ML19323G394
| ML19323G394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/23/1979 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-79-038A, SECY-79-38A, NUDOCS 8006020351 | |
| Download: ML19323G394 (28) | |
Text
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l EM October 23, 1979 SECY-79-38A i
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COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
The Comissicners From:
William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguarcs j
1 Thru:
Lee V. 'Gossick, Executive Director for Operations 6C h.,
Subject:
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CATEGCRY II AND III MATERIAL IN TRANSIT Purcose:
To submit for the Commission's consideration an analysis cf need for further protection of Category II and III material in transit along with a staff recc:=endation.
Category:
This paper covers a minor policy issue requiring Comission action.
1 Issue:
Whether physical protection for Category II and III materials in, transit should be upgraded to be equivalent to the levels of protection provided by DOE for material of the same cate-geries?
Decision 1.
Is any additional protection necessary for Category II criteria:
and III material in transit?
j 2.
Which measures to increase protection levels are most cost effective?
Alternatives:
1.
Maintain current levels of physical protection for Category II and III materials.
2.
Amend current regulations to allow NRC to control scheduling of certain Category II shipments where aggregate quantities of concurrent shipments r.ay amount to a formula quantity.
3.
Increase physical protection levels for Category II material, along the lines of but not duplicative of DOE requirements, in addition to Alternative 2.
4.
Increase physical protection levels for Category II material to duplicate DOE requirements, in addition to Alternative 2.
ontact:
. Nulsen, SGRI 81 "
80060203S(
.. Discussion:
On June 24, 1979, the Commission approved, for publication in the Federal Recister, amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 73, and 150 (SECY-79-38) for the physical protection of Category II and III soecial nuclear material as defined in IAEA bulletin INFCIRC/225/Rev.1, June 1977.
In addition to approving'these amendments, the Commission requested the staff to examine, for possible strengthening, several areas of the Category II and III amendments. One area identified was the protection of Category II and III material in transit. The staff was directed to provide an analysis of any need for such protec-tion, a corresponding staff recommendation, and as an alter-native, a draft proposed NRC rule comparable to the DOE order (Order 5632.1) for protection of Category II material in transit.
In developing the analysis for more stringent in-transit physical protection requirements, the staff formally contacted the Office of Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy (00E), for information concerning the technical rationale and impact analysis used in developing their requirements.
Because of a heavy workload, COE was not able to formally respond to NRC's inquiry in the time alloted, but they did respond informally via telephone. Enclosure "B" is a copy of the letter sent to DOE. Based on'this response, it appears that the 00E made no formal technical assessment of the need for or extent of physical protection to be required of Category II and III material in transit, but developed their requirements based on what they judged their contractors could reasonably meet. Similarly, the proposed DOE requirements were not subjected to a formal value/ impact assessment. It is still too early to determine what impact DOE's order has had on contractor shipping costs. The impact may be slight since DOE said that the contractors in many instances combine their Category II material shipments with Category I shipments which are shipped in specially designed safe-secure transport (SST) vehicles accompanied by two or more escorts. This option is generally not available to NRC licensees.
Threat Analysis Summary Regarding sabotage, SECY-77-79 (Feb.11,1977) state'd that the risk of dispersion of small or moderate quantities of nuclear materials does not appear to pose a risk to the public sufficient to justify specific protection measures iw thess materials. This view was supported further by the staff in NUREG;0170, " Final Environmental Statement on the Transporta-tion of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes." Based upon information obtained informally from 00E, there was no systematic assessment done of the sabotage threat to DOE cwned Category II and III materials, and no specific measures were included in the DOE order to protect against sabotage of such material while in transit.
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.. A study, currently in progress to reassess the potential risk to the public health and safety of sabotage of Category II or III materials, has an estimated completion date of March 1980. The position of the staff, pencing completion of this study, is that there is presently no justification for requiring specific measures to protect against sabotace of Category II and III materials in-transit. Enclosure "C" discusses tnis issue in further cetail. The staff does maintain, hcwever, that there is presently a need for physical protection of Category II and III materiais against theft.
SECY-78-142 (Maren 9,1978) which initially proposed the amendments now referred to as the Category II/III Rule, included a technical assessment of the consequences of misuse of Category II and III materials through theft.
The levels of protection provided for Category II material in the Category II/III Rule were based on this technical assess-ment and staff interpretations of IAEA recomendations to arrive at a rule that would provide protection equivalent to that recomended in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1.
Analysis of Need for Additional Protection Insofar as Category III material is concerned, there is s
presently equivalency between NRC and DOE physical protection requirements. No additional requirements for Category III materials in-transit are considered necessary.
The additional requirements which would be needed to bring the present NRC physical protection requirements for Category II material in-transit to a level of protection equivalent to DOE I
Order 5632.1 include requiring locked vehicles or cargo compartments; detailed search of the load vehicle prior to l
loading and shipment; exclusive-use trucks in the case of road shipments; frequent telephane communications between the transport vehicle and the s: tipper, receiver or a designated agent of either; a minimuc. of two escorts for all shipments t
(one escort can be the driver for road shipments); maintaining the shipment under surveillance by escorts during the trip; and clearances for escorts.
The staff has considered the need for and the desiracility of requiring each of these measures.
For each of these i
measures the staff has prepared an analysis which is included in Enclosure "D".
As a result of this analysis, it appears that the need for any of the additional measures considered is a highly subjective judgment based upon the perceptions of both (a) how strategically important Category II quanti-ties of highly enriched uranium are, and (b) how much additional protection is provided by a given measure. Given
j 1 this, the decision whether or not to include a particular requirement depends largely on a suojective judgment of the value of the measure (i.e., the increase in protection) versus the cost of providing such protection. Regardless of this judgment, it should be noted that acne of the additional measures considered to bring '!RC requirements inte conformity with 00E recuirements would achieve prevention of armed theft of in-transit Category II material.
The inclusion of the following ceasures in amendments to the physical protection requirements in the Category II/III Rule, were examined: locked and sealed vehicles or cargo compartments; excit.sive-use trucks; frequent telephcne comunications; a single escort (in addition to the driver of a truck); and shipment surveillance by the escort. The adoption of these additional measures would bring NRC requirements into closer conformity to the reccmmendatiens contained in IAEA publication INFCIRC/225 especially in regard to the recomendations for locked vehicles and searches of the load vehicle which imply the need for exclusive-use trucks.
Mcwever, it shculd be noted that Mth the adopticn of Alternative 2 requirements, there is, as discussed below, little or no technical justifi-cation for these additional measures since a formula quantity of SSNM, made up of separate shipments, will never be in-transit at the same time.
The staff determined, also, that a second escort for air, rail, and sea shipments, and a detailed search prior to loading and shipment were unnecessary. The#asesforthese findings are discussed in Enclosure "D".
The fact that many public comments were received following publication of the draft Category II/III Rule [43 FR 22216, May 24, 1978] which questioned the technical justification for physical protection requirements for Category II and III material, was recognized by the staff at the time of publication of the final rule.
It was indicated in the staff's response to those comments [44 FR 43280, July 24, 1979] that the threat to the common defense and national security, insofar as Category II material is concerned, arises mainly from the possibility of multiple thefts of close to
.. formla quantities of SSNM through whicn a formula quantity cculd be accumulated to allow construction of a nuclear ext.losive device.
In view of the indirect nature of this threat, with respect to physical protection requirements for individual shipments of Category II material, it was stated that the proposed requirements were of a detection nature, rather than prevention.
Also, for this reason, it was detemined that the tecnnical justificaticn for requiring security clearances for persons involved in the transportation of less than formula quantities of SSNM, based on the threat to the common defense and national security, was too incirect to justify clearances and that caly employer screening would be required.
However, recognizing that the availability, in the aggregate, of greater than formula quantities of SSNM among several Category II shipments in-transit at the same time posed a continued threat, the Comission included in the Physical Protection Upgrade Rule [aporoved for publication as a final rule on July 24, 1979] a prohibition against concurrent shipments of Category II material by a single licensee if the aggregate quantity included %ucn snipments amountea to a fcrmula quantity.
The staff proposes to extend this require-ment to allow the staff to withhold approval for the dispatch-ing of certain Category II shipments so that the staff will be able to assure, if necessary, that a formla quantity of SSNM will not in the aggregate be in-transit simultaneously as a result of Category II shipments made by different licensees.
This will provide assurance that in tne event a Category II shipment is discovered missing or stolen, NRC will have an opportunity to prevent additional material from falling into the hands of adversaries before the original shipment is recovered or otherwise accounted for.
This authority to delay Category II shipments is proposed as an amendment to 10 CFR Part 73.47(e)(6).,It is the basis for Alternative 2 as presented in this paper, and is also included in Alternatives 3 and 4.
Both Alternatives 2 and 3 are presented in Enclosure "A".
In Alternative 2, there is a combination of preventive and detection measures which would provide assurance that the NRC could respond to an individual theft of a Category II shicment in sufficient time to prevent an adversary from accumulating a formla quanticy of SSNM through mitiple thefts.
Alternative 3 includes the amendment found in Alternative 2 as well as additional measures to facilitate earlier detection of missing material and lessen the opportunites for theft by eliminating the temporary storage and transfers associated with normal freight operations and providing for greater control by the licensees.
These measures are:
o locked and sealed vehicles o cargo compartments o exclusive-use trucks a fregrent telephone communication o single escort (in addition to the driver) o shipment surveillance by the escort Neither Alternative 2 nor Alternative 3 provides for preven-tion of individual thefts, especially those which~could be perpetrated by a dedicated, armed and well-trained adversary.
Thus, the additional measures in Alternative 3 do not provide a significantly higher level of protection than Alternative 2, but they do increase shipment costs.
In comoarative terms, air shipment costs are doubled while road shi; rent costs are increased by an order of magnitude.
Alternative 4 is similar to Altsrnative 3 in most respects except that:
o it provides for two escorts for air, sea, and rail shipments, o includes a requirement for a detailed search of the load vehicle prior to loading and shipment, ared o requires escorts to have security clearances.
None of these additional measures provides a theft prevention capability, or increases the efficiency of theft detection, while cumulatively they further increase shipment costs substantially.
Cost Analysis The summary of costs of implementing the additional physical Summary protection measures outlined in this paper are as follows (See Enclosure "E" for complete discussion).
Summary of Road Shiocing Costs (for sample trip - 500 lb load - 300 miles)
General Truck Freight (Common Carrier)
S 85.
Exclusive-Use Road Vehicle -
- Rented Van and Hi red Driver.............$
925
- Speci al i zed Haul er..................... 51,046.
- Rented 14-Foot Truck and Hired Driver.. 51,133.
- Common C a rri e r......................... 31,7 91.
.. Summary of Escort Costs by Mode (for sample 800 mile trip)
Single Escort General Truck Freight (Common Carrier)
Exclusive-use Road Vehicle -
- Rented Van and Hi red Dri ver*,v........... 5385.
- Specialized Hauler (Dou bl e 0 perati en ) **................... $ 531.
- Specialized Hauler (Si ngl e Operation ) *.................... S38 5.
- Rented 14-Foot Truck and Hi red D ri ve r*, +........................ $ 38 5.
- Common Carrier (Si ngl e Operation)*.................... $385.
Air Carco (Exclusive of local grou nd tra nsp ort ati on )***...............
5 221.
Ra i l Frei ght............................... $ 97 0.
Escort provided by the licensee; escort is non-driver.
There is additional cost due to higher minimum load and a qualified driver-escort is provided enabling continuous (double) operation.
- Assumes four-hour flight and terminal time.
+
Does not include insurance.
CCMBINED SHIPPING AND ESCORT COSTS (for sample 800 mile trip)
Cations Acoroxi:aate Cost a Present costs for raad shipment........... S 85.
o Present costs for ai r shi pment...........
5 21 5.
o Costs for exclusive-use road vehicl'e (specialized hauler) and single escort... $1,431.
o Cost for air-cargo with single escort..... $ 436.
o Costs for rail shipment with si ngl e es cort..........................
5 2,181.
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' For ccmparison purposes, it was determined that the minimum value of material comprising a Category II shipment (approx-imately one kilogram of high enriched uranium in bulk fccm) has a'value of about $40,000. The maximum typical value of a Category II shipment, comprised of close to five kilograms of high enriched uranium in the form of precisely machined and fabricated fuel elements or assemolies has a value of about $280,000.
The transportation cost (by exclusive-use tmek provided by a specialized hauler) fer a' tyoical 800-mile shipment, about $1,400, would add about 3.5% onto tne total cost of the lowest valued quantity of Category II material delivered to the recipient as customer.
The same $1,400 shipment cost would add on only accut 0.5% to the total cost of the highest valued quantity of Category II material delivered to the recipient as customer.
Investigation has shown that licensees custcmarily have not elected to ship Category II materials by rail.
In an examination of Category II shipments made in the cast eighteen months, it was determined that no rail shipments of Category II material have been made by licensees. The costs of such shipments would be comparable to that for exclusive-use trucks, but the slower transportation would make the costs of escorts for such shipments much greater than for the other modes. The frecuent layovers in freight yards would also pose much greater risk of theft of the material.
Resources:
It'is estimated that no additional NRC personnel will be needed to carry out the proposed action.
==
Conclusion:==
The staff concludes that Alternative 2 provides the most cost effective requirements to increase physical protection levels for Category II materials in-transit.
Enclosure "A" includes proposed amendments to implement Alternative 2.
Recomendation:
That the Comission approve Alternative 2 and instruct the staff to prepare that alternative for publication in the Federal Register for public comment.
Note:
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.5(d)(3) an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared because these amendments are considered non-substantial and insignificant from the stand-point of environmental impact.
.. Coordination:
The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection to the recomendaticns of this paper. The Offices of Inspection and Enforcement and Standards Development concur in the recomendations of this paper.
[ U O[t.1 c [ r QC1.,- 379 William J. Direxs, Director Office of Nuciaar Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
"A" Proposed Amer.dments "3"
Letter to DCE "C"
Threat Analysis "D"
Discussion of DOE Requirements "E"
Costing of Alternatives Note: Comissioner cements should be given directly to the Office of the Secretary by C.O.B. Monday, November 5,1979.
Ccmission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT October 30, 1979, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and coment, the Comissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION Comissioners Comission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS Secretariat
-s
e e
e ENCLOSURE A I
e 4
e yy-v
Proposed Amendments I.
Alternative 2 t
1.
Category II in-transit requirements (Section 73.47(e) would be amended to include an additional paragraph 573.47(e)(6) to read as follows:
(6) If, after receiving notification of a shioment of soecial nuclear material pursuant to 973.72 of tnis Part, it accears to tne Commiss1cn tnat two or more sn1trents of scecial nuclear raterial cf moderate strategic significance, constituting in the aggregate an amount ecual to or greater tnan a formula cuantity of strateoic soecial nuclear material, may ce en route at tne same time, the Commission may order one or more of the sniocers to delay snlement.
II. Alternative 3 Category II in-transit requirements (Section 73.47(e)) would be revised 1.
to read as follows:
(e) In-Transit Requirements for Special fluclear Matarial of Moderata Strategic Significance.
(1) Each licensee who transports, exports, or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:
(1) provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier, and transport identification.
(ii) receive confirmation from the receiver prior to the cocinencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport.
(iii) transoort the material either by exclusive-use road vehicle or by air, rail, or sea,
[{4H}] (iv) transport the material in Ea3 tamper-indicating sealed containers enclosed in a locked and sealed cargo comoartment,
[(4v.)] (v) check the integrity of the containers, locks and seals prior to shipment,
[(v.)] arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of 173.47(e)(3) of this part unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.
"Underlinec worcs denote new text - dashed through and bracketed words indicate deletions to present text - relative to the Comission approved Category II/III Rule.
Enclesure "A"
. (2) Each licenseee who receives special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:
(i) check the integrity of the containers, locks and seals upon receipt of the shipment, (ii) notify the shipper of receipt of the material as required in Section 70.54 of Part 70 of tnis chapter, and (iii) arrange for the in-transit physical orotection of the material in accordance with the recuirements of 6 73.47(e)(3) of this part unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.
(3) Each Itcensee, either shipper or receiver, who arranges for the phys-ical protection of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance while in-transit or wno takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.b.)
the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall:
(i) arrange f:r [4.. telephone..cr..radf.o] frecuent comunications [<+ pas 4 Nry],
for monitoring of the shioment, for notification of any delays in the scheduled snipment, or to request acoroariate law enforcement agency resconse in the event of an emergency, cetween tne [carrierj transport vecnicle and tne snipper u receiver or a sniacer/ receiver designee.
(ii) arrange for at least one escort to check locks and seals when necessary and maintain surveillance of tne matertaf curing all loacing and unloading operations, stoos, emergencies, or otner situations that mignt affect security of tne material. For road shipments the escort must be in addition to the dr1ver, except for snipments of less tnan one nour in duration.
[.(i.1.).] (iii) minimize the time that the material is in-transit by re-
)
ducing the number and duration of nuclear material transfers and by routing the material in the most safe and direct manner.
[-(ti.i.).] (iv) conduct screening of all licensee employees involved in the transportation of the material in order to obtain information on which to base a decision to permit them control over the material, i
i
[-(-ivt] (v) establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such material.
[-(-u.).] (vi) make arrangements to be notified imediately of the arrival of the shipment at its destination, or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for af ter the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and
'Underlinea worcs denote new text - dashed through and bracketed words indicate deletions to present text - relative to the Comission approved Category II/III Rule.
Enclosure "A"
. [.(.v.i.).] (vii) conduct imediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time and report to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission as specified in 173.71 and to the shipper or receiver as appropri ate.
The licensee wno made the physical protection arrangements snall also imediately notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Comission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appenaix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.
(4) Each licensee who exports special nuclear material of moderata strategic significanca shall ccmply with the requirements specified in f 73.47(c), (e)(1),
and (e)(3).
(5) Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:
(i) comply with the requirements specified in 173.47(c), (e)(2), and (e)(3),and l
(ii) notify the exporter wno delivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of such material.
(6) If, after receiving notification of a shicment of soecial nuclear material cursuant to 6 73.72 of this Part, it accears to tne Comission that two or more snioments of special nuclear mater 1al of macerate strateg1C significance, constituting in tne aggregate an amount ecual to or greater tnan a formula cuantity of strategic special nuclear material, may oe en route at tne same time, the Comission may order one or more of tne sniocers to celay sniement.
- Underlined words denote new text - dashed through and bracketed words indicate deletions to present text - relative to the Comission approved Category II/III Rule.
(Secs. 53,1611., Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 930, 949, as amended Sec. 7, FL 93-377,88 STAT 475(42U.S.C.2073,2201).)
Enclosure "A"
8 9
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ENCLOSURE B O
h 1
1 O
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E".
- l'il2 G
Dr. Jeseph Tinney Division of Policy & Analysis Office of Safeguards & Security U.S. Department of Energy Washington *, D.C.
20545 Cear Dr. Tinney:
The fluclear Regulatory Ccbission (NRC) recently a;;reved publicatien of amend-ments (enclosed) to Title 10 cf the Coce of r de'ral Regulations that will place e
safeguard requirements on licensaes who ::cssess, use, er transport Category II cuantities of special nuclear material (Stim).
On appreving the amencments, the Cem.ission directed the staff to prepare a Commissicn ::a:er, comparing the neec for'our licensees to protect in-transit quantities of Category II SNM with tne level of protection afforded similar cuantities of government-cuned SNM by virtue of COE Order 5362.
In crder te better meet the C: ::ission's recuest, we reed c understand the raticnala and analysis that ;r:vided the basis for scme Of the specific 00E recuirements in tha: Crder.
Be fellcuia.g have ceen identifie: as :cpics on which.se need in;ut frcm DCE in
- rcer to properly prepare a rescense t: the Ccmmissicn.
We wculd appreciate any information that you can provide en these cuesticns.
SPECIFIC TOPICS 1.
Recuirement g(l)(a)l:
Uas a value/ impact analysis made on the recuireme'nt that Category II a.
material be shipped by exclusive-use truck?
If so, please forward a ccpy of the analysis.
b.
What was the basis for requiring at least two escorts for.all Category I material in-transit?
2.
Recuirement g(l)(a)6:
~
a.
What is the danger to the public health and safety resulting frem si.
- tage of Category II quantities of SNM?
3.
Recuirement g(3) a.
Wculd you please send us a ccpy of Form DOE-50?
GEf!ERAL TOPICS 1.
What was the basis for developing a categorization of Stim different frem the Category I, II, and III quantities used by the IAEA?
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2 Tr. Joseph T1nner 2.
What was the b& sis for placing safeguard recuirerst..s ::: 1 A-enrichec uranium, high-enriched Pu and uranium 223 for cuanci:its a: cve I Gra:J Specifically, v. hat threat was identified that re uiree prete: tion of such small quantities of Ste!?
3.
Could we be provided a copy of any ecst-i: pact analysis that your Category II and III recuirements will have on ycur centracters?
s sculd apprecicte rcceiving answers to the above cuestiens by July IS,1979,
.so t!.at they car..:r ft:tcred into the Cec.:ission paper due tc the Cc 1ssion by the end cf July, til rc.sponses can be rcnt to t'r. Jacas ;. Prcil. Office of Stardcrcis Devci::.
tit. L'.S. t!uclear.4 tlatcry Cmcissicn,1:c.n:ington, D.C.
20555.
If yce ldvc eny questions about tl:c informatien recuestcc, please call Mr. Prell (M2-5C").
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P.arl ~.. N iler, Direc:cr Divir.ia. ci Siting, health '. Saftpuar:s Starinarci Cffice cf Standards Devalcpcent Er. closures:
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O 9
ENCLOSURE C F
e 4
THREAT AWALYSIS Sabo'tage Threat NRC staff presently has under study an assessment of the potential risk to the public health and safety of sabotage of Category II or III material in-transit.
Until this study is complete (estimated completion date is March 1980) an accurate risk assessment cannot be made.
However, the staff can draw some conclusions based on previous studies done in this area.
There appears to be no particular reason to assume that sabotage of in-transit SGM is any more hazardous to the pitblic health and safety than sabotage of in-transit nuclear by-product material or toxic chemicals.
This summarizes statements made and supported by the staff in NUREG-0170, " Final Environmental Statement On the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes."
Specifically, as it applies to Category II and III material, NUREG-0170 made the following statements:
- a.. Low Enriched Uranium - paragraph 7.2.1, page 7 "Furthermore, Ine racicactivity of this material is so low that dispersal by manual means or acts of sabotage would not produce a significant radiological hazard."
b.
Uranium Highly Enriched in U-235 - paragraph 7.2.7, page 7 "Because of its low racloactivity, sabotaf:2 of U-235 would not, in general, constitute a general threat to the public."
c.
Plutonium and Uranium-233 - paragraph 7.2.8, page 7 "In accition, because of tneir radioactivity, plutenium and U-233 are potentially hazardous, particularly when in the form of respirable aerosols. Therefore, for significant quantities of these materials, the potential exists for misuse both as illicit explosivas and as dispersal weapons."
In this context "significant quantities" was interpreted to mean greater than formula quantities and the stated threat is not one of sabotage but of theft and ultimate use of the material in an illicit weapon.
For less than formula quantities NUREG-0170 makes the following statement in paragraph 7.4.2, page 7-8; "While this level is not directly related to risks associated with dispersal weapons, it can be shown that the possible consequences from dispersal of such quantities would be of the same order as malevolent use of chemical explosives and small compared to a nuclear explosion.
(It has been estimated in Reference 7-3 that plutonium dispersed in a city having a high population density could result in one fatality for each 15 grams dispersed.)"
Staff, therefore, feels that protection against sabotage of in-transit SNM is not warranted at this time, pending the results of the studt to be completed in March 1980.
l o
Enclosure "C"
C
.. Theft Threat There appears to be little technical justification for requiring preventive ceasures to protect against the theft of individual Category II shipments, since the quantities of strategic special nuclear material involved in such shipments are less than that needed to construct a nuclear explosive device.
This was recognized at the time the Category II/III Rule was approved by the Commissicn
[da ER 43280, July 24, 1979], when it was stated that the threat to Category II material arises mainly from the possibility of multiple thefts of close to formula quantities of SSiiM which, in the aggregate, cculd be acetmulated tc allcw construction of an illicit nuclear weapon.
This led to the decision to provide for detection of individual thefts of Category II shipments, but to exclude measures to prevent such thefts.
However, the threat of multiple theft of Category II shipments was the prime consideration in the Commissicn's decision to include in the racently approved '
[ July 24, 1979] Physical Protection Upgrade Rule a prohibition against multiple shipments of Category II material by the same licensee if the total quantity included in such shipments amounted to a formula quantity. Additional measures to prevent multiple thefts of Category II shipments by different licensees would be similarly justified.
Enclosure "C"
,8 e
ENCLOSURE D O
l
Discussion of DOE Recuirements i
Exclusive-Use Truck DOE Requirement:
"Use of government-owned or exclusive-use truck by a ccmmer-cial carrier."
Present NRC "Rcute material in mest safe and direct manner".
(Exclusive-Requirement:
use truck or container not required.)
Discussicn: The intent of the DOE requirement apparently is to assure that SNM containers are not accidentally misrouted, and to minimize travel time and limit access to cargo compartments. Most Category II shipments are small ano can be shipped much less expensively in LTL (less than truckload) mode.
Exclusive-use tractor trailers cost much more because carriers are allowed to charge for minimum loads in the tens of thousands of pounds, wnile most Category II ship-ments do not exceed 500 pounds. The use of privately cwned or rented trucks of a much smaller size commensurate with the job, and driven by esecrts, would still not offer a very much more cost-effective alternative. Although exclusive-use road vehicles are much more costly than shipping the same material by general freight, they offer some security advantages. They orovide the licensee and NRC with greater control over the progress and routing of the shipment, since the carrier is responsible only to the licensee and need not make inter-i mediate stops to 1 cad or unload other cargo. Also, lengthy layover times can be avoided at truck depots, where general freight might be stored for a time pending continuation of the shipment on a different truck.
These intermediate stops are times when the shipment would be cost vulnerable to theft. Also, the duration of the shipment is reduced due to more direct travel between origin and destination.
Exclusive-tse road vehicles also allow for double (continuous) operation, which would eliminate intermediate layovers entirely.
(DOT regulations require drivers to stop for eight hours of rest after every ten hours of driving time, but allcw two drivers to alternate driving, permitting continuous operation if a specially designed sleeper berth is available in the cab.)
The increase in cost for road shipments due to the requirement for an exclusive-use vehicle is significant compared to the cost for making the same shipment by general freight. However, when compared to the value of the material shipped, it is a relatively small percentage of the total value of the shipment (see Enclosure "E").
Escorts DOE Requirement:
...in custody of at least two escorts..."
(Escorts can include the driver.)
" Escorts shall maintain shipment under surveillance" i
Enclosure "0"
. - Present NRC (No escort required for road, rail, air, or sea shipments.
Requirement:
No requirement for surveillance or inspection of shipment duringtrip.)
Discussion: DOE requires two escorts to perform surveillance and other security related duties while the transport is in motion as well as stopped.
(For road shipments, one escort can be the driver.) No in-transit surveillance or in-spection capabilities are required by NRC for Category II shipments, nor are they recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.1.
IAEA reccmmendations do not include the use of escorts to accompany shipments. The presence of an escort to maintain the shipment under surveillance during times the driver is concerned with other things (vehicle maintenance and refueling, and during rest stops) could enhance the security of the shipment, and provide continuity of security supervision in case changes of drivers or transport vehicles become necessary. However, the necessity for an escort is not apparent since periodic inspection by the driver could provide an adequate detection capability during stops.
A single escort for Category II air shipments would be cacable of perfor-ing all functions required of the two DOE escorts. DOE intent regarcing the second escort for air and rail shipments was stated by 00E to be for curposes of insider protection. DOE escorts are not required to be armed and therefore are not required to repel an armed attack. Thus their numbers would not be sig-nificant frem the point of view of armed response.
There appears to be no justification for the second escort beyond the insider protection issue, which is to be taken up comprehensively in a response to a separate Commission request regarding this issue.
Security Clearances DOE Requirement:
... escorts possessing "L" access authorizations or equivalent."
Present NRC
" Conduct screening of all licensee employees involved in the Requirement:
transportation of the material."
Discussion:
It has ben stated previously (Enclosure "C") that the threat to Category II shipments arises from the possibility of multiple thefts, and that there was little technical justification for requiring preventive measures for the protection of individual shipments.
The staff has recognized this by requiring 'only detection measures for Category II shipmerts.
Based upon this lack of technical justification,-it was the Commission's judgment at the time the Category II/III Rule was approved [44 FR 43280, July 24,1979] that the threat to the common defense and national security arising frem the possibility of theft of an individual shipment of Category II material was too indirect to justify a requirement for clearances of transportation personnel. This require-ment was replaced by a less onerous one that the licensee screen his employees involved with transportation of Category II material.
Enclosure "D" t
. Locks and Seals for Caroo Comoartments 00E Requirement:
" Cargo compartments shall be locked and sealed."
Present NRC (No requirement for locked cargo compartments.)
Requirement:
Discussion:
T" intent of the DOE requirement is to discourage casual unauthor-ized access tc argo ccmoartments, and provide a means of detecting covert unauthorized acass cr tampering. Locks are generally easily penetratac and do not pose a significant ob:;tacle to the dedicated adversary. However, the cast of locking and sealing cargo ccmpartments in addition to sealing SNM centainers (already required by NRC) is slight, and is probably general practice en the part of most carriers.
Ccemur.ications 00E Requirement:
".. maintain frecuent periodic communication with a control station which can request aporcpriate law enforcement agency response."
Present NRC
" Arrange for a telephone or radio communications capability, Requi rement:
for notification of any delays in the scheduled shipment."
Discussion:
The NRC and 00E requirements are not far from equivalence. The 00E requirement implies that it would be acceptable for the escorts to call the control station during stops of the transport utilizing ordinary telephone lines. The same capability is required of NRC licensees, but actual communica-tion is required only if there is an expected delay in the scheduled arrival of the shipment at its desination. There is little additional cost in requiring periodic check-in calls using ordinary telephones.
Detailed Searches Prior to Loading 00E Requirement:
... detailed search of the transport vehicle pricr to loading and shipment..."
Present NRC (No search required)
Requirement:
Discussion:
The purpose of the DOE requirement has been stated by 00E personnel as helping to assure that the transpcrt vehicle is not sabotaged as part of a plan for a subsequent theft attempt at some time during the shipment. However, the staff perceives such an act of sabotage as an act of force commensurate with other violent acts which might occur during the shipment, such as armed robbery, for which the Category II/III rule is not implemented to provide any pmventive measures. Furthermore, the staff's experience is that even a pre-loading search performed by personnel who had been especially trained in such search precedures would not provide reasonable assurance that the vehicle had not been sabotaged.
For these reasons, the detailed search requirement prior to loading and shipment is beyond the scope of the present Category II/III Rule, as currently constituted.
Enclosure "D"
0 ENCLOSURE E e
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f i
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l Costs of Upgrading Category II Material Physical Protection to DOE levels Listed below are the additional physical protection measures which would be required to bring NRC regulations for the physical protection of Category II material into equivalence with DOE Order 5632.1.
In each case, a discussion is presented of the costs of their implementation.
Exclusive-Use Truck Road shipments of Category II material are currently shipped primarily by general freight via common carriers. General freight rates for interstate transportation are regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, a Federal agency. These rates differ for different shipment distances and different regions of the country. Therefore, it would be difficult to generalize costs of general freight for Category II shipments. However, it would ce informative to compare costs of a typical snipment of Category II material.
The typical shipment will be assumed to be travelling a distance of 800 miles (rcughly the distance frem (shington, D.C. to St. Louis, M0).* The gross shipping weignt of actual i
shipmey!s of Category II material is between 200 and 500 pounds.
General freight costs for such a shipment would be $16.61 per hundredweight (100 lbs).
In addition, there wculd be a fuel surcharge of 2.7"..
The 800 mile shipment from Washington to St. Louis would cost $85.29.
The costs for the same trip by exclusive-use vehicle would be different depending upon whether a specialized hauler or common carrier were used. The specialized hauler generally charges less that a common carrier.
The cost of exclusive-use truck freight by a particular specialized hauler for the 800 mile typical trip would be at the rate of $3.27 per hundredweight, but the charges would be calculated on the basis of a 32,000 pound minimum load. The total cost would be
$1,046.40.
($3.27 x 320 hundredweights).
This is about twelve times the general freight cost.
The common carrier costs for an exclusive-use truck over the same route would be at the rate of $9.17 per hundredweight for an 18,000 pound minimum load, with an additional fuel surcharge of 8.5*..
The total cost would be $1,790.90 (5.17 x 1.085 x 180).
- Avererage Category II shipment by truck for calendar year 1978 is about 800 miles.
Enclosure "E"
.. Shipment by an exclusive-use truck which can accommodate ! cads in excess of 32,000 lbs. would appea.r to be quite wasteful for a shipment whose gross weight does not exceed 500 lbs. Therefore, another alternative was investigated to determine if an exclusive-use vehicle of smaller size could provide substantial savings.
This alternative consisted of the shipper hiring a rented vehicle of smaller size. Two types of vehicles available frcm the Ryder Truck Rental and Leasing Company and which were suitable for the task were chosen as examples; a 14-foot truck and an Econoline van. These vehicles were assumed to be rented for a round trip of 1,600 miles (between Washington anc St. Louis).
In either case, the renter pays for gasoline and provides the driver, wnich could be an 4
employee of the licensee. At an average speed of 45 miles per hour, the 1,600 mile trip would require about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of driving time (taking into account normal rest stops, meals, etc.).
In addition, a single driver would have to i
intersperse his driving time with (DOT required) mandatory rest pericas of eight hours each after every ten hours of driving time, so that the trip would take at least 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> to complete (36 driving hours + 3 eight-hour rest periods).
It is reasonable to expect the trip to be completed within three days, assuming no unnecessary delays.
The Econoline vehicle can be expected to average abou: 10 miles per gallon.
Gasoline would cost approximately ten cents per mile (@ $1.00/ga11on). The rental costs are listed as $25/ day and 5.15/mi.le. The total rental and gasolice costs for the 1,600 mile round trip would be $475. [$75 + ($.15 + 5.10) x 1,600 miles].
The 14-foot truck was stated to average 6 mpg (or about 17 cents per mile at the same $1.00 per gallon rate for gasoline) and rents for $41/ day and 3.18/ mile.
The total rental and gasoline costs for the 1,600 mile round trip are estimated as $683. [$123 + (3.18 + $.17) x 1,600 miles].
In addition to vehicle operating costs, the driver's pay must be considered.
This is estimated to be about $150/ day, or about $12.50/ hour of duty time.
The three-day trip would result in a driver cost of $450. The cost of insurance was not considered because it is unknown to what extent the employer's existing coverage would be effective, and such insurance would probably have to be negotiated with an insurance company on a case by case basis.
In summary, the cost of hiring the driver and rental vehicle to transport the material would range from $925 to $1,133, exclusive of insurance. The con-clusion is that this mode would not represent a significant savings, if any, over the use of an exclusive-use truck provided by a specialized or common ca rri er.-
Enclosure "E" I
c r.
' Summary of Shiocing Costs by Mode (for sample trip - 500 lbs loao - 800 miles)
Comparative Cost General Truck Freight (Common Carrier) 85.
1X Exclusive-Use Road Vehicle -
Rented Van and Hired Driver 3 925.
11 X Specialized Hauler
$1,046.
12 X Rented 14-Foot Truck and Hired Driver
$1,133.
13 X Common Carrier
$1,791 21 X Air Cargo The cost of air cargo (non-exclusive-use aircraft) is somewhat more than for general freight road shipments, but is considerably less than for exclusive-use truck freight. Rates for sample shipments on air cargo aircraft are provided belcw for an air cargo firm which has handled radioactive material in the past, Flying Tiger Airfreight.
~
Airfreight Rates Origin Destination Cost for 500 lbs*
Washington, D.C.
Atlanta, GA
$126.90 Washington, D.C.
St. Louis, M0
$213.30 Washington, D.C.
Los Angeles, CA
$324.27
- Includes 8% Federal Tax which varies by air terminal.
Enclosure "E"
.. In the case of exclusive-use road vehicles provided by the licensee - i.e.,
j ronted van or 14-foot truck, the esc' orts must be available for at least half of the 1,600 mile round trip.
The driver, bewever, must complete the trip in order to bring back the vehicle to the point of origin.
The escorts may either complete the trip by ground transportation in the rented vehicle, or return by commercial air transportation. The latter alternative is preferable.
The cost of providing a single escort is assumed to be $12.50 per duty hour, the same as the driver. The number of duty hours for an escort acccmpanying the transport vehicle both ways is the total driving time - 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
In the case of over-night layovers, while the shipment is in the custody of tne escort ano driver, there may be additional hours of duty required depending on the method of surveillance.
If only the driver returns with the transport vehicle, and any additional escort personnel use commercial air transportation, the numoer of hours of duty for the escort would be 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> to complete the one-way trip distance plus an additional 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for air and local ground transportation - a total of 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> on duty.
Air and local ground transcortation are estinated to cost $110. Continuous driving of the vehicle without mandatory rest stops was not considered in this case because the rental vehicles would not be prcoeriv ecuipoed with sleeper berths to allcw for dcuble operation under Federal W.cor Carrier Safety Rules.
If an additional qualified driver-escort is provided by the specialized hauler, the cost of the escort would be about $.50 per mile, or about $25 per hour.
Also, the minimum load upon which the transportation charge is calculated would be increased to 36,000 lbs. This, however, would allow for double oper-i ation (continuous operation of the vehicle) so that the total trip time would be about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, and there would be no necessity for surveillance during mandatory driver rest periods..
If a non-driver was provided as an escort, who could simply be a licensee employee, the hourly rate would more likely be $12.50 per hour, but total duty time might be increased over the special hauler case depending on how surveil-lance required during driver rest periods is performed. The escort would also have to be paid during his return trip.
In the example of the 800 mile trip we have chosen; the return transportation costs are assumed to be $110 per person for ccmmercial air transportation. Escort duty hours would be 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> (not including surveillance during driver rest periods).
The escort costs are summarized in the table below for each case shown in previous table on " Summary of Shipping Costs by Mode".
The cost of airfare for an escort to accompany an air shipment is based upon a factor of 400% of the 100-lb rate for the freight. Thus, the airfare for an escort for the Washington to St. Louis shipment would be $170.64.
The cost of providing an escort to accompany a rail shipment would be particularly expensive.
It is estimated that total cost of the escort would be $97Q.
This cost includes the escort's wages at the rate of $150 per day for five days; his fare for the caboose, $110; and his airfare by commercial passenger airline for the return trip, $110.
It would also be unreasonable to expect a single esecrt to maintain the shipment under continuous surveillance during the entire 881-mile trip, especially when the freight car was stationary in freight yards during hours of darkness. Freight yards are routinely targets of-vandals and thieves.
Enclosure "E"
. Surmary of Escort Costs by Mode *
(for sample 600 mile trip)
- (not including costs of surveillance during driver rest periods)
Single Escort General Freicht Exclusive-Use Vehicle -
Rented Van and Hired Driver
- S385.00 Specialized Hauler (Double Operation)**
$531.00 Specialized Hauler (Single Operation)*
$385.00 Rented 14-Foot Truck and Hired Driver *
$385.00 Common Carrier
~
(Single Operation)*
$385.00 Air Carco
$555.64 Rail Shipment
$979.00 Escort provided by the licensee; escort is non-driver.
Additional cost due to higher minimum load included; qualified driver-escort.
Other Costs The costs of implementation for other measures such as surveillance, ccmmunica-tions, and locking cargo compartments, are generally procedural in nature and do not result in significant increments of additional cost beyond those already described.
Value of Category II Shioments As a basis for comparison of costs of Category II shipments, it was determined that the minimum value of a Category II shipment, presumed to be comprised of high enriched uranium (approximately 93% U-235) in a quantity just in excess of Enclosure "E"
d s* one kilogram, would have a value of about $40,000.
This figure was obtained from a licensee responsible for originating a good portion of Category II shipments, and agrees roughly with information obtained independently from DOE sources based upon the value of uranium feedstock and the cost of separative work units required to enrich the uranium to the 93% level.
It was also found, based upon actual shipment values obtained frcm the same licensee, that the value of the material after it had been fabricated into fuel elements or assemblies was increased by a factor of aoout 40%.
This leads to tne conclusion that the maximum typical value of a Category II shipment, presumed to be comprised of close to five kilograms of HEU in the form of finished fuel assemblies or elements is about $280,000 [$40,000/kg. x 5 kg. x 1.4 factor for value added in manufactura].
The maximum shipping cost for a road shipmen: cf Category II material over the typical 800-mile shipment distance would be about $1,400. This represents only 3.5% of the total value of the shicment. This shioment cost wculd be cnly 0.5%
i of the value of the highest valued shipment.
1 Enclosure "E"