ML19323D166
| ML19323D166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Humboldt Bay |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1980 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Crane P PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005210194 | |
| Download: ML19323D166 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES
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WALNUT CRE EK. CALIFORNI A 94596 May 8, 1980 Docket No. 50-133 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Attention: Mr. Philip A. Crane, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-11 which requires action by you. A written response is required.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, clease contact this office.
_ Sincerely, W~g;L R. H. Engelken Director Enclosures -
1.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/ enclosures:
W. Barr, PG&E W. Raymond, PG&E E. Weeks, PG&E, Humboldt Bay i
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ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No.:
6820 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190695 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555
_.IE Bulletin No. 80-11 Date:
May 8, 1980 Page 1 of 4 MASONRY WALL DESIGN Description of Circumstances:
In the course of conducting inspections pursuant to IE Bulletin Nos. 79-02 and 79-14 at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, Portland General Electric Co. (PGE) identi-fled a problem with the structural integrity of concrete masonry walls with Seismic Category I piping attached to them.
This problem was briefly addressed in IE Information Notice No. 79-28, which was sent to all Construction Permit and Operating License holders on November 16, 1979 (Attachment 1).
I The problem was that some walls were found which did not have adequate structural strength to sustain the required piping system support reactions.
These structural deficiencies were at that time reported to be attributable to two deficiencies:
1)
Apparent lack of a final check of certain pipe support locations and reactions to ensure that the supporting elements possessed adequate structural integrity to sustain the required loads.
2)
Non-conservative design criteria for the reactions from supports anchored into the face of concrete masonry walls; e.g., relying on the comb *ned strength of double block walls without substantial positive connection between the twc walls by means other Den the bond provided by a layer of mortar, grout or concrete between them.
Continued investigations into the deficiencies identified at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, engineered by Bechtel, confirmed the deficiencies to be attributable to error in engineering judgment, lack of procedures and procedural detail, and inadequate design criteria (details are in Trojan Nuclear Plant's LER No.
j 79-15, and supplements).
Because of this and the generic implications of similar deficiencies with other operating facilities, we have concerns with i
regard to the adequacy of design criteria used for the design of masonry walls and an apparent lack of design coordination between the structural and piping /
equipment design groups.
IE Bulletin 79-02, Revision 2 issu pipe supports attached to masonry DUPLICATE DOCUMENT most pipe supports, in this catego by bolting through the wall or the Entire document previously Supports that are bolted through a entered into system under:
the review for this Bulletin.
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ANO No. of pages:
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SSINS No.: 6870 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7910250475 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 November 16, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-28 OVERL0ADIflG OF STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS DUE TO PIPE SUPPORT LOADS Description of Circumstances:
Recently, the NRC was informed that, in the course of the inspections pursuant to IE Bulletin No. 79-02 and 79-14 by the Portland General Electric Co.
(PGE' at the Trojan Nuclear Plant, some walls were found which did not have adequate structural strength to sustain the required support reactions.
Bechtel Corporation was the Architect Engineer for the plant.
These structural inadequacies were reported to be attributable to two deficiencies:
1)
Apparent lack of a final check of certain pipe support locations and reactions to ensure that the supporting structural elements possessed adequate structural integrity to sustain the required loads.
2)
Inadequate design criteria for the reactions from supports anchored into the face of concrete block walls; e.g., relying on the combined strength of double concrete block walls without positive connection between the two walls by means other than the bond provided by layer of grout between them.
The NRC is currently pursuing these issues in detail for the Trojan Nuclear Plant to determine the extnet of these deficiencies and the generic implications for other Bechtel facilities.
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possible signif-icant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities and the actins being performed under IE Bulletin No. 79-02.
Specific action is being requested relating to the adequacy of attachments to concrete block walls under IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Revision 2, item 5.c.
No pecific actions are requested in response to this Information Notice.
If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested or required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
No written response to this IE Infonnation Notice is required.
F IE Bulletin No. 80-11 Enclosure May 8, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All power reactor Nonradioactive System and facilities with an Resulting Potential for OL or CP Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment 80-09 Hydramoto. Actuator 4/17/80 All power reactor Deficiencies operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All power reactors with Liner Penetration Welds a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980 80-07 BWR Jet Pump Assembly 4/4/80 All GE BWR-3 and Failure BWR-4 facilities with an OL 80-06 Engineered Safety Feature 3/13/80 All power reactor (ESF) Reset Controls facilities with an OL
~"'
80-05 Vacuum Condition Resulting 3/10/80 All PWR power reactor In Damage To Chemical Volume facilities holding Control System (CVCS) Holdup OLs and to those with Tanks a CP 79-01B Environmental Qualification 2/29/80 All power reactor of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL 80-04 Analysis of a PWR Main 2/8/80 All PWR reactor facilities Steam Li.1e Break With helding OLs and to those Continued Feedwater nearing licensing Addition 80-03 Loss of Charcoal From 2/6/80 All 1. alders of Power Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Reactor OLs and cps Tray Adsorber Cells 80-02 Inadequate Quality 1/21/80 All BWR licenses with Assurance for Nuclear a CP or OL 80-01' Operability of' ADS Valve 1/11/80 All BWR power reacter Pneumatic Supply facilities with and OL
.