ML19322C813
| ML19322C813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1979 |
| From: | Chin R, Dornsife W BURNS & ROE CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240589 | |
| Download: ML19322C813 (19) | |
Text
_ _ _ _
DX,-hhz NUCLE AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSION i
O 1
IN THE M ATTER CF:
i THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITION i
l l
l DEPOSITION OF:
WILLIAM P.
DORNSIFE I
1 i
O P00R DMNA.
~
Place.
HARRISBURG, PA.
Date -
September 19,, 1979 Pages 1 thru 19 l
T.i.oren.:
l (202)347 3700 l
l ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficxalReporters l
444 North Cecitol Street l
Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY 8001240
/
1
!!OR-4 8951 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA bp 2
X 3
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S :
4 TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP 5
'ON 6
TIIE ACCIDENT AT Tl!REE MILE ISLAND :
7
x 8
(Oral deposition of WILLIAM P. DORNSIFE) 9 10 11 APPEARANCES:
12 NRC's Special Inquiry Group
'q 13 Robert Chin, Esquire U
Malcolm Ernst 14 Frederick Herr Robert Schamberger 15 Peter Sicilia, Jr.
16 17 TAKEN AT:
18 IIoliday Inn Toun 3:15 p.m., Wedncuday Second and Chestnut Strcots September 19, 1979 19
!!arrisburg, Pennsylvania 20 21 O
23 24
(
25 MOkeCsL $1E N00ma PMIC 9tRW4L E.
4 493 OL D MILL MOAD WTOMatteNG. PA 99610
1
_I _N.D_.E_ _X 2
WITNESS:
EXAMINED BY:
PAGE NUM13ER 3
William P. Dornsife Mr. Chin 3 - 17 O
d 5
6 EXIIIBITS 7
8 Number Marked 9
1 Letter of confirmation to 3
William P. Dornsife from the 10 NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group ij 2
One page resume entitled 4
" Biographic Information, William P. Dornsife" 12 O
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 s./
23 24 1
25 wo
.c. u i,.oo....c 4.v.c.... o m, u.,,o. o.........,.
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3 1
PEQQEgglEEE 2
WILLIAM P. DORNSIFE, 3
was called as a witness and, having been duly sworn, was
()
4 examined and testified as follows:
5 BY MR. CIIIN :
6 Q
State your full name and position for the record.
7 A
My name is William Paul Dornsife.
I am a Nuclear 8
Engineer for the Bureau of Radiation Protection, Department 9
of Environmental Resources.
10 (Exhibit No. 1 marked.)
11 BY MR. CIIIN:
12 Q
Let me show you a letter marked Exhibit 1.
Is this 13 a copy of the letter we sent to you concerning your deposition O
y before this group today?
A Yes, it is.
15 16 Q
llave you read the document in full?
17 A
Yes, I have.
18 Q
Do you understand what we portrayed in the letter 19 about the purpose of our inquiry and the fact that you may have.
20 an attorney present?
21 A
Yes, I do.
22 Q
And that' some of the information or all of it may 23 become eventually public?
24 A-Yes, I am fully aware of that.
25 Q
Mr. Dornsife, are you represented by. counsel?
1 M 3NIC R ST E NOGR A PD**C SE RVIC E.
9 413 OLD MtLL PO A D. WVOMIS$tNG. PA 19410 I
4 1
A No, I am not.
2 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note for the record that 3
the witness is not represented by counsel.
O 4
av an cu "=
5 Q
Mr. Dornsife, if at any time during this interview if you need an attorney or to have an attorney present, would 6
7 you please advise us and we will adjourn this meeting to make 8
the appropriate arrangements.
Is that all right with you?
9 A
Yes, it is.
10 Q
Did you bring a resume with you today?
A Yes, I did.
j; (Exhibit No. 2 marked.)
12 BY MR. CHIN:
13 O
O Is that Exhibit No.
2, your resume?
y A
es, t
s.
15 MR. CHIN:
And I wish to note for the record, 16 Exhibit No. 2 is a single paged docu'ent titled " Biographic m
37 Information, William P. Dornsife."
18 19 BY MR. CHIN:
20 Q
I understand, Mr. Dornsife, that at one time you 21 had some association with TMI.
Could you explain that to us.
22 A
Yes, prior to working -- coming to work for the J
(}
23 Commonwealth, I was employed by Burns and Roe who is the 24 architect for the engineering of Three Mile Island, and I 25 spent a very short time of my total time at Burns and Roe I
MOPssCM ST E NOGR A PHIC $$ MVIC E.
14 t 3 OL D MILL #0 A D, WYOMiSStNG. PA 19480
5 1
working on Three Mile Island.
2 I started on the Forked River project, and when the 3
staff was cut back, I was transfered over to Three Mile Island.
4 And I spent about four to five months on the home office
()
5 offort, which was well down the line, which was a matter of 6
reviewing drawings and purchasing smaller equipment.
7 And then I spent about six or seven months at the 8
site as the Assistant Project Engineer.
9 0
llow many months was that?
10 A
About six or seven months at the site as the 11 Assistant Project Engineer.
12 O
And at what stage of construction was that?
13 A
It was 80 to 90 percent complete at this point.
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ja Q
I want you tothink back to the first three days of the accident.
So, from March 28th to the 3'Oth, could you 15 describe just what your function was with regard to the 16 accident?
j7 A
Well, I was -- if I can characterize it as that --
18 probably the only nuclear engineer employed by the state.
So, j9 I was looked upon as being the source of technical information 20 and trying to get technical information from the utility and 21 NRC to determine what the status of the plant was,and what
'T 22 w!
23 the future might hold.
0 And how did you go about doing that job?
24 A
Well, primarily from talking on the telephone with 25 MONiC M ti f faCGetape**C %5 fe W8C E, le t t CL f3 MIL L PO A D, W 9 0 MIS teNo PA tetto
6 1
tha plant.
I tried to get the status of the equipment and 2
plant statuses.
Although I have to admit that since we were 3
-- the Bureau was primarily involved in assessing the radio-4 logical consequences, I was using -- I did have quite a bit bgs 5
of experience in. radiological protection from my Navy back-6 ground.
I was using more of my radiological knowledge than 7
engineering knowledge in assessing the situation at the plant.
8 Q
At any time were you on site?
9 A
No, not the first three days.
I was at the 10 Observation Center on Thursday for most of the day but not 11 on site.
12 O
And your source of information was plant operators 13 or NRC people on site?
14 A
Right.
15 Q
Both?
16 A
Both.
17 Q
By phone?
18 A
Yes, except when I was down on the site Thursday, I was talking directly to the coordination team.
The NRC 19 20 and the utility coordination team was operating out of the 21 Observation Center.
22 Q
Can you identify the people involved in t he f\\
23 coordination committee?
24 A
Well, it wasn't a committee.
The utility had a 25 group that was coordinating off site monitoring information, WONICM ST E 8eoces4% c o g nyict, g 413 OL D MIL L RO A D. WVOMISSING. P A 19600
7 1
and they had various -- by name I really don't recall.
2 The NRC had Rick Ilymie in charge of the operational 3
aspects and Phil Stohr in charge of the radiological aspects
()
4 operating out of the Observation Center.
And I was coordin-5 ating directly with them for information.
And I was essen-6 tially looking over the Met-Ed peoples' sl.oulder of the moni-7 toring that was going on.
8 I also attended the briefings that were held for 9
the congressional people that were held on site.
10 Q
So, actually you were novel in the control room for 11 the first three days?
12 A
No, I was not.
13 Q
What were you doing with your information once you O( s 14 had collected it?
15 A
I was essentially sharing it with the other members 16 of the Bureau and later with the Governor and whoever -- you 17 know, whatever meeting I may be attending at the time.
18 Q
And tnis was by phone or by personal appearance or 19 both?
20 A
Well, depending on -- when I was down at the site, 21 I was sharing it by phone.
In the office I was sharing it by 22 personal communications.
23 Q
But those first three days, were you more on,. site?
24 A
No, it was more in the office.
25 Q
More in the office.
Governor Thornburgh has said 1
son.cn st oconarmc'ss avice i4o oto mLL nomo. wromssmo. PA insio
8 I
that he sent radiation experts and nuclear engineering experts 2
to the site.
Were you the sole nuclear engineer expert on 3
site?
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4 A
Yes, I was then.
By on site, I was at trailer city.
5 From Saturday morning -- well, from Friday afternoon on, I 6
went down and attended the same briefings that IIarold Denton 7
attended when he first arrived on site.
And I came back and 8
reported to the Governor before Harold Denton arrived of what 9
I had heard.
And then on Saturday morning, I started spending 10 full time at the trailers, at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> a day.
I 11 Q
Which trailer?
i 12 A
I was primarily working out of the NRR trailer, and 4
13 I had free run of it, the NRR trailor and the utility trailer
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m 14 if I so desired.
15 0
APParently, on the 28th you were asked to brief 16 Lieutenant Governor Scranton.
Who asked you to do that?
17 A
The Deputy Secretary Mittendorf came down and asked 18 somebody to go over'and brief the Lieutenant Governor and 19 possibly attend a press conference.
And since at that point 20 I Probably knew as much as, if not more than anybody off site, 21 I was volunteered or volunteered myself.
I am not sure.
22 O
What did you do to prepare yourself for that brief-23 ing?
24 A
I wasn' t comfortable with the information I had at 25 that point on the plant status.
So, I called the site and --
MOMCM Si t N0G n a Phac '5 t Rv tC f.
14 9 3 OLD MeL L NO A D. W TOMeSSING. P A 19610
9 I
we had an open line, but I, you know, got the open line 2
activated and told them what I was going to do, that I was 3
going to brief the Lieutenant Governor and I would like to 4
talk to somebody with a detailed knowledge of what had 5
happened.
6 And I got to talk to Gary Miller, the station 7
Superintendent, and he briefed me on what had happened to the 8
best of his knowledge at that point.
9 Q
At what time did you brief Scranton?
10 A
At about, I would guess, in the neighborhood of 10:0
.m.
jj 12 Q
After that briefing or before that briefing, did the 13 Lieutenant Governor have a phone conversation with Mr. Miller 14 to your knowledge?
A Not to my knowledge.
Apparently, there was one 15 16 because he later came up to his office that afternoon.
I have no idea when that conversation was.
I am not sure if it was 17 18 even with Gary Mill 6r.
Maybe with Herbein or one of the people in management.. But he requested a meeting with Met-Ed j9 people later that afternoon.
20 Q
I am going to ask you about three planned procedures, 21 22 and I would like for you to tell me when you hear.d about each (3
'^'
23 ne of them, what you understood them to mean and what,.you did 24 about comrdunicating the implication of those procedures to 25 other people in the Pennsylvania state government.
MopesCM ST E PeOGR APHIC.SE RWlC f.
1413 CL D M sL L PO A D W VOMIS&tteG. P A 19650
10 1
The first one would be the venting of the make-up 2
tanks. Do you.7 member when you first heard about that pro-3 cedure?
4 A
I first heard it on "riday morning when we were
(}
5 notified by the plant that that operation was proceeding and 6
they had found an elevated reading of 1200 millirems above 7
the plant vent.
8 0
Were you aware of a 3R. reading on Thursday?
9 A
Yes, I was.
10 Q
What did you associate that reading with in terms 1
of the plant status?
12 A
At that time the readings were -- there were numerous 13 readings that I was seeing at the Observation Center looking
,sC ja over Met-Ed peoples' shoulders who were coordinating the data.
And there were a number of readings in that range on site or 15 16 in the plant.
And I really didn't associate the 3,000 Rem 17 with anything because the off site readings were relatively 18 low, and that was my major consideration.
Even though the readings were high on site, the off 19 site levels were still within the range of 1 to 10 millirems.
20 21 O
You learned about the venting on Friday morning.
22 This was in your office?
( )
23 A
YCS*
1 24 Q
Not on site?
25 A
No, not on site.
MONtC K ST f NOGR A PM'C '5 E RVIC E.
14 5 3 OL D MILL RO AD. W VOM14 & LNG. PA 19410
11 1
Q Who did you learn it from?
2 A
I believe Margaret was the one who received the 3
phone call and they informed me of the reading.
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4 0
What does venting the make-up tank mean to you in C
5 terms of releases?
6 A
Well, normally it doesn't mean anything.
Normally 7
it is a closed system.
The make-up tank is vented into a 8
waste gas header and'it is.then compressed from the waste gas 9
header into the waste decay tanks for eventual release after 10 decay.
And that is what I had associated with it.
I hadn't 11 known that there was any leakage in the waste gas header.
12 Q
When did you first learn about the leakage?
13 A
I didn' t learn that there was any suspected leakage (C\\
U 14 until a couple of weeks after this incident occurred.
But it was by association that you suspected that there was something 15 16 that was causing the leaks, that it wasn't just venting into 17 the atmosphere of the auxiliary tanks.
But offi61 ally, I didn't learn from any people that 18 they suspected a leak on that morning.
19 20 0
But you suspected that or. Friday morning?
A Yes, I guess it was in the back of my mindi it had 21 to come from somewhere.
']
22 U
23 0
Prior to Friday morning, what was your understanding of the sources of releases of radioactivity off site?
24 25 A
Well, initially it was thought, in tenna of the Moh8CR Sf t NOGR APHIC.ht NylC E. 1419 OL D MIL L h0 AO. WyoMe%44NG PA 19610
12 I
information we were receiving, that the venting -- the 2
atmospheric dumping of steam was the primary release path on 3
Wednesday morning.
When it was terminated and, as a result
()
4 of the briefing which I unfortunately did not attend when 5
Met-Ed came up and briefed the Lieutenant Governor, it was 6
then thought that the releases were occurring from water that 7
had been pumped over from the reactor building, of degassing 8
on the floor of the auxiliary building.
9 And it wasn't until much, much later that it became 10 evident that the leakage was really a combination of various 11 system leakages contributing to just the general radiation 12 levels in the auxiliary building.
13 Q
You mentioned steam dumping.
When did you learn la about that event?
15 A
Somotimo Wednesday morning.
I am not sure of the 16 time.
It was one of the routine releases that they had lost 17 condenser vacuum and they had to go to atmospheric dumping of 18 steam.
19 Q
You knew they were doing that before the Lieutenant
- o Governor's press conference, or I think it was around 12
- 30?
- )
A I think it was after -- I don't think I knew before 1
r~N
- 2
-- about it before that.
(.)
03 Q
Now, I want to move on to a second procedure, and 24 that is the procedure adopted by the utility to attempt to
.i t
15 I reduce the size of the hydrogen bubble.
They described it as
{
MONICM STINOGR APHIC 4tavtCf 14 9 3 OL D MtL L RO AD. W 70MI$5f NG P A 19410
1 i
13 1
a cycle process.
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Were you informed about that particular process or i
(~)
4 the bubble itself?
v 5
A Well, I guess the first time we were informed about a void or the uncovering of the core and the bubble in the 6
7 reactor cooling system was on Friday afternoon when Chairman Hendrie called the Governor and he informed us of his assess-8 9
ment of the situation.
At that point he and Denton were still 10 in Washington.
This was the first time we had heard about the 11 12 uncovering of the core.
But, of course, we had suspected a lot of fuel damage based on the radiation levels of concen-13 g g~)
'wJ ja tration in the reactor coolant system.
I learned of the proposed venting operation -- and in my opinion, the -- the 15 bubbic was being decreased in size from Wednesday on when the 16 letdown flow was re-established because the letdown was being 17 vented into the make-up tank, and then the water being pumped 18 back in was deficient in dissolved gases and it was allowing 19 s me of the bubble, but not very much, to slowly dissolve.
20 But on Saturday morning, a procedure was put into 2
motion to -- the primary purpose was to vent this gas, and N
22 x-)
it was venting of the pressurizer into the reactor building.
23 24 Q
You learned about that Saturday morning?
A Yes.
25 MONtC 4 Si t%OGR A PHIC *S(PytC(, 14 9 3 Ot,D M rLL RO AD. W VOMISSthG PA 19410
~
fii 14 1
Q From whom?
2 A
Well, just from the general talk that was going on 3
in the trailers when I arrived on site.
(3 4
Q The next matter I want to address is the possibility LJ 5
of oxygen generation within the reactor vessel head in the 6
hydrogen bubble.
When did you learn about that?
7 A
Again, Saturday morning.
And when I heard of it, 8
I know when I thought about it for e while, based on the 9
experience I had in the Navy and oths pressurized water 10 reactors, I couldn't for the life of me figure how oxygen ij could be generated, because I knew there was required to be 12 an excess of hydrogen in the system to prevent that, to 13 scavenge oxygen and prevent radiolysis from occurring.
tr^s
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')
ja And I remember I relayed that information to every-x' 15 body on the NRC staff whenever I could.
And everyone tended 16 to agree %_th me.
And it seemed that Roger Mattson was the j7 only one who was not convinced that that was still a problem 18 or was not a probic6.
Q Who else did you communicate with?
Could you name 19 s me names.
20 A
Vollmer, Jerry Cling]ar.
That is all -- and some 21 People from IME.
I forget whom.
22
)'
Q Did you also communicate your feeling to anyone in 23 24 the state government?
A I believe I informed the Bureau over the telephone 01:
25 MohsC R ST E NOGR APHIC,g t h yIC E.
1413 OL D MeLL RO A D. WYOMs 951% #
- e 19eto
15 1
my feelings in that direction.
And I know I mentioned it to 2
the Governor on Sunday when we had a mixed meeting.
And I 3
told the state legislators -- I told them my opinion that the r-4 hydrogen bubble presented not that very great risk because of (SJ S
what I had known.about hydrogen overpressure and because there 6
just didn't seem to be a spark source in the reactor vessel.
7 Q
What was the date of that?
8 A
That was Sunday evening.
9 0
Sunday evening.
Were you in touch with any of the 10 Metropolitan Edison people about the hydrogen bubble or the 11 oxygen above the bubble at any time?
12 A
Not in that time frame.
Later I was, after the 13 bubble had dissipated, I was, you know, wondering how they
,'[')
E' 14 felt about the problem, whether it was a real problem or not 13 because, of course, it was the thing that caused all the 16 COasternation over the weekend.
17 And I again communicated with some Met-Ed people to 18 see what their ansehsment was.
39 Q
Was there any reason why you didn' t contact Mot-Ed 20 people prior to that time about the bubble?
A There was no specific reason -- I guess I didn'P.
21 22 have any formal lines of communication with them, any people p
23 in a decision-making status.
I was free to roam in the l
24 Observation Center and look at the readings.
But as far as l
7, anyone in a decision-making capacity, I really wasn't M G Nic e( ev g NoGaeamusc p e seyet 8 14 9 9 OL D M et t feOAD WWyoutst NU Pa 19010 i
16 1
communicating on any regular channel.
2 O
You made no attempt to contact some of your normal 3
contacts in the plant about the plant status at that time?
("T 4
A Well, I was getting enough plant status from being
(/
5 at the trailer, from the information the NRC was receiving.
6 That is how I was getting my information.
7 0
So, you were basically getting your information from 8
NRC people on site?
9 A
-Yes.
10 Q
Rather than --
A Because I was in the trailer where the information jj 12 was coming in.
And I felt at that point it was sufficient 13 frcm Saturday on, when the staff was there, I felt that was r,T tv a sufficient source of information.
14 Q
My last question has to do with the names of your 15 contacts in NRC, and I think you have answered that.
Were 16 37 there any other persons at NRC that you were normally in 18 contact with on site or at Region 1 during the accident?
j9 Well, just about everybody that was there.
I would A
pr bably include almost everybody I was at least talking 20 t
r communicating with because I was just there all the time 21 And people in fact thought I was part of the NRC staff.
That 22 is how I was able to learn a lot of the information at the 23 l
l 24 Incident Response Center on Friday morning.
Q After the first three days, would you tell us what 25 I
uom.cn sur moonsenic senvice, tais oto uitt moao. wvouissimo en seeio
17
/
/
1 you did at the plant?
You were there every day from Saturday 2
on?
3 A
Right.
~}
4 Q
For how many days?
5 A
Oh, for at least a month.
6 Q
At least a month.
What were your hours?
7 A
Typically, 8:00'to 8:00.
8 Q
Eight to 8:007 9
A I would stay later if something were going on of 10 any significance.
11 Q
And that was from Saturday plus 30 days?
12 A
Right about that.
Probably longer.
13 Q
And you maintained communications with your head-
\\'
~
ja quarters by phone?
A Yes.
I would update them probably two or three 15 16 times a day, you know, find out what was going on up there and they would fill me in and I would fill them in.
There 17 18 really wasn't very*Atuch going on after Saturday.
There was a sparcity of new information.
19 MR. CllIN:
Fine.
Are there any other questions?
20 MR. ERNST:
No.
21 MR. IIERR:
No.
22
(.,)
MR. SCIIAMBERGER:
No.
i 23
/
MR. CllIN :
Now, do you want to adjourn the meeting?
24 MR. ERNST:
All right.
I would just want to state 25 J
M ONIC al STf MOGhaPMeC $tisysCt. 9 413 OLD MILL MO AD WYOMISSING. P A 19410 l
18 1
that this does conclude this session.
However, I don' t want 2
to recess the deposition because there may be a time in the 3
future when we might want to ask another question of you.
But n
4 I do want to thank you for your time and effort on behalf of
()
5 rar inquiry, 6
MR. CHIN:
Before we do wind up, is there anything 7
that you want to help us out by commenting on or explaining 8
to us about the accident that would help us in our inquiry 9
as far as a general nature or lessons learned?
10 THE WITNESS:
Well, I guess one of the mainly 11 obvious things that I saw in my dealings with the NRC staff 12 that was on site was that the NRC staff is typically organized f'S 13 to license nuclear power plants.
And because of this -- and
\\>
ja rightfully so -- they are a group with expertise in that area, and quite a few different areas.
But I wasn't totally 15 16 impressed that the group had any full, detailed knowledge of that particular plant.
That was a very big problem.
In fact,I knew more about that plant than anybody 18 19 from NRC from having worked on it.
And it was a big problem.
20 A lot of the problems that did occur, if somebody would have 21 had a detailed knowledge of that plant, they could have been
(~
22 able to better decipher some of the information.
And each V
23 group seemed to be making very possimistic findings in their 24 cach individual area.
And the NRC staff has been known to do that.
And it caused a lot of problems.
25 uo% cn straoceae ue senwicc. sets oto uitt nomo. wrouissimo. en sesso
19 1
MR. Cl!IN:
Finc.
Anything else, Mr. Dornsife?
2 TIIE WITNESS:
I can't think of anything else.
I 3
have a lot of other comments --
4 MR. CIIIN :
Well, feel free --
5 Again, we want to thank you very much.
The meeting 6
is adjourned.
7 (Thereupon, the deposition of Mr. Dornsife was 8
rccessed.)
)
9 10 CERTIFICATE 11 I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence 12 are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me ex 13 on the hearing of the foregoing cause, and that this copy is
(*'t ja a correct transcript of the same.
15 16
& /4.43 Na,ncy O'N +11-Reusing, Reporter g d
j7 Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 18 MONICK STENOGRAPilIC SERVICE 19 My commission expires December 13, 1982.
20
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P00RORCNAL 73 22
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