ML19323G745
| ML19323G745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006060587 | |
| Download: ML19323G745 (1) | |
Text
CENTRAL FILES PDR:HQ
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LPDR
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REGloN IV 7
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411 RYAN Pt.AZA DRIVE. SUITE 1oco NSIC
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May 8, 1980 Docket No.
50-285 Omaha Public Power District ATIN:
W. C. Jones, Division Manager -
Production Operations 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin Fo. 80-11 whir.h requires action by you. A written responsa is required.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Karl V. Seyfrfst Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc:
S. C. Stevens, Manager Fort Calhoun Station Post Office Box 98 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68102 10k
SSINS No.:
6820 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190695 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Bulletin No. 80-11 Date: May 8, 1980 Page 1 of 4 MASONRY WALL DESIGN Description of Circumstances:
In the course of conducting inspections pursuant to IE Bulletin Nos. 79-02 and 79-14 at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, Portland General Electric Co. (PGE) identi-fied a problem with the structural integrity of concrete masonry walls with Seismic Category I piping attached to them.
This problem was briefly addressed in IE Information Notice No. 79-28, which was sent to all Construction Permit and Operating License holders on November 16, 1979 (Attacnment 1).
i The problem was that some walls were found which did not have adequate structural strength to sustain the required piping system support reactions.
These structural deficiencies were at that time reported to be attributable to two deficiencies:
1)
Apparent lack of a final check of certain pipe support locations and reactions to ensure that the supporting elements possessed adequate structural integrity to sustain the required loads.
2)
Non-conservative design criteria for the reactions from supports anchored into the face of concrete masonry walls; e.g.,
relying on the combined strength of double block walls without substantial positive connection between the two walls by means other than the bond provided by a layer of mortar, grout or concrete between them.
Continued investigations into the deficiencies identified at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, engineered by Bechtel, confirmed the deficiencies to be attributable to error in engineering judgment, lack of procedures and procedural detail, and inadequate design criteria (details are in Trojan Nuclear Plant's LER No. 79-15, and supplements).
Because of this and the generic implications of similar deficiencies with other operating facilities, we have concerns with regard to the adequacy of design criteria used for the design of masonry walls and an i
apparent lack of design coordination between the structural and piping / equipment design groups.
i j
IE Bulletin 79-02, Revision 2 issued l
pipe supports attached to masonry wa DUPLICATE DOCUMENT pipe supports in this category, the bolting through the wall or the supp Entire document Previously Supports that are bolted through mas entered into system under:
review for this Bulletin.
ANO No. of Pages:
m
SSINS No.:
6870 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7910250475 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 (1/ O, if' IE Information Notice No. 79-28 Date:
November 16, 1979 Page 1 of 1 OVERLOADING OF STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS DUE TO PIPE SUPPORT LOADS Description of Circumstances:
Recently, the NRC was informed that, in the course of the inspections pursuant to IE Bulletin No. 79-02 and 79-14 by the Portland General Electric Co.
(PGE) at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, some walls were found which did not have adequate structural strength to sustain the required support reactions.
Bechtel Corporation was the Architect Engineer for the plant. These structural inadequacies were reported to be attributable to two deficiencies:
1)
Apparent lack of a final check of certain pipe support locations and reactions to ensure that the supporting structural elements possessed adequate structural integrity to sustain the required loads.
2)
Inadequate design criteria for the reactions from supports anchored into the face of concrete block walls; e.g., relying on the combined strength of double concrete block walls without positive connection between the two walls by means other than the bond provided by layer of grout between them.
The NRC is currently pursuing these issues in detail for the Trojan Nuclear Plant to determine the extent of these deficiencies and the generic implications for other Bechtel facilities.
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possible signif-icant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities and the actions being performed under IE Bulletin No. 79-02.
Specific action is being requested relating to the adequacy of attachments to concrete block walls under IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Revision 2, item 5.c.
No specific actions are requested in response to this Information Notice.
If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested or required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
No written response to this IE Information Notice is required.
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May 8, 1980 l
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RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
80-06 Engineered Safety Feature 3/13/80 All power reactor facilities (ESF) Reset Controls with an Operating License (OL)79-03A Longitudinal Weld Defects 4/4/80 All power reactor facilities In ASME SA-312 Type 304 with an Operating License Stainless Steel Pipe (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) 80-07 BWR Jet Pump Assembly 4/4/80 All GE BWR-3 and BWR-4 Failure facilities with an Operating License (OL) 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All power reactors with a Liner Penetration Welds Construction Permit and/or Operating License (0L) 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 All power reactor Deficiencies operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits (cps) 80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All power reactor Nonradioactive System and facilities with an Resulting Potential for Operating License (OL)
Unmonitored, Uncontrolled or Construction Permit Release to Environment (CP)
Enclosure
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