:
That is not all the input.
I was just 5 told by Frank this is only the input from the third study.
6 I asked about the generic items, and he said that would be 7 looked at in the fall.
Is that correct?
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
So tnis is just a partial picture 9 of unresolved safety issues. Is he telling me thst?
10 DR. SIESS:
This does not go in the report to 11 Congress, is that right?
12 MR. GEORGE:
That is correct.
13 MR SCHROEDER:
But that other list, of course, we O
14 screened when, a year and a half, two years ago, and 15 screened out what we thought were the unresolved safety 16 issues.
And this fall we are going to go through that list 17 again to see if we want to change'our view of them.
18 MR. AYCOCK:
I might add we have told the industry 19 recently, at least down at the ANS conference in April, that 20 we intended to involve them more in the identification 21 process for this very subject.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
I guess I would sort of endorse 23 that each time we take up an applicant, we ask of the O
24epp11 cent, do you neve in your neckground eny unreso1ved 25 safety issues that you haven't brought before me at this O
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' time, eno tnen set e position statement certirication to 2 the effect that they are being clean.
3 MR. SCHROEDER:
That is almost a certification
/
4 that they are meeting the law, Jesse.
Part 21 requires that 5 they bring them to us.
It hasn't always worked, perhaps.
6 That is all I have got.
7 OR. MARK:
I think in connection with the 8 visitation we just had, there is a letter in your -- it is 9 not a letter, a --
10 DR. SIESS:
It is Recommended Procedures Committee 11 review.
12 DR. MARK:
Do you want to make some comment on it?
13 DR. SIESS:
No. If anybody else wants to, fine.
I 14 just thought it could go through the Procedures Committee.
15 OR. SHEWMON:
I would like to urge that we do.
I 16 don't understand why Chet thinks it is particularly 17 irrational now, but I agree with him.
It seems to me that 18 we have had this list, which is to me as a newcomer somewhat 19 anachronistic, at least the way we handle it now, and I 20 think it could be folded in with the staff's effort and we 21 could then go back and comment on it.
That would be a much 22 more logical system, from my viewpoint.
23 DR. MARK:
Are there any other comments on this?
O 24 DR. SHewMon:
It s-s to me if we don't do enet.
25 there has also been in your folder off and on over the last 2
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' six montns e memo from me, ene tnen sometnino enet aonn 2 McKinley put out on when is one resolved.
Since we are 3 exceeoingly reluctant to ever let loose of one completely, 4 the thought was that if we could at least say we think these 5 are urgent and these will keep very well if we just ignore 6 them though they are unresolved, that still doesn't address 7 Chet's part, but it seems to me more rational.
8 DR. SIESS:
The question of resolution is 9 addressed in what I have written, because when it is 10 resolved, by our previous criteria, did not address the 11 implementation as thoroughly as it should.
I put a lot of 12 emphasis in here on knowing what the implementation of the 13 resolution is, the backfitting.
O 14 Reg. Guide 197 resolved our generic item on 15 instrumentation to follow the course of an accident, by our 16 de finition.
And really, we didn't look at the 17 implementation when we accepted it as being resolved, and I 18 think that was one of the --
19 DR. SHEWMON:
Did we have a definition of 20 resolution except --
21 DR. SIESS:
When the staff has a position on reg 22 guides issued, we considered it resolved.
That is all 23 right, except --
O 24 DR. SnEWMDs:
rne on1y criteria 1 rememeer wes 25 that if less than two people object to it, it is resolved.
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i oR. S1ESS: No.
2 DR. SHEWMON:
If everybody except one thinks it is 3 resolved, it is --
4 DR. SIESS:
That was a procedural definition.
We 5 would accept something as resolved when a reg guide was 6 issued, which is quite' adequate as long as we agreed with 7 not only the reg guide but its implementation.
A lot of 8 people on this committee didn't think that reg guide 197, 9 which didn't backfit, was a resolution.
10 So there is a lot more to this than I wrote down 11 there.
12 DR. SHEWMON:
I would urge it be taken up.
13 DR. SIESS:
Staff doesn't know what we are talking O
14 about.
15 (Laughter.)
16 OR. SHEWMON:
Frank, when is it that we get to see i
17 this new list?
Next month or the month after.
18 MR. SCHROEDER:
Are you talking about the list for 19 the July report to Congress?
We will be going down to the 20 Commission with our paper on it in early July, and we would 21 expect to make that available at that time to the committee 22 also, of course, Then I made the distinction that we will 1
23 immediately thereafter begin this wider reevaluation of all o
v 24 the old issues in preparation for our annual report to 25 Congress which has to go to press late in the year, and for OV ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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111 be beca to tne committee.
We auid expect to 2 invo1ve the subcommittee and tne full committee in that 3 exercise beginning in August sometime.
4 DR. PLESSET:
Are you ready for a brief recess 5 until 5 o' clock?
We have one other item.
So let's have a 6 ten-minute recess.
7 (Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m.,
the open session was 8 concluded. )
9 10 11 4
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14 15 16 17 18 i
19 20 21 22 23 1
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nuc m R unu m o n Cn erssron This is to certify that the attached proceedings cefore the O
in the matter of:
ACRS - 242nd Meeting Open Session Date of Proceeding:
June 6, 1980 Docket llumber:
Place of Proceeding:
Washington, D. C.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.,
Suzanne R.
Babineau Official Reporter (Typed)
A. m Offi al Reporter (Signature)
O O
O O
O O
O DEFINITION:
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE *
"AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE IS A MATTER AFFECTING A NUMBER OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS TilAT POSES IMPORTANT QUESTIONS CONCERNING Tile ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR WilICll A FINAL RESOLUTION llAS NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED AND THAT INVOLVES CONDI-TIONS NOT LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE OVER Tile LIFETIME OF Tile PLANTS AFFECTED."
- FROM THE DECEMBER 13, 1977 AMENDMENT (PL 95-209) To THE ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974, SECTION 210.
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O O
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O MATTERS POSING IMPORTANT' SAFETY' QUESTIONS IN APPLYING THIS DEFINITION, MATTERS THAT POSE "IMPORTANT QUESTI0flS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS" WERE JUDGED TO BE Til0SE FOR WHICil RESOLUTI0il IS NECESSARY T0 (1) COMPENSATE FOR A POSSIBLE MAJOR REDUCTION IN Tile DEGREE OF PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC llEALTH AND SAFETY, OR (2) PROVIDE A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN Tile RISK TO Tile PUBLIC llEALTil AND SAFETY.
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O INITIAL SCREENING CRITERIA - flew USI AN ISSUE OR RECOMMENDATION llAS BEEN SCREENED FROM FURT!1ER CONSIDERATION AS AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE IF IT MEETS ONE OR MORE OF TilESE CRITERIA.
1.
THE ISSUE OR RECOMMENDATION IS NOT RELATED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY, E.G.,
TRAtlSPORTATION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS.
2.
A STAFF POSITION ON TI-iE ISSUE OR RECOMMENDATION liAS BEEN DEVELOPED OR IS EXPECTED WITilIN 6 MONTHS.
3.
Tile ISSUE IS NOT GENERIC.
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T!!E ISSUE OR RECOMMENDATION IS ONLY INDIRECTLY RELAT$D TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY, E.G., RECOMMENDED C11ANGES IN Tile LICENSING PROCESS, NRC ORGANIZATION, ETC.
5.
RESOLUTION OF Tile ISSUE REQUIRES LONG TERM CONFIRMATORY OR EXPLORATORY RESEARCll.
6.
Tile ISSUE OR RECOMMENDATION IS RELATED TO ONE ALREADY BEING ADDRESSED AS A USI AND CAN REASONABLY BE OR ALREADY_IS INCLUDED IN Tile CURRENT PROGRAM.
THE ISSUE OR RECOMMENDATI0' REQUIRES A POLICY DECISION RAT 11ER TilAN A TEClltlICAL SOLUTION.
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