ML19322C693

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Forwards Summary of Understanding of Completeness of B&W Nuclear Power Plant Simulator in Response to . Notifies That Facility to Be Visited on 720327 to Conduct Examinations of Most Recent Trainees
ML19322C693
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 03/07/1971
From: Collins P
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Deddens J
BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001200013
Download: ML19322C693 (7)


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I Babcock 4 Wilcox ATTN: lir. James C. Deddens Manager, Nuclear Service Power Generation Division P. O. Box 1260 g

Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 H

Centlemen*

I.

This is in reply to your letter, dated December 13, 1971 regarding i

the acceptance 'f the BT.W Nuclear Power Plant Simulator.

As you know, t > aave never evaluated a NPPS as an entity, but only as part of an overall training program leading to an individual j

l establishing cold eligibility pursuant to Section 55.25(b) of 10 CFR Part 55.

Based on our understanding of the completeness of the simulator, we have determined that its use is acceptable in a training program outlined in our letter to you, dated December 16, 1968.

Enclosed is a copy of a sma==ry of our understanding of the com-f pleteness of the E&W NPPS.

Mr. Burney and I will visit your facility on March 27, 1972 to conduct exarninations of your most recent trainees, f

At that tima I would like to discuss the above - ary and the methods employed by your staff to evaluate the trainees.

1 Sincerely, ORIGINAL ClGNED BY P. F. COLLINS

. Paul F. Collins, Chief i

Operator Licensing Branch Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosure:

Summary - B&W FTPS 8001200Ol3

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B&W SDJIILATOR I.

Major Systems and Components _

The following systems are simulated in detail, giving ON/OFF and variable changes of parameters with the corresponding A.

plant response.

l 1.

Reactor Core i

2.

Primary Coolant System Reactor Coolant Pumps and Seal System a.

b.

Letdown and Makeup 1

Pressurizer c.

i d.

Boration/Deboration 3.

Secondary Systems Steam Generators a.

i b.

Turbine - Generator I

I Condensate /Feedwater i

c.

d.

Feedwater Heaters E=crgency Feedwater e.

Steam Bypass and Reliefs f.

Main Condenser g.

h.

Condenser C'rculating Water i.

Cooling Towers 4.

ECCS Systems High Pressure Injection a.

Low Pressure Injection b.

Core Flood Tr.nks c.

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C,ontainment. Ventilation s

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Reactor Building Spray I

f.

Recirculation Capability 5.

Instrumentation & Control Integrated Control System (Includes Reactor, a.

Steam Generaters, Turbine),

b.

Ex-core Nuclear Instrumentation - Console display only.

c.

Turbine - Generator d.

Primary and Secondary parameters, including Operator selected displays and control inputs for multiple detectors.

6.

Electrical Systems 1

a.

230 KV Switchyard b.

Unit Auxiliary, Main and Startup Transformers.

c.

6900V busses d.

4160V busses c.

480V busses

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f.

Diesel Generators i

II.

The following items are areas of possible weakness in the 35W

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Simulation:

i A.

Plant Computer - The on-line computer will be used as an

-operational aid only.

Its program is being improved but it is presently limited to operator call-up of selected parameters.

It does not monitor all. sensers of a parameter thich has several sensers (such as pressi rizer _ level) and vill therefore not give cn alarm if a non-controlling senser fails.

There are no plans at present to use the computer for calculations such as reactivity balance or. flux mapping.

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In-Core Nuclear Instrumentation _ - A recorder logs the in-core I

Inere are no back panels or detailed instrumentation B.

l outputs.

is not used in the B&W trcining program The instructor can enter a " Xenon Oscillction" It for this system.

to any extent.

the in-core readout but since this condition which will effect is is no longer considered a problem on the B6W reactor, it The in-cores will not not stressed during operator training.

respond to a flux perturbation such as would be expected from a malpositioned or dropped control rod.

Ex-Core Nuclear Instrumentation _ - All three channels of nuclear There is no control C.

instrumentation are simulated in detail.however, other than console mete One complete power range, channel has been installed in a class-room equipment, Some consideration is being given to room for demonstration. tinto the control room and including it naving this equipment in the simulation.

2 Area and Process Radiation Monitoring - Simulation is limited D.

to the following:

Reactor Building High Radiation i

1.

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2.

Air Ejector Activity i

l These annunciators will accompany a casualty which causes high j

There is no breakdown for radiation in these specific areas.

Tne operator must resuest particulate or gaseous activity. additional information from the instru magnitude and type of radiation problem.

v Auxilicry Systecs - The following is a breakdown of auxiliary J

systems at the Rancho Seco (SMUD) reactor and the extent to E.

d which they are programmed at the B&'d Simalator.

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Nuclear Service Cooling Water & Nuclear Service Raw Water -

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Pumps ON/0FF will 1.

No heat balance effect is simulated.

cause immediate temperature alarms on components cooled by p

L the systems if all redundant pumps are stopped.

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o Connonent Cooling Water - Loss of CCW will not cause tem-f perature alarms on the components (CRD's, RCP's 2.

cooled.

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l the CCW is operating.

One exception is the Letcc.7n Heat i

Exchanger for which the heat balance is simulated.

Loss

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of CCW to this component will cause increasing letdown temperature and eventual isolation of letdown.

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3.

Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water - Te:perature alarms i

of associated components cooled by this system are triggered by the OFF position of the pumps.

4 Decay Heat Removal - This system also serves an ESF function and is simulated in greater detail than other acriliary systems. Flows, temperatures, pressures, and heat balances are programmed.

5.

Suoervisory Panels - Several culti-point recorders are installed to monitor various secondary and primary param-eters. These are usually not control signals, but rather give the operator additional information to help evaluate plant condition and suspected abnormalities.

Some attes;,t is mada at simulation but the response is only a grcss representation. For example, the turbine supervisory panel is related to turbine speed. The recorder values will be those normal for the turbine speed and don't reflect changes in lubricating or cooling subtyster.s.

6.

Diesel Genarators - The diesel generaters are simulated to start and load as at the actual reactor plant.

Casualties such as trip or failure to start can be simulated. However, they are assumed to handle all loads on the energency busses and will not show effects of being i properly loaded.

Neither can the effects of malfunctions in suppor: systems, such as cooling and lubrication, be simulated.

In none of the closed cooling water systems considered above are corponents other than pumps and heat exchangers simulated.

j simulated.

i Surge tanks, makeup and radiation monitors are not Provisions are not made to demonstrate leakage from the systems. Leakage from the letdoun heat exchange into com-ponent ecoling can be simulated but only to the extent of the effects of such leakage on the Primary Coolant System.

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e III. The capability of the BiU Sinularor to denonstrate casualty con-ditions and trcasients of the Rancho Seco (S'!UL) reactor was studied by conparing known simulator characteristics with the FSAR Safety Analysis of Rancho Seco.

A.

Transients Considered In The Rancho Seco Safety Analysis 1.

Core and Coolant Boundry Protection Analysis a.

Uncompensated Operating Reactivity Changes j

(1) Boric Acid Depletion (2) Xenon Trcnsients b.

Stcrtup Accident (Continuous Rod Withdrawal from c Suberitical Condition),

c.

Rod Withdrawl Accident at Rated Power Operation d.

Moderator Dilution Accident i

e.

Cold Water Accident (Startup of Both Pumps in an j

Idle Loop),

i f.

Loss of Coolant Flow i

g.

Stuck-Out, Stuck-In, or Dropped Control Rod Accident.

h.

Loss of E.ectric Power j

2.

Standby Safegucrds Analysis (Accidents in iTaich Cne or ': ore l

of the Protectiu Barriers are not Effective and Standby Safeguards cre Recuired) c.

Stea=line Failure b.

Steam Generator Tube Failure c.

Fuel Ecndling Accident d.

Control Rod Ejection 3.ccident e.

Loss of Coolant Accident f.

Letdown Line Rupture i

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Siculctor Canability The 3&W Simulator can deconstrate the plant response to all of the above accidents and transients with the follcuing 1.

e::ceptions:

Loss of Coolant Flow - Full simulation cf all cc=bi-Tne nations of Reactor Coolant pump trips is provided.

a.

locked rotor accident, with the resultant loss of flow coastdown, is not simulated.

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Fuel handling Accident - This accident b.

of simulation.

and equipment outsice 3&N's scopt

- Not Sinulated.

Control Rod E'ection Accident c.

e Letdoun Line Ruoture_ - The Sa. ty t.nar;e:.s cons;aers a d.

rupture of the letdown line cutside of the containment due to the radiological consecuences cf the spilled The accident is ternincted t: hen the lech j

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coolant.

causes primary pressure to decrease to 1600psig, giving ht isolation.

a high pressure injection signal and containnent i

The simulator can demonstrate c leak in the letdcten line

Response

but the break is inside the reactor building.

is the sane as thct considered in of the reactor plant Additionally, the effects of leckage on the FSAR.

reactor building pressure and tenperature are simulated.

The reacter plant simulction is by no means restricted to the above i

There are 102 " defined" =cifunctions - those which can be A wide variety i

transients.

originated by.he simulator instructor frc= his console.of tran systems can be demonstrated at the B&W siculator.

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