ML19322C827
| ML19322C827 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1979 |
| From: | Engle L, Hebdon F NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280553 | |
| Download: ML19322C827 (78) | |
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N U C L E A.9 F.5 C U L A T O R '/ C O M M ! O d i O *:
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IN THE M ATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND l
t INTERVIEW OF LEON ENGLE i
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Date - Wednesday, 8 August 1979 Pages 1 - 77 l
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(202)347 3700 ACE - FEDERAL itEPORTERS, INC.
Official Reponers
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CR6347 1
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'~Y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
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4 In the Matter of:
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5 THREE MILE ISLAND
-X 6
7 INTERVIEW OF LEON ENGLE 8
9 Room 401 Arlington Road Building 10 6935 Arlington Road Dethesda, Maryland 11 Wednesday, 8 August 1979 12 8:50 a.m.
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13 BEFORE:
14 FRED HEBDON WILLIAM PARLER 15 TOM COX 16 17 18 19 20 21 fy<j 23 il) 24 Ace-rederet fler.orters, Inc.
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MR. HEBDON:
Let's begin, please.
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3 Whereupon, 4
LEON ENGLE 5
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was 6
examined and testified as follows:
7 EXAMI NATI Oil 8
BY MR. HEBDON:
9 0
Have you read and do you understand the witness 10 notification that was attached to the memo sent to you 11 concerning this interview?
12 A
I do.
13 0
Would you please state your name.
()
14 A
Leon Engle.
IS O
What is your current occupation?
16 A
I am presently project manager for the restart of TMI 17 Unit 1.
I work for Denny Ross in Bulletins and Orders, and 18 have been put on loan to Dick Vollmer on the TMI task force.
19 0
What was your position in late 19.77?
20 A
In late 19.77 I was project manager, branch LWR-It 21 branch chief was John Stolz.
I had responsibility for the
(**
licensing ma tters regarding Davis-Besse and operating plant, 23 and.at that time I also had the responsibility for seeing that
()
24 the Palo Verde. 4 and 5 qualification review was complete.
25.
O Since Davis-Besse was already an operating plant, why w
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were you still-assigned c-the LPM?
V 2
A Davis-Besse, when it got its OL in April of '.77, had 3
a lot of stipulations or conditions in the license, which
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4 required ~further actions.
In addition to that, the plant had S
had a long period of time up through September in startup and 6
testing problems related to the secondary system 7
instrumentation, ironing the bugs out of the systems and they 8
had not really got up to even 15, 25 percent of power.
And 9
based on this ongoing activities, which really interf aced more 10 with the project manager, which was me, prior to OL 1.ssuance,
.11 the project had not been transferred to DOR.
12 In September we started working on what's called a 13
" transfer package," which gives out the specificity of the
()
14 items that require further action and what actions had been 15 comple ted.
This transf er package requires the concurrence of 16 groups in DSS, DOR, before it is finally transferred to DOR 17 and we were just working on that in September.
1G O
What was the nature of the stipulations that were on 19 the license?
20 A
Oh, they included a variety of items, conditions such 21 as must keep one reactor coolant pump in operation per 1.oopi 22 they had to complete an analysis for the Millstone grid, which 23 was a generic issue at that time.
Another one was related to
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24 fire protections they had to provide a submittal, updated 25 submittal, on fire protection, generic matters and conditions
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6347.01.3 4
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that you find in an operating license.
There were 23 items, as 2
I remember.
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3 0
Was it unusual to have these types of conditions and 4
stipulations,. or this many conditions and stipulations?
5 A
I understand f rom other people that Davis-Besse had a 6
large number compared to some of the plants.
Just how many 7
more in relation to the other plants. I don't know.
8 0
Do you have any. idea why they had so many?
9 A
Many of these were items that had been licensing
-10 issues prior to the issuance of the SER, which we had JI stipulated in the SER items which the reactors -- the atomic --
12 the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, some stipulations 13 they required in there as a result of our meeting on
)
14 Davis-Besse.
And these items, in some cases, continued down 15-through the supplement; and in some cases, they we re resolved, 16 and some cases, it required additional actions which the staff 17 deemed necessary over a period of time, but which would not 18 necessarily preclude OL issuance.
19 0
Do you recall if any of these issues or any of these 20 stipulations had any bearing on the incident that occurred at 21 Davis-Besse on September 24, 19 77?-
22 A
No, I do not.
23 BY MR. PARLER:
( ).
24 0
One point of possible clarification.
You re ferred in 25 your answer, when you were referring to the various conditions pV
5 p347.Ol.4
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i in the Davis-Besse license, to the need to complete an analysis 2
of the Millstone grid.
Did you mean to refer to Millstone?
m
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3 A
That's correc t.
4 BY MR. HEBDON:
5 0
How many people reported to you in your capacity as a lic nsing project manager?
6 e
7 A
Prior to OL issuance, I would say that there were 23, l
8 possib y 25, individuals that I had responsibility with who r
9 were involved in the various DSS groups.
After the plant 10 received an OL, a change occurs t, at that point, you are now
.11 working with Enforcement and Inspection, who have 12 responsibilities on an operating plant, and so you interface 13 with thc.n al so.
14 As to the actual number of people who reported to the 15 project manager, I think it wo'uld be more of a case of me 16 contacting them and requiring actions of them, and the number 17 would vary depending on what the issuas might be.
i 18 0
Could you describe your employment history, including 19 positions held at the NRC?
20 A
I came from Los Alamos as a loanee in 1973 and was 21 assigned to Division of project Management.
At that time I was 22.
given.the construction permit review for Greenwood Energy 23 Center Unit 2 and 3.
In 1974 we issued our SER on Greenwood in I ')
s-24 Jul'y; and in August of '74 we went to the Advisory Committee of 25 Reactor Safeguards, where we received a favorable letter for 1 ~
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{347.01.5 6
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this CP application.
2 In September, the applicant, Detroit Edison, for
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3 Greenwood Energy Center indicated they were deactivating the 4
review because of financial difficulties, and the review came 5
to an end.
6 In late De cember of 1974, I was assigned the OL 7
licensing ma tters regarding Davis-Besse Unit 1, and also was 8
assigned the licensing matters for Crystal River Unit 3.
In 9
addition to that, I was assigned licensing matters for Midland 10 Units 1 and 2.
11 Do you want me to continue with this?
12 0
Yes.
13 A
And that remained fairly well -- those three 14 responsibilities up tc, I believe it was, the middle of 1974, 15 when additional responsibilities on both Davis-Besse and 16 Crystal River, which were both OLs, I was relieved of mi duties 17 along Midland 1 and 2.
18 0
Why was that?
19 A
I had two Ols, and there is a certain amount of work 20 to be done. and my branch ct T felt that I should be relieved 21 of those duties on Midland I and 2.
22 O
So, it was just a workload consideration?
23 A
Workload consideration.
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24 At the licensing process -- continued through 1974 on both -the e plants, addressing safety issues, and continued, oh, 25 s
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3.347.01.6 7
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on into 1975 and '76.
2 Basic a lly, the responsibilities were on these two rx
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3 plants, Crystal River and Davis-Besse, plus a one-month period 4
in the summertime each month when Detroit Edison asked for an 5
expedited 30-day requalification review on the status of their 6
deactivated Greenwood Energy Center.
7 And then', in late 1976, both Crystal River and 8
Davis-Rosse, although they had slipped in schedule, were 9
finally coming closer to that time when the SER -- they would i
10 be request ng an operating license with soma indication that il they would be ready for fuel loading.
12 Late 1976 -- let's see late 19.77, in the f all, 13 because of dome delaminations on the containment of Crystal O
14 River Unit 3 and those ensuing problems, I was placed on 15 Davis-Be sse alone, because of workload.
And in, I believe it
- l <6 was, November of 1977 we issued our SER for Davis-Besse -- I am i
17 sorry, I am speaking of 1976 now -- in November of 1976 wo 18 issued the SER for Davis-Besse, and in January of -1977 we went 19 to ACRS on Davis-Besse, and then in early April we issued.the 20 supplement to.the SER on Davis-Besse.
21 And I believe it was April 7, 1977, we issued our 22 operating license for Davis-Besse, and then the matters which I 23 have mentioned continued on Davis-Besse, and I have
{T 24 responsibility for that OL which was now an operating plant, 25 and then was given the qualification review for Palo. Verde 4 b)
3347.01.7 8
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and 5 around the first of October 1977.
And that continued on 2
until, oh, about the middle of Dacember, when we finished the
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qu lification review on Palo Verde 4 and 5, at which time, in 3
a 4
addition to my duties still on Davis-Besse, I was assigned tile 5
BOPSAR/BSAR-205 standard review.
6 Then we get on into 1978.
I still had Davis-Besse 7
and was continuing with the safety review on BOPSAR/SSAR-205.
8 That continued on through into 1978.
And in August of 1978 9
BOPSAR -- or mid-summer 1978 -- the BSAR-205 was transf erred to 10 the Standard Licensing Branch for standard plants, at which J1 time I picked up Arkansas Unit 2, which had just received an 12 OL.
And I continued with those licensing matters in the same 13 manner that I still had Davis-Besse.
(3 sl 14-And I believe it was around the end of October 31 we 15 finally transferred Davis-Besse to the Division of Operating 16 Reactors.
That would be December of 1978.
And at that time, 17 then, I continued with the Arkansas operating licensa matters,e 18 and that continued on down to about the first of June 1979.
19 0
What was your employnent history prior to coming to 20 the NRC?
21 A
My history goes back to 1950, when I was first 22 employed by the Land-Air Company, which was an Air Force 23-subsidiary, in White Sands, New Mexico, involved in se tting up
()
24 a. radar beacon _ system to track early missiles -in development.
25 Af ter that I went to Los Alamos and spent 23 years p,
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6347.01.8 9
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there until I came back here and went through various periods
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2 of work 1ng in weapons development and then into theoretical
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w rk on neutron cross-sections for fast assemblies, worked on 4
critical assemblies at the pagarito Lab.
5 That continued and finally got into theoretical work 6
tied in with computers on coupled neutronic, neutronic 7
hydrodynamic codes on LMFBR accidents.
8 0
What's your educational background?
I 9
A I have a bachelor of. science degree from Colorado 10 Co llege, 1950, in physics and mathematics.
And then additional
.11 gradua~te work at the University of New Mexico, which was 12 carried on through the Los Alamos training program.
13 0
Okay.
I would like to ask you some questions 14 concerning the incident that occa red at Davis-Besse Septemb'er 15 24, 19 77.
I am mainly concerned with your knowledge concerning 16 that event prior to March 28 of '79, prior to the accident at 17.
TMI.
j 18 Laat was -
prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge 19 did you have concerning the incident that occurred at 20 Davis-Besse on September 24. 19.77?
.21 A
As I have indicated, at that period of time I was the 22 project manager for Davis-Besse.
Ilo w, that event occurred at 23 about 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> on September 24, 1977, which was a Saturday.
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24 So, then, you get into September 25, which was a Sunday, and 25 then we go into September 26 -which was-Monday.
10 pl.01.9 i
And I was at work, and sometime late morning, lllpv Jerry Klingler, of IaE, called me and notified me of the event, 2
3 and indicated that they would be issuing an I&E early
(])
4 notification of what might be a significant or abnormal event.
5 I talked to Jerry, and he indicated it was basically 6
a feedwater transient, and I learned from Jerry basically that 7
there had been a f eedwater transient but it was also coupled 8
with a primary systen transient which had allowed about 10,000 9
gallons of water to spread over the containment floor.
There 10 had been some damage, slight damage, to the steam generator.
.11 And as I remember, after talking to Jerry, I notified 12 my branch chief and AD on what little inform, tion I had at that 13 time.
()
14 Later on in the day, on that Monday, I tried to get i
15 hold of the licensee.
I had.eight different telephone circuits 16 to contact them, and they were very busy.
I couldn't get them.
17 0
Do you know why the phones were still so busy on 18 Monday, since the incident occurred on Saturday night?
19 A
I can only suppose, but it makes all the sense in the 20 world, that they were evaluating this event.
21 0
Okay.
22 A
I contacted, I believe it was, Jerry Mazetis and --
23 of Reactor Systems Branch -- and Andy Szukevicz, of the l (x 24 Instrument and Control Branch, and told them what little I knew
)
25 of the event at that time, just to inform them.
6347.01.10 11
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i Then, let's see, 24th, 25th, 26th.
On Tuesday, the
-2
'27th, the licensee called me up the first thing in the morning.
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3-As I. remember, it was about 8:10.
And the man who called me 4'
was a. Mr. Euge ne Novak..
He was in charge of licensing on 5
Da v is-Be ss e.
And he told me what had happened, went into a 6-little more detail, indicating the scenario of events.
7 I then, after'that telephone call, I briefed my 8
branch chief and made a call to I&E to get more information, 9
and I called Jerry Mazetis, Andy Szukeviczi and I also notified 10 Jack McDermo tt, who was in the OA Branch and involved in
.11 startup testing.
12 Then, late in the day, I called the licensee back and 13 asked for a further status report.
And as I recall, on 14 Wednesday, I called I&E in the morning --
15 0
Could I interrupt.for just a second?. What vere the 16 concerns that caused you to contact each o f the people that you 17 called?
Why did you call Mazetis t why did you call McDarmott?
18 A
Hell, that's just to k eep them informed, because they 19.
are reviewers in this area, and I wanted to make sure that 20 people were beginning to know what had happened and what was 21 going on here.
22 0
Wrnt those three individuals-as opposed to any of the 23 20-some-odd reviewers that were involved in this project?
('s
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24 A
Because it had co:ne out there was a spurious 25 l half-trip in the steam f eedwater and rupture control system on 1
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B347. 01.11 12
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1 Davis-Besse, which was basically an electrical problemt and 2-therefore, I f elt Andy should know about this.
(]J 3
It was also very apparent that there had been a 4
transient in the primary system, and that was in Jerry's 5
bailiwick.
At that time I felt tiiose were the two most 6
significant areas.
7 And the reason I talked to Jack was we had been 8
involved, me as project manager and he in the startup testing 9
on Davis-Besse, and I felt he should know about this, too.
10 Notifying the branch chief is just the normal procedure to keep Ji people up to date.
12 BY MR. PARLEN:
13 0
Who was the branch chief?
()
14 A
John Stolz.
15-0 Who was the assistant director that you ref er to at r
16 this time?
.17 A
Don Va ssallo.
18 O
And who was the contact that you communicated with in.
19 Inspection and Enforcement?
20 A
To the best of my recollection, I contacted 21 Carl Seyfrit in I&E headquarters, Jerry Klingford, and I also 22 talked to the Region 3, Dick Knopp.
23 0
-Who was the person that you contacted in the
().
24
- Davis-Besse organization?- Was this Novak, Eugene Novak?
25 A
Eugene Novak.
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6347.01.12 BY MR. HEBDON:
13
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0 Did you have any contact with anybody in the Babcock 2
& Wilcox organization?
ya 3
A No, not at this time.
%f 4
On Wednesday of-that week, sometime in the morning, 5
Andy Szukevicz called me and said that he was going on a trip 6
to a -- a DSS trip to Davis-Besse to investigate the accident, 7
and asked.me if I was going.
I knew nothing of this.
8
.So, I called Jerry lJazetis again in Reactor Systems 9
Branch, as a matter of curiosity and interesti and he indicated 10 that he also-was going.
.1 1 -
So, I notified my management that this trip was 12 upcoming for the Friday which would have been September 30 and 13 indicated whether they thought I should go, and, of course, I
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14 felt I should go.
15 0
Why weren't you involved in setting up the trip in 16 the first place?
17 A
Because I did not th' ink at this time that a trip was 18 required.
I&E had two inspectors in the field at the site.
19
. They were still analyzing this e vent, and I felt'that it was 20 more important at this time to let everybody do their homework, 21 sort it-out,.and then once we had a further contact with IAE, 22 that if a trip was appropriate, it would then be held.
23
.I wanted those inspectors on their own to nake sure
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24 that they had a good f eel for what had happened out there, b}
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25 0
Who set up the trip?
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You don't have any idea who arranged the trip?
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2 A
flo.
All I know is that it was being set up.
3 O
Do you have any idea why you weren't more formally 4
informed of the fact that this trip was going to be made?
5 A
I think probably that was due primarily to hurried 6
reaction to get a trip going on the part of DSS.
7 0
Who in D'SS would have been the one to make such 8
a decision?
Do you have any idea?
9 A
I have no idea.
I would imagine i t was the branch 10 chief s and their appropriate management.
11 5 hall I continue with the scenario of events?
12 0
Please.
13 A
On Thursday morning, I called up I&E region 3, O.
14 both in Chicago, Glenn Allen, and contacted the inspector 15 out at the site.
And i t was my conclusion at that time that 16 I was not going to bother them with f urther calls.
That might F
17 be more of a hindrance to them, ge tting all the f acts 18 toge t he r.
19 0
Who is the inspector at the site that you contacted?
20 A
At that time there were two inspectors.
I t was 21 Tom Tambling and Terry Harpster, and I forget which one it 22 was that I talked to.
23 O
As I remember, and this is only in remembrance, I
24 think Tom had gone back to Glenn Allen and I talked to Terry.
25 I did learn, though, at that time that I&E would be issuing l
l l
l
pt.02.2 hsh 15 I
an immediate action order specifying certain things required 2
of the licensee to evaluate ard check out before they came Q
3 back up to power.
4 BY MR. PARLER 5
0 How did you learn that?
6 A
By talking to them.
7 0
To whom?
8 A
To the region 3.
9 BY MR. HEBDON:
10 0
To Harpster when you called him at the site?
11 A
Harpster or Dick Knopp at region 3.
12 BY MR. COX:
13 0
0 From the beginning of the scenario until this point i4 in time thet you ere now eescrsuino, do vou rece11 env 15 informal or formal request by the I&E people with whom 16 you had contact to the NRR organization?
And again, I have to 17 cite either informal or formal, a request by I&E to NRR 18 tirough you or through anybody for assitance in e valua ting 19 what was going on?
20 A
Up to this point, which I'm speaking of as about 21 Wednesday, noon, no.
They had not requested a meeting of us 22 at the site.
I had had a lot of informal calls with I&E to 23 try and keep up on this event and make sure what wa O
s going on.
24 But ne specific reguest thet 1 remember frem 1&E in thi 25 s
particular week for as::istance.
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. - - - - - - ~ -~
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6347.02.3 16 i
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2 0
Was tha t normal for them to go ahead and do tha t O
3 phase of the investigation on their own without any assistance 4
from NRR?
5 A
Absolutely.
They are the lead - they have the 6
lead responsibility to assess what has happened, whether there 7
has been any impact on safe ty and health to sort out what has 8
happened and make a preliminary de termination, such that an 9
immediate action order can be issued f rom I&E requesting 10 that any addi tional things may be done.
I1 On an operating plant, the intensity of ge tting 12 actions going is a little different than i t is in a 13 pre-licensing situation because, you know, sooner or later, O
i4 ene 11censee is going to went to ering thet pient seck up on 15 line af ter they have completed whatever they f eel is required.
16 Now tha t entails from the project manager that he 17 is keeping close contact on what is going on.
He knows what 18 I&E is doing, wha t they are requiring, what the licensee is 19 doing.
Are they interfacing?
20 And also, in case there is going to be any required 21 safety analysis on the part of NRR, that he be able to arrange 22 t ha t to fit into all the other priorities that the reviewers 23 may have.
O 24
^11 of these things get invo1ved.
And teiepnone is 25 the quickest, most expeditious way to get some of these things O
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b347.02.4 17 O
I done in short time-f rames.
(,.sh.
2 0
During this time immediately following the incident,
()
3 were you aware of the utilities plans with respect to 4
restarting the plant?
For example, on Monday or Tuesday, did 5
you know whether they planned to try to restart back up on 6
Wednesday?
7 A
No, they were shut down.
They figured -- well, they 8
knew when an immediate action order was coming that would 9
require specific ac tions.
10 0
Did you know that?
11 A-Beg your pardon? '
F 12 0
Did you know that?
13 A
Well, like I just said, I knew that on Tuesday, p(_/
14 0
You Knew that on Tuesday, s
15 A
Right.
16 0
Okay.
17 A
Now, in talking to Mr. Novak, he indicated that they 18 had representatives f rom B&W out there.
They had
.19 representatives f rom the architect engineer, Bechtel 20 Corporation, that there were I&E representatives on the site, 21 and that all of these parties were evaluating the damage and 22 possible damage on the transient, and realized full well that 23 the plant would probably.be down for some period of time.
()
24 Now when I&E issues an immediate action order 25 that stipulates that such and such ac tions must be completed AU
3347.02.5 18
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to the satisf action of the I&E before the plant is allowed to m
2 start up.
(')
3 So Davis-Besse on Wednesday of that week was 4
effectively shut down until additional evaluations were made.
5 Shall I go.back to the continuing from Wednesday 6
and go on?
7 0
Yes.
8 BY MR. PARLER:
9 0
Incidentally, for purposes of clarification to 10 other readers of this record, Mr. Novak, to whom you last Il ref erred, and Mr. Eugene Novak of the Tolede Edison Company.
12 A
That is correct.
.3 Wednesday, about Wednesday, noon, I got word from
(
14 my management that I was going on a trip.
And the rest of 15 Wednesday af ternoon was set up in ge tting that coordinated.
16 BY MR. HEBDON:
17 0
Had you expressed to your management your concern 18 that it was premature for you to make a trip to the sita and 19 for the people f rom DSS to make a trip to the site?
20 A
As I remember, I expressed to my branch chief that 21 I felt it was premature.
I did not mention this to DSS.
22 0
Did he give you any indication of whether or not 23 t ha t had been discussed with DSS?
24 A
No, he did no t.
25 O
All right.
Just go ahead, please.
n
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9347.02.6 19
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-l A
All right, now we're into Friday, which is September 2
30th.
We lef t i~ the morning, went ou t to Cleveland, got out
(--)
3 to Davis-Besse, which is about 40 miles west of Cleveland at 4
about 11: 00.
Convened in one of the construction buildings 5
and in that party was Jerry Mazetis, reactor systems branch, 6
Andy Szukevicz, instrument control branch, Vince Leung --
7 his last name is spelled L-e-u-n g -- of the auxiliary 5
systems branch, and R. Raj Rajan of the -- and he was in the 9
mechanical engineering branch.
10 The mee ting convened about 11:00 and there were 11 representatives f rom the Toledo Edison Companyt t ha t i s:
12 Eugene 14ovak, Lowell Rowe, vice president of construct. ions 13 Chuck Domack, who had been placed as project manager with the
()
14 Toledo Edison Company just recently on Davis-Besse 1.
15 There were a lot of people.
There were B&W 16 representatives, there were Bechtel representatives, and thert 17 were the I&E inspectors who had been out there, a team of them.
l 18 And as the meeting convened, I wasn't sure of just 19 what my place was in this mee ting.
I t was more a DSS 20 meeting than it was my meeting, which if I had set it up.
21 But questions were coming from all diff erent areas --
-22 what do we have to do or what went wrong with the auxiliary 23 f eedwater system, what ha ppened to -- was there a lot -*
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24 ins laticn around the sump pump in the containment building?
u 25 I think it was just normal, being a. project manager O
\\
i 6347.02.7 20
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and being used to leading meetings.
I tried to direct the 2
meeting so that we would get the overall scenario before we
()
3 got into specifics.
4 And we convened at, oh, I don't know, it must have 5
been about 12:00 and I think we met at 1800.
And we had a 6
session where the licensee presented what they are doing.
7 I&E indicated what they had requested the licensee to do.
8 There was a dialogue between the staff and myself on various 9
questions relating to the reactor coolant system transient.
10 Also, the aux feedwater transient.
Some discussion of, was 11 there any residual radioactivity in the 10,000 gallons of 12 water?
What actions they were taking in regards to design
- l 13 basis accidents to see that the design of the equipment had A()
14 not been exceeded by any of these transients.
15 And that went on until about 4:00 when we lef t and
)
l 16 came home Friday night.
l 17 Now they had -- the Davis-Be sse plant, because it 18 was in a start-up phase, had the B&W reactimeter connected 19 to their instrumentation, which is a high speed computing 20 device which records reactor core parameters, reactor coolant 21 system parameters and some of the aux feed parameters.
22 There was a mass of data and I got a copy of this 23 and proceeded home and over Saturday and Sunday spent most
.(m_)
24 of those two days making a large poster-size graph of the 25 event.
4
9347.02.8 21
()sh i
That event -- I don't have that wi th me because 2
the President's commission has requested that copies be made
()
3 of that, but I made a point to see that an additional copy 4
'will be sent to you.
5 That graph was, oh, a'large poster-size and it 6
basically was a plot as a function of time of several basic 7
primary parameters.
8 Trose parameters were reactor coolant pre ssure, 9
pressurizer level, T-hot, T-cold, and one of the loops -- I 10 think it was B loop, and also saturation pressure.
- Yes, il saturation pre ssure, the coolant system.
12 BY MR. HEBDON:
13 O
Could we back up just a moment and let me clarify
(
14 a couple of points?
15 Who are the peopic who attended the meeting from 16 I&E7 17 A
There were several people.
Terry Harpster, however, 18 was the lead inspector.
That was the man I talked to on that 19 30th.
20 0
Do you recall any of the other people that were 21 there f rom I&E7 22 A
I do no t recall their names.
Tom Tambling, 23 however, hai gone.
I remember he was gone.
()
24 0
Did you have any meetings with I&E before you went 23 out on this trip, any meetings with the people f rom I&E
(
l l
L t
6347.02.9 22 sh I
headquarters?
2 A
A 10-minute mee. ting with them as we walked in the Q
3 building prior to the 11:00 meeting.
4 0
But there were no meetings or briefings prior to 5
that that you know of?
6 A
Just a 10-minute briefing.
7 0
Were there any meetings with any of the people that 8
would be participating in the trip prior to the trip?
9 A
Not that I knoiv of.
We got out there at 11: 00.
We 10 immediately went jato the meeting and there was just tha t 11 little 10-minute period.
12 0
But none during the week preceding the trip out 13 there?
O i4 A
Now I'm st111 sgeekino --
15 0
You went out there on Friday. Now during the week 16 prior.to the trip out there, were there any meetings or 17 briefings by people f rom I&E or f rom any other group of 18 people f rom within NRR?
19 A
I know of none other than my telephone ca11s with 20 I&E.
21 0
By phone.
22 A
Dy phone.
23 0
Did you prepare a trip report for the trip out h
24 there?
25 A
I had planned to but on Monday morning, I received a O
9347.02.10 23 sh I
call about 8:30.
Jerry Mazetis said that DSS wan going to 2
have a DSS briefing on their trip.
And I told Jerry that
('
k-3 I prepared this large-scale poster that I was more than willing 4
for him to use to describe the scenario of events.
5 And I forget exactly when the meeting started, but 6
it started with Jerry using the plot tha t I had made to 7
describe the overall scenario of events.
And that meeting 8
went on -- I don't know -- roughly an hour, an hour and a 9
half.
And at the conclusion of that meeting, i t was decided 10 that -- I believe it was Carl Seifert indicated to Roger 11 Mattson that the I&E would maintain lead responsibility in 12 evaluating this event.
7, And also, as I remember, I talked with Jerry and 13 U
14 indicated for the present, this is your meeting.
Are you 15 going to make a trip report for the DSS?
16 And I got out of that meeting and I had important 17 things to do on Davis-Besse and proceeded from that point to 18 do the things which I f elt I had a responsibility for.
19 To answer your question, no, I did not make a trip 1
20 re por t.
]
21 0
What was Mazotis' response to your question 22 concerning whether or not he was going to prepare a trip 23 re por t?
(~h
\\'
24 A
It was dorse very quickly in that meeting.
And I 25 do not remember exactly what his answer was, whether it was,
,y U
G347.02.ll 24 7 :sh I
yes, I'll get it done as soon as I can, or what.
2 0
Do you know if he ever did prepare a trip report?
f)
(
3 A
Apparently, a trip report was prepared and I learned 4
of that last Friday when I was being asked questions in the 5
President's Commission.
6 0
But you didn't see a copy of that trip report 7
prior to last Friday?
8 A
No.
Now there were a lot of things that I had to 9
do that week.
Now I&E has lead responsibility, and as 10 project manager, I wanted to make sure that certain items 11 were being done.
12 I had some very, very strong concerns.
For one 13 thing, I had a strong concern about the spurious trip in the O\\
14 steam f eedwater and rupture control system.
That's what had 15 actuated the whole scenario of events to begin with.
16 Now that was a spurious trip and that means somewhere 17 or another, they were getting either in black box circuitry, 18 there was some malfunction of that electrical logic and I 19 was concerned about that.
20 I was also very concerned about the missing relay 21 in the electro-magnetic solenoid valve that had been the 22 cause of the POVR sticking open.
l 23 That relay was just missing and I was very concerned r
24 about that.
25 And during that week I talked to Lowell Rowe.
O
n 9347.02.12 25 A
(_;sh I
primarily, vice president of Toledo Edison.
And my concern 2
was, was it sabotage or could it have been?
()
3 If it wasn't sabotage, was it possibly breakdown in 4
OA?
5 And I also talked to I&E about this.
6 BY MR. PARLER:
7 0
Who in I&E?
8 A
My concern about it, I know I talked to Dick 9
Knopp about it.
I know I talked to Tom Tambling about it.
10 I know I talked to Terry Harpster about it. And I expect the 11 way I deal with I&E, I also talked to Jerry Klingler and 12 Carl Seyf rit.
13 0
Were thase concerns of yours expressed at the 14 meeting that you referred to earlier that took place, I 15 guess with Dr. Ma ttson and with Mr. Seyf rit?
16 In other words, the meeting that took place, the 17 Monday meeting, after.your visit to the site.
18 A
I'm sure they were generally brought up. Whether 19 they were at that time focusing on these -- on my conceros, 20 I have no way of knowing.
21 0
Did you bring your concerns up at that meeting?
22 That's what I'm asking?
23 A
No, I did not bring my concerns up at that meeting.
O Tm/
24 That was primarily a DSS meeting and the dialogue was between 25 DSS people.
()
l 1
O r
3347.02,13 26 hh I
O You mean if somebody in particular in a division 2
calls a meeting and other peopI a ttend who have strong 3
concerns about an incident, that they can express themselves?
Q 4
A And to get a briefing on what may be going on.
5 6
J o
V 9
10 Il 12 13
)
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 O
24 25 l
l l
l l
9347 03 01 27 p'
'c-1 This relay valve. I. was concerned about, and I talked to 2
Lowell Rowe, the Vice-president, and they indicated tha t q( /
3 they were checking the whole plant out for circuitry that 4
had this type of relay -valve, and in addition to which, they 5
had posted on the board a request that anybody who know why 6
this valve was missing -- or relay was missing -- to step 7
forward.
8 I followed that through f airly closely for a period of 9
two weeks.
That would be two weeks e.?ter the 30th of 10 September.
11 Now I was concerned about other items, too.
I was 12 cc..cerned abou t the reactor coolant pumps, becausa you had 13 reached satura tion in tha t transi en t, and there had boon b</
14 some bubic formation in the area around the impeller blades.
15-BY MR. HEBRON:
16 0
Back up just a second.
What did you finally 17 decide concerning the missing relay?
18 A
I aske.d if I&E was pursuing i t, and in my 19-conversations with I&E they indicated that they also were 20 aware of -- the licensee had requested anybody to come 21 forward, and they were making a recheck of all areas where 22
- this valve would be.
23-0 Relay?
' f')
k/.
24 A
Relay.
And that any information that they might
-2S require f rom us, they would let us know about it.
O As
6347 03 02 28
)(])c
~
l-0 Do you recall if they finally decided what 2
happened to the relay?
Were they ever able to figure out
(])
3 what happened to it?
4 A.
It's my understanding -- and I remember calling on 5
several other o ccasions through the delta-T -- tha t I had 6
Davis-Be sse just casually asking, did you ever find out, and 7
to my best knowledge they never found out why it was 8
missing.
9 0
Did you have a theory?
Do you have any idea of 10 your own what happened to tha t relay?
11 A
My best theory is based on the licensee's best 12 theory and that was that some workman cannibalized that 13 particular relay to use in another area.
()
14 0
Would that have been that difficult?
15 A
No.
16 0
Were you concerned that it would have been that 17 casy?
18
'A I don't understand your question.
19 0
Did it raise any concerns in your mind that this 20 relay -- tha t the method of operating the plant and the 21
_ method of doing maintenance on the plant was such that 22 somebody could go in and cannibalize a relay out of a system 23 thac compare.s par t of the primary system?
()
24-A I just spen t about 15 minutes indicating how 25 concerned I was about that.
(
1
G347,03[03 29
()c.
1 0
Did you take any ac tion to change any of the 2
administrative procedures at the plant so that it would
{)
~
3 become more difficult for somebody to remove that relay?
4 A
The changing of procedures is basically done by
'S Enforcement and Inspection.
In t'he Division of Project 6
Management, you do not specifically look at those 7
procedures.
Now it should be pointed out that that relay on 8
that particular system was not a safety-related system.
It
-9 was what was called by the licensee "a Yellow Book".
They 10 had their own procedures for making sure that that system 11 worked.
But the POVR was not regarded at that time as a 12 saf e ty-grade piece of equipment.
13 0
Why wasn' t it considered to be saf ety grade?
.()
14 A
It was part -- it was just not reviewed at that 15 time.
16 0
Who made the determination that.it wasn't 17 safety grade?
18 A
I do not know who in NRR made it, but those 19 particular relays were not regarded as saf ety-grade to meet 20 single failure and IEEE criteria.
21 BY MR. PARLER:
22 0
That's a position that's reflected in what the 23 Standard Review Pian or branch technical position or an h
- 2 4-office :le tter or wha t?
25 A
It would-have been the basic Standard Review Plan, O
6347'03 04
~
~
30
(N c I
the staff's review procedures, qualifications.
LJ 2
BY MR. HEBRON:
[}
3 O
How would the f act that that relay was missing 4
'have been handled, if that system had been saf ety-related?
5 A
At the-very least, the licensee would have been 6
probably cited with an inf raction, and the intensity of the 7
investigation of that would have been of a much greater 8
order of intensity.
9 0
What sort of things would have been done?
10 A
I&E would have, I am sure, required a much grea ter 11 scope of investigation into that event.
DSS could have 12 become invovled, if I&E had requested that by transf er of 13 lead responsibility that we look into this.
()
14 BY MR. PARLER:
15 0
Is whether something is classified as safety-grade 16 or nonsafety-grade, does that determine who has the lead 17 responsiblity -- DSS or I&E?
18 A
No.
No t -- no.
It's a matter -- in talking about 19 this relay, as I mentioned earlier, my concerns were why was 20 it missing.
And that relates to quality assurance.
And for 21 saf e ty-grade equi pment, there are criteria for quality 22 assurance and requirements that the licensee must meet.
And 23 that is regulations, whether IE or DSS or NRR or any agency
-( )
24 within the Commi ssion.
25 0
My question is what is your understanding of the
-(3 RJ
s347 03 05 31 ff'jc I
basic groundrules that are used to decide whether, under a
2 circumstances such as we are talking about, it is I&E or NRR f'Y 3
that takes the lead responsibility investigating an U
4 incident.
5 A
Ini tially, it is I&E, because the licensee, on 6
what may be regarded a significant items, re ports -- must 7
report to their respective region with a report on this.
8 That is part of the rules.
And therefore, I&E is the 9
initial investigator of the event.
10 0
Right.
But how about -
presumably a point might 11 be reached where a decision has to be made whether there 12 should be a transfer of that responsibility f rom I&E to 13 NRR.
I think you ref erred to such discussions in the Monday
()
14 mee ting between Mr. Seyf rit and Dr. Mattson, in which take the lead into looking at the 15 Mr. Seyfrit said I&E wt a
16 September 24th event.
The question I am asking is at that 17 point what are the groundrules for whether I&E shall 18 continue, or whe ther the lead responsibility should be 19 transferred?
What are the grounrules, as you understand 20 them?
21 A
The groundrules are that I&E will maintain ' lead 22 responsibility until such time as they f ormally notify us 4
23 that they want either the whole event or some portion of it
()
24 analyzed'by NRR.
25 0
What is your understanding of a situation in which r)
L i
r w--
y
^
4347:03 06-32
/~'
l A._/c I&E would want the whole event analyzed by NRR?
2 A
I can't really answer tha t.
There are so many
( }.
3 permutations and. combinations tha t you ge t into f actorial
'4 impo ssib'i'll ti e s.
5 BY MR. HEBRON -
6 0
Okay.
Can we go back to the Mazetis briefing for 7
just a moment.
Do you recall during that briefing any 8
discussions of the dynamic ef f ects of vapor formation in the 9
10 A
Now that was a very confused meeting.
People 11 would.come in late, so my recollection of what is going on 12 only interaces with the mee ting.
That is, people coming 13 in -- as I remember as far as PSAT being reached in the (f
14
-f orma tion of vapor bubbles, it was only generally brought up 15 in relation to when Jerry traced out the transient on my 16 graph.
17 0
okay.
Do you recall any discussions by 18 Mr. Mazetis concerning what-if type analyses, such as wha t 19-if the plant had been at higher power?
What if they hadn't 20 found the stuck-open POVR sooner?
Do you recall any 21 discussions of concerns of that nature?
j 22 A'
Not specifically.
However, I know all of us f elt 23 that because the plant had only been at one eff ective f ull
(])
24' power day and only was at 9 percent when the tran sien t 25 occurred that our primary thought was that it practically (3
%)
.. ~
b347 03 07 33 I
had no fission product decay in the core and, the ref ore,
ggge 2
when the POVR came open and we got that 10,000 gallons of 3
water on the containment floor, the clean-up was negligible
')
4 f rom the standpoint of radioactivity.
I think it's very 5
dif ficult a t this time in hindsight and all that's gone on 6
to be.very specific in what I did and did not think at that 7
time on that particular item.
8 There are other things that I was concerned wi th that I 9
was carrying on, if I could continue.
I mentioned the 10 reactor coolant pumps, the impeller blades, 11 0
Let me just try to get a couple of these, and then 12 we'll go on to the other concerns that you had.
Do you know 13 if anyone prepared a written report of the meeting?
( })
14 A
Until last Friday, the only -- i t had been my 15 understanding Jerry was going to make a trip report.
The 16 only time I really learned that the trip report has been 17 made was when I saw a copy of i t last Friday.
18 0
Okay.
19 BY MR. PARLER 20 0
I t hought the question was about the Monday 21 meeting with DSS and I&E.
Did anybody prepar'e a report of 22 tha t mee ting as f ar as you ae aware?
23 BY MR. HEBRON:
()
24 0
A meeting summary, as opposed to a trip report?
25 A
Not that I know of.
/m i
4
0347 03 08 34 r
1
-0 Do you recall who attended the meeting?
. f'/
s-2 A
In part.
As I mentioned, they kept coming in and
(}
3 going out. - But Carl Seyf rit was there.
Roger Mattson was 4
there.
Jerry Mazetis was there.
Andy Szukevicz was there.
5 Vince Leung was there. Raj Rajan was there.
Vic Benneroya
~
6 was there.
Tedesco came in at that meeting.
Thiadanni, 7
Vassallo-- Don Vassalb wa s there.
I believe, though I'm not 8
sure, Jerry Klingler f rom I&E was there.
Roger Matson was 9
there.
I think -- Jim Knight was there.
I think mostly a 10 representative from most of the DSS sections.
ll 0
Do you recall if Tom Novak was there?
12 A
Yes.
Tom Novak.
No, I'll correct that.
I'm sure 13 Novak was there, but I can't in my mind relate seeing Tom h
14 there.
15 0
You're sure he was there because you felt that he 16 should have been there?
Or you're sure he was there because 17 you recall that he was, in fact, there?
18 A
To answer your question, I think he was there 19 because that would have been of great interest to him.
20
-0 Do you recall if Sandy Israel was there?
21 A
I'll have to answer that the same way.
I just 22 can't in my mind at this time remember seeing Sandy there.
23 But I will answer it the same way.
I would say he was there
()
24 based on he would have been interested in that event.
25 0
Do you know if there were any other meetings held j
v)
.t
6347 03 09 35 r~S
(_jc
_1 concerning the incident other than the one on Monday?
2 A
_I do not know of any other meetings held regarding
()
3 tha t inciden t.
4 O
All right.
Are you aware of an investigation 5
conducted by MacDermott of the Quality Assurance Branch 6
concerning the quality assurance implications of the missing 7
relay?
8 A
Well as I have mentioned, when the event -- when I 9
first learned of it, I called Bob MacDermott because he is 10 involved in start-up testing.
And I kept him updated on 11 this and was especially concerned and talked to him about 12 this relay being missing.
And as I remember, it was I 13 believe a memo on October 6th f rom Bob to his AD, John I )-
14 Scovall, which basically said I have looked at the events s-15 this happened; there was a half-spurious half-trip, and, you 16 know, all of the events that led through this.
17 And the closure of that memo said, I am continuing to 18 have discussions with the inspector regarding the relay.
19 And I was provided -- my name was on a copy of that memo.
20 0
Do you know if there was a follow-up memo?
21 A
Not tha t I recall.
22 0
Okay.
There was an investigation being conducted
(
23 by I&E.
There was some sort of revic':; or investiga tion 24 being conducted by DSS.
You had concerns that you had I
l 25 raised.
!.;acDermott was conducting some sort of
'b) x-
\\
4347 03 10 36
- (~'\\
L,4 1
investigation of hi s own.
Who was in charge of it all?
2 A
I&E had lead responsibili ty.
I, as project
()
had to inte[dce.
I wanted to make my assertions
'3
- manager, 4
and concerns know regarding possible equipment damage and 5
analyses that had to be done to bring that plant back 6
on-line.
My responsibilities also involved talking to I&E, 7
back right af ter that Monday meeting, on several occasions 8
to ' Dick Knopp and to Terry Harpster and to Carl Seyfrit, 9
indicating are you going to be transf erring some portion of 10 this to us.
Because if that happens, the project manager 11 has to alert the DSS people and indicate to them there's 12 going to be a transfer of lead responsibility on Item X, for 13 instance.
And we are going to have to evaluate it.
And 14 because of all the priorities that DSS may be going through 15 of the plants, a projec t manager, if he's going to get the 16 Job done, the sooner he knows there's going to be a transf er 17 of lead responsibility, the butter he can get all tha t 18 machinery meshed to ge t that job done.
19 0
Okay.
So I&E had the lead on the thing.
But DSS 20 went out and conducted their own visit out there and their l
l 21 own investiga tion without a request f rom I&E, f rom what I 22 understand.
23 A
That's correct, k3 r
l 24 0
So they were basically operating on their own.
25-A Tha t's correc t.
O
\\_-
6347 03 11 37
(]' c'
~ l 0
Also without any coordination f rom your division?
2 A
That's correct.
(]}
3 0
Now Mr. MacDermott, did anyone request that he 4
conduct an investigation of the OA implications, to your 5
knowledge?
6 A
I t -- I'm only -- this is only a supposition, but 7
I had voiced to Bob my strong concerns that I f el t we should 8
look into this relay.
l 9
0 But you didn't actually request --
10 A
But no formal request.
11 0
Do you have any f eel for how effectively the 12 information that was being developed by one part of this l
13 investigation was being f ed to the other parts?
For rs
(_)
14 e xample, were the concerns that were raised at the Monday 15 meeting by Mr. Maze tis, did those every reach Mr. Harpster 16 by any mechanism that you know of so that he would be aware 17 of the concerns that DSS had?
18 A
I understood that if they had concerns, they would l
19 discuss them with I&E.
But as me being involved in any 20 specific discussions in relation to DSS calling I&E, I have i
21 no memory of that.
22 0
So as f ar as you know, then, the only interf ace i
23 between the people in DSS that had concerns and the people
()
24 in I&E that were conducting the investigation was whatever 25.
Mr. Seyfrit carried away from the meeting on Monday?
n-
b347 03 12 38 f,fc 1
A Would you repeat that question again?
m 2
O As far as you know, the only interf ace between the
)
3 people in DSS that had concerns and the people in I&E that 4
were doing the investigation was whatever information 5
Mr. Seyfrit carried away from that meeting on Monday 6
morning?
7 A
I don't know if Mr. Seyfrit carried away any 8
information that morning.
9 0
Whatever he carried away, if anything.
10 A
Whatever he had obtained by listening to the 11 mee ting or whatever.
12 Bf MR. PARLER:
13 0
3re you aware, to your own knowledge, of any other O
14 efforts on the part of anyone in DSS to communicate with the 15 I&E people that were conducting their investigations and in 16 that communication tell the I&E people of particular 17 concerns that they had or some of the concerns that you have 18 expre ssed?
and it would have been in this 19 A
As I remember it 20 time f rame -- hidy Szukevicz of the Instrumentation and 21 Control Branch called me and asked if he could call about l
22 the spurious trip in the steam f eedwater.and rupture control 23 system.
24 0
He called who?
25 A
The licensee.
And I.said go ahead, Andy, because O
9
h347 03 l3 39 llhe I
that's one of the areas I mentioned I was interested in.
2 Now I do remember -- and we're getting into delta-Ts of
)
3 time here, but I still think we're speaking in terms of two 4
weeks af ter that meeting, I remember Raj Rajan came around 5
and said, is there anything we are going to do.
And I o
remember Vince Leung coming around and saying, is there 7
anything we are going to do.
And I don't know my exact 8
words, but to my best rememberance I told both of them, I 9
don't know if we're going to have it -- if you're going to 10 have anything to do yet.
I&E has not transferred lead 11 re s ponsibili ty.
12 BY MR. HEBRON:
13 Q
Doesn't this whole system strike you as kind of a x_/
14 hit-or-mi ss way to do an inve stiga tion?
15 A
Yes, it does.
10 0
Was that the normal way of doing investigations of 17 incidents?
18 A
Not having been involved in an incident of this 19 order before, I can't answer that question.
20 0
Did you raise this concern to anyone that you 21 didn't f eel that this investigation was being done in a 22 particularly systematic annner?
23 A
Yes, I did, to my branch chief.
,n
(_
24 0
What was the re sul t of t t?
25 A
I don't think there was any result of that.
I
^
/
's i
6347 03 14-40
(_%jc 1
was more or less, you might say, le tting of f steam when I
(
2 talked to my branch chief.
A)
's 3
0 You did it in the course of a discussion?
m 4
A A discussion.
5 0
Did you formalize it in a memo or a note of any 6
type ?
7 A
No, I did not, because I had other things that 8
were still going'on in relation to this event that I felt Y
were more important.
And that was to assure myself that 10 everyong, to the best of their ability, had determined why 11 that relay was missing.
Were those reactor coolant pumps 12 damaged?
Were the seals damaged?
Were the blades damaged?
13 What was I&E doing?
l/
14 Now I didn't need to do this, but being a project 15 manager, you've got to let those people know that even 16 though you're in Washington you are still tracking on these 17 items.
I was concerned about that spurious half-trip in i
18 that relay logic.
I was also very concerned about whether 19 B&W would determine that there had been any exceeding the 20 design basis limits for f uel cladding or the various safety 4
21 systems that are based on design basis accidents out of 22 Chapter 15.
That transient had been a rather significant 23 one, and I knew sooner or later -- and it's an opera ting O
(_/
24 pl an t -- t ha t tha t licensee would want to bring it back up.
25 And I had in my mind -- I f el t I had to be sure that these O
'~w
(6347 03 15 41
- c-1-
things were being done.
It doesn't mean I didn't have -- I 2
had the.most, the greatest confidence in I&E and their 3
in ve s tiga tion.
Bu t it's just the way you do busine ss, and f_O 4
they also as a result of tha t immediate action letter that 5
I've mentioned f rom IaE, they had to check that POVR, and I 6
was concerned about that.
And that meant that that POVR had 7
to be sdccessfully cycled prior to going critical.
4 8
Now all of these items were going on.
That's what I 9
.had to'do.
Now in the meantime, though, based on NRR and 10 their f eeling tha t the Palo Verde qualification review be
.11 completed in 30 days, which meant reviewing the entire i
12 applicant's FSAR, I had tha t going al so.
So I had to assess 13 my priori ties.
I 14
.( )
e g/
15 16 17 j.
18 19 20 l
21 22 23 24 (2) 25 L
y
_-~_
e.-#,
,r__w 9-e.
w
.m wm.=
j347.04.1 42 (h
l' And what I'm indicating to you is how I ass ess 2
them.
(]
3 BY MR. PARLER:
4-O lhe people who assigned to you the Palo Verde task, 5
the people in management, presumably, to the best of your 6
knowledge, were aware with the concerns that you had about 7
this Davis-Gesse event?
8 A
My branch chief would have been to a greater degree 9
than anybody else because I made a point of keeping my branch 10 chief constantly briefed on what I was doing.
.11 0
My understanding would be, from what you have said 12 here, that you had numerous concerns about the significance 13 of this transient, but nevertheless, another large priority
)
14 task was assigned to you.
15 Is that right?
16 A
That's right.
17 0
And the assignment of that priority task, what 18 impact did' it have on your ability to deal to your prof essional 19 satisfaction with all of the several concerns that you have Zs enumerated about the Davis-Besse transient?
21 4
The nuclear reactor regulation, they demand that-
- 22 project managers be able to handle what they feel that they 23 can handle.
And it's up to the project manager to make an-(I 24
' assessment if he f eels he's being givan too much.
25 I' didn't f eel that I was being given too much.
.O
2347.04.2 43 hh 1
BY MR. ilE3 DON:
2 0
das the Palo Verde requalification review assigned 3
to you before or after the Davis-Besse incident?
4 A
Before.
5 0
flad much work been done 'on it prior to the incident?
6 A
No.
7 0
So it would not have been particular dif ficult to 8
transfer that to so'ncone else?
9 It would not have been a great of inefficiency 10 associated with somebody having to go back and redo a lot of
.I I work that you had already done.
12 A
Because this was to be an expedited review, yes, it 13 would have inpacted it because I had the reviewers set up, 7.()
14 I had the scheduling made up, and that would have neint a 15 del ta T dela y.
16 0
Couldn't someone have just picked up the wor' that 17 you had done with scheduling the review?
18 A
They could have picked it up, but there would have 19 still been a delay on the expedited review.
20 0
of approximately how long?
21 A
Oh, based on my experience, two weeks.
22 0
You were discussing your concerns with respect to 23 the incident.
I think that you were talking about the m
24 reactor coolant pumps and your concern nonut damage to those 25 pumps.
~
h
p347.04.3 44 C'u h
1 A
Yes.
2 0
Could we go ahead and pick up your discussion of 3
your. concerns at that point?
{
4 A.
Well, I believe I -mentioned I was -- I believe-my 5
primary concern had been that relay was one.
Almost 6
cotangent, or of equivalent order, was that spurious trip.
4 7
They were ge tting 'in tha t steam f eedwater rupture control 8
system.
9 0
Did you ever figure out what caused. the spurious 10 trip?
Il A
It was eventually figured out that it was a loose 12 wire connection, I belie ve, to an aux feedwater pump that 13 was causing electro-static chatter.
They went into quite an O
(_j 14 investigation on that.
15 Anyway, I was concerned about the reactor c oolant 16 pu ps.
m 17 0
Was that a safety grade system?
18 A
That was a safety grade system.
p 19 0
If it had not been a safety grade system, would they i
.20 have not conducted an investigation of that same depth?
21-A If it had not been a safety grade system, I doubt if 22 it would have got the intensity.
1lowever, an auxiliary 23 feedwater system is of.such importance, and it was on
..()
24 Davis-Besse, that I believe it makes your question somewhat 25 moot.
)
1
.-.r=,v
. - -. - + - -. -. - -
07.04.4 45 gsh l
BY MR. HEBDOU (3
s_/
2-0-
I don't understand that.
3 A
Ma ybe I don't understand -- we ll, let me go back.
()
4 If it had been a safety grade system, it gets a certain degree 5
of review, period.
It is a safety grade system and the OA 6
on that is well spelled out in the regulations and OA 7
manuals.
7 8
If it had not been a saf ety system, it would have not 9
had the OA review that a saf ety system -- not the intensity 10 that a safety system would have.
.31 However, the auxiliary f eedwater system is of l
12 enough significance in a pressurized water reactor that it 13 is a safety system.
14 0
We ll, let's say for the sake of argument sonebody O'
15 had decided it wasn't a saf ety s ystem.
Would the investigation s-16 have been conducted in sufficient depth, in your opinion, to 17 have identified the problem that caused the spurious trip?
18 Or do you think they would have just said, well, it is not l
19 a safety system and it's a spurious trip and we can't find it 20 and let's go on.
21 A
A non-safety system can have -- well, first of all, 12 2 the auxiliary f eedwater system is a safety system, i
23 0
I realize that.
But I'm saying for the sake of l
24 argument, let's say it was decided that auxiliary f eedwater l
<"g I/
25 system wasn't a safety system.
m t
f 9
e
h347.04.5 46
(])h 1
-A Well, your argument is precluding a very important 2
system, which I find hard to think of in terms of being
_ ("] _
3 non-safety because that system is so important to feeding
~
\\s 4
f eedwater to the steam generators and avoiding transients, 5
and in effect, because it is a safety system and is 6
important -- I'm trying to answer your question because you're 7
taking an important safety system and saying, let's pretend 8
it isn't.
9 And it's a very significant system.
10 If it was still the same system, I think the licensee
_11 would have had to make -- they'd have had to find it because 12 the plant would have continually been tripping off power.
13 0
Would the f act that the plant was continuing to
()
14 trip off power be a safety concern or a plant availability 15 concern?
16 A
It's plant availabilit y. 3ut every time a plant 17 trips on some spurious signal, it's going through a transient, 18 and therefore, it has some degree of safety.
19 0-But the utilities concerned would have been primarily 20 availabilty, not safety.
21 A
I don't know that that would have been their concern.
22.
Would you state that question again?
23 0
Well, you are saying that the utility -- you're
()
24 saying that even though the utility would not have been 25 required to conduct such an investigclion, if the plant had
/~T
\\_/
_ _ ~ _
.6347.04.6 7
4 p)sh
(,
I not been saf ety-related -- excuse ne -- if the system had not 2
been safety-related, that they would have conducted it anyway
(,w
(._)
3 because of the problem of causing the plant to trip when 4
th'y got these spurious trips on the system.
5 What I vas wondering, would their concern have been 6
the safety of the plant or would the concern have been loss of 7
availability that would have resulted from all of these 8
spurious trips?
9-A We ll, I can only sup;
.e because I don't know what 10 goes in the minds of the --
11 0
All right.
You were calking about your concerns 12 with the reactor coolant pumps and whether or not they were 13 damaged. Did you have any other concerns besides the ones that
(~')
14 we have discussed so f ar?
15 A
Yes.
I had concerns that if any analyses which 16 B&W nade on that transient, whether it might have exceeded 17 design capabilities of safety systems.
18 0
Do you know if any analyses were, in fact, conducted 19 by B&W?
20.
A Yes, analyses were conducted by B&W.
I&E evaluated 21 them and there were two -- now I don't remember these dates 22-Jus t exactly, but there were an IRE inspection report nade,.
23 I believe in -- oh, around November 22.
And then ere was O(e 24 a follow-up, a supplement to the licensee's LER, where they 25.
went into great detail on'all of these itens.
,m
.(
i 4347.04.7 48
- t7
(,J h 1
I got a copy the 29th. I belicve they may actually 2
have sent that f rom Toledo Edison Company around.the 22nd.
O 3
0 of wnet2 4
A The supplement to 5
0 The 22nd of what month?
6 A
November.
7 0
Okay.
So you received the I&E inspection report and 8
you received the licensee supp10 ment to the licensing event 9
report.
10-What did you do with those?
.31 A
I Xeroxed a number of copies, called people up, 12 indicated to them that their branch would be ge tting a copy of 13 it, they ought to look at it, evalu ed it myself, may have b
14 had several discussions with people, made a point to see that 15 even though Davis-Be sse was still in the division of project 16 management and review team would have been DSS, I made a 17 point to see that additional people in DOR received conies of h
18 t at, that they might be interested in it.
19 O
So you sent the report around to a large number of 20 people.
Do you knov --
21 A
I sent it around to people.
22 0
All.right, to people.
Do you know who.actually 23 read the report?
hx.
24 A
We ll, I know one person that read it and that was t'
25 me.
c l
.)347.04.8 49
(
sh 1
0 Okay.
Do you know anyone else who read it?
2 A
Yes, I know several people who had read it.
Now g(])
3 I am getting into a broad delta T span of just different 4
people I remember talking in the halls, you know, asking me 5
about this events.
6 BY MR. PARLER:
7 0
You're still in 19.77, the latter part?
8 A
We're now into -- early 1978, at the time I had 9
the BOPSAR/8ESAR scanning review.
10 0
Incidentally, for the record, would you say what
.11 that BOPSAR/BESAR review is?
We all know, but others may not, 12 just what the acronyn is.
13 A
Balance of Plant Safety Evaluation Reoort -- well, O)
(_
14 it's the B&W 205 assembly.
15 0
That's good enough.
BESAR just comes from B&W, 16 B&W Safety Analysis Report.
Right?
17 MR. COX: BOPSAR is the Balance of Plant -- the 18 BOPSAR/BESAR design, as I understand it, is a combination of 19 balance of plant design and a BESAR 205 nuclear steam system 20 design.
21 That was proposed or submitted for review by tly 22 FLORO Pioneer Company as a standard reference design on your 123 Appendix 0.
()
24 MR. HEBDON: It's an acronym for standard type of 25 design.
1 r
4347.04.9 50 2h i
THE WITNESS: Right.
Anyway, during that period of 2
time, I remember that I was talking to a Mr. Jack Rowe, who I f)
3 was in the licensing. safeguard branch, and was just asking us 4-
'him about how things were going workwise.
And he had 5
indicated that he was se tting up groups to discuss possible 6
sabotage on plants.
And we got into this discussion. I said 7
come down - to the o f fice.
I would like to show you something.
8 And Jack came on down and I showed him ny Davis-Be sse graph, 9
the one that I had mentioned previously.
And I said, look --
10 and I went through the scenario and I said, this just
.l i reinforces what you said.
You can take some small item and l
12 then you get a combination of events and you may be in trouble.
13 He asked if he could have my graph and he took that f'%
(,/
14 graph and had it reproduced in small size.
And as I remember, 15 he sont that out to certain people.
And I also gave him a 16 copy of the report.
17 Then late -- well, in the summer of '78, Doaminic la Thidanni -- D-o-m-m-1-n-i-c, I believe that's T-h-i-d-a-n-n-1, i
19 Thidanni, of the division of operating reactors, in their 20 mechanical branch, came dov. and said he was evaluating the l
21 event based on this supplement that the licens ee had l
22 -
provided.
And I discussed it with him, and I think by that i
23
. time I was getting to be known as the Davis-Besse nut because
()
24 I was more than willing to describe this event with anybody 25 who would listen to me.
y y
.e-7.y-f
--,.-,_y-,
7-yr,
,w,
.,-,-.,-r
,,y-,--
i P
G47.04.10 51
/~h
( Jh l
I. discussed it with him, shcwed him the graph, and 2
he said, could I come back?
And he wanted to know about the
()
3 special feedwater and rupture control system, and for about 4
a couple of weeks there, he was quite interested in this 5
event.
6
. Then to my best understanding, he got pulled of f of 7
evaluating the event.
8 BY MR. HESDON:
9 0
What were his concerns?
10 A
His concern was basically my concern, which did not 11 necessarily agree with some other people.
The most significant 12 event had not been the auxiliary f eedwater transient but was 13 the fact that the POVR was stuck open and allowed I
(
14 depressurization.
15 I remember discussing that with Domninic on 16 several occasions.
17 BY MR. PARLER:
18 0
Whicr. Domminic?
19 A
Theoda nni.
20 BY MR. HEBDON:
21 0
Why did you consider that to be the most significant 22 part of the event?
23 A
We ll, if you have read over the event and really 24 analyzed it, it's a small break.
And the fact that you reach
=25 saturation conditions and get stean bubbles in the primary
'~()
i
_ _,,, _ -.. ~
047.04.11 52 p
(_jh I
system is certainly not to be -- you just don't want that, 2
and that's what happened. Depending on what operator action O
may be taken, the building of the size of bubbles and 3
-s-4 possibly placing of those bubbles, you can get your primary 5
system build-up in heat and possible cutdown on the circulation 6
of the p,rimary system around the core.
7 0
So you had a concern in that area during the time 8
of the review of the event?
9 A
I got that concern when I went home that weekend 10 and from that reactimeter data plotted on that graph, and 11 that graph clearly shows the significance of reaching 12 saturation temperature.
And you'll get a copy of that graph O
.for this mee ting.
13 14 0
The significance being what of reaching saturation 15 temperature?
The significance being that the boilin] occurred 16 in the core?
17 A
Not necessarily the core.
It certainly may.
But in 18 the primary coolant system.
19 0
To whom did you raise.these concerns?
20 A
I discussed this with IdE on whether they night 21 eventually be wanting us to analyze any of these design 22 basis accidents.
- 23 BY MR. PARLER8 i (q e
~/
24 0
There could you give their names again?
Here, again,-I talked with a lot of people from Id2 25 A
( (3 -
/ )
s
{} Wh k ' -
',,[' k [g 53
)347.04.12.
4'
(
.g f, hh~
'2(fit y60lif.hafe been e ither Terry Harpster, Tom Tambling l
.z
~2' or Dick Knopp because that would have been where their
/
3 origination --
4-O People.in region 3?
5 A
Region 3.
'6 0
You didn't have such discussions with people at 7
headquarte rs ?
8 A
l'm sure I had a lot of discussions, but I can't 9
be that specific of Mr. So and So and Mr. So and So.
10 BY MR. HEBDON:
.11 0
Did you have any discussions with people in NRR concerning these concerns?
13-A Yes, I work at NRR and I said I'd go through the
()
14 holes and I'd be more than willing to discuss this event.
15 BY MR. PARLER8 16 0
With the JRR technical managament people such as 17 an assistant director in the division of safety systems?
18
. Dr. Ma ttson, your assistant director, your branch chief, the 19 head of NHR, the deputy director of NRR, people such as 20 that as contrasted from conversations in the hall?
21 A
To the best of my remembrance, I only discussed the 22 Davis-Besse transient with Jim Knight, who was an ass istant 23 director in DSS directly.
And it was more in the light of
()
24 asking what 'ha ppened there, more of just curiosity.
1
- Q,4 25
(~)~
v J
m 4347.04.13 54 r~h BY MR. HEBD0;l:
V 2
O Curiosity on his part.
3 A
On his part.
4 BY MR. PARLER:
5 0
Was this graph that you prepared over the weekend 6
af ter the Davis-Besse visit and which I understand you had 7
at the Monday meeting, was that graph exhibited to the people 8
of that meeting, including, say, Dr. Mattson?
9 A
Yes.
As I indicated, Jerry called me up that morning 10 and said that we're going to have a DSS meeting.
I said, 11 Jerry, I have got a big postar card graph of this event.
It 12 might help you in discussing the scenario of the event.
And 13 he,used that, pointing to the various transients.
O i4 Br ""
"ssoo"=
15 0
Were your concerns about the boiling and the 16 primary and the fact that the pressure reached the saturation 17 pressure brought up during that neeting?
18 A.
No, they were not brought up in that meeting.
As 19 I've mentioned, that was a DNSS meeting.
The dialogue was 20 between DSS people.
21 O
It wasn't brought up by anyone else?
22 A
Not that I remember.
23 BY MR. PARLER:
(~)S 24 0
What was the reaction to the graph which you prepared
\\-
l 25-which, as I understand what you have said here -- graphically
. q i: u/
i l
347.04.14 55 gsh
'l indicated something to you that -- did it have the same
('.
j 2
impression on others at the Monday meeting?
3 It told you a significant story, as I understand
()'
4 it, the graph did.
5 A
The meeting was not a well organized meeting. People 6
came in.
'lhey weren't all there to begin with.
They 7
interrupted each other.
It may well be that Jerry was through 8
his scenario and that graph by the tine that some people got 9
in there.
And I doubt if some ever know that it existed.
10 0
Do you recall whether Dr. Mattson was at the entire il meetin97 12 A
I do not think that Dr. Mattson was at the entire 13' meeting.
14 0
Was your branch chief at the meeting?
,G -
(_)
15 A
My branch chief indicated he could not be there, 16 but that the AD wo'ld be there.
17 0
Was Domemic Vassallo at the entire meeting, as 18 far as you can recall?
19 A
As far as I can recall.
20 0
Was Mr. Tedesco at the meeting, the entire meeting?
i 21 A
Yes, I've mentioned Tedesco was -- I can't -- I 22 don't remember the entire meeting.
23 0
All right.. How about
.ir. Ros.;?
24'
-A I don't remember if
.'.{r. Ro ss -- I ca n' t -- De nny 4
()
25 makes such an inpression, I relate him to meetings.
And I
()
i i
L __.
E
3347.04.15 56 hsh I
can't remember if Denny was thero, but I'm sure he was.
2 0
I want to ask you this.
After that meetin; at which j
3 your graph was available and apparently used, to soma extent, 4
by the briefet, did that graph ever -- was it ever used a"Jain 5
in any similar neeting?
Did it surf ace at all until recently 6
before the President's Comission?
7 A
We 11 I have mentloned thit Jack Howe took the graph 8
and had copics made for his use.
9 0
But he was interested in it primarily from the 10 safeguards standpoint.
ll A
The graph was used quite a oft after March 30th, 12 1979 I3 BY MR. HEBDON:
/
I4 0
After the T..t! incident.
15 BY MR. PARLER:
16 0
My question was:
Was it used before except for its 17 s
u age you have already talked about, the Monday meeting and ue 18 also yo re us ing it in connection with certain individuals 19 such as Stack, Rowe, and Domminic Theoda nni?
20 A
No.
But oy that time, there were now other curves 21 that had been produced by the licensee which basically gave 22 that same information.
23 So my graph was not the only thing that existed.
p_
_/
24 BY MR. 11d3D03 25 0
Did you formally raise your concerns about this I
3347.04.16 57 ash I
particular incident to anyone?
Did you write a memo to anyone?
2 A
No, I did not.
Like I said, I was primarily 3
concerned with makino sure that ISE had that plant back ready, Os 4
based on the concerns that I had mentioned before they went 5
critical.
6 0
When you saw the 185 inspection report, diJ you feel 7
that the' concerns that you had had been satisf actorily 8
resolved?
9 A
At that time I.did.
Now when you -- my concerns 10 on the stuck-open POVR as an interval of time of sitting 11 looking at that graph, of reading that event, and I can't 12 say exactly when my concerns -- it probably -- the only 13 f educial point that I can tie it to is when I talked to
{ )g Dommenic Theodanni and we went into some of these discussions.
14
/
15 And he asked me what I thought was most important and I 16 specifically at that time said, it's the stuck open POVR.
17 I may have said it to people before that, out that's 18 a. specific time that I can tie into when'I was concerned about 19 it.
20
-21 22 J
23 24 25 l
I l
B347.05.1 58 O nv i
BY MR. HEsDoa, 2
0 Do you recall when that was?
()
3 A
Yes.
That would have been in April, May, and June of 4
1978.
I had the burnable poison rod assembly with Davis-Besse 5
thens I can relate things like that.
6 BY MR. PARLER 7
0 Did you give your graph to the I&E people in 8
connection with their investigation?
9 A
Ho, I did not.
10 BY MR. HEBDON:
.11 0
Why not?
12 A
They had the reactimeter data that I had.
13 0
So you felt they could have made the same plot?
14 A
By that time, the licensee had nade plots.
15 0
And the plots that you saw would essentially be the 16 same as the one that you had prepared?
17 A
They weren't the same ordinate and abscissa, but it la was basically -- it was a f unction of time, the same data.
19 0
Ge tting back to the scenario, what happeneJ as a r sult of this incident, that11 think we have interrapted on 20 e
21 several occasions?
Did you have any more that you wanted to 2'2 add as f ar as what "tas done concerning this particular event?
23 Have you completed your scenario of the response to the 24 incident?
25 A
I think we have all this other that's gone on, I ba
p:_.-__._-..._
0347 05.2 59 0 pv 1
mean all the other questions you've asked we've covered in some 2
manner or other.
k-)
3 There was one items I was concerned about the POVR, 4
and I AE had stipulated in their immediate-action order that 5
licensee would be required to cycle the POVR.
Now, the c ycle 6
at POVR on the pressurizer requires that the plant go up to 7
hot standby at 2200 psi and 700 degrees to really test it for 8
operating conditions.
And so I kept in very close touch with 9
IAE when the li.?ansee had finished the other immediate actions 10 which would allow them to go into mode 5, 4,
and 3.
.I l The first time they tested the valve -- and I think 12 it was on -- they went up to hot -- they went to mode 3 on f-13 October 10s I think they first tested that valve on October 16,
(
I4 and it f ailed.
And then they tested it on the following day, 15 and I remember that two days there I spent a lot cf time with 16 I&E keeping bo'h the I&E and the licensee to make sure what the 17 results of tha*. test was, because I knew aft'er that, having 18 finished all'other things, that they would go critical.
19 0
Did they find out why the valve failed?
20 A
I believe it was crud material on the stem that 21 caused galling, as I remember.
The event is specified in an 22 LER.
'23 0
Did they finally correct the problem?
O 24 A'
The y - corrected it, Inasmuch as I know, on 25 Da vi s-B e ss e.
It never stuck again.
{^%
sg
m.,.
3347.05.3 60
( ) pv.
1 0
Okay.
What I would like to do is go back through 2
some specific questions that I _have.
Some of these will be 3
somewhat redundant of sone of the discussions that we've 4
al ready had, but I want to make sure that we've got a complete 5
record of the various issues that we're concerned about in this 6
particular incident.
So, if you would bear with me on the ones 7
that you have already answered, and we'.11 see if we can get 3
through~these.
9 At the time following the incident, we re you involved i
10 or still involved with the.Aidland or the Crystal River or the
.11 Arkansas reviews?
You mentioned that you had been involved
-12 with those various reviews at various and sundry times.
13 A
Ho.
At the time that the incident happened, I had 14 Davis-Besse and had just been given the qualification reviwe on 15 Palo Verde.
4
-16 0
All right.
Did you consider the incident that 17 occurred at Davis-Besse to have any ganeric implications for 18 the other B&W plants?
19-A At that time, no.
20 0
At some later-time?
21 A
I did later.
I did later, just before -- well, I did 22 later in the time f rame of April of 1978, just prior to the 23 burnable poison rod problen on Davis-Besse.
And at that time'I 24 decided I wanted to get licensing event reports and go through
~
25 them and see if there was any history of other valves sticking O
347.05.4 61
(~)/pv
'I open.
And I became so completely involved in a f airly s_
t' 2
exhaustive saf ety evaluation on that burnable poison rod
'r~w
(-)
3 assembly problem that I never got to carry it any further.
4 0
Is this something you just did on your own
{
5 initiative, or was it something somebody assigned you to do?
t z
- Well, it's something I wanted to do on my own 6
A r
7 initiative, but because of other matters I never got to do it.
8 0
Did you ever inform anyone either informally or 9
formally that this was something you f elt ought to be done?
10 A
I did not.
11 0
So, it was just something you were going to do in the co rse of your --
12 u
l 13 A
Although I had in the period of time discussed with 14 John Angelo, another project manager, what I felt was a problem 15 with licensing event reports.
16 0
What was that problem?
l 17 A
That how were they being catalogued, what was the l
18 bookkeeping, what was the sorting process of where there might 19 be similarity of more than one event, a generic-type concern.
L l
20 0
Did you raise that concern with anyone else other 21 than discussing it with another project manager?
22 A
No, I-did not, because John Angelo at the time was l
l 23 involved in systems interaction study which was being set up.
I
("N
' Ld-24 and he was -- that was one of the concerns of that group.
But 25 I~ personally did not.
l O.
\\_)
.)347.05.5-62
( ) py I
~0 Did you know of any other investigation or analyses 2-of the incident that were performed other than the ones we have
( )-
3 discussed so far?
4 A
No. I do not.
5~
MR. PARLER:
You're speaking about NRC or outside of 6
NitC?
7 MR. HEBDod Yes.
By anyone.
8 THE WITNESS:
Other than those I have mentioned, I do 9
not.
10 BY MR. HESDON:
.11 0
You mention that you did realize that steam had 12 formed in the reactor coolant system to some extent during the 13 transient.
Did you realize that the steam f ormation in the 14 reactor coolant system had caused the pressurizer level to 15 increase while the leak was continuing?
16 A-Absolutely, I knew that on that weekend when I 17 plotted pressurizer level and pressurizer pressure or reactor 18 coolant pressure.
19 0
So you were aware of the fact that the pressurizer 20 level was increased by the void formation in the primary?
21 A
It's clearly shown as a function of time on any plot.
22 0
Is that -- what significance did you assign to that 23 fact?
()
24-
.A I did not assign much significance.
I did. discuss 25 that at that meeting, and I remember the operator saying that h
i
-. ~. -
, '. u ; 6 63 r"s I
af ter the initial depressurization and when he had his HPSI
.Qav-2
-pumps turned on, !! PSI pumps came on whan the reactor coolant
- (~g 3
pressure wont to 1600 psi.
That actuated the HPSI.
I don't --
U 4
I forget the exact time, but I believe it was somewhere in the 5
range of about six minutes af ter the manual trip, they turned 6
off.those HPSI pumps.
And the reason the operator at that time 7
turned thoso pumps off was that the pressurizer 10 vel had come 8
back. up to about normal, and thov were very concerned at that 9
timo because they had had seal problem with the reactor coolant 10 pumps, and they wanted to get o ff the HPSI and get back to the
.I l charging line to be sure that they woro maintaining seal 12 coolant.
13 MR. PARLER:
The meeting you were talking about was a
-Q 14 mee ting with Davis-00 sso.
The trip out therot right/
Not the 15 Monday meeting?he trip out therei right?
Not the Monday 16 Tile WITUdSS:
Right.
Not the Monday meeting.
17 BY MR. HEBDON:
18 0
Do you f oo l that the increase in pressurizer Icvol 19 was caused by the ilPSI or was caused by the void formation?
'20 A'
. On Davis-Be sse, at this particular. point, I think 21 that the pressurizer levol at that point had been caused by 2!2 IIPSI.
23-
,0 JAnd not by the void formation?
24 A
. Not by the void f ormation.
Because-they only reached
(}.
- 25 saturation, realisaturation, at - about six minutos.
b
.w
=
3J47.05.7 64 Jnr I:
0
.So at six minutes they reached saturation.
O 2
A That is correct.
3 0
But they shut of f the HPSI at about 4-l/2 minutes.
\\~'
4 A
That's right.
Because HPSI had come on very shortly 5
after the tr.ip.
6 0
Pressurizer level -- did pressurizer level continue 7
to increase from 4-1/2 minutes to six minutes?
8 A
Approximate, as I remember -- if I had that graph, of 9
course, we could look at it specifically, l' hey follow almost 10 in suits one interfaces with the other.
Pressurizer level did
.11 increase.
12 0
So for that minute and a half, between when they shut 13 off HPSI and when -- and the six-minute point -- what was 14 causing pressurizer level to increase?
15 A
Af ter the HPSIs were shut of f in that -- around that 16 six minutes, it nay well have been that at that time you were 17 9etting enough steam fornation that it may have helped pull it 18 up.
19 0
So you think at that point, then, there was some 20
. increase in pressurizer level as a result of steam formation?
21 A
To the best ~ of my ability, without being a'le to a
22
.specifically look at those graphs, I still believe in that 23 particular time frame that the primary increase in the 24
,. s pressurizer level was due to HPSI.
O-25
'O.
At what point in time.do you think the pressurizer
<~
, 15._/
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O
B347.05.3 65
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level increase was caused by the void formation?
2 A
In the interval six to'eight ninutes.
{}
3 0
All right.
Did you realize that'the operators 4
secured the HPSI before they identified and isolated. the leak?
5 A
Yes, because my graph has operator actions tied in on 6
the top of it.
7 0
Did you consider that to be proper operator action?
8 A
At that time, I don't think I gave consideration 9
whether it was or was not proper operator action.
10 0
Why or why not?
That's a vague question.
.11 Why didn't you consider it to be a problem?
Why 12 didn't you consider the issue of whether or not it was proper 13 operator action?
()
14 A
Basically, because I was involved in all -- involved 15 in all the other concerns and seeing that they were addressed.
16 0
Are you saying, then, that you didn't f eel that the 17 operator action was sufficiently in..artant to be of concern?
18 A
I hadn't evaluated operator actions on that 19 event, to the point where I could or could not make a 20 determination.
21 0
When you evaluate incidents, do you normally evaluate 22 the operator actions?
23 A
Pro. lect managers do not normally evaluate incidents.
'l 24-They get ' staff review to evaluate incidents.
If you evaluate (J
25~
incidents, 'it's more or less what you yourself want to do on
^h(J J
.66 it.
O All right.
If you had _ the sta ff review this
- n
- (-)
i incident, who on the sta ff would have reviewed the operator action?
A It first of all would have been reviewed by I&E.
If I&E then had requested DSS to further look into some area, DSS s
might have requested that the operator procedures be provided to then.
Operator procedures are not normally part of the review.
.2 0
What about the operator actions, regardless of what
- I the procedures said to do; would anyone have looked at what the
- 2 operators did and make a determination that what they did was
- 3 right or wrong, that it helped prevent the problem or helped
,_sU mitigate the problem or that it contributed to the problem?
Is
- 3 there anyone in NRR that you know of that routinely makes that
- 5 sort of an evaluation when they are reviewing incidents?
- 7 A
I can only speak for the Davis-Besse event.
.3 0
For.the Davis-Besse event, then.
D A
If there had been any request for, for instance, for
/> _
us to evaluate some operator response on this event -- for instance, if I&E had requested that we do this -- it would have 24 been in the operator training branch, Paul Collins.
And they would have gone through those procedures.
But no request came
. r3
\\ l:
/t to signal.or initiate this.
l
/,
O And to your knowledge, no such review was done?
i
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6347.05.10 67
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A To my knowledge, no such review was done.
2 0
You mentioned that you sent out copies of the
-( )
3 analyses of the event that were prepared by I&E and the one 4
'that was prepared by the licensee.
Did you send a copy of that 5
to Paul Collins?
6 A
I don't remember.
I would have to look at the copy 7
on that cover to know it was distributed.
4 8
0 Could you check that and let me know at some later 9
tine, whether a copy was sent to Paul Collins?
10 A
(Nods affirmatively. )
11 0
Would it be normal for you to send a copy to 12 Paul Collins ?
13 A
It might and might not.
At that time I was pretty
'14 well determining -- calling up the distribution and the records 15 branch telling them when I wanted something to go to a specific 16 person or make it a standard coverage.
17 Normally, it probably would have gone, just as part 18 of the DSS and review team.
19 0
Did any or all of the events raise any concerns in 20 your r 1 with respect to the accident analyses, the operator 21 tr6... ng, or the adequacy of plant procedures?
22 A
Would you repeat that question?
Could we possibly 23 take that in three parts?
'. ( )
24 0
Sure.
Did any. or all of thase events raise any
'25 concerns in your mind with respect to accident analyses?
n l
L.
E 1
1347.05.11.
68
( )pv 1
A Ye s, it did.
2 0
What were those concerns?
()
3 A
The concern was, as time developed and I thought 4
about this event, was the stuck-open relief valve and the 5
depre ssur iza tion.
6 0
What was your concern?
Was your concern that this 7
event -- was your concern that the stuck-open relief valve and 8
the depressurization had not been covered as part of the normal 9
accident analyses?
10 A
I always wanted to check -- I actually did check on
,11
-- the Chapter 15 design basis accident for feedwater 12 transients, and determined that for the most conservative case, 13 which includes loss of off-site power, that the overall
[
14 accident had been enveloped by the design basis accident.
15 But I was always curious as to whether any actual 16 analysis had been done on the transient LLself as the 17 reactimeter data actually showed the event.
13 0
So you did look, and you concluded that the design 19 basis accidents did include the incident that occurred at 20
-Davis-Besse?
21 A
That the incident was enveloped by the design basis
'22 accident.
23 0
/11 right.
Did any or all of these events raise any f([
24 concerns in your mind with respect to operator training?
25 A
At the time, it raised admiration for the operator at O
$347.05.12 69 pv~
'I Davis-Besse who was on that plant.
Now, that's not a concern, 2
but that was my main thought with regards to operator _ action.
3 O
Would you expand on that a little bit?
4 A
Yes.
The man actually manually tripped the reactor.
5 He didn't wait for any safety system when he saw pressurizer 6
level coning up.
He had two transients going on at once:
He 7
had the stuck-open relief valve and the depressurization event.
8 At the same time, he had an unknown transient occurring in his 9
steam f eedwater and control system, which led to loss of water 10 in one of the steam feedwater generators.
11 He was seeing this scenario of events, not realizing 12 that all of this was going on.
Whether in hindsight it was 13 right or wrong, he did trip his HPSIs when he saw pressurizer O
'4 tevet ootao va-
^as taet es 8esed nert1v o" their coacera 15 that they wanted to check those reactor coolant pump seals.
16 The man further tripped two reactor coolant pumps, 17 one in each loop, because the nan had enough thermodynamic 18 capability to realize he was reaching saturation condition.
19 And he real17.ed that those pumps turn out five megawatts of 20 heat in that system, which was probably more heat thar: the
~
21 decay heat from the. core at that time.
And he wanted to assure 22.
himself that he was not getting cavitation and bubbles in the 23 reactor coolant impeller blade area, and.had determined that
_{}
24 within 20 minutes the POVR was stuck open, and he closed the 25.
block valve.
0
.)347.05.13 70
( )pv i
Now, all of these things together, the man. I felt.
2 had done -- had analyzed the situation very well.
And even
()
3 based on things that have happened since that transient, I 4
still am convinced that that operator was a very good. operator.
5 0
Do you. recall the name of the operator?
6 A
I should.
I think his name was Deravan, but I 7
just --
8 0
Deravan?
9 A
De ra va n.
10 0
Did you give any consideration to what would have
.11 happened during this transient if the operator had
- done 12 such a good job?
13 A
Ye s.
In a period of time, I.think I came to the A
14 conclusion that the man closing the block valve was the 15 significant operator action.
But where in the period of time 16 that I came to this conclusion, I -- it's just merged into this 17 Whole time.
18 0
In the course of reviewing the incident, did you give 19 any thought to what would have happened if he had not done such 20 a good job, if there had been a less qualified or less 21 competent operator there?
22
.A No.
No, Decause nobody initiated a request that 23 operater actions be evaluated, and I had the other concerns I.
b)#5 24 have mentioned before.
25 f3
-V
4347.06.1 71 o
s,/ pv i
0 Do you think that the operators realized that boiling I
2 in the reactor coolant system had caused the pressurizer level 4
1._)
3 to increase?
4 A
They did later, but early into that event I am not 5
sure they did.
6 0
At what point -- approximately what time in the 7
transient do you think that they became-aware that the 8
pressurizer level was being influenced by boiling?
9 A
Everytime they tripped one reactor coolant pump in 10 each loop.
.11 0
At that time did the operators realize the boiling in
.12 the core reactor coolant system caused pressurizer level to 13 increase?
14 A
!!ot early into the event.
15 0
At what point in time did they realize the boiling 16 in the primary was having an influence on pressurizer level?
17 A
When they tripped on reactor coolant pump per loop.
18 0
Do you know what caused the operators to realize that 19 the PORY was open?
20 A
I-believe, as I remember, they checked the tailpipe 12 1 temperatures.
22 0
Do you.know what caused them to check the tailpipe 2J temperature?
24
'A 1 do not.
25 0
Did you make any sort' of assessment of what i
\\lil
D47.06.2 72
-(])pv-1 information was available to them to tell them the PORV was, in 2
fact, stuck open?
()))
3 A
lb t in the early months af ter this event, no.
4 0
Prior to the TMI-2 acc ident, did you make any sort of 5
assessment of what caused them to realize that the POLY was 6
open?
7 A
flot that.I can remember.
8 0
Since you have said that you felt that the PORV 9
sticking was a major concern in this particular transient, do 10 you have any f eelings as to why you didn't become more
.I l concerned about the indication that was available to the 12 operator to realize that the valve was stuck ?
13 A
I think that as time went by actual thought of the
(_)
14 event would only occur at various times, and I had become so 15 involved in other reviews that this became a background type of 16 sc ena rio.
17 In addition to that, as I have repeated, we do not 18 specif ically look into operator procedures and actions.
That 19 comes only through a formal review request.
20 0
Did you ever discuss this incident or any of the 21 issues raised by this incident with Joseph Kelly or Burt Dunn 22 or any other employee of B&W? -
23.
A If Joseph Kelly or Burt Dunn had been at that meeting
()
24 at Davis-Besse, it might have been discussed in that meeting.
25 but' I do not remember discussing with those two nen this event.
I -
)
F I
l l
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f k
- 347.06.3 73
(,pv i
0 Were there representatives of B&W at that teeting?
2 A
Yes, there were.
(m,)
3 0
Do you recall any of the concerns raised by those 4
people?
5 A
B&W was primarily looking into design basis accidents 6
to see if the des'ign, any design limits, had been exceeded for 7
the pressurizer, for the reactor coolant system, for the pumps, 8
whether there had been any fuel damage exceeding f uel cladding 9
requirements, which are really design basis analyses, and was 10 also looking into the corrective. actions testing that might be
.11 taken on reactor coolant pumps and pressurizer.
12 But I don't specifically remember -- at that meeting 13 they were more or less addressing our questions and concerns.
14 0
Were you ever aware of their concerns about the 15 September 24, 1977 incident?
Did you ever become aware of 16 their concerns?
17 A
I never -- I did not know that they were concerned 18 about the event.
19 0
Okay.
How effectively does the current IE-N RR 20 relationship f acilitate the f eedback of operational experience 21 into the licensing process?
22 A
Very badly.
23 0
Would you care to expand on that?
()
24 A
Yes.
Now, as we have been discussing, this problem 25 always comes up of lead responsibility, and lead responsibility
'rs b
4347.06.4 74
( } pv i
is a matter of I&E until such time as they transf er, by formal 2
request.
{]}
3 There are two problems heres One, in one case, for 4
instance, Division of Project Management, or if it's DOR, for 5
that matter, whoever has project mant Nr, has the plant, they 6
may not know that there is going to be a transfer of lead 7
responsibility coming until they see the memo.
And this, then, 8
entails the fact that you have to make time available in what 9
may be a very extensive review schedule of people who will be requir d to evaluate this event, which involves time and may 10 e
.11 involve delay, needless delay, in getting an evaluation which 12 is required.
13 The same applies from the other way.
I&E, when they n-(_)
14 request a transf er of lead responsibility, may find that it 15 takes a long time for that transf er of responsibility to 16 finally be consummated in the saf ety evaluation report that 17 they need to make a determination.
18 It is almost as if these types of safety evaluation 19 are addendum to the licensing actions that are going on.
Tliere 20 is no real good fit place for these evaluations to take place.
21 That's partly due to there isn't the manpower t they are all 22 involved in other things.
23 If I could, I would like to suggest that une of the
()
24 best ways to take good care of this is to set up soma
' ndependent group -- hard, cold, anal ytical group
- that has 25 i
I h
347.06.5 75
({]) pv' I
the capability to understand reactor systems and operations, to 2
assess the licensing event reports that come in, catalog these
/)
3 and probably use a computer for bookkeeping, though they A/
4 shouldn't rely on the computer itself, to determine if there 5
are events occurring more than once, twice, three times, and 6
ring an alarm bell.
And this is their jobs they are not tied 7
into other specific actions or scheduling that requires certain 8
actions; they are a group aloof and they can look at this hard, 9
cold, and analytically and ring a bell, if necessary, and say, 10
" Gentlemen, look at this.
Is there any safety significance
.11 related to this item that we f eel ma/ be a problem, because, 12 for instance, a POVR or a spuriou; trip has occurred in XZY 13 plants."
()
14 In addition, to get such a group is going to be 15 difficult because there is a lot of boredom in going through 16 LERs and to have good men that understand systems constantly 17 reading LERs, they wd,1 become bored.
So you have got to have 18 some kind of a program where you put them through test 19 exercises.
Just like a crew on a ship, they get bored af ter a 20 time, and y.ou have got to have tests to bring them up to speed.
21 This group, though, their primary job must be 22 assessing LERs using a computer -- not relying on a computti,
23 though, other than just the mundane bookkeeping these events
()
24 cataloged.
And that's a problem, too, because -- let's go back 25 to Davis-Besses When somebody records on a computer card what p) c-
^
1 1347.06.6 76
/~N.
(,j pv
.I was the cause of the transient, somebody, with the best of 2
intentions, will say -- might say a stuck-open POVR.
Another
(,/
3 person, with the best of intentions, who had read the same 4
scenario, would say that relay was missing.
5 So, in. cataloging these, there has to be a very rigid 6
regimentation that allows some absoluteness in cataloging these 7
events right.
That group must be independent of other work 8
responsibilities.
9 0
There is some effort now to computerize the LEHs.
Do 10 you feel that that -- are you familiar at all with that
.11 cataloging e ffort?
12 A
I am not f amiliar enough with it to comment one way 13 or another.
G
~/
14 O
Do you know of any other precursor events that are 15 relevant to the accident at TMI?
16 A~
Since TMI, I have learned that there are others.
17 stuck POVHs, in reading over the various publications.
18 0
Which ones of those would you consider to oe the 19 most significant?
20 A
I-would consider two of them one, the Dav is-Be sse 21 event; and the other is the combination of the stuck-open POVRs 22 on the plants.
'23 0
No specific one, just the fact that it occurred on a 24 number of plants?
25 A
Ihe fact that the valve sticks open, that its
. (y 5
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E
.)34'7.06.7
.77
/") pv I
reliability is not as high as other systems.
U 2
MR. PARLER:
The Davis-Bessa event that you just
(~}
3 referred to is the one that we have been talking about this 4.
morning, the September 24, ' 77 ?
~
5 THE WITNESS:
That's right.
6 BY MR. HE8 DON:
7 0
Do you have any additional information that might be y.
8 relevant to our inquiry into this incident?
9 A
flo, not specifically.
I did indicate, though, that 10 the President's Commission entered ny graph as Exhibit B, and I
.11 asked them if I could keep that.
And they said if I got 12 photographic copies, the large size, that would be all right, 13 and I ordered two, realizing I would be down here.
do, you O) 14 will get a copy of that.
s.
15 0
Very g ood.
Do you have any other information other
-16 than that that you feel might be relevant?
17 A
I don't believe so.
18 MR. HEBDON:
Do you have any additional questions?
19 MR. PARLER:
tio.
20 Tom?
21 MR. COX:
No.
22 MR. HEBDON:
All right.
Thank you very much.
23-That terminates the interview.
()
24 (dhereupon, at.I1:00 a.m., the.. interview was end#6 25 concluded.)
f i
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