ML19323A122
| ML19323A122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1980 |
| From: | Stephen Burns NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18044A766 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004170258 | |
| Download: ML19323A122 (35) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:() UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE In the Matter of ? ) s CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY j Docket No. 50-255 (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility) ) (Civil Penalty) NRC STAFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY'S "FIRST ROUND OF INTERR0GATORIES AND REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS" Answer to Interrogatory 1,: The following persons participated in the preparation of the answers or provided information related to interrogatories 12, 13, 14 and 17: Headquarters: (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555; 492-7000) Norman C. Moseley, Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection (DROI), Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Samuel E. Bryan, Assistant Director for Field Coordination, DROI, IE Frank J. Nolan, Senior Reactor Inspection Specialist, DROI, IE John Reisland, Senior Reactor Inspection Specialist, DROI, IE James P. Murray, Director and Chief Counsel..Rulemaking and Enforcement Division, Office of the Executive Legal Director (0 ELD) James Lieberman, Attorney, Rulemaking and Enforcement Division, OELD l Stephen G. Burns, Attorney, Rulemaking and Enforcement Division, OELD Regional Offices: (Addresses and telephone numbers for the NRC's Regional Offices are listed in Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 20) l Region I: Eldon J. Brunner, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch H. Kister, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Region II: James P. O'Reilly, Director 8 00417075$j
-.a. Charles M. Upright, Assistant to the Director Jack C. Bryant, Enforcement Coordinator Region III: James G. Keppler, Director Charles E. Norelius, Assistant to the Director Robert F. Heishman, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dwane C. Boyd, Section Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Region IV: Glen Madsen, Chief, Reactor j0perations and Nuclear Support Branch Thomas F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section Region V: Robert H. Engelken, Director Jesse L. Crews, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
- 12.
For each instance in which the NRC or any NRC personnel was notified or otherwise became aware of an incident in which containment isolation was violated or an incident constituting a violation of containment integrity [ (as that tem is used in the second line of the letter dated November 9, 1979, from Mr. Victor Stello of the NRC to Mr. R.B. DeWitt of Consumers Power Company).at any utilization facility (as defined in 10 CFR 550.2(b)) provide the following infomation: (a) The name of the licensee of the utilization facility and the name of the facility-i (b) The docket number assigned by the NRC to the facility; (c) The manner in which the NRC or NRC personnel learned of the incident and the date thereof; (d) The dates on which it is belie'ved that containment isolation or contain-ment integrity was violated; (e) A description of the incident; (h) The sanctions ultimately imposed; + 1 (i) The reasons for imposing said sanctions or, if no sanctions were imposed, the reason for not imposing sanctions; (j) identify each document which related or refers to the instances identified in response to 12(a)-(i); (k) provide each document identified in response to 12(j). t Answer to Interrogatory 12: 1. (a) Boston Edison Company, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1. i (b) 50-293 . (c) An NRC inspector. identified.the noncompliance during a routine, unannounced inspection conducted on August 7-10, 1979. (d) June 12, 1979 (e)- Primary containment integrity was violated when, with-the reactor critical at full power, the torus was opened to the reactor build-l ing atmosphere by disassembling the "A" Core Spray Full Flow Test i Check Valve during a maintenance operation.
w a. (h) The licensee was cited for an infraction by Region I on September i 14, 1979. Region I had issued an Immediate Action Letter on August 10, 1979, to confirm the licensee's commitment to undertake a review of the events leading to the violation, a review of pro-I cedural and management controls, and a review of the adequacy of plant staffing and training to prevent occurrence of such events.- (i) The letter (9/11/79) transmitting the Notice of Violation and Inspection Report related to the incident states that, as result of inspection, one of licensee's activities appeared to be in noncompliance with regulatory requirements. (j) Letter to G. Carl Andognini, Manager, Nuclear Operations Depart-ment, Boston Edison Co., from Eldon J. Brunner, Chief, Reatu.r Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, Region I (9/14/79), enclosing Appendix A - Notice of Violation and IE Inspection Report No. 50-293/79-16 (9/11/79). Letter to Boyce Grier, Director, Region I. from P.J. McGuire. r Station Manager - Nuclear Operations, enclosing Licensee Event Report No. 79-029/01T-0(8/24/79). Letter to G. Carl Andognini, Boston Edison Company, from Boyce Grier, Region I, "Immediate Action Letter".regarding the June 12, 1979 incident (8/10/79). Letter to Boyce Grier, Region I, from G. Carl Andognini, Boston Edison Co., (8/17/79), with reference to letter from Grier of ' August 10, 1979, regarding June 12, 1979, incident, i A
a Letter to Eldon J. Brunner, Region I, from G. Carl Andognini, Boston Edison Co., " Response to IE Inspection No. 79-16" (10/15/79), identified licensee's corrective action. Letter to G. Carl Andognini, Boston Edison Co., from Eldon J. Brunner, Region I, acknowledging licensee's 10/15/79 letter concerning licensee's corrective action. 2. (a) Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L), H. B. Robinson Unit 2. (b) 50-261 (c) The licensee informed the NRC by telephone on October 27, 1972. (d) October 27, 1972. (e) While two persons were exiting the containment vessel, the contain-ment vessel personnel hatch inner door malfunctioned and could not be completely closed with the two persons in the air lock of the personnel hatch. In order to get the two persons out of the hatch expeditiously, the licensee depressurized and purged the contain-ment vessel. The outer door of the hatch was opened for approxi-mately 10 seconds to pennit the two persons to exit the air lock. The licensee, with the agreement of the AEC Directorate of Licensing, breached containment a second time to repair the inner door. (h) The licensee was issued a Notice of Violation for breach of contain-ment integrity in an enclosure to a letter from the Director, AEC Region II, to the licensee (3/16/73). (i) Other than to say that items of noncompliance with the regulatory . requirements appeared to exist, neither the letter. nor the Notice of Violation identify particular reasons for the action. However, the Notice of Violation state's, "Due to the unusual cir-cumstances surrounding the event and the subsequent. corrective' actions taken, a response is not requested concerning this event." a.
> (j) Letter to J. A. Jones, Senior Vice President - Engineering & Operating, CP&L, from Norman C. Moseley, Director, AEC Region II (3/16/73); concerns inspection conducted in January-February 1973 and encloses an Enclosure (identifying noncompliances) and Regulatory Operations (RO) Inspection Report No. 50-261/73-2(3/13/73). R0 Inspection Report No. 50-261/72-6(12/13/72), which includes as Attachment "C" RO Inquiry Report No. 50-261/72-14Q(11/1/72). " Breach of Containment Integrity During Reactor Operation", pre-pared by R.L. Cubitt, Reactor Inspector, Reactor Operations Branch, Region II. The inquiry report attaches a telegram (10/27/72) from i B.J. Furr, Plant Manager, to John Davis, Director, Region II, re-porting violation of containment integrity to pennit exit of tech-nicians from personnel hatch. Letter to Norman C. Moseley, Director, AEC Region II, from E.E. l Utley, Vice President - Bulk Power Supply, CP&L (4/2/73), entitled " Resolution of Activities in Noncompliance with Technical Specifi-cations"; letter responds to Moseley's 3.16/73 letter concerning items of noncompliance. Letter to J.A. Jones, CP&L. from Nonnan C. Moseley, AEC Region II ~(5/14/73)~a'cknowledging receipt of CP&L's 4/2/73 letter infonning-Region II of corrective action. 3. (a) Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L); H.B. Robinson Unit 2. (b) 50-261 9 (c) Identified by NRC inspector during special inspection on May 2-8 and 14-19, 1975. ~
l i ; (d) May 1, 1975. (e) Containment integrity was defeated by opening an isolation valve { I motor breaker while the valve was open and the plant was not in cold shutdown. (h) The licensee was cited for an infraction by Region II on June 3, i 1975. (i) The letter (6/3/75) enclosing the inspection report (No. 50-26/75-7) f which identifies the item of noncompliance states that certain of i the licensee's activities were apparently in noncompliance with regulatory requirements. i (j) Letter to~J. A. Jones, Executive Vice President - Engineering, Construction & Operation, CP&L, from Norman C. Moseley, Director, i Region II (6/3/75), enclosing IE Inspection Report No. 50-261/75-7 i (5/30/75). Items of noncompliance are identified in the inspection report, including an infraction for violation of containment integrity. Letter to Norman C. Moseley, Region IIm from E. E. Utley, Vice j President - Bulk Power Supply, CP&L (6/19/75), " Response to Items of Enforcement", concerns 6/3/75 letter from Region II. Letter '.o Norman C. Moseley, Region II, from E. E. Utley.CP&L (7/16/75),"ResponseofItemsofEnforcement",modifiesresponse made in CP&L's 6/19/75 letter. 1-I i Letter to J. A. Jones,- CP&L, from Nonnan C. Moseley, Region II i (8/1/75), acknowledging CP&L's 6/19/75 and 7/16/75 letters. l i l f a
., Letter to J. A. Jones, CP&L, from Norman C. Moseley, Region II, (9/18/75), concerning inspections conducted in August 1975 and noti-fying licensee that certain items concerning operations involving "C" reactor coolant pump on May 1, 1975, are being referred te IE Headquarters for review. Letter attaches IE Inspection Repor: No. 50-261/75-11 (9/5/75). Letter to J.A. Jones, CP&L, from John G. Davis, Acting Director, Division of Field Operations, IE, concerning inspections identified in Inspection Report No. 50-261/75-7 concerning operation of "C" reactor coolant pump after failure of pump seal system on 5/1/75. Letter expresses. concern with licensee's management controls that. permitted " questionable operational activities without conducting [ an adequate prior evaluation". 4. (a) Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO), North Anna Power Station Unit 1. (b) 50-338 (c) The licensee infonned the NRC through Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 79-144/03L-0 (11/16/79). (d) October 18, 1979 (e) Caps were removed from a containment penetration to tie in contain-ment fire protection during refueling operations when containment integrity was required. (h) No sanctions were imposed.
_. (i) Region II did not cite for noncompliance in view of the general policy stated in section 0850 (c)(3) of Manual Chapter 0800. t (j) LER No. 79-144/03L-0, submitted under cover of letter from C.M. Stallings, Vice President - Power Supply & Production Operations, V" CO, to James P. O'Reilly, Director, U.S. NRC Region II. + Letter to W.L. Proffitt, Senior Vice President - Power, VEPCO, from R.C. Lewis, Act'ing Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, U.S. NRC Region II, enclosing Inspection Report No. 50-338/79-50-50-339/79-59 (1/16/80). 5. (a) Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 3. (b) 50-296 (c) The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector on December 10, 1979. (d) December 6-9, 1979. ~ -(e)- The Browns-Ferry-Unit-Nor 3 facility was operated without maintain-l ing primary containment integrity during the period from return to critical at 6:45 a.m. on December 6, 1979 until containment integ-rity was restored at approximately 8:30 a.m. on December 9, 1979. (h) On January 4,1980 the Director of the Office of Inspection and En-forcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed ~~ ~ Imposition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $29,000 for items of noncompliance associated with the incident. An " Order Modifying License Effective Immediately" was also issued by the Director on the same date which modified the licenses for all three Browns Ferry units.
10 (i) The Director's letter to the licensee dated January 4,1980, en-closing the aforementioned Notices and Order states: "The vi(2nLion of containment integrity is a matter of safet3 significance which demonstrates a weakness in your ability to control licensed activities, speci-fically your ability to control routine maintenance activities. Therefore, we propose to impose civil penalties Tor the items of noncompliance...in a total amount of $29,000.00." In addition the Director's " Order Modifying License Effective Immediately" states: "The specific items of noncompliance associated with the incident which are described in the Notice of Violation issued this date demonstrate that the licensee has not adopted appropriate controls to assure that maintenance activities do not defeat required safety features. There is reasonable assurance that containment closures for the Browns Ferry Units are in their proper condition at this time. However, it is also necessary to assure that future maintenance activities will be performed in a manner that will not defeat required safety features. Therefore, I have determined that the public health, safety, and interest requires an immediately effec-tive, modification of License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68.... " i (j) Letter to H.G. Parris, Manager of Power, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), from Victor Stello, Jr., Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) (1/4/80), concerning violation of containment integrity in December 1979; letter encloses Notice of Violation, Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, and Order Modify-r ing License Effective Immediately. " Letter to Victor Stello, Jr..' IE, 'from Hugh G. Parris, TVA (1/10/80), responding to letter of 1/4/80 enclosing Notices and Order; letter represents that TVA does not contest the matters set forth in the Notice of Violation and lists the licensee's correctivo action. Letter to H. G. Parris, TVA, from Victor Stello, Jr., IE (1/18/80), acknowledging TVA's letter of 1/10/80 and payment of civil penalties in amount of $29,000. l Letter to H. G. Parris, TVA from R. C. Lewis, IE, Region II (1/4/80), enclosing Inspection Report No. 50-259,-260,-296/79-45. 6. (a) Carolina Power & Light Company, H. B. Robinson Unit 2. (b) 50-261. (c) The licensee informed the AEC by telephone and telegram on June 6,1973. (d) May 16 to June 5,1973. (e) The reactor was operated at power levels up to 7.5% with 3 con-tainment pressure sensing lines (3/8 inch each) vented to outside atmosphere. (h) The licensee was cited by Region II with a Category 2 severity violation for the violation of containment integrity and 3 other Category 2 severity violations related to the incident. 9 (i) The letter (8/31/73) transmitting the inspection report which lists the noncompliances states that certa.in of the licensee's operations appeared to be in noncompliance with regulatory requirements. (j) Letter to J. A. Jones, Executive Vice President, CP&L, from l l Nonnan C. Moseley, Director, Region II (8/31/73), enclosing R0 Inspection Report No. 50-261/73-4(8/16/73) and noting . violations identified therein. l Letter to John F. O' Leary, Directorate of Reactor Licensing, l AEC, from E. E. Utley, Vice President - Bulk Power Supply, CP&L ~ (6/14/7?), "ALnormal~ Occurrence Report - Violation' of Technical i Specifications", reports the occurrence and describes corrective action. Telegram to Norman C. Moseley, Director AEC Region II, from BennyJ.Furr, Manager-RobinsonPlant(6/6/73), reporting abnormal occurrence on 6/5/73 concerning discovery of open vent valves on sensing lines. Telegram to John F. O' Leary, AEC, from Benny J. Furr, CP&L (6/6/73), reporting abnormal occurrence. Letter to Norman C. Moseley, Region II, from E. E. Utley, CP&L, dated 9/21/73 responding to 8/31/73 AEC letter. Letter to Noman C. Moseley, Region II, from N. B. Bessac, CP&L, dated 10/1/73 providing supplemental information to CP&L letter dated 9/21/73. Letter to Norman C. Moseley, Region II, from E. E. Utley, CP&L, dated 10/15/73 providing clarifying infomation on CP&L responses. Acknowledgement letter to J. A. Jones, CP&L from Norman C. Moseley, Region II, dated 10/30/73. 7. (a) Comonwealth Edison Company, Dresden Unit 1. (b) 50-010. (c) The licensee informed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) of the incident in a letter of February 22, 1974. (d), Possibly from October 1969 until January 1974 during periods of power operation. (e) During perfomance of a primary containment leak rate test, ex- .cessive leakage was detected passing through a two-inch line in the radwaste pipeway. Sometime after October 1969, when a satis-factory integrated leak rate test had been performed, either the s manual isolation Valve in the line was opened or two air operated valves that had been installed in the line in September 1968 had been removed or both events occurred. (h) The licensee was cited for an item of noncompliance, Category II severity, by AEC Region III, on February 28, 1974. (i) The letter and the accompanying inspection report which identifies the item of noncompliance state that certain of the licensee's activities appeared to have been in noncompliance with regulatory requirements. (j) Letter to J.F. O' Leary, Director, Directorate of Licensing, AEC, from W.P. Worden Station Superintendent, Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 (2/22/74), "
Subject:
... Report of Unusual Event per Section 6.6.B.2 of the Technical-Specifications. Excessive-Con-tainment Leakage", reports discovery of open 2 inch line. Letter to Byron Lee, Vice President, Comonwealth Edison Company, from James G. Keppler, Director, AEC Region III (2/28/74), con-cerning inspection conducted in January 1974 and enclosing Regula-tory Operations (RO) Inspection Report No. 50-010/74-01 (2/28/74), which identifies the item of noncompliance for brea n of contain-ment integrity. ~~ Letter to James' G. Keppler,' Region III - from Byron Lee, Common-wealth Edison (3/20/74), "
Subject:
Response to Letter of James G. Keppler to Byron Lee, Jr., Dated February 28, 1974, Concerning j ~ ~ ' Apparent' Dresden Unit 'l' Viol'ation' of AEC Requirements, -AEC Dkt. ~ No. 53-10". Letter to Byron Lee, Comonwealth Edison, from James G. Keppler, . Region III (4/3/74), acknowledging Lee's letter of 3/20/74 infonn- ) ing Region III of licensee's corrective action. 8. (a) Omaha Public Power pistrict (.0 PPD), Ft. Calhoun Station Unit 1. (b) 50-285. (c) The licensee informed AEC inspectors on site on September 5,1973. (d) Possibly August 6,1973, to September 5,1973, during power operation. ~ (e) During a routine inspection, the licensee discovered that a contain-ment building pressure-indicating manometer was void of fluid and unisolated, thereby creating a leak path (approximately 1/4" line) from the containment building to the auxiliary building. (h) None. (i) Theletter(11/13/74) enclosing the inspection report which reviews the licensee's abnormal occurrence report concerning the incident, i states only that "No violations or safety items were identified within the scope of this inspection". (j) Letter to J. L. Wilkins, Group Manager - Operations, OPPD, from G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Construction & Operations Branch, Region IV t (11/13/74), concerning inspection conducted in October 1974, including review of items reported by OPPD, encloses Regulatory Operations (RO) Inspection Report No. 50-285/74-8. Inspection Report-No.- 50-285/74-8-(11/13/74), including review-of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-285/74-14. Letter to E. Morris Howard, Director, AEC Region IV, froin W.C. Jones, Operations Manager, OPPD (9/17/74), enclosing licensee's Abnonnal Octurrence Report No. 50-285/74-14 (9/16/74) for Fort Cal-houn Station Unit 1, concerning violation of containment integrity. l Letter to J.L. Wilkins Ass't. General Manager, OPPD, from G.L. Mads (.1, Region IV (9/20/74), enclosing R0 Inspection Report No. 50-285/74-6(9/20/74), concerning July, August, September inspectionst and identifying licensee's report of void manometer.
" 9 (a) Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L), Arkansas Nuclear One. Unit 1. (b) 50-313. (c) The licensee informed the NRC of the incident on approxi-mately January 17, 1979. (d) December 18, 1978. (e) During power operation, licensee personnel opened the outer door of the Emergency Escape Hatch while the inner door was open. The personnel were performing a surveillance test on the hatch, and the incident resulted in violated of contain-ment integrity for a few seconds. (h) None. (i) Region IV did not take enforcement action on the basis of the general policy stated in section 0850(c)(3) of Manual Chapter 0800. T (j) Letter to K. V. Seyfrit, Director, U.S. NRC Region IV, from Daniel H. Williams, Manager-Licensing, AP&L (1/17/79), enclosing' Licensee Event Report No. 50-313/78-32(1/17/79), i concerning the above described incident. Letter to William Cavanagh, Vice President of Generation and j Construction, AP&L, from G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, Region IV (10/4/79), enclosing Inspection Report Nos. 50-313/79-17 & 50-368/79-15 (10/2/79)- (tworeportscombinedinone).
_, 10. (a) Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L), Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2. (b) 50-368. (c) The licensee informed the NRC of the incident on about December 19, 1978. (d) November 28, 1978. (e) During Mode 3 operation, prior to initial criticality, both doors of the personnel hatch were simultaneously opened by personnel entering and personnel leaving the containment building. (h) None. (i) Region IV did not take enforcement action on the basis of the general policy stated in section 0850(c)(3) of Manual Chapter 0800. i (j) Letter to K. V. Seyfrit, Director, U.S. NRC Region IV, from Danie.1 H. Williams, Manager-Licensing, AP&L (12/15/78); enclosing Licensee Event Report Hos. 50-368/78-18 and 50-368/78-19. LER No. 50-368/78-18 describes the incident referred to above. Letter to William Cavanaugh III, Vice President of Generation and Construction, from G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations -and Nuclear Support Branch, Region IV.(4/4/79), concerning inspections during February-March 1979, enclosing Inspection Report No. 50-313 & 50-368/79-06 (4/3/79). o The preceding examples were identified by personnel in IE headquarters and in the NRC's regional offices. Other instances of violation of containment , integrity could be identified by an examination of " Licensee Event Reports" submitted to the Commission by licensees in accordance with various reporting requirements. The Staff keeps a computer file of " Licensee Event Reports" (LER's) submitted by licensees since 1969 on reportable occurrences, which would include instances that would constitute violations of containment integrity or i containment isolation. Two portions of this computer file would retrieve items related to such instances: " Containment and Containment Isolation Systems" and " Containment Combustible Gas Control System." This file does not, however, indicate the enforcement sanctions imposed, if any, for these reportable occurrences. The Staff also keeps a " noncompliance file," which summarizes items of noncompliance reported in IE Inspection Reports submitted by each Region since July 1975. This file does not-identify noncompliances by a categorization that would narrowly key in on noncompliances involving violation of containment integrity. The file will identify entries of noncompliance with 10 CFR Part 50 or with technical spe'cifi-t cations. Cited noncompliances involving violation of containment integrity would-appear among the items retrieved on a search of the file keyed to noncompliance with Part 50 and technical specifications. Using this data as a starting point, one could then search the docket files in NRC's public document room for relevant documents (e.g., inspection reports, enforcement correspondence, and-licensee event-reports) related to an incident identified on one of the computer printouts. The IE headquarters and regional personnel ' identified in the answer to interrogatory 1 above provided information or identified documents referenced in this answer.
, P Answer to 12(k): All (f the documents identified in response to interrogatory 12 are available in the NRC's public document room. The staff will make available copies of conputer printouts on the computer files identified above at the Office of Inspection and Enforcement's offices in Bethesda, Maryland. It is the staff's understanding that Consumers Power Company is obtaining a copy of these printouts through its March 1980 request under the Freedom of Infor-nation Act. 3 k e i L
13. Identify all items of non-compliance at any utilization facility which have come to the attention of the NRC or any NRC personnel and which are of similar severity */ to the breach of containment integrity for which Con-sumers Power Company was cited by providing for each such instance the following information: (a) The name of the licensee of the utilization facility and the name of the facility; (b) The docket number assigned by the NRC to the facility; (c) The manner in which the NRC or any NRC personnel learned of the incident and the date thereof; (d) The dates on which it is believed by the NRC the item of non-compliance existed; (e) A description of the incident; (h) The sanctions ultimately imposed; and (i) The reasons for imposing said sanctions or, if no sanctions were imposed, the reason for not imposing sanctions. 1 Answer to Interrogatory 13: 1. (a) Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Vermont Yankee Generating Station (b) 50-271. (c) The licensee reported the incident to the AEC on November 8, 1973. (d) November-7,-1973 (e) On November 7,1973, a control rod function test was conducted j that resulted in an accidental criticality.
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In this context, severity does not refer to the duration that the item of non-compliance existed, but rather its significance at the time it existed.
. (h) On December 27, 1973 the Director of Regulatory Operations issued ~ a Notice of Violation and a Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $15,000 for items of noncompliance associated with the incident. Penalties in the amount of $15,000 were imposed on February 1,1974. (1) The letter to the licensee dated December 27, 1973 indicates that the following cited violations caused, contributed to or resulted from the occurrence of an accidental criticality: use of a pro-cedure that had been neither reviewed nor approved by the Manager of Operations or by the Plant Operations Review Comittee; the Nu-clear Safety. Audit and Review Committee (NSARC) failed to recognize that the conditions and circumstance which resulted in the acci-dental criticality constituted an unreviewed safety question .(10 CFR 50.59);, prior.. instances of procedural violations and of failure of NSARC to perfom its intended function. 2. (a) Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Unit No.1. (b) 50-245 (c) Reporting by licensee of an unplanned criticality on November 12, 1976. l (d) November 12, 1976. (e) On November 12, 1976 during the performance of.the specified shutdown margin test, control roct 46-19 was erroneously selected . -and withdrawn to a predetemined position following the proper postponing of control rod 46-23. An unplanned criticality and l
I automatic reactor trip from high flux on four IRM channels occurred at 4:49 a.m. following withdrawal of control rod 46-23. t Between 4:50 and 4:58 a.m. on the same date, further shutdown margin testing was perfonned without recognition of the previous rod selection error. Control rod 46-23 was positioned as specified. Control rod 46-19 was then again erroneously selected and withdrawn to a predetermined position and control rod 46-23 was then with-l drawn. The seco~nd withdrawal, while tenninated prior to a second automatic reactor trip, did result in a reactivity increase re-quiring innediate insertion of control rod 46-23 in order to prevent t a second reactor trip. (h) On December 20, 1976, the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and a Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $15,000 for items of noncompliance associated with the incident. An Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalties was issued on January 21, 1977. (i) The letter to the licensee dated December 20, l_976 specifically mentions the effectiveness of the licensee's management control of-licensed activities as a particular concern in this incident. 3. (a) Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Kewaunee Nuclear Power - i i Plant ~ (b) 50-305 l (c) On May 3,1978 licensee infonned NRC inspectors on site of the event. (d) May 2, 1978
. l (e) On May 2,1978, the shift supervisor on duty entered the reactor cavity during refueling while the in-core instrument thimbles were withdrawn. The entry was made without adequate radiation survey-ing and without provision of adequate monitoring equipment. (h) A Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $10,000 for items of noncompliance f associated with the incident was issued by the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement on July 19, 1978. The Director issued an Amended Notice of Violation and Amended Notice of Proposed in.po-sition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $7,000 cn December 7, 1978. An Order Imposing Civil Penalties was signed by the Director i on February 16, 1979. The licensee paid the civil penalty pursucnt to a settlement with the NRC staff approved by the Administrative Law Judge in an Order of July 17, 1979. (1) The enforcement letters (dated July 19, 1978, December 7,1978 and February 22, 1979) sent to the licensee with the aforementioned Notices and Order emphasize the following aspects of the items of noncompliance associated with the incident. L (1) the potentially high radiation exposure that could have resulted from the incident; (2) the fact that a similar incident had been brought previously to the attention of the licensee in IE Circular No.-76-03; (3) lack of effective controls to prevent such exposure . (4) importance of adherence to established requirements by the licensee's supervisory personnel. l 4. (a) Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit No. 3. (b) 50-296 (c) The licensee notified the NRC of the incident on December 10, 1979. (d) December 6-9, 1979 (e) The Browns Ferry Unit No. 3 facility was operated without main-taining primary containment integrity during the period from return to critical at 6:45 a.m. on December 6, 1979 until ' containment integrity was restored at approximately 8:30 a.m. on December 9, 1979. (h) On January 4,1980 the Director of the Office of Inspection and En-forcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Impo-sition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $29,000 for items of noncompliance associated with the incident. An " Order Modifying License Effective Immediately" was also issued by the Director on the same date which modified the licenses for all three Browns Ferry units. (i) The Director's letter to the licensee dated January 4,1980 en-closing the aforementioned Notices and Order states: "The violation of containment integrity is a matter of safety significance which demonstrates a weakness f in your ability to control licensed activities, speci-fically your. ability to control. routine maintenance.. activities. Therefore, we propose to impose civil penalties for the items of noncompliance...in a total amount of $29,000.00." In addition the Director's " Order Modifying License Effective Immediately" states:
"The specific items of noncompliance associated with the incident which are described in the Notice of Violation issued this date demonstrate that the licensee has not adopted appropriate controls to assure that maintenance activities do not defeat required safety features. There is reasonable assurance that containment closures for the Browns Ferry Units are in their proper condition at this time. However, it is also necessary to assure that future maintenance activities will be perfonned in a manner that will not defeat required safety features. Theiefore, I have determined that the public health, safety, and interest requires an immediately effec-tive, modification of License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68...." 5. (a) Portland General Electric Company, Trojan Nuclear Power Plant (b) 50-344 j (c) The licensee notified the NRC of the incident on April 6,1978. (d) April 1 and 5, 1978 (e) The incident involved exposure to ra'diation in excess of regula-tory limits, i.e., whole body exposures of 27 and 17 rems respec-tively to two individuals working in the reactor containment building. (h) On July 25, 1978, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $20,500 for items of non-compliance associated with the incident. (i) The Director's letter (dated July 25,1978) enclosing the afore-mentioned Notices states, "Our investigation of the incident... , revealed that noncompliance with NRC regulations contributed significantly to the cause and severity of the overexposures." The letter goes on to say: i
"The circumstances associated with this incident indicate a need for significant improvement in radiation protection practices at the Trojan Nu-clear Power Plant as well as a need for improved interdepartmental communications. The apparent items of noncompliance associated with the incident, when viewed in conjunction with other events and items of noncompliance which have occurred since ~ the Trojan Plant was licensed for operation, also raise serious concerns about your ability to appropriately identify, evaluate and correct problems." 6. (a) Metropolitan Edison Company, Three Mile Islund Nuclear Station, Unit 2. (b) 50-320 (c) The NRC learned of the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 from the licensee on March 28, 1979. Noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identified during the investigation conducted from March 28 through July 31, 1979. (d) Cited violations occurred variably between October 1978 and March 30, 1979. (e) As a result of the NRC's investigation of the Three Mile Island accident several significant items of noncompliance were identi-fied which involved: (1) inoperability of flow paths to both steam generators by feed-water header isolation valve closure; (2) failure to isolate the electromatic relief isolation valve upon identification of high temperatures in the electromatic relief valve discharge line; (3) Throttling of the high pressure injection system; l t
i i (4) removal of the Core Flood System from service; (5) manual tripping of diesel generator fuel racks which pre-vented automatic start of the diesel generators upon Engineered Safeguards Feature actuation and manual start from the control. (h) On October 26, 1979, the Director of the Office of Inspection and ( Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $155,000 for the above-mentioned and other items of noncompliance. An Order imposing Civil Monetary Penalties in the amount of $155,000 was issued on January 23, 1980. I (1) Intheletter(10/26/79) from the Director of IE transmitting the Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, it is stated "In light of the seriousness of these alleged i noncompliances and in view of the significance and nature of our inspection findings, we pro-pose to impose c.ivil penalties." The letter.goes on to.say: - "In detennining the amount of the penalties assigned the staff took into account the severity and duration-of the noncompliance, including the relationship of i the items of noncompliance to the accident itself L. .and the relationship of the noncompliance to other -. items of noncompliance." The October 26th letter and-the cover letter (1/23/80) to Metro - politan Edison from Mr. Stello enclosing the Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalties discuss generally the items of noncompliance 'I various weaknesses in the licensee's programs related to this enforce-ment action. 7. (a) American Electric Power Service Corporation and Indiana & Michigan Power Company, D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, U7it 1. (b) 50-315 (c) The licensee reported the incident to the NRC on November 18, i 1977. (d) On 17 days between November 1 and November 18, 1977. (e) While performing a surveillance test (a valve lineup check of the containment spray system), the licensee discovered that the inlet valves to the west and east containment spray system heat exchanges were closed. The closed valves blocked the flow from the contain- [ ment spray system pumps to the spray headers in the containment, and thereby rendered both subsystems of the containment spray system inoperable. l (h) A Notice of Violation was issued on January 27, 1978 by IE head-quarters (signed by Harold Thornburg, Director, Division of Reactor 7 Operations Inspection. IE) citing the licensee for a violation. (i) The cover letter (1/27/78) transmitting the Notice of Violation identifies the adequacy of management controls of licensed activi-f ties as a particular concern. i i b r ..J
. 9. (a) Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion Station Unit 2. (b) 50-304. i (c) The licensee infomed the NRC of the incident on July 12, 1977. (d) July 12,. 1977. P ~(e)' Dummy test signals were improperly inserted in the reactor protection system logic of Unit 2 while in hot shutdown condition and thereby masked out real signals from the pressurizer, stean generators and reactor coolant loops. This precluded automatic activation of the safety injection system by these signals. As a result of the loss of actual signals and indicators, water was withdrawn from the reactor coolant system for about 40 minutes, without operations personnel being aware of this degradation in plant conditions. ~ ~ ~ (h) A Notice of Violation and a Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties were issued on September 30, 1977 by the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. In addition to other items of noncompliance, the licensee was ~ cited for a violation and a penalty of $5,000 was imposed for an item of noncompliance related to the aforementioned incident. (i) The letter (9/30/77) to Commonwealth Edison from the Director enclosing the Notice described above states, in part: "Three recent safety related events at your Zion . Station indicate a. breakdown in your management control s.... Lack of implementation' of effective ~ ^ management controls pemitted the personnel errors that resulted in these events. Further-more, the significance of.the July instances'of' inadequate control is compounded by the history of escalated.. enforcement action taken during the last four. years at the three Commorwealth Edison operating nuclear stations."
10.(a) Comonwealth Edison Company, Zion Station Unit 1 (b) 50-295 (c) The licensee notified Region III of the incident on March 19, 1976. (d) March 18,1976 (e) An employee received a whole body radiation dose of 8.05 rem during an entry into the cavity beneath the reactor vessel while the in-core thimbles were withdrawn. The licensee failed to make surveys or adhere to procedural controls. (h) On May 20,1976,.the Director of the Office of Inspection and i Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed i Imposition of Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $13,000 for items of noncompliance associated with the incident. (i) The Director's letter of May 20,1976, to the licensee enclosing Notices notes that "[i]n addition to these specific items of [ . noncompliance, the inspection disclosed.two general problem areas which we wish to bring specifically to your attention: (1) a lack of disciplined procedural controls, and (2) an indication of poor. radiation. safety practices.." 11.(a) Consolidated Edson Company of New York, Indian Point Station Unit 2 (b) 50-247 (c) The licensee reported the incident to an NRC inspector at the site on April 5, 1976. (d) April 5.-1976. (e) A nuclear plant operator received a whole' body radiation dose of 10.06 rem during an entry into the reactor vessel sump room while the in-core _..__.____. instrument thimbles were withdrawn. ~The entry was made'without' adequate ' ~ ~ ' ' ~ l
. surveying of the radiation area or adequate controls over the circumstances of the entry. (h) On June 21, 1976, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of j i Civil Penalties in the cumulative amount of $23,000 for items of non-compliance identified during the investigation of the incident. On August 23, 1976, the Director issued an Order Imposing Civil Penalties in the total amount of $20,850. { (i) Apart from noting that the licensee's " activities were not conducted in feil compliance with NRC requimments", the Director's letter of June 21, 1976, enclosing the Notices also states "[W]e are concerned j about the implementation of your management control systems that pennitted them [the items of noncompliance] to occur," and "Also, we note that [certain) items...are similar to those found during [other) inspections....' 12.(a) Virginia Electric & Power Company (VEPCO), Surry Power Station Unit 2 (b).50-281 (c) The NRC resident inspector was notified on April 15, 1979. (d) April 14, 1979. ~ (e) An employee. received a..whole body dose.of approximately.10 rems during an entry into the in-core instrument room (reactor cavity). The entry was made without adherence to procedural safeguards, without adequate ._.... _.--surveyJng,-and.without.provis.fon of appropriate. monitoring instrumentation...._ - (h) On August 15, 1979, the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation and a Notice of Proposed _ Imposition of Civil _..... Penalties in-the cumulative -amount.of-$15,000 -for.. items-of-noncompliance -.- r vP Y
associated with the incident. An Order Imposing civil Monetary Penalties was issued on September 28, 1979. (i) The Director's August 15, 1979, letter enclosing the aforementioned Notices states: "Our concern with regard to this overexposure is amplified in that the potential for significant l personnel exposures from entries into this area was brought to your attention by IE Circular 16-03, " Radiation Exposures in Reactor Cavities," dated i September 10, 1976. The overexposure apparently resulted from a breakdown or disregard on the part of an-individual for the precautions discussed in your response to this circular. In addition, the individual overexposure, while entering the in-core instrument room beneath the reactor vessel, was a senior reactor operator and the senior VEPC0 operations representative onsite at the time. We are seriously concerned that-the actions of this - senior member of your staff might serve as an example to your employees. The significance of this occurrence cannot be overstated. Consequently, we propose to impose civil penalties...." While reiterating these same' points, the Director's-letter (10/1/79) enclosing the Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalties (10/28/79) also i state: [ t "The' imposition of~ civil penalties is i~ntended here to once again impress on your organization, your employees, and other nuclear facilities and their employees, the, significance and importance of strict adherence to basic radiation safety requirements designed to assure the health and safety of your employees." The IE headquarters and regional personnel identified in the answer to interrogatory 1 above assisted in the identification of the incidents and related documentation referenced in this answer. e
. 14. For each instance in which any HRC personnel categorized, as a preliminary or final matter, an item of noncompliance by any licensee of a production facility or any utilization facility as a violation, infraction or deficiency and based this detennination, in whole or in part, on whether the item of noncompliance.had a " substantial potential for.... contributing or aggra-vating...an incident or occurrence [such as] (b) Radiation levels in unrestricted areas which exceed 50 times the regulatory limits...," provide the following information: (a) Identify the instance by providing: (1) the name of the licensee and the docket number and name of the facility at which the item of noncompliance occurred; (ii) the date or dates on which the item of noncompliance occurred; (iii) a brief description of the item of noncompliance; (vi) the category of noncompliance into which the item of non- - compliance was ultimately placed; (vii) the sanction imposed or other action ultimately taken by the NRC; (b) For each such instance, identify the " regulatory limits" (as that tenn is used in the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement "In-spection and Enforcement Meual") used for purposes of the categori-zation. - (c) For each such instance,- list all of the assumptions used in the ~~ calculation or estimate of potential radiation levels. Your list should include, without limitation, the accident conditions hypo-thesized and an explicit statement of how the item of noncompliance would cause, contribute to or aggravate the incident. -(d) For each such instance, ' identify the potential radiation level esti- ^ mated or calculated. Answer to Interrogatory 14: IE ' inspection' reports," notices' of violation',~ ~and 'related ' enforcement cories ' ~ pondence generally do not indicate the particular criterion or criteria applied to classify an item of noncompliance as a violation, infraction, or deficiency i 1
' unde.r the 1974 " Categories of Noncompliance". Incidental references to the , criteria may appear in the correspondence related to a particular enforcement action. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement does not maintain, however, a listing that would identify such cases. The particular criterion to which Consumers Power Company refers in its interrogatory is criterion "(b)" for a " violation" under the 1974 " Categories of Noncompliance". Except in the correspondence related to the imposition of civil penalties against Consumers Power Company in this case, the staff has not identi-fled any instance involving a " violation"-category of noncompliance in which the categ' rization as a " violation" is explained in the enforcement correspondence in o terms of the violation's " substantial potential for...contributin an incident or occurrence [such as] (b) g or aggravating... Radiation levels in unrestricted areas which exceed 50 times the regula-tory limits...." -- - -The staff believes--that-the item of noncompliance fits this particular criterion - - ~ for a violation in this case: (a) (i) Consumers Power Company, Palisades Nuclear Power Facility; Docket'No. 50-255; (ii) From approximately April 11, 1978 to September 11, 1979, during periods of reactor operation. ~ (iii) Containment' integrity was not maintained'during periods'of ~ operation in that two manual containment isolation valves were locked open. (vi) Violation ~ (vii) i.,1vil penalties O
o 34 - '(b) 10 CFR Part 20 i (c) At the time the item of noncompliance was classified a violation based i .in part on-this particular criterion for violations, the Office of t Inspection and Enforcement relied on calculations and analyses made by Consumers Power Company in its Licensee Event Reports concerning this incident and in Consumers Power Company's responses to the November 9, 1979 Notice of Violation and Notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties. -(d) -Potential-levels of release and potential-doses are identified in Con-sumers Power Company's calculations and estimates contained in the documents referenced above. ~ ~ ~ ~ The'IE-headquarters and regional personnel identified in response to interrogatory 1 above and Stephen Burns assisted in the preparation of the answer to this interrogatory. e a O
' t 17. Identify any communications between NRC personnel which relate or refer to CPC0's performance as an NRC licensee with respect to CPC0's compliance or lack of compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. (a) Identify any s' communication relating to the imposition of the CPC0 civi: venalties of December 20, 1.979. (b) Identify any documents which relate or refer to the communica-tions iden#ied in response to 17. (c) Provide all documents identified in response to 17(b). Answer to Interrogatory 17: 17. (a): (1) Written memorandum (dated October 26,1979) from James G. Keppler, Director, U.S. N.R.C. Region III, to George C. Gower, Acting Executi.ve Officer for Operations Support..IE, "
Subject:
Consumers. Power Company (Palisades) - Recommended Civil Penalty". The memorandum attaches a table of containment integrity violations - reported since the beginning of 1978. The memorandum and table. would have been seen by others on the Region III and IE Head-quarters staffs who may have reviewed the proposed civil penalty action. (b) The memorandmn and table are identified in 17(a). (c) A copy of the relevant portions of the memorandum are attached.- =}}