ML19323E217

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-269/80-07,50-270/80-05 & 50-287/80-05.Corrective Actions:Procedure to Verify Bearing Oil Pressure Prior to Warming Period Has Been Revised for All Units
ML19323E217
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1980
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19323E216 List:
References
NUDOCS 8005230203
Download: ML19323E217 (3)


Text

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Dunn Pownn Co31Pm Powra Brit.Diso 402 Socin Cucucts St urri. CnAHl.OTTE, N. C. 28212 WILLI AM O. PA R et E R, J a.

Pril 28, 1980 ViC F Pat S OFM1 TtitPe=0%C: An E A 704 STEAM Pocosction 373-4033 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nt. clear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: RII:FJ 50-269/80-7 50-270/80-5 50-287/80-5

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Dear Sir:

f With regard to Mr. R. C. Lewis' letter of April 2, 1980 which transmitted the reference Inspection Report, Duke Power Company does not consider the informa-tion contained therein to be proprietary.

Please find attached our responses to the cited items of noncompliance.

Very truly yours,

' W.M i

William O. Parker, Jr

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Attachment 1

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION I

Response to Inspection Report 50-269/80-7, -270/80-5, -287/80-5 ITEM A As required by Technical Specification 6.4.1.a. procedures shall be followed for operation of systems and components involving nuclear safety of the facility.

Contrary to the above, on February 5, 1980, the emergency feedwater turbine was placed into operation without verifying bearing oil pressure as instructed on OP/1/A/1106/06, resulting in destruction of the turbine bearings.

This is an infraction and applies to Oconee Unit 1.

RESPONSE

This item resulted from a procedural inadequacy, rather than failure to follow the procedure. The procedure called for verifying bearing oil pressure before the two hour warming period but not after. The Control Operator did verify bearing oil pressure prior to the warming period, but evidently the regulator valve was closed, possibly due to vibration, during the warming period. To help prevent recurrence of a similar incident, the following corrective actions have been or will be completed:

1) Procedure OP/1106/06 has been revised for all units to require a recheck of step 4.2.12 (verification of bearing oil pressure) after the warming period and prior to starting the turbine. Also, a schematic drawing of the oil system has been included in the procedures.
2) All Operators have reviewed this incident and corrective actions in the Operator Requalification Program.

3)

Several Nuclear Station Modifications are being considered which will provide additional operational indications and reliability for the emergency feedwater turbines.

ITEM B As required by Technical Specif4 r$1on 6.4.1.3, maintenance activities which could affect safety are required to be accomplished by adherence to procedures and instructions.

Contrary to the above, Work Requests 54292 and 57139 were issued with insuffi-

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cient instructions to insure that the proper gasket would be issued to workmen for primary manway installations on A OTSG. Further MP/0/A/1130/2 was not followed completely which resulted in a primary system boundary leak on February 9, 1980, while the plant was heating up in preparation for return to power operatiun.

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This is an infraction and applies to Oconee Unit 1.

RESPONSE

The Work Request issued to replace the manway gasket was given a Priority 5F, which does not require the same handling as a normal Work Request, as stated in Station Directive 3.3.5.

The Work Request was completed correctly per the directive; however, the personnel involved in procuring the gasket chose the incorrect gasket due to the similarity between the different types. All steam generator gaskets in stock have been checked for size, location, and correct part numbers.

In addition, a program is being pursued with the vendor to color code or otherwise aid identification of gaskets according to pressure ratings.

The program is expected to be implemented by January 1, 1981.

As stated in the inspection repor4 procedure MP/0/A/1130/2 (Primary Side Man-way and Handholes Installation and Removal) did not specify the degree of stud cleanliness required prior to torquing. This procedure will be revised by June 15, 1980 to clarify the correct application of Molykote "G" paste, to define the degree of cleanliness required, and to preclude the use of glue to position gaskets.

This incident has been reviewed with all personnel performing this type work at Oconee, and their responsibility for correctly following procedures has been emphasized.

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