ML19323D467

Effect of Natural Phenomena on Existing Pu Fabrication Facilities:Response of Structures to Extreme Wind Hazard, Vol 1

ML19323D467
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	12/31/1979
From:	Mcdonald J, Mehta K, Danni Smith TEXAS TECH UNIV., LUBBOCK, TX
To:
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ML19323D464	List: ML19323D463 ML19323D467
References
NUDOCS 8005210586
Download: ML19323D467 (35)

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I 4

O EFFECT OF NATURAL PHENOMENA ON EXISTING PLUTONIUM FABRICATION FACILITIES 45ponse of Structures to Extreme Wind Hozord of the Exxon Nudect Company Mixed Oxide Fuel Fobrication Plant PJchland, Woshington l

Volume i nS~itute for JiS6 Ster TeSearC1

~EXAS 'EC-UN VEWy

_ubbocs, kxes 79409 i

8005210 V&

e THE acerCT OF NL"'UPE PHENCL'EIA ON EXISTING PLUTONICZ FABRICATION FACILITIES RESPCNSI 0F STRUCTURES TO E:CI?" WIND HA:'ARD at the ECCON NUCLEAR CC).!PANY MIXED OXIDE FTTEL FABRICATICN PLANT Richland, Washing cn VOLiPR I by Kisher C. Mehta j

Ja:nes R. McDenald l

Douglas A. Smith l

1 l

Institute for Disaster Research

's Texas Tech University Lubbock, Texas Dece=ber 1979

8 FC?ZCC?D

'he U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C dssien has undertaken a project to analy e the effects :f natural phenc=ena upon existing plutoniu:

fabrication facilities. Se werk is being ace==;11shed by a task f:rce Of experts the are centributing to the various phases of the project. This rep rt is one of a series cf repc-ts, te be produced by Texas Tech University, which en-".es the respense cf structures and the damage censequences to a specific existing pluteniu fabri-cation facility caused by severe wind.

• he Exxon Nuclear Cc=pany

'tized Oxide Fuel Fabricatien Plant (!IF?) located at Richlcr.d,

'#ashington is the subject of.ais report. Velu=e I of this report presents the methodology, the basic data, the results and the cen-clusiens of the study. Volu=e II centa*-e -% e-----"~'

aalcula-tiens en which the results are based.

~he project tasks are perfor=ed by Texas Tech University under subcentract from Argonne National Iaboratory (Contract Nu=ber 31-109-38-3712). Mr. Ja=es E. Carsen, Divisien of Environ = ental I= pact Studies, Argonne Natienal Laboratcry, is the project manager. Dr.

James R. McDcLaid and Dr. Kisher C. Mehta of Texas Tech University a e the principal investigators for the troject. Mr. Douglas A.

S=1th of Texas Tech University (now of Southwestern Public Service C0=pany) served as research associate. The project is coordi.ated thr: ugh the Depa-t=ent of Civil Engineering and the Ins,itute for Disaster Research, Texas Tech University.

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TABLE OF CCN*E!CS Page I.

IN*RCDUCTION I

II. STRUCTUPE SYSTF'.3 AND MATERIAL PROPERTIES 3

A.

General Layout of the 10FF Facility 3

3.

Structural Syste=s 3

C.

Material Properties 11 III. STRUC~UPE PISPONSE AND DAMAGE CONSEQUENCES 14 A.

Threshold Windspeeds to P-cduce Da= age 14 3.

Atmospheric Pressure Change 18 C.

Cc=bination of Wind and A.=ospheric Pressure Change 20 D.

Windborne Debris 21 E.

Damage Consequences 21 IV.

TEPIS'dCLD WINDSPEEDS AND FA'LUP2 !.CDF2

?"

A.

Damage to 10FP Facility 25 B.

Atmospheric Pressure Change Effects 28 C.

Damage from Windborne Debris 28 D.

Sc=ca r of Failure Medes 28 V.

DAMAGE SCENARICS 30 A.

Da= age Scenario for Nominal Windspeed of 95 =ph 30 3.

Damage Scenario for Nominal Windspe-d of 150 =ph 31 C.

Da= age Sennario for Nominal Windspeed of 190 =ph 31 D.

Damage Scenario for Neminal Windspeed of 250 mph 32 VI.

Rtre2NCES 34 s

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Ternadic 7/indspeeis Atnespherie Pressure o

Change and 7enting Require =ents 19 3

Windster= Generated ?!.issile Velecities 22 4.

Da= age Consequences 24

. =

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This reper. is part of a 3:127 spenscred by -he U. S. "uclear Regulatory Cc=ission to assess the potential radiological consequences of natural phenc=ena (ficed, earthquakes, and severe winds) en existing pluteni= fabrica icn facilities. The study involves dete=ination of hacard risk, s =ctural respense, sc = ce te=, dispersien, de=cgraphic patte=s and dese levels. The paper by J. A. Ayer and W. Burkhardt,

" Analyses cf Iffect of Abnc=al Natur

Oka--a-a Izisting Fluteni =

Fabrication Plants" [1]*, prevides backg c=d en the overall hacards evaluation.

~he respense of strue = al syste=s and ec=penents to wind hacard at the Ex:cn Nuclear Cc= ant; !. fixed Oride Fuel Fabrication Plant

(!.!OFP) located a* Richland, Washing.cn is the subject of this repor*.

The winds *c= risk assess =ent was =ade by Fu'ita [2] based on tomado and other severe rhd reccrds frc= the gecg aphical region s" -~'~ '- A * - c' e 'e'an..c'.~.e.

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of straight line winds er te=adoes and is expressed in te=s of ex-pected value of windspeed for a given probability cf cecurrence.

~

Associated with *crnadic windspeeds are i=plications of stnospheric pressure change end windberne debris.

Structural respense of the building and the potential cf windbo me debris are expressed in te=s of thresheld val'ns of windspeed to produce postulated da= age to the building enclosure. The danage pos-tulation is based en nine years of winds c= da= age investigation experiences involving core than forty windstc= incidents by the senior au* hors. The structural respense and =issile i. pacts are sub-sequently translated into censequences of da= age to glove texes and fi2ters. These censequences then provide infc=ation to *he scurce te= evaluators, who, in tum, dete=ine the a= cunt and fc= or pluto-ni= that would be available for dispersion into the atnosphere.

~he type of structural syste=s and const =ction =aterial properties at the Exxcn Nuclear IEFP facility are discussed in Section II of this

• Nu=bers

'- d ats pertain Oc References, Secticn VI A.

J

report. Ihe st=ctural syste=s and the =aterial properties are docu-

=ented frc= the plant drawings and specificaticns, the C AC Task I report [3] and a site visit. A general discussien of st =ctural re-sponse to the windstom ha::ard, including the effects of wind, at=o-spheric pressure change and windborne debris, is contained in Section III. The consequences of da= age to glove boxes and filters also are defined in Secticn III.Section IV contains postulated failure = odes, calculated threshold windspeed values, and a s"

= 7 of postulated da= age for the Izzen facility. Actual calculations of the values pre-sented in Section IV are centained in Volune II of this reper [4].

Scenarios of expected structural da= age and the consequences of da= age to plutoniun containments for selected windspeeds are presented in Section 7.

6 5

s 2

1 II. STRUCTURAL SYS~EZS AfD MATERIAL PROPERTIES In this section the structural syste=s e= ployed in the Izzen LUFP facility are described and the material properties which are cernen to the= are defined. Only those features of the structure that are crit-ical to wind hacard assess =ent are presented herein.

A.

General Layout of the 10FP Facility The Izzen L"'FP facility is located in Richland, Washi*gton. A floor plan of the facility is shown in Figure 1.

Areas of concern as defined by Mishi=a [5] are indicated by crosshatching. ~he areas of cence = are the Mixed Ozide Preparation Area, the Cold Lab Area, the

!dass Spe: Area, the Peisen Red Fab Area, and the Vault, as indicated in Figure 1.

3.

Structural Syste=s This bW'ng is of one story construction. A =eccanine at the north end of the building centains offices and a cafeteria. A plan view of the building with designated areas of conce= is shewn in Figure 1.

The building is appr W-tely 100 ft. x 114 ft. in plan.

~he wall height is typically 20 ft.

For discussion purposes, the building can be divided into a lab ares and an office area.

~he two areas are separated by a hallway.

~he north end of the lab a ea has a 10-in. cast-in-place reinforced concrete wall, (Ref. Figure 1). All the areas of concern, except the Vault, are located in the lab area. Therefore, discussion of the structural syste=s of the building is li=ited to the lab area.

~he roof over the lab area consists of a built-up roof on a netal deck.

~he =etal deck is supported by leng-span steel joists. The fra=ing plan for the labcratory area is shewn in Figure 2.

At the scuth wall the steel joists fra=e into a collecter bes=, which is an-chored to stub bea=s framed into each column. At the 10-in. cast-in-place cencrete wall the joists bear en the wall. At the 10-in, wall a positive cernection provides uplift resistance, however the joists l

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~he exterior walls are precast concrete panels. "'ypical panels are 23 ft. high, 9 ft. wide and 6 in. thick, as shown in Figure 4.

A t7;ical wall panel is reinforced with #3 bars at 12 in. eenters in the vertical direction and #4 bars at 12 in. centers in the horicental direction. The reinforcing steel extends into the cast-in-place colu=s and parapet bea=s to provide continuous support for the wall panel. 2e wall panel *.s not anchored to the footing.

Instead, fric.icn between the panel and e, rout layer is relied upcn to support the bettes edge of the wall. The details of the connections between the precast wall panels and the ecl.=:ns, the parapet bea=s and the footings are shown in Figures 4 and 5.

~he colu=s and the parapet bes=s are constructed of cast-in-place reinferced concrete. The colu= di=ensions are typically 13 in. by 14 in. and are reinferced with 4-#S bars. The colu=r sre anchored to their f00 tings by a single #8 bar and by a shear key as shown in Figure 5.

At the top, the celu=n reinforcing extends into the parapet beam to provide positive anchorage.

Se parapet bean is 12 in. x 14 in. and is centinuous along the top of the wall. Reinforce =ent used in the parapet bess is typically 4-#4 bars as shown in Figure 4.

The in-plane truss system, which is provided for seismic resistance, bears en tcp of the parapet. It is held in place by =ecns of anchers which are bolted to the colu=n.

Because of the support provided by the in-planc truss, the parapet bea=

resists lateral wind leads as a centinuous bea=.

The inplane truss syste= is constructed of roned steel wide flange sections, round bars, and turnbuckles as shown in Figure 6.

It is an-chored securely to the parapet beam.

l Interior walls in the lab area are constructed of gypsu= board i

and =etal studs er unreinforced concrete =asenry block. These wsils i

do not significantly affect the response of the structure to wind leads.

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i Se vaul, is a =assive cast-in-place cencrete struc,are.

Its ex-tener walls are 18 in thick and its interior walls are 21. in. thick us sh0rn in Fir.tre 7.

• he vault reef is an 6 in, reinfereed cen: rete slab with additienal suppert provided by wide-flange steel bea=s. The steel beams are attaded to t,he roof slab by belts through the slab.

C.

l'aterial Pr:perties Fr:perties of -he building =aterials that are significan, to wind 4

da= age assessment are listed in able I.

Se table lists median values of =a erial properties, and a range of low and high values. Se.ari-ati:n of =at,erial pr:terty values is assu=ed to be leg-nor=al; the =ag-nitude Of the ranges of strength are based on judg=ent.

"?.e pr % /

source of =a,erial property values is DAC Task I report [3].

In cases where =aterial properties are not available in docu=ents, judg=ents based en standard pr:fessi:nal pract. ice are.ade.

In additi:n, if naterial preperties fer building ec.senents at the Exxon LCFP facility are not provided in reports such as Reference 3, the =aterial property values are taken from the previous EAC reports [6,7] to insure con-sist,ency among the different studies.

For steel and weld =etals, the ulti= ate sheer strength is taken as 1/ vTti=es tne tensile strength of the =ater. :.&

Ris relationship is based en the =azi=u= dister-icn energy theory for ductile =aterial [3].

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TYPICAL SECTION THROUGH VAULT 12 I

TADi.E I

!!ATElll AI.11tul'HtTI FS I

I" liiil.e r i a l Property Source Value 1.i r.v til 'In l

Wehl Metal aliear strength 47 kal 40 kul

$6 kul E70 electroiten A% Structural Steel tensile strength 68 kal 64 kul 7J kal EDAC [3]

Steel 1100f Deck tensile strength 60 kal 56.5 knl 64 kol EDAC [3]

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( A$17A A570 Gr.C) shear strength 34.6 kul 32.6 kal 37 kal lleinforcing steel tennile strength 102 kal 97 kul 109 kal EDAC [3]

( A311161's Gr.60) yielit strength 66 kal 62 kul 70.5 kal ypAc [3]

Strinctural lloits tonalle strength 130 kal 125 kul 136 kol EDAC [3]

< 1" $, ASi1A A325 3/4"4 Stuil Anchor Pullout strength 10.1 kips 8.5 kips 12.2 kips EDAC [3]

"lfecthen 1" shear strength 14.4 klpn 12.0 kipu 17.0 kips Structural Concrete Compressive strength 4.0 kol 3.4 kal 4.7 kul EDAC [3]

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The effect Of wind 1: ads = a building and its :=penents is re-ferred te herein as stru:: ural resp:nse. This section presents a generie discussion of stru:. ural response and damage consequences. In order to predict damage to glove bezes containing plut=1= as well as t: filters, the struct r al resp:nse of the building and its ce=ponents due to th ee effects of wind:::=s, namely, Fnd, at:0 spheric pressure change (=17 in case of ::=adoes), and windborne debris =ust be eval-us,ed.

Tne wind and at=cspheric pressure change effe :s =sy be ::=bined under specific cire= stances. The general analytical approach for dete=ining a threshold value of windspeed that will produce significant da= age : a buil:ing er its :=penents is presented in this section.

In add 1:icn discussions concerning ds= age fren windbo=e debris is also presented.

~he struct r al damage to the building and its ::.penents is then translated into subsequen. da= age to glove boxes and filters.

Because the consequential da= age to glove bexes and filters is rande=,

rati=al judg=ents regarding glove box and filter damage are =ade.

Fire, as a censequence er f.n:iste= da= age, does not appear to be a pertinent hara-d. In = ore than !.0 =ajor vindste= events i=7esti-gated by the authers, not a single ene produced a fire as a consequence of windsto= ds= age.

A.

~hreshold Windspeeds.c Produce Damage

~'hreshold values of windspeed to produce da= age *.o a building and its ce=penents are obtained by applying basic techniques of structural analysis.

These techniques are utili:ed by the authors to dete=ine windspeeds in tomadoes [9]. Da= age, as used here, i= plies the re=cval of a ec=penent due to outward acting forces er the,otal collapse cf a

=e=ber due te cutward er inward acting forces.

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Wind interacts with a flat-roofed building and produces inward

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acting extemal pressures en the windward wall and outward acting ex-

• e=al pressures en the sidewalls,,he leeward wall, and the roof (F.ef.

1 Figre 8).

In aiiition, relatively high cutward actirJi[ exte=al pres-s=es are prcduced en localized areas a; wall cerners, reef ecrners i

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LOCAtJZED WINO FRE55URE FIGURE 8.

WIND PRESSURES ON A BUILDING 15

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v and eaves (Ref. Figure 3).

In cases where there are openings in the walls or the roof of a building, inte=al press =es are also produced.

These inte=al pressures may ec bine wi,h external press =es to produce a more severe leading cendition on a building ce=ponent. Since wind can ecme from any direction, the failure mode of a building ce=penent should be evaluated for the inward acting pressures as well as the outward acting pressures.

Knowing the strengths of the =aterials and the type of stract= al system, principles cf mechanics are applied to dete=ine structural respense and the wind pressure to produce a postulated failure. The structural response of a building ce=penent is made up of a static and a dyna =ic part. For low-rise buildings and relatively stiff ec=penents the centributien of the dyna =ic pan of the response can be neglected.

The fundt.= ental frequencies of 10w-rise buildings er their ce=penents such as =asonry walls or =etal reef decks have funda= ental frequencies greater than 3 E:, while = cst cf *.he free field wind gust spectrum energy is in the frequency range that is less than 0.5 Ec[10,11).

2.e disparity between fundamental frequencies cf building ce=penents and gust frequencies of the wind suggests that the dynamic part of the re-spense is negligible for crdinary structures.

Once the wind pressure required to produce the postulated fail = e

)

=0de is cht,ained, the correspending windspeed V is calculated using i

appropria*e equations that relate windspeed to aerodyna=ic pressure.

The general fe= cf the equation is o

p = 0.002567'C (1) where p is the wind pressure in psf V is the windspeed in =ph C is a shape facter er pressure ecefficient Iquatien (1) is the stagnatien pressure multiplied by an appropriate pressure coefficient. Pressure ecefficients are cbtained primarily frc= wind tunnel tests of =cdel structures. Coefficients frem the 16

Anerican National Standards hstituta Standard A58.1-1972 [12] are used in this study.

The ANSI A53.1 Standard (12) defines three types of pressure coefficien s:

(1) Extemal pressure coefficient, Cp (2) hternal pressure coefficient, C.,

r-(3) Net pressee coefficient, Cf Extemal pressure coefficients are applicable fer ene=al wind pressres acting en enciesed buildings. The equatien for exte = ally acting wind pressure is:

p = 0.0025672 (C )

(2) p If the building has windows, doors or other openings that allow the wind to get inside the building, inte= al pressures act en the walls and reef in additien to the exte mal pressures. The equation for cenbined ene=al and inte=al wind pressure acting en a building ec=penent is:

p = 0.00256V (C

-C,)

(3) i i

p p-

~he sign of the inte=al pressure coefficient C is a function of g

W.nd directien and epening locations in a given building.

Net pressure coefficients are used for structures such as chim-neys er towers. The wind pressure is the net hericental pressure and is cbtained fren the equatien:

o p = 0.00256V' (C,)

(4)

With knowledge of the wind pressure p calculated frem structural necher.ics procedures, and with appropriate pressure coefficients de-te.~ined frem the literature, the threshold windspeed V can be calcu-lated utili::ing the above equations.

The threshold windspeeds -hat produce damage as dete=1ned using the above equatiens include wind gusts.

• he calculated windspeeds are equivalent to "gus speed" given in Celu=n 3, Table 14 or "tc= ado J

il 1

/>

a windspeed" given in Colu m D, Table 1/. of Eeference 2.

Whether the thresheid windspeeds are straight-line winds er *c=adic winds depend en the probability of occurrence s " " d-*ensity wind.

3.

Atmospheric Pressee Change ( A?C)

If a tomado is the windstc= hazard, then.he effect of a:ne-spheric change ( APC) nay also centribute :: the danage. A region Of reduced pressee exists near the core of a te=ade. As the : mad:

passes over a building the press =e inside a building becenes greater

-han that cn the outside, thus producing a differential pressure across the walls and the reef of the building. Taele II gives the AFC values associated with te=adic windspeeds fer differen* probabilities Of coeurrence a. the Exx:n Nuclear Z FP facility.

he probabilities of cecu.unce of c=adic windspeeds at the I:x:n EFF facili*y are Ob-tained frc= Reference 2.

The APC values are calculated using the cy-clostrophic equatic: [12].

If a building is sealed, it will experience the effect of APC as the tomado passes over it. However, most industrial buildings are not totally sealed (air tight). If there are encugh openings in the l

l walls or the roof to allow air inside the building *o escape, the differential pressure will be equalized. The venting areas per cubic i

ft. of building are given in Table II for different values of A?C.

i I

18

TABI.E II Tornadic Windspeeds, Atmospheric Pressure Change and VenLing Requirements Probabilities of Straight Line" Tornadic Atmospheric Pressure Venting Area Occurrence per year Windspeeds, mph Windspeed, mph change, psf sq.ft/cu.ft 10 44

-1 10 65 10' 88 10~

109

-4 10 128 g

10~

143

-6 10

)$$

-7

-3 10 167 91 0.17 x 10

" Includes gusts; Column B of Table 14 from Reference [2]

bColumn D of Table 14 and Figure 6 frcen Reference [2]

Determined using cyclostrophic equation Reference [13, 2) dEscaping air is limited to 25 mph

C.

Cc=binatien of Wind and At=cspheric Pressure Change For buildings which are sealed, the ec=bined effects of wind and at=0 spheric pressure change may produce the =os* critical leading condition en the building ec=penents. The highest load could be due to outward acting pressure caused by the =v'ne windspeed in a *crnado and the associated atmospheric pressure change at the loca* ion of the

=ax1== windspeed. It is pessible to express the value of the at=o-spheric pressure change in ter=s of mstr um windspeed if certain assu=p-d tiens are pe. itted. This infor=ation is given below.

The =axi=un windspeed, V, in a tornado is a ec=bination of the tangential, V and translatienal, V windspeeds:

V=V

+V t

tr Fujita [2] assu=es that translational windspeed is 20% of the -aT*-u=

windspeed, hence V. = 0.SV o

~'he cyclostrophic equatien suggests that at=csphe-ic pressure change at the point of =azi=u= windspeed in a tornado is:

o APC = 0.5 o V' Where o is = ass density of air. Tne total cutward acting pressure due to ec=bined effect of wind and APC cn a building co=penent would be e

p = 0.00256V C + 0.5 o V' p

Substituting the value for o and utilicing V = 0.87, the totcl cutward acting pressure will be p = 2 (0.0C256C + 0.0016/.)

v p

The value of C would depend on the type of ec=ponent such as side wall, p

recf, roof ec=er, etc. For example, the pressure ecefricient for the reef is C, - 0.7, hence the uplift pressure wculd be s

20 I

l

2 p = 0.00343V A threshold value of a tomadic windspeed can be deterr.ined that would fail a building ec=penent. ?re require =ents are essential to consider c0=bined effects of wind and AFC; they are (1) the building is sealed, and (2) tha ^ -a

• 01d windspeed is in tc = adic windspeed range as spec-4.r.4.d m,.,

.ab.,e 4

?.

Tindbe=e Cebris Tinds0=s tend te pick up and transport various typec of 10cse debris. The kinds of debris range in sice frc= reef gravel to auto-

=0 biles. Mest of the debris censists of objects such as sheet =etal, ti=ber fres ds= aged houses er Other light weight objects.

In a ver/-

1 intense tomado (windspeeds g eater thsn 200 =ph) debris can be pre-pelled to high velocities to bec0=e ds.= aging =issiles. Velocities attained by typical pieces of debris which can cause da= age are sh:wn in Table III. Missiles which i= pact exterior walls =ay not pose danger to glove bcx integrity or to HEPA filters if =uch of the =issile energy is absorbed by the wall. The walls of the Exxon MOFP are reinforced precast ecncrete panels and colu=ns. Hence, windborne debris da= age is not likely to be critical at this facility.

E.

Damage Censequences The building da= age ard da= age consequences discussion presented here are generic in nature. Structural response, 00=penent damage and

=issile i= pact translate into damage to glove boxes, filters, or other centain=ents of plutcri s.

• he consequences cf building da= age er

=issile i= pact to glove boxes and other contain=ents can be catastrophic cr can be negligible depending en the potential to release plutoniu=.

The da= age to glove boxes and the subsequent pluteniu= release potential are defined as folicws:

Crushing of Glove EcI: If a heavy Object falls en

ne glove ocx, structural = embers of the box =ay l

collapse resulting in the gicve bcx being c ushed.

l This event could cecur if a lead-bearing wall er building fra=e should collapse thus allowing the reef structure te fall downward. In this case the integrity of the gleve box wculd be viciated.

~.e e

material inside the glove bcx would be exposed te the a:=csphere.

l 21

TABII III Vlindstern Generated 3/dssile Velocities (13]

Impact Missile Velocities. =th Weight Aras Windspeed, spn (V)

!!lssile (1b)

( ft2) 100 150 200 250 300 Tinber Plank 28 0.04 70 98 124 160 2 in. x 4 in. x 15 ft Tinber Pla:2 115 0.29 60 90 100 125 4 in. I 12 in. I 12 ft Standard Steel Pipe 76 0.067 65 85 110 3 in, dia x 15 ft Utility Pole 1490 0.99 50 100 13.5 in. dia x 35 ft Autencbile 4000 20 25 45 Note 1.

Interpolatien of windspeed is reasonable and censistent with the current state-of-the-knowledge en missile generation.

22 c'

E.

.Ca.'o-a.da.n C.# *k.e G'. ve D.-x-C.# a c a..e o.#

'-ka con 0 rete blOcts, 10cse pie 0es Cf pipe Or 9CuipCe.~.

- uld s.ike a -'ove S.

x a.a"=.'...- a.

-. a..3. -....

'.

• k.a s.

e.' ove box w'.ad.ow.

c. ' u'..- _# - s,

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,13.,.

+o b.,. eas.a 4

. w e..,.

+ e,

k....,

.ca..

..]

=aterial in powder fc= could possibly escape the confines of the glove box. Failure of an exterier wall could allow the wind to circulate throughout the building, causing loose cbjects :: be 'hrown against th3 glove boxes. Windborne debris eculd

.a.a ns e. d. e s * '.a

,aa..

• k..a.. _.,va *rx a'd

=s."...a.

e.#..a 'r.

• k.e..'.v S m..

~ea-in Glove:

'"he g10ves are the weakest ele ents wi.n respect to the glove box integ-ity. Flying er

=cving debris could strike and tear a glove. Scre of the material in powder f0= could be pulled er k..i ewn.e,.03 +.k.... 6 +m..le k.x s..e.,7 4 7

w

. w..' e. e ' e

4...

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3s3.e De a.7*e*a.d k"

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s

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t 4

IV. I"3?2SECLD WINDSP"nS AND FAILUF2 V.0 DES

"'he threshold values of windspeed that cause failure of building ecmponents have been calculated. Detailed calculations are contained in Volume II of this report [4]. Each postulated failure mode has potential for damage to glove boxe; and HEPA filters. The failure mode that occurs at the lowest windspeed is the critical failure mode for a given building ec=ponent. Critical failure modes of ecm-ponents and their associated windspeeds are su==arized in this section.

These data are then used to formulate da= age scenarios in Section V for selected windspeeds and associated probabilities of occurrence.

Calculated threshold windspeeds are considered gust speeds or tornadic windspeeds which include gusts. In addition, the threshold windspeeds to produce damage are also considered to be nominal wbd-speeds since they are based on median strengths of materials. Wind-speed ranges are provided for each calculated th-eshold windspeed to reflect variation in =aterial properties. In cases where the material properties are not the governing failure criteria, windspeed ranges are based on subjective engineering judg=ents. All windspeed ranges are assumed to have a log-nor=al distributien.

Critical failure modes, threshold windspeed values for wind dam-age, atmospheric pressure change effects, and missile impact da nage are described below.

A.

Wind Damage at 10FP Facility The framing and construction details of the Exzen Nuclear LOFF 4

facility are discussed in Section II. A 10 in, reinfereed concrete wall (Ref. Fig.1) separates the building into an office area and a laboratory area (high bay area). All the areas of concern except the vault are in tM laboratory area. Calculated threshold windspeeds to fail roof ecmpo-nents, wall components, and the structural frame are shown in Table 7 and discussed below.

The door in the east wall at the southeast corner of the buildir4 s

i I

25 e

r y-

s TABl.E V Threshold Failure Windspeeds For Exxon MOFP Nominal Threshold Windspeed Range mph Iluilding Component Remarks W1 dsped qdi bm til@

Doors:

Southeast Corner 88 83 92 Collapses outward other Exterior Doors 140 133 147 Collapses inward; alleviates offects of APC.

Hoof:

West Eave Area 167 154 182 Failure of bearing connection M

of joist due to uplift; 10 ft wide section collapses downward.

East Eave Area 189 174 206 7 ft wide section collapses downward other Areas 231 213 252 Several joists could fall.

Walls:

Corners (except vault) 184 170 199 Failure of column and parapet beams; outward collapse of 20 ft wide sectlon.

Other Areas 204 188 221 Invard collapse of walls I.ateral Collapse

>300 Failure not feasible.

Vault

>300 Structure is able to resist the loads

ceuld fail at SS =;h.

Other decrs located in the enerior walls of tha ' o a-aa eculd fail a: 140 =ph.

Fai1=e of the enerior door in the scu h wa2 could result in the collapse of the interior unrein-forced concre,e block walls located in the vicinity of the deer.

"'he roof jois; located close to the west wall could be uplifted due to a failure of the weld between the joist bearing plate and the support bea: at windspeed of lo7 =ph.

A 10 ft. wide section of the reef in that area would tend to uplift, but would be prevented by the presence of the inplane rcof truss.

"'he reef section would likely collapse to the flecr after reduction of the uplift forces. The roof J01st, located close to the east wall could fail at windspeed of 189 =ph.

The failure is due T,o failu e of weld between the fois; bearing plate and the support i:ea=.

A 7 ft wide section of the reef nen to the east wall could ecllapse downward. Critical failure windspeed for the

-a-

' ' g roof joists is 231 =ph.

A 20 ft. wide section of the wall ec=ers (except at the vault) could collapse outward due to failure of the first eclu _n frc= the cor-ner and the parapet bea= at windspeed of 134 =ph.

This opening in the wall would pe=1t develop:::ent of intemal p-essure inside the building which will centribute to subsequent additional failures in the roof.

F.nterior walls subject to windward (inward) pressres could collapse at 2C/. =ph.

Ca"-=

cf the south wall, which indirectly supports the rcof joists, results in collapse of the roof also.

Lateral collapse of the building could occur at windspeeds greater than 250 =ph.

"'his is not a feasible failure mode, because the individ-ual ec=penents (wall ec=ers, roof areas and walls) fail at windspeeds censiderably less T.han 250 =ph.

Calculations show that no da= age to the vault occurs at windspeeds of 300 =ph.

The rest of the building could be lying in rubble, but the vault will ra-ain intact.

27

e.

3.

A*msrheric Pressure Change ( AFC) Effects Tomadic winds would be the centrclling windspeeds rather than straight-line gust winds for windspeeds higher than 155 =ph (Ref. Table II). For ternadic icading, atmospheric pressure change effects should be considered, if sufficient venting area as shown in Table II is not available.

In the lab area, the doors to the ex-

• erior are expected to fail at windspeed of 140 =ph.

Sese Openings

• hrough *he doors pre d.de opening areas sufficient for adequate venti-lation to take place.

Thus, APC pressure is not likely to centribute to da= age in *he lab area. The vault is capable of withstanding the na

• u= APC effects postulated for the site.

C.

Damage frc= Windborne Debris Extreme winds tend to pick up and transport various types of debris that range in size frc= rcof gravel

• ,o aute=obiles. Windbo me debris is of secendary concern for the ?.0FF facility. The energy which a =issile =ay possess as it approaches this building will be dissipated upon i= pact, with the exterior precast cencrete walls. When the exte-rior walls fail, the equipment is likely to be crushed undemeath the walls. Therefore, missiles entering the ?.07P facility subsequent to the wall collapse cause little additional damage. The =assive walls and roof of the vault are able to resis* any =issile i= pac

• postulated in this study.

D.

Su==a:/ of Failure 1.2 des Calculations of threshold values of windspeed tha* cause damage suggest the followirg sequence of failure modes:

88 =ch The exterier door at the coutheast comer of the building could fail.

140 =ch Other exterior doors could collapse inward, resulting in sc=e wind circulatien through the building. De west interier wall of the Pcisen Red Fab Area eculd ec11 apse.

28

e,

l 167 ::h A joist anchcrage failure occurs along the west eave of the lab area. A 10 ft. wide strip of roof alcng the west wall will tend to uplift, but will be res-trained by the inplane roof truss. The joists and roof decking will subsequently collapse downward to the ficer.

134 =oh A twenty ft. wide section of the exterior wall could collapse at the wall ec=ers (except at the vault) due to failure of the first colu== f:cm the corner er due to the fer=ation of a =echanis: in the parapet bea=.

'f this failure occurs in the south wall at the southeast ec=er, the joists bearing en this wall (through the brackets attached to the colu=n) and the 20 ft. wide section of roof will collapse downward.

204 =h F.xterior walls collapse inward due to windward pres-sures. If this occurs in the south wall, joists bearing en the wall will collapse downward. All the walls are not likely to collapse but rather portions of the walls would be affected.

231 =th Additional jcist anchorage failure could occur resulting in portions of roof ecllapsing to the floor.

250 _7. h At these windspeeds, the integrity of the laboratory building is expected to be 1 cst. Mest of the walls will collapse along with the inplane roof truss. The vault is not likely to sustain dange at this windspeed.

s 29

o.

V.

DAMAGE SCENARIOS Damage scenarios for selected probabilities of occurrence of windspeed are formulated from the calculated threshold windspeeds presented in Section IV. The damage scenarios are used for sub-sequent identification of source terms.

Four damage scenarios for selected windspeed values are presented to formulate a trend of increasing damage with reduced probability of occurrence.

Fujita [2] developed the relationship between wind-speed values and their probability of occurrence at the Exxon M0FP facility. The values used here and presented in Table II are taken from curves B and D of Figure 6 in Reference 2.

The windspeed values are gust speeds in the case of straight line winds and maximum tornadic windspeeds in the case of tornadoes. Damage causing threshold wind-speeds are either gust speeds or maximum tornadic windspeeds. Since damage is based on median material strengths, the threshold wind-speeds are termed nominal windspeed. Variation in material properties, or subjective engineering judgement, based on the type of damage, establishes the windspeed range for each damage scenario. These wind-speed ranges may be used to provide error bands on potential damage to the facility.

A.

Damage Scenario for Nominal Windspeed of 95 mph Procability of Occurrence: 6 x 10-3 Windsoeed Rance: 83 mph to 109 mph, based on failure of door.

Mixed 0xide Preparation Area: The small door at the southeast corner of the building could fail cutward. Wind circulation in the vicinity of the failed door could damage the exterior filters on glove box 4a. The other glove boxes or filters in the Mixed Oxide Preparation Area are not likely to sustain damage. No sig-nificant missile induced damage is expected at this windspeed.

Cold Lab Area: No damage of consequence.

Mass Soec Area: No damage of consecuence.

i 30

Poison Rod Fab Area: ?!o damage of consecuence.

Vault: No damage of consequence.

B.

Damage Scenario for "cminal Windsceed of 150 mph Probabilitv of Occurrence: 3 x 10-6 Windsoeed Rance:

133 mph to 169 moh, based on failure of doors.

"ixad Cx;.e Precaration Areai Failure of the small door in the scutheast corner of the building would pemit some wind circulation in the area. Since the coenine is small, only the glove box closest to the door is likely to be affected. The filter outside the glove box is likely to be damage ; and the glove box could be perforated by a small wooden plank.

No damace'of consecuence.

Cold Lab Area:

Mass Soec Area: No damace of consecuence.

Poison Rod Fab Area: Outside door in south wall could fail allowing wind to circulate in that area of the building. The interior wall could collapse in the poison rod fab area, causing damage to eouip-ment located within 15 ft. of the wall. Best estimate of the number of pieces of equicment crushed is one-third as median value with upper and lower bound values being one-half and one-fifth, respectively.

Vault: No damage of consecuence.

C.

Damage Scenario for Ncminal Windspeed of 190 moh Probability of Occurrence:

6 x 10-0 Windsceed Rance: 170 mph to 212 mph, based on failure of walls.

Mixed Oxide Precaration Area: A 20 ft. section of L oth wall at the southeast corner can fail. This failure will cause 20 ft. sec-tion of the roof to collapse downward. Roof joists and metal deck are likely to remain together and the north end of the roof may not slip from its support. The best estimate is that three-fourths of the glove boxes in this 20 ft. wide section close to east wall will be crushed; upper and lower bound values of the glove boxes 31

4 crushed are all and one-half, resoectively.

In the remaining area, one-half of the glove boxes may be perforated by debris; uocer and lower bound values for the glove boxes affected are

@ree-fourths and one-third, respectively.

Cold Lab Area: No damage of consequence since it is at a fair distance away from the wall opening.

Mass Spec Area: No damage of consecuence since it is at a fair distance away from the wall opening.

Poison Rod Fab Area: Portions of west and east interior walls are likely to collapse and could cause damage to equipment located within 15 ft.

of the walls. Best estimate of the number of pieces of equipment crushed is one-half as median value with upper and lower bound values being three-fourths and one-third, respec-tively.

Vault: No damage of consecuence.

D.

Damage Scenario for Nominal Windspeed of 250 mph Probability of Occurrence: 3 x 10-9 Windsoeed Rance: 200 mph to 312 moh, based on collapse of walls.

Mixed Oxide Precaration Area: Portions df the outside walls col-lapse. The interior wall between Poison Rod Fab Area and MOP collapses allowing wind to circulate through the building. The roof collapses downward along with the inplane truss. All glov boxes and filters are likely to be crushed. The roof deck and the inplane truss cover the glove boxes and prevent some material from being blown from the building.

Cold Lab Area:

Interior walls collaose. The roof and the inplane roof truss collapse downward. The 10 in. concrete wall is likely to remain standing. All glove boxes and filters will be crushed. The roof deck is likely to cover the crushed boxes and prevent some material from being blown from the building, Mass Soec Area: Damage similar to Coid Lab Area, i

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